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How does threat perception change how states use foreign aid? The conventional 
wisdom is that donor countries provide aid to serve their commercial interest, security interests 
or to promote their normative values.  But under what conditions do commercial, security, or 
normative interests dominate a donor countries aid giving decisions?  This dissertation tests the 
proposition that the level of threat perception determines when donor countries use foreign aid 
to promote their commercial or security interests. Under high threat conditions, I expect donors 
to emphasize security interests. During low threat periods, I expect donors to emphasize 
commercial interests in their aid giving. I expect normative factors to be important when 
humanitarian crises occur but unimportant otherwise.  
  
Based on a detailed analysis of Japan and China’s aid commitments and an assessment 
of each countries level of threat perception, I test the explanatory power of commercial, security 
and normative factors on aid commitment decisions.  This research uses a bespoke data set 
based on a mix of primary research, existing sources, and newly available project level data 
collected by Aiddata.org on China’s worldwide aid activities from 2000-2014, which was 
manually adjusted specifically for this dissertation.  The regression analysis is augmented by 
case studies on the motivations behind Japan’s and China’s aid commitments to the Philippines 
and Cambodia from the late 1990s to 2014.  
 
This dissertation finds that, despite its reputation for utilizing aid for its own commercial 
benefit, aid from Japan is highly security oriented when Japan has high level of threat 





did commercial factors explain Japan’s aid. Even during the low threat period, security factors 
were a significant consideration in Japan’s aid commitment decisions. As Japan’s threat 
perception of China increased, commercial factors became nearly irrelevant in Japan’s aid 
decisions and Japanese aid became increasingly integrated with United States security interests.  
Aid from China has been primarily security oriented over the entire period for which data is 
available (2000-2014) reflecting its elevated threat perception from the United States-Japan 
alliance when the 1997 revision of the Guidelines for United States Japan-Defense Cooperation 
were perceived as targeting and containing China.  In the early period for which data is available 
(2000-2007), China’s aid reflected its “charm offensive” strategy to reassure other Asian 
countries of its intentions, but from 2008 onward became increasingly punitive against other 
Asian states that had conflicts with China.  Over the entire analysis period, China’s aid was 
targeted at weakening the aid recipient’s relations with the United States, countering United 
States interests, and has repeatedly been used to counter aid sanctions by Western donors.  
Overall, security factors have been the most important determinants of Japan and China’s aid 
decisions. 
 
This dissertation enriches our understanding of the motivations behind aid giving and 
helps explain the factors that are driving the “securitization” of foreign aid that has coincided 
with China’s rise.  The increase in aid from emerging powers has expanded the number of 
donors and the resources available to aid recipient countries while at the same time reducing 
the leverage of donors over the policies of aid recipients.  Recipient countries can increasingly 
pit donor against donor to maximize the development resources available to them while 








Looking across a large wooden table on a bright sunny day in August 2011 in 
Ulaanbaatar Mongolia, I see a man with too much to do and not enough time.  The Deputy 
Director General of the Development Financing and Cooperation Department of the Mongolian 
Ministry of Finance is anxious to wrap up this meeting and rush to his next one with the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Today we finalized the proposal for the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) to provide $170 million to complete the Western Regional Road, a 
750 km rural highway between Russia and China through Western Mongolia, but the Mongolia 
Government has much more on its plate. 
 
For the Mongolian government, this year had become a non-stop series of meetings with 
international financial institutions like ADB and bi-lateral aid donors, all seeking to finance 
project after project in the booming country.  This was my third year working in Mongolia for 
ADB1 and there had never been this much donor activity and what felt like pitched competition 
for the government’s attention.  JICA was offering grant aid for a bridge in Ulaanbaatar and a 
concessional loan package for the new Ulaanbaatar International Airport. While both projects 
had been in the planning phase for several years, JICA was pushing to conclude these aid 
projects with renewed fervor.  Also in 2011, China and Mongolia signed a comprehensive 
strategic partnership complete with an offer of $500 million worth of soft loans for Mongolia’s 
infrastructure projects.2  What was going on? 
                                                 
1 The author is (as of 2019) the Unit Head, Project Administration in the Asian Development Bank’s Resident 
Mission in the Kyrgyz Republic.  He was previously a Senior Transport Economist at the Asian Development 
Bank. He has helped plan and manage concessional loan and grant financed infrastructure projects in China, 
Mongolia, the Kyrgyz Republic, India, and Myanmar. 
2 Abanti Bhattacharya, “China and Mongolia: Realizing a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’,” Institute for 






The previous fall (September 2010), the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) arrested and detained 
the Chinese crew of a fishing vessel that had collided with JCG vessels near Japan’s Senkaku 
Islands which are claimed by China (and Taiwan).3 In retaliation, China blocked rare earth 
mineral exports to Japan; a vital commodity in many electronics products produced in Japan 
and over which China held a near monopoly over the supply.4 While the export ban was lifted 
about a month later, the point had been made. China could make Japan pay in a conflict over 
its islands because Japan was dependent on China for certain basic materials. But what does 
this have to do with aid to Mongolia? For starters, Mongolia is one potential source of rare earth 
minerals among a vast array of other resources including coking coal (used for steel production), 
oil, nickel, and copper.  Mongolia is also a tiny country of 3 million people between Russia and 
China with a strong historical distrust of China.  Chinese nationals have been occasional victims 
of random physical attacks by Mongolians5 and severe limits were placed on the importation 
of Chinese labor causing difficulties for ADB’s own projects in Mongolia which utilized 
Chinese contractors.  If Japan was looking for a country motivated to align itself with Japan’s 
interests over China, Mongolia was a good choice with the side benefit of potentially providing 
resources that Japan and China need. 
 
At ADB, we often find ourselves working with other development partners including 
bi-lateral donors like Japan and China.  But often the larger forces of international politics that 
drive these partners to provide aid in the first place are opaque.  The ADB-financed Western 
                                                 
3 Tania Branigan, “China cuts Japan contacts over detained trawler captain.” The Guardian, 19 September 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/19/china-japan-contacts-detained-trawler-captain. 
4 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan.” The New York Times, 22 September 
2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html.  






Regional Road project was partially financed by Chinese soft loans in different sections.  The 
Japanese government provided grant funds, through the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction 
(JFPR) to build local connector roads as part of ADB’s project.  Three donors all appearing to 
work together to build one project, but did this reflect cooperation, competition, or just a 
coincidence?   
 
Growing international tensions and competition for resources seemed to drive 
increasing aid commitments from China and Japan.  It seemed that Japan and China were 
allocating more aid to strategically important countries, but is there quantitative evidence for 
this?  Could aid be an effective tool to improve international relations between donor and 
recipient or drive two countries apart? These are the questions that inspired this dissertation.  
China is rapidly rising in power; a transition which Japan and the United States may perceive 
as a threat.  At the same time, all major powers in Asia have been rapidly scaling up foreign aid 
commitments.  In this dissertation, I seek to unravel the motivations that drive foreign aid of 












1.1 The research question 
The overall research question is: How have the motivations behind China’s and Japan’s 
aid commitments changed as their level of threat perception has increased?  This dissertation 
will attempt to show how threat perception in China and Japan has changed over time, show 
how threat perception is related to China’s rise, and explain how China and Japan have altered 
their foreign aid programs as a result.  I will try to answer questions like: What factors explain 
the rapid growth of China and Japan’s foreign aid programs since the beginning of the 
millennium? Has increasing threat perception changed where, why and how much foreign aid 
is committed by China and Japan?  Does China seek to counter United States and Japanese 
interests with its aid program and if so, how does it do so?  Does Japan use its aid program to 
support United States security interests? To what extent do normative values (e.g. support for 
poverty reduction, democracy, human rights, and recovery and reconstruction after disasters) 
affect the aid commitments of Japan and China?  Does China use its aid program to secure 
natural resources for itself?  Does Chinese aid support despotic regimes and undermine 
democracy and good governance?   
 
Emerging powers are establishing or expanding their foreign aid programs at a rapid 
rate. Existing donors often perceive aid from emerging donors as a challenge to their interests 
and values. However, lack of data from emerging donors, conflation of foreign aid and foreign 
investment, and different understandings of the purpose of foreign aid has led to misperception 
and mutual distrust among donors, confusion in public discourse, and a lack of understanding 
among recipients.  As China has risen to be the second largest economy in the world, escalated 




as a threat to its security and economic interests6 and appears to interpret China’s burgeoning 
foreign aid program as a signal of its intention to displace Japan politically and strategically as 
well as economically.7  
 
Japan has been one of the largest foreign aid donors in the world for decades and its aid 
program has long been thought of as an extension of Japan’s commercial policy.  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA)8 was seen as an investment in both Japan’s economy and that 
of the recipient country.9 ODA was considered part of Japan’s economic strategy, including 
Japan’s commercial interests.10  Many scholars find that China’s modern approach to foreign 
aid resembles Japan’s ODA practices beginning in the 1970s including its commercial 
orientation. 11  Others perceive a threatening edge to China’s aid as a challenge to Western 
values12 or a tool for capturing resources from developing countries.13 
 
1.2 Why is this important? 
This dissertation is important for three reasons.  First, it is important because it addresses 
an under-explored pathway for both transmitting and perceiving threats between the two most 
important countries in Asia.  If rapid increases in aid from China is perceived as threatening, 
                                                 
6 Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, “The Rise of ‘China Threat’ Arguments,” PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2006. 
7 Masayuki Masuda, "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China", China Perspectives, Vol. 47 (May-June 
2003), 4-5. 
8 In this dissertation ODA and foreign aid are generally interchangeable.  China does not officially provide ODA, 
so I attempt to limit the description of China’s aid activities to foreign aid. However, the literature on foreign aid 
freely refer to China’s foreign aid as ODA and certain citations and quotes include references to Chinese ODA.   
9 Robert M. Orr and Bruce Koppel, ed., “A Donor of Consequence: Japan as a Foreign Aid Power,” in Japan's 
Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 1-18. 
10 Dennis Yasutomo, “Why Aid? Japan as an aid great power,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Winter 1989-1990), 
490-503. 
11 Ping Wang, "The Chinese View: Reflection of the Long-Term Experiences of Aid Receiving and Giving," in ed. 
Yasutami Shimomura and Hideao Ohashi, A Study of China's Foreign Aid: An Asian Perspective (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 130. 
12 Moises Naim, "Rogue Aid," Foreign Policy, Vol. 159 (March/April 2007), 95-6. 
13 Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the 




Japan may increasingly use its foreign aid to balance against China and compete for influence.  
China may then respond in kind potentially contributing to security competition and distrust, 
eventually escalating any conflicts.   
 
Second, this dissertation will enhance the general understanding of the purpose and use 
of foreign aid during times of escalating threats. The stated purpose of foreign aid is normally 
altruistic, peaceful and cooperative, but the actual purpose may not be clear from the discourse 
surrounding foreign aid. This disconnect between discourse and actual intent makes changes in 
foreign aid policy difficult to discern.  Realists view foreign aid as an extension of security 
policy and interpret aid giving as tool for alliance building and balancing against threats. 
Liberals tend to view foreign aid as a commercial strategy to promote trade, investment and 
interdependence or to promote the development of international institutions and global values. 
Each of these interpretations may be correct under different conditions.  This dissertation 
attempts explain the conditions under which foreign aid is allocated for security vs. the 
promotion of commercial interests based on changes in the level of threat perception of the 
donor. 
 
Third, this dissertation seeks to unravel the motivations behind China’s burgeoning 
foreign aid program.  China publishes aggregate statistics about its aid budgets but does not 
clearly define how its aid program is distinguished from other types of economic cooperation.  
Further, specific aid commitments to countries are a state secret so, contrary to OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members like Japan, there are no official data on 
how much foreign aid China gives to any specific country.  Lack of data on China’s aid 
commitments has led to varying interpretations of China’s intentions.  Unsurprisingly, realists 




to grab developing country resources for itself, counter Western values and challenge the 
international system.  Liberals tend to be more sanguine and assert that China’s aid program is 
reasonable consequence of its attempts to promote its commercial or diplomatic interests, just 
like other donors.  This dissertation makes use of a new data set on China’s worldwide aid 
activities from Aiddata.org released in late 2017.  I manually modified this dataset, developing 
a bespoke database of Chinese financed grant and concessional loan aid tailored to the purposes 
of this dissertation.  This new dataset enables me to determine the motivations behind China’s 
aid commitments and will illuminate whether the more negative realist interpretation or the 
more sanguine liberal interpretation of Chinese aid comports with reality.   
 
1.3 The argument 
This dissertation proposes a framework for understanding foreign aid that attempts to 
bridge realist and liberal ideas about the role of foreign aid.  I accept that foreign aid is allocated 
for security purposes (alliance building, countering security threats, bribery, etc…), commercial 
purposes (trade, export promotion, securing natural resources), and to promote normative 
values (humanitarian aid, poverty reduction, human rights) but states pursue these purposes to 
different degrees at different times depending on the security environment measured by threat 
perception. They may even pursue these all three goals simultaneously or pursue different goals 
in different regions. While accepting the multiplicity of aid purposes, I expect that higher threat 
perception will result in a measurable difference in the importance of security factors in 
explaining who gets aid and how much.  
 
The dependent variable (DV) is foreign aid commitments. The condition variable (CV) 
is threat perception.  The independent variables (IVs) include security variables, commercial 




threat are more likely to prioritize realist concerns and allocate foreign aid to balance against 
and contain security threats. States without substantial security concerns are more likely to use 
their aid to provide commercial or reputational benefits more consistent with liberal predictions.  
States may also use foreign aid to promote their normative values. Humanitarian aid is given to 
states that are victims of natural or man-made disasters for short to medium term recovery and 
reconstruction and aid may promote the welfare of the recipient. I expect that states that feel 
threatened are less likely to consider normative values in their aid giving.   
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, foreign aid follows the definition of the OECD DAC.  
The DAC defines foreign aid as flows to countries on the DAC list of ODA recipients that is 1) 
intended to promote economic development and welfare in the recipient as is “main” purpose, 
and 2) is concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent.14  To analyze aid 
decision-making, foreign aid commitments are the preferred measure over aid disbursements.  
Aid commitments are defined by the OECD DAC as: “A firm obligation, expressed in writing 
and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified 
assistance to a recipient country….Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of 
expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements.”15  
Disbursements are the actual budgetary outlays in the year they were expended and can occur 
well after the aid commitment was made. 
 
By commercially oriented aid, I mean that the main purpose of the donor in making the 
aid commitment is to benefit the donor state’s commercial enterprises.  By security-oriented 
                                                 
14 OECD, "Is it ODA?," Development Assistance Committee, Factsheet (November 2008), 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf.  





aid, I mean that the main purpose of the donor in making the aid commitment is to improve the 
national security of the donor.  By normative aid, I mean that the main purpose of the donor in 
making the aid commitment is to benefit the recipient or express the norms and values of the 
donor country.   
 
I define “threat” as a danger to a nation that originates from another nation involving a 
military aspect. “Threat perception” is the perception of that danger.  I attempt to measure threat 
perception based primarily on the discourse of political leaders and security agencies in the 
perceiving countries and augment that analysis with measures of the proliferation of threat 
arguments in the media and overall public opinion.  The measurement of threat perception is 
described in detail in Chapter 4.4. 
 
The main hypothesis is that Japan and China’s foreign aid increasingly reflects 
security interests due to increased threat perception precipitated by the rise of China.  This 
hypothesis is tested by developing models of aid giving behavior based on the proposed 
theoretical framework. First, the level and source of threat perception of China and Japan are 
estimated. China's rapidly increasing power and aid programs may be interpreted by Japan as a 
strategic challenge and potential security threat. Japan is expected to respond by, first scaling 
back its own aid to China and using aid to bolster potential allies to balance against China. 
China is primarily threatened by the United States and the United States-Japan security alliance 
which China interprets as targeting China.16  China’s increasing threat perception may then 
compel it to target its own aid program towards security goals.  
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The main alternative hypotheses are: 
1) There is no change in the use of foreign aid for Japan and China. Japan and China 
continue to focus on commercial goals in their aid allocations. Under this hypothesis, 
the perceived threats are insufficient to change Japan and China’s aid policy. 
2) China and Japan do not allocate aid in a manner consistent with the proposed theory. 
Aid from China and Japan could be given for altruistic reasons (e.g. responds to the 
needs of the recipient rather than the donor – i.e. poorer states receive more aid all else 
being equal), to express national norms, or to indicate status. If neither commercial nor 
security factors explain aid allocations, then altruism, norms, and status would become 
the default explanations and the theory disproved. 
 
The causal mechanism that links threat perception and the allocation of aid is derived 
from the assumption that when states perceive a significant threat to their security, it is logical 
that they prioritize survival and security above all other considerations.  The policy tools at their 
disposal to promote security include defense, diplomacy, and foreign aid, among others. The 
level of threat perception of decision-makers and political leaders leads them to prioritize 
security considerations in their aid decisions. The link between threat perception and aid 
decisions may vary, but in most countries, high-level decision-making bodies and political 
leaders have ultimate authority over aid budgets and country allocations.  I claim that threat 
perception is like a “cloud” that affects all of the actors with influence on aid allocation 
decisions and empowers those actors active in national security.  For example, when military 
forces are dispatched to a foreign state (war, UN peacekeeping missions, etc…), the aid 
bureaucracy is likely to be tasked with promoting stability in that state with higher aid 
allocations. The coordination of aid and security policy was evident for the United States where 




when Syria became the largest recipient; all countries with substantial United States military 
operations.17 Following Walt, I propose that states that are threatened may seek allies and 
balance against the threatening state.18  If a state seeks to balance against a threat, political 
leaders will respond by directing the transfer of resources, including aid, to states in conflict 
with or that are likely to join a balancing coalition against the threatening state.  State visits by 
leader that perceive significant security threats may be based on security considerations.  These 
visits by threatened donors to developing countries may then be accompanied by aid 
commitments to the host to secure policy actions that benefit the security of the donor.  This 
logic underpinning the hypothesis suggests that during high threat periods security variables 
will be more significant than all other consideration in the aid commitment decision.  
 
When a country perceives no significant threat to its security, it is more likely to 
prioritize economic and social development above other concerns more consistent with the 
predictions of liberalism.  Under low threat conditions, I expect the “cloud” of threat perception 
to lift and economic policy makers to gain bureaucratic power in relation to the national security 
establishment.  Economic arguments around employment and economic competitiveness may 
even begin to dominate debates about military spending.  Under these conditions, I predict that 
decision-makers and political leaders will use the policy instruments at their disposal, including 
foreign aid, to promote economic wellbeing and domestic commercial interests.  Rather than 
seek alliances, states will seek markets and investment opportunities.  Leaders may begin to 
prioritize state visits to countries where commercial interests are strong and seek to promote 
                                                 
17 Source: United States Agency for International Development. 
18 The idea that states balance against threats rather than power is provided in Stephen Walt, "Alliance formation 
and the balance of world power," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), 3-43. Many aid donors, 
including Japan and China, are great powers which would be unlikely to bandwagon with the threatening state 




expanding business ties rather than security ties. Under this logic, low threat periods will be 
characterized by a higher significance of commercial variables in aid commitment decisions. 
 
In addition to the core research question and hypotheses, this dissertation addresses 
many other questions and puzzles in the foreign aid and international relations literature.  With 
respect to Japan’s aid program, I explore the extent to which Japanese aid has become 
“securitized” as Jain19, Carvalho and Potter20, and Yoshimatsu and Trinidad21 have asserted and 
to what extent Japan has used its aid policy to as a complement to its role in the United States-
Japan alliance. I also look at the role of normative values in Japan’s aid decision-making.  With 
the publication of Japan’s first Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in 1992, the 
discourse around foreign aid in Japan began to change and increasingly reflects humanitarian 
and democratic norms (more recently called “human security”) in addition to a focus on 
commercial benefits.22 But is this increasing concern with humanitarian and democratic norms 
at the societal level reflected in a greater emphasis on normative factors in Japan’s aid 
commitment decisions? This dissertation will answer these questions. 
 
As China’s aid program has expanded in scope and ambition, many observers see 
Chinese aid as a threat to the Western led international system.23 Others see either a aid program 
that is essentially political and aid motivations are largely the same as most established aid 
                                                 
19 Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old and New Contests.” Pacific Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2016), 93–113. 
20 Pedro Carvalho and David M. Potter, “Peacebuilding and the ‘Human Securitization’ of Japan’s Foreign Aid,” in 
S. Brown and J. Gravingholt, eds., The Securitization of Foreign Aid, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2016), 85–
112. 
21 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu and Dennis D. Trinidad, “Development Assistance, Strategic Interests, and the China 
Factor in Japan’s Role in ASEAN Integration.” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 2 (August 
2010), 199–219. 
22 Keiko Hirata, “Whither the Developmental State? The Growing Role of NGOs in Japanese Aid Policymaking.” 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2002), 165–188. 
23 Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs, “Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China’s Aid Allocation,” Courant Research 




donors or that China’s aid is actually better for aid recipients because it is less paternalistic and 
finances more useful and profitable projects than established donors.24 The availability of a 
complete dataset of Chinese foreign aid worldwide enables this dissertation to test the 
motivations behind China’s aid in a way that had been impossible.  I will be able to determine 
whether China’s aid is security or commercially oriented and whether it is meant to balance 
against the perceived threat posed by the United States.  I can also determine if China’s aid is 
designed to capture resources for itself or support despotic regimes. 
 
The findings of this study also have implications for the effectiveness of aid conditions 
by donors.  In a world where new donors are proliferating and the interests of those donors are 
not necessarily in line with existing donors, will aid conditions become harder to extract?  For 
example, if an aid recipient is able to simply switch from one donor to another to finance its 
investment priorities, donors’ leverage over aid recipients will decline. With more donors 
bringing more aid, recipient countries may also have the opportunity to extract more aid from 
donors while at the same time minimizing the need to give in to policy conditions that are often 
imposed by primarily Western donors. 
 
1.4 The methodology 
The overall methodology of this dissertation is a combination of quantitative analysis 
of aid commitment decisions by Japan and China supplemented by two case studies that detail 
the aid commitments of Japan and China to two key countries: the Philippines and Cambodia.  
The first part of the dissertation presents key definitions and details about how foreign aid 
developed and functions in practice and describes how the international relations literature has 
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dealt with foreign aid.  Next, I present a theoretical framework for understanding foreign aid.  
The core hypothesis and predictions are presented based on the proposed theoretical framework. 
I then present an overview of the historical development of Japan’s and China’s foreign aid 
programs and review the literature on foreign aid from these donors with a particular emphasis 
on past quantitative studies of Japanese and Chinese aid motivation.  The purpose of these 
sections is to ensure that the reader understands how this dissertation contributes to an overall 
understanding of foreign aid practice, to identify useful variables that can explain aid 
commitments, and to show how this study contributes to and advances the existing literature on 
Japanese and Chinese foreign aid. 
 
In order the conduct a quantitative analysis, I developed a panel dataset of aid 
commitments and a large set of explanatory variables based on the theory. The dataset contains 
detailed information on the aid commitments of Japan and China to specific recipient countries 
(DVs) and numerous security, commercial and normative variables (IVs).  Regression models 
are developed to estimate the explanatory power of security, commercial, and normative factors 
in determining the foreign aid commitments of China and Japan during high and low threat 
periods.  
 
The Philippines and Cambodia were chosen for supplementary case studies because 
they best illustrate the statistically significant variables in the regression models.  The overall 
findings of the quantitative models and the case studies combine to provide a rich picture of the 
motivations of Japan and China in their aid commitments over a long period of time and under 
varying levels of perceived threat to their national security. Figure 1-1 on page 12 presents a 





Figure 1-1: Dissertation roadmap 
 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation unfolds over seven chapters. Chapter 2 describes the theoretical 
framework for understanding the purpose of foreign aid and how we should expect foreign aid 
commitments to change when threat perception is high.  This section concludes with hypotheses 
and predictions based on the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 describes how international 
relations theory has treated the issue of foreign aid and provides an overview of the 
development and main characteristics of Japan’s and China’s aid programs.  In Chapter 4, I 
present the dependent and independent variables and describe the methodology that I will use 
to test the hypotheses and provide an overview and justification for the research design.  
Chapter 5 contains the quantitative regression analysis and Chapter 6, the case studies.  Chapter 
7 is the conclusion.  I provide substantial detail on technical and methodological matters, data 







2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK25 
In this section I attempt to establish a coherent framework for understanding foreign aid 
as a policy tool. This theoretical framework forms the basis of the regression analysis that forms 
the heart of this dissertation and guides the interpretation of actions and motivations in the case 
studies. The theory should help answer the following questions: When is aid provided for 
security and when is it commercial? Does aid have normative motivations? How can we tell 
the difference? Without a framework for understanding aid, certain aid allocations could be 
misinterpreted. We need to look at aid through different theoretical lenses depending on the 
conditions we observe but avoid attempting to explain every nuance or allocation of aid giving 
behavior. 
 
The theoretical framework provides a roadmap to explain what is going on when donors 
provide foreign aid and allows us to infer donor intent to foreign aid policy and allocations.  
The framework should be able to establish the purpose and likely allocation of foreign aid by 
key donors and help clarify whether or not aid is or is likely to be commercial, security, or 
normative in nature. Commercial or normative aid should not be perceived as threatening while 
security oriented aid may be threatening to other donors if national interests are highly divergent 
between donors. For example, if Chinese foreign aid is meant to promote authoritarian regimes 
to give itself legitimacy or facilitate access to the recipient state by the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) or Navy (PLAN), that aid may appear threatening to other donors. But if Chinese 
aid is primarily to give foreign work to Chinese construction companies, promote Chinese 
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exports, or assist in disaster recovery, then its aid should not be interpreted as a security threat 
to other donors.  
 
2.1 What is foreign aid? 
For the purpose of this dissertation, foreign aid or Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) follows the definition of the OECD DAC.  It does not include military aid.  Military aid 
is security assistance from on state to another and its purpose is not in question. Foreign aid is 
either grant aid or concessional loan aid from a donor country to a developing country whose 
purpose is the development and welfare of the recipient.  Japan follows the DAC definition of 
ODA. The DAC collects comprehensive data from all its members26 on their aid activities and 
publishes project level data on every donor project to every recipient country.  China is not in 
the DAC and its aid does not have to meet this definition though I apply a similar framework 
designed to determine if the recipient and China would consider the financial flow to be “aid” 
which is consistent with the DAC definition of ODA.   
 
Loan aid comes in various forms that can provide clues to the donor’s intent.  Untied 
loans are generally made for a specific project and do not have any restrictions on the supplier 
or contractors selected to implement the eventual project, though competitive bidding is 
generally required.  Tied loans restrict the borrower to using only contractors from the donor 
country for a certain percentage of the project cost. The percentage that must be reserved from 
donor country contractors is generally 50-100% depending on the donor. The purpose of aid 
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tying is to maximize the commercial benefits to the donor. From the recipient’s perspective, 
tied loans can significantly erode the perceived benefits of even highly concessional lending.  
Generally, tied concessional loans will be a better deal overall than what is available to the 
recipient country using market rate financing. Otherwise, the recipient would simply borrow 
on the international capital markets and implement the project itself. In some cases, when there 
are cost overruns or bids come in higher than expected, tied loans can be detrimental to relations 
between donor and recipient since tying locks recipients into paying higher than market price 
for development projects that, in some cases, would have been procured from local firms in the 
recipient country. For this reason, tied loans are sometimes rejected by potential recipients if 
the terms are not sufficiently beneficial.  Tied loans may indicate that the donor is prioritizing 
commercial benefits over political influence on the recipient. 
 
Bi-lateral grants can include project grant aid, or more commonly, technical assistance. 
Most grants are tied to donor suppliers and contractors. They may also be given in the form of 
grants in-kind such as food aid. Bi-lateral grants are usually much smaller than loan projects 
meant to finance infrastructure and generally fund technical assistance, studies and consulting, 
or smaller projects often for education or health. Bi-lateral grants are tied primarily to reduce 
the donor’s cost and improve the political viability of providing them.  For example, it is much 
easier politically for a donor to offer food aid directly procured in the donor country than to 
provide a free grant for the recipient to buy food on the open market.  
 
Last are untied grants which are rare in the world of bi-lateral aid. Some small donors, 
primarily Scandinavian countries, provide untied grants, but most of this funding is only 




Development Bank and the World Bank and financed by donor trust funds. Only bi-lateral aid 
is included as foreign aid in this dissertation.  
 
2.1.1 When did aid begin? 
Giving state resources to another state is a relatively recent phenomenon stemming from 
the destruction of WWII. First, the aftermath of that war was characterized by economic and 
humanitarian devastation across Europe and Asia. Second, the Cold War between the United 
States-led Western Bloc organized under NATO and the Soviet Union-led Eastern Bloc 
organized under the Warsaw Pact military alliance began to vigorously compete for influence 
and advantage. And Third, the decolonization movement in Africa and Asia quickly gathered 
force resulting in a great number of newly independent and very poor countries historically 
dependent on a more developed colonizer.  These three events compelled most developed 
countries to transfer substantial resources to developing or recovering states. 
 
The Marshall Plan (1948-1951) is considered the beginning of modern foreign aid 
programs. It provided about $13 billion27 to European countries before it was replaced by the 
Mutual Security Act of 195128 which channeled over $7 billion per year to United States allies 
explicitly to prevent the spread of communism. The Mutual Security Agency implemented the 
program until 1961 when it was replaced by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). As its name implies, the Mutual Security Act was designed to 
strengthen countries within the United States sphere of influence to promote the security 
interests of the United States.  
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Asia did not receive the same level of assistance enjoyed by Europe, but the 
establishment of the Colombo Plan heralded to beginning of a concerted effort to provide aid 
to South and Southeast Asia. The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in 
South and Southeast Asia was established in 1950 by the commonwealth countries of Australia, 
Britain, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, New Zealand and Pakistan but soon joined by 
many other countries including the United States (joined in 1951) and Japan (joined in 1954). 
Like the Marshall Plan, the impetus for the Colombo plan was to combat communism in South 
and Southeast Asia, but it was a multilateral effort rather than an initiative of the United States.  
Though the United States provided the largest contributions, the Colombo Plan sought a 
coordinating role for international assistance rather than directly disbursing funds.  The 
Colombo Plan continues to operate and has focused increasingly on South-South cooperation, 
human resource development and drug abuse prevention.29  
 
The outbreak of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union affected 
how and where foreign aid was allocated.  The United States used its aid program to support 
regimes that would be considered repellent as long as they supported the United States rather 
than the Soviet Union.  Humanitarian factors were secondary and subordinate to the prevention 
of the spread of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). The Soviet Union and China each competed with the “Western” (including 
Japan) donor states for influence and primacy across the developing world. 
 
                                                 




The decolonization movement also had a major effect on the foreign aid programs of 
colonial powers. France and the UK had amassed a large number of colonies spread across the 
world and, by the end of WWII, it became clear that colonization was unsustainable as well as 
morally indefensible. The foreign aid programs of both France and the UK grew out of their 
colonial administration apparatus’s and, at least initially, focused aid primarily on former 
colonies. France established the Ministry of Cooperation in 1959 to manage aid to former 
colonies and provided both technical and military assistance. In the UK, the Ministry of 
Overseas Development was established in 1964. As early as the 1920s, France and the UK 
began systems for investing in and improving the infrastructure in their colonies. 30  The 
institutions established to manage these investment and development programs provided the 
foundation for the foreign aid programs of both countries.  
 
2.1.2 Who gives it? 
Aid is provided by nearly all developed countries and increasing numbers of developing 
countries, many of whom still receive aid themselves. Japan and China each began offering 
foreign aid soon after the end of WWII and each was an aid recipient when their aid programs 
were initiated.  ODA disbursements (net of repayments) of DAC countries are shown in Figure 
2-1 on page 19. Real net ODA disbursements increased by over 300% between the levels that 
prevailed in the 1970s and 2016.  ODA levels rose strongly from the late 1970s and 80s, 
stagnated and declined in the 90s and rose rapidly in the early 2000s and have continued to 
grow through 2016. The United States has been the largest donor for most of this period though 
Japan was the largest donor in 1989 and for several years in the 1990s. Together, the United 
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States, Japan, the UK, France and Germany have accounted for about 70 percent of all DAC 
ODA since the 1970s. 
 
Figure 2-1: Total Net Bi-lateral ODA from DAC Donors by Year and Donor, 1967-2016 




DAC members provide most ODA but their proportion of total aid is shrinking. By 2014 
the OECD estimated that non-DAC gross ODA disbursements reached over $30 billion which 
would account for over 20 percent of all ODA though Saudi Arabia alone was estimated to 
make up close to half of all non-DAC ODA in 2014 (see Table 2-1 on page 20). Further, the 
ODA attributable to China is underestimated.  The estimates of China’s foreign aid used in the 
analysis section of this dissertation, based on a newly available dataset, are substantially higher 




data, issues, and methodology used to compile the dataset are described in Chapter 4.2.2. The 
overall importance of non-DAC ODA is increasing and should continue increasing in future 
years as the economies of major aid providers such as China, India, Turkey, and the major oil 
producers in the Middle East increase in relative economic and political power compared to 
DAC members. 
 
Table 2-1: Total Gross ODA Disbursements, non-DAC donors, 2011-2015 (Current $ millions) 
Donor Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Non-DAC but reporting to OECD voluntarily 
Azerbaijan NA NA NA 16  13  
Bulgaria 48  40  50  49  41  
Croatia NA 21  45  72  51  
Cyprus 38  25  20  19  18  
Estonia 24  23  31  38  34  
Israel 206  181  202  200  233  
Kazakhstan NA NA 8  33  43  
Kuwait 526  482  541  598  632  
Latvia 19  21  24  25  23  
Liechtenstein 31  29  28  27  24  
Lithuania 52  52  50  46  48  
Malta 20  19  18  20  17  
Romania 164  142  134  214  158  
Russia 479  465  714  876  1,161  
Saudi Arabia 5,239  1,436  5,825  13,785  6,979  
Taiwan 381  305  272  274  279  
Thailand 41  30  55  86  79  
Timor-Leste NA NA NA 3  4  
Turkey 1,273  2,533  3,308  3,591  4,169  
United Arab Emirates 796  854  5,493  5,193  4,490  
Non-DAC non-reporting (as estimated by OECD) 
Brazil1 469  411  316  NA NA 
Chile 24  38  44  49  33  
China 2,785  3,123  2,997  3,401  3,113  
Colombia 22  27  42  45  42  
Costa Rica NA NA 21  24  10  
India2 794  1,077  1,223  1,398  1,772  
Indonesia 16  26  49  56  NA 
Mexico 99  203  526  169  NA 
Qatar 733  543  1,344  NA NA 
South Africa2 229  191  191  148  100  
Total Bi-lateral Non-DAC 
ODA Disbursed (Gross) 
14,509  12,297  23,571  30,455  23,567  
Total Bi-lateral DAC ODA 
Disbursed (Gross) 




Non-DAC Share 9.7% 8.8% 15.5% 20.1% 16.5% 
Sources:  OECD/DAC Statistics; oecd.dac/stats for Total ODA figures.  
Estimates for ODA-like flows estimated by OECD from published donor government sources as follows: 
Brazil: Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). 
Chile: Chile Ministry of Finance. 
China: China Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance. 
Columbia: Strategic institutional plans, Presidential Agency of International Cooperation. 
Costa Rica: Annual budget laws, Ministry of Finance. 
India: Annual budget figures, Ministry of Finance. 
Indonesia: Ministry of National Development Planning. 
Mexico: Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID). 
Qatar: Foreign aid reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
South Africa: Estimates of public expenditures, National Treasury. 
See http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/non-dac-reporting.htm for detailed source information. 
 
Most donors, whether established DAC donors or emerging powers, provide all types 
of aid. The United States provides its aid as mostly grants while Japan provides about 50% or 
more of its aid as concessional lending. Emerging donors tend to provide larger proportions of 
their aid as concessional loans while DAC countries tend to offer a larger proportion of grants. 
The proportion of grants within total ODA has been declining (see Figure 2-2 on page 22) in 
recent years and the decline for Japan has been particularly pronounced.  The reason for the 
declining level of grants is unclear but may indicate more limited budgets for aid among DAC 
members or a greater focus on infrastructure or other types of project more appropriate for loan 
financing.  The emergence of China as a donor primarily financing infrastructure has 
highlighted to existing donors the demand by aid recipients for infrastructure.  This may be 





Figure 2-2: Proportion of Grants in Total ODA, 2005-2014 
 
Source: OECD  
 
2.1.3 How does aid work in practice? 
Understanding the role of the donor and the recipient in the aid relationship is necessary 
to interpret and establish donor intent and make sense of the data on aid commitments.  There 
is a wide variety of practices used by donors and recipients to develop aid programs.  Developed 
countries with professionalized aid programs, which includes most DAC members, have 
ongoing country aid programming processes managed by aid agency staff based in recipient 
countries.  Most donors prepare, with the input of recipient countries, a country strategy which 
outlines the main areas of assistance that the donor will target its assistance towards.  These 
country strategies usually cover multiple years, describe the development needs of the country, 
specify the areas where the donor will assist the recipient, and describe how the assistance will 
support the recipient’s development.  Country strategies are prepared by both bi-lateral and 





Based on these country strategies, donor country staff based in the recipient country will 
periodically meet with government counterparts to discuss project ideas and priorities for aid 
funding. The country strategies only address the types of projects on which the donor and 
recipient agree to work.  The decision to allocate foreign aid by the donor is made at high levels 
of the donor government during the development and approval of the national budget. The 
decision to select a specific project depends on project readiness and country priorities and is 
often made by staff of bi-lateral development agencies.  DAC donors endeavor to have some 
degree of donor coordination so that multiple donors so not end up duplicating the work of 
other donors.  Donor coordination is often accomplished by formal donor coordination 
committees established in many recipient countries and, in some cases, joint aid programming 
meetings are held between most donors and the recipient country.  Such joint meetings are often 
held when there is post-conflict or disaster reconstruction effort where donors hold a pledging 
conference.  Examples of this include the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (2016) after and 
International Ministerial Conference on Rebuilding Cambodia (Tokyo Conference, 1992).  At 
these meetings, most donors pledge to provide aid to the recipient in a coordinated way so as 
to prevent duplication and increase efficiency. 
 
Many donors utilize technical assistance grants as a tool to generate projects for aid 
financing.  Japan is a prime example of this approach where grant aid is often used to generate 
infrastructure master plans which contain prioritized lists of potential projects in the sectors 
where Japan has chosen to concentrate its aid efforts.  Sometimes the recipient states adopt such 
donor prepared master plans as their own infrastructure development strategies, but most have 
their own priorities.  The donor and the recipient then negotiate on which projects will be 
financed by the donor, when, and on what terms.  Most donors, including Japan, have annual 




implemented in the upcoming year or two and which projects will be developed in the future.  
Most aid recipient countries have large infrastructure deficits and high demand for aid resources 
so donor proposals to finance projects are generally well received. 
 
Donors depend on having a pipeline31 of potential projects that can be financed by aid 
commitments.  These project pipelines are developed over time in cooperation with the 
recipient and enable donors to scale up aid when in the donor’s interest.  When aid commitments 
increase, the implementation of the project pipeline speeds up and when aid is reduced, it slows 
down offering a level of flexibility to the donor.  This ready pipeline enables leaders of donor 
countries to announce new aid packages during state visits to aid recipient countries.  These 
project pipelines also enable other donors to join as co-financiers if they do not have their own 
ready projects developed and sometimes take over financing of projects identified and prepared 
by other donors.  Bi-lateral donors may add funds to multi-lateral donor projects as in the case 
of Agence Française de Développement (AFD) providing $150 million in cofinaning to the 
ADB financed Peshawar Sustainable Bus Rapid Transit Corridor project in Pakistan.32  In this 
way, donors that wish to scale up their aid giving can participate in other donor’s projects when 
it suits their interests.  
 
Finally, donors who wish to scale up aid activities quickly can rapidly increase aid to 
key recipients by offering direct budget support or by cancelling debt incurred on previous aid 
financed projects.  For example, Japan forgave over $5 billion of Myanmar’s debt to Japan over 
                                                 
31 A project pipeline refers to a set of projects at various stages of preparation that are under development and 
can be financed if and when a donor provides funding.  Bilateral aid agencies spend much of their efforts 
preparing pipelines of development projects to absorb the aid allocations of the donor government. 





the span of only 2 years (2012-2013).33 In 2011, China cancelled $6 billion in Cuba’s debt.34 
These large debt forgiveness actions generally reflect a desire on the part of the donor to make 
a gain a major public relations win to improve their reputation and influence in the recipient.  
Direct budget support is not frequently utilized.  In 2017, for example, out of $124.7 billion in 
total ODA from DAC members, just $2.4 billion was budget support.  Debt cancellation 
amounts are generally much higher than direct budget support and more relevant to donors with 
a high proportion of loan aid, such as Japan and China. 
 
Emerging donors often do not have robust aid bureaucracies through which to develop 
and implement aid programs.  China only established its first aid agency, the China 
International Development Cooperation Agency, or CIDCA, in April 2018 after being an aid 
donor for over 60 years.  Going forward CIDCA may develop into a large and capable aid 
bureaucracy which develops future projects, but as of this writing, there are rarely China 
developed project pipelines in aid recipient countries ready to accept China’s aid commitments.  
China tends to rely on the recipient to propose projects or offers general concessional financing 
packages that will later be targeted at specific projects.  In 2011, for example, China signed a 
strategic partnership agreement with Mongolia and accompanied the agreement with a pledge 
of $500 million in China Ex-Im Bank financing at concessional rates for unspecified projects.35 
At the time the soft loans were offered, Mongolia had not proposed any specific projects to 
China. Mongolia proposed projects to China for financing under this loan over the next several 
                                                 
33 Daniel DeFraia, “Japan forgives Myanmar debt, offers investment and aid,” Agence France-Presse, 26 May 
2013 accessed 31 March 2019, https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-05-26/japan-forgives-myanmar-debt-offers-
investment-and-aid. 
34 Kenneth Rapoza, “China has forgiven nearly $10 billion in debt. Cuba accounts for over half,” Forbes, 29 May 
2019, accessed 8 June 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/29/china-has-forgiven-nearly-10-
billion-in-debt-cuba-accounts-for-over-half/. 
35 Alicia J. Campi, “China seeks to strengthen Mongolia trade links during August trilateral summit,” The 




years. Chinese largesse is often preceded by visits from Chinese leaders and signing of other 
agreements.  These aid commitments, since they often do not have specific projects identified, 
may take many years to be implemented or may not be implemented at all.  Because China has 
relied on the recipient to propose projects, recipients sometimes propose projects prepared by 
other donors.  Planning and engineering work may be paid for by a DAC donor and then the 
project eventually financed by China. The prevalence of this has bred some degree of 
competitive hostility from other donors towards China’s aid activities.   
 
One overlooked aspect of foreign aid research is that recipient countries have agency in 
the aid commitment decision.  Some recipient countries are actively shopping their highest 
priority projects to potential donors to gain financing.  Countries that are particularly dependent 
on aid often develop lists of potential projects that include all the high priority projects left over 
after all of their domestic resources have been exhausted. These unfunded projects then become 
the basis for requests from the donor community.  
 
Donors that offer a relatively high percentage of their aid as loans can also increase their 
aid giving more readily than countries that have grant based aid programs because the budget 
impact of offering a concessional loan is less than a grant. The peculiarities of the way the DAC 
defines ODA allowed some countries including Japan to actually provide loans that qualified 
as ODA but that were in reality reasonably profitable for the country. For instance, Japan can 
borrow yen for 30 years at less than 1% interest (as of March 2019 the coupon rate on a 30-
year Japanese government bond was 0.7%).  Japan could then offer a 1% ODA loan to a 
developing country, earning more interest from ODA lending than the government’s own 





2.2 Foreign aid and international relations theory 
Foreign aid policy and practice has long helped to define the character of relations 
between the more advanced countries and the so-called developing world. The theoretical 
framework proposed later in this chapter and tested in Chapters 5 and 6 blends aspects of 
different theoretical paradigms in international relations (IR). The purpose of this section is to 
present the various theoretical lenses through which international relations scholars attempt to 
understand the purpose and effectiveness of foreign aid.  I will then describe where this 
dissertation’s research fits in the existing literature and how it contributes to understanding 
foreign aid policy and practice and its effect on international security. 
 
2.2.1 Purpose of foreign aid 
Scholars have characterized aid’s purpose in a variety of ways, but the most common 
purposes in the literature are (i) commercial, (ii) security, (iii) diplomatic, (iv) developmental, 
(v) cultural, and (vi) humanitarian.36  Some scholars studying the purposes of foreign aid have 
developed simpler groupings.  One common way to conceive of aid purposes is to divide certain 
types of aid into its overarching goal.  For example, development aid given to develop a port 
that can be used to export raw materials important to the donor could be considered 
commercially oriented since the overall goal of the project is to improve the economic well-
being of the donor. Likewise, diplomatic aid or aid meant to improve relations between states 
could be commercial or security oriented, depending on the overall purpose of improving 
relations. For example, aid for diplomacy when the donor is attempting to negotiate a security 
agreement with the recipient would be aid for security goals. Aid for development that has no 
potential commercial or security benefits to the donor would be altruistic and, therefore, be 
                                                 




similar to humanitarian assistance.  By focusing on the overarching goal, it becomes clear that 
most aid can be considered either 1) commercial, for the economic benefit of the donor, 2) 
security, to enhance the national security of the donor, or 3) normative, for the economic or 
social benefit of the recipient.  This simpler taxonomy of aid purposes has been used by 
Barthelemy 37  in his quantitative study on donor interests vs. recipient interests. Other 
researchers have combined commercial, security and diplomatic purposes into single models 
of donor interests vs. recipient interests to determine how aid is allocated and for whose 
benefit.38  In this dissertation, I have adopted the three-purpose taxonomy of aid: commercial, 
security and normative.  
 
One useful way to make sense of foreign aid purposes is to map those purposes to the 
predictions of the dominant theories used by international relations scholars to understand 
world politics. In the foreign aid literature, there are three dominant paradigms used to 
understand foreign aid: realism, liberalism and constructivism. While there is substantial 
variation within these schools of thought, most states that provide foreign aid fit the 
expectations of one or more of these theoretical constructs when it comes to aid policy.  The 
next sections summarize the views on foreign aid under each paradigm. 
 
2.2.2 Realism 
The core realist argument is that foreign aid is first and foremost to promote the security 
self-interest of the donor.  In a world characterized by anarchy, security is the primary interest 
of major powers in the international system. States act in the international system to maximize 
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38 Alfred Maizels and Michiko Nissanke "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," World Development, Vol. 




their power vis-à-vis other states and aid is one of the tools available with which to pursue gains 
in relative power.  Realists/neorealists such as Morgenthau,39 Banfield,40 Walt,41 Schelling,42 
and Liska43 argue that foreign aid is essentially bribery meant to solidify alliances and buy 
policy concessions. Hans Mongenthau44 considered foreign aid to be an indispensable part of 
foreign policy because there are state interests that cannot be secured militarily or 
diplomatically. Morgenthau was critical of implying that foreign aid should promote economic 
development because it confused both donor and recipient on the purpose of aid. For 
Morgenthau, all aid was political, even if it was branded economic development assistance.   
 
George Liska more concretely put foreign aid in the context of national security.45 He 
summarized the goal of foreign aid as the optimal use of donor resources both domestically and 
internationally to maximize security. Writing in the context of the Cold War, he said that the 
United States needs cooperation in political, economic, and military matters.  Its main methods 
short of force to induce cooperation are the granting and withholding of aid and political 
subversion. Contrary to many scholars who point to post WWII as the beginning of foreign aid 
as a policy tool, Liska links the granting of foreign aid to the use of subsidies in Renaissance 
Europe. Cross state subsidies were used to induce desirable behavior at less present cost than 
possible future military conflict. In addition, the support of allies during wars in this period 
often took form of monetary transfers. Tribute is also seen as a sort of a reverse subsidy in that 
the donor is the weak state buying off the aggression of the powerful state. All these subsidy 
                                                 
39 Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 
(June 1962), 301-309. 
40 Edward Banfield, American Foreign Aid Doctrines (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1963), 24-5. 
41 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1987), 236-7.  
42 Thomas Schelling, “American Foreign Assistance,” World Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1955), 606-62. 
43 George Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960), 30. 
44 Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 301-309. 




relationships had an explicit quid pro quo and reciprocity was assumed.  For realists like Liska, 
the key objectives of foreign aid are: (i) to strengthen economies of allies, (ii) to strengthen 
non-communist regimes, and (iii) to strengthen the strategic position of United States by 
developing and holding military assets in foreign countries. Liska notes that objective (i) is a 
long-term security strategy while (ii) and (iii) are short term security strategies.  
 
Thomas Schelling highlights the problem with distinguishing military from economic 
aid.46 There was a consensus that economic aid can be either for military or economic purposes, 
while military aid can only serve military purposes.  Schelling noted that the real net effect of 
aid cannot be known from the aid type because the fungibility of aid means that the true impact 
of military aid could be economic or that economic aid could result in more military spending.47 
Aid fungibility means that economic aid can have military benefits for the recipient and security 
benefits to the donor. For this reason, where military aid is difficult to provide for political 
reasons, economic aid may suffice to serve the same purpose.   
 
This idea of aid fungibility implies that we cannot distinguish the purpose of aid simply 
on the basis of what type of project is undertaken with the aid.  As any aid professional can 
attest, those offering aid packages will utilize the fact that aid money used for a specific purpose 
frees up regular budget resource in the recipient country which can be put to other uses.  For 
example, a donor may provide funding for a highway that the recipient government would build 
anyway with the understanding that the recipient would use the savings to do something else, 
such as invest in border protection, military cooperation, or purchase weapons.  This is a useful 
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feature for states like Japan that are legally prohibited from offering military assistance. 
Economic aid can effectively serve as security assistance due to its fungibility. 
 
Realists have also argued that economic aid can be useful if it strengthens a donor’s 
allies against a common threat.  However, realist scholars have argued amongst themselves 
about the usefulness of aid for this purpose.  Many realists prefer military assistance to 
economic assistance because of doubts about the effectiveness of economic assistance to 
transform economies and produce economic development that would strengthen the potential 
ally.   
 
Since foreign aid is primarily given by powerful donors to weaker and often seemingly 
inconsequential states, foreign aid tends to be ignored in the realist literature.  Some aid 
relationships also defy the predictions of realists.  How would realists interpret the fact that the 
United States provided over $52 million48 in grant aid to China as recently as 2013?  Most 
realists believe the United States is in pitched competition with China for power in the 
international system so providing aid to a peer competitor appears incomprehensible.  If states 
seek only power and care only about relative gains, then United States aid to China makes little 
sense.  At the other extreme, after the end of the Cold War aid to small states with little power 
is also hard to understand from a realist perspective. What value can that aid provide to great 
powers when the recipient state is incapable of providing much meaningful security assistance 
to the donor?  To answer these questions, we need to acknowledge that states do not always act 
according to realist principles and may pursue goals beyond scraping for relative gains against 
competitor states.  
                                                 






While realists49 and liberals50 generally assume that foreign aid promotes the “national 
interests” of the donor, they diverge with regard to relative gains and economic interdependence. 
Liberals sometimes argue that foreign aid could be given even if it increases the relative power 
of the recipient as long as domestic actors in the donor country also benefit. Realists would 
argue that this is unlikely. Liberals would also assert that foreign aid that promotes 
interdependence is useful for promoting peaceful relations while realists tend to see 
interdependence as threatening.  
 
Liberal/neoliberals emphasize the use of aid to enhance the donor's "soft" power and 
international prestige,51 the commercial benefits to the donor (commercial liberalism)52, and 
the development of international institutions (institutional liberalism).53 Some liberals admit 
that aid can serve security interests.  For example Nye and Welch categorize foreign aid as one 
type of international intervention which is less costly and disruptive than military action but 
more coercive than speeches or information dissemination.54 Like realists, liberals tend to view 
foreign aid as self-interested, but have a more expansive view of state interests which include 
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economic and trade relations, roles and power of states within institutions, and the notion of 
national reputation and “soft power.”55  
 
Disagreements about foreign policy behavior between realists and liberals are based on 
different understandings of the role of domestic factors and structural factors in compelling 
state behavior.  Liberal theories are based on the notion that states have preferences based on 
domestic society and institutions. These preferences come from the bottom up in that 
international politics depends on the demands of individuals and groups in domestic society.  
Governments represent different subsets of groups in society and the interests of those groups 
determine state preferences. International cooperation and interdependence within the 
international system can influence these domestic groups and, hence, state behavior.56   
 
This liberal view is contradicted by the neorealist view that international structure 
determines state behavior rather than preferences.  For neorealists like Kenneth Waltz, the 
notion that state preferences or the character of states determines state behavior is reductive. 
That is, he asserts that such a view reduces to the facile finding that states go to war because 
they are “war-like” and stable international order is the result of most states being “orderly”.57  
Liberals argue that basing behavior on state preferences is not reductionist as state preferences 
can transmit the results of international interactions.  Further, state action is not only based on 
a single state’s preferences, but partially on the preferences of other states linked by a degree 
of interdependence.58   
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Foreign aid can serve to burnish the image of the donor and promote the values and 
desires of the donor state among the people and leaders of the recipient, and according to 
liberals, these goals can be more important than seeking relative gains. Nye argues59 that the 
small United States foreign aid budget has a negative impact on its soft power as the United 
States only spends about one-third the level, relative to the size of the economy, of European 
governments on foreign aid.  He argues that if the United States is concerned about its soft 
power, it needs to make economic aid a higher foreign policy priority.60  Even leading realists 
with liberal foreign policy tendencies such as Zbigniew Brzezinski lament the low level of 
United States foreign aid and lack of more concrete support for the UN Millennium 
Development Goals. 61   He points to the global alienation from American values that has 
resulted from this lack of generosity62, which is a soft power argument. 
 
2.2.4 Constructivism 
Constructivist views on foreign aid are diverse. Some constructivist scholars (and much 
of the foreign aid establishment) emphasize the role of values and the humanitarian dimension 
of aid as a reflection of the moral values of the donor63 though constructivism is such a varied 
and diverse approach to international relations that many explanations for foreign aid fall within 
the paradigm. Some constructivists have argued that aid expresses the moral value of helping 
those who are less fortunate. 64 Others argue that aid establishes a social relationship between 
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donor and recipient meant to perpetuate a dominant/submissive social and economic 
relationship.   
 
Much of the constructivist reasoning on foreign aid is a reaction to the near universal 
dismissal of ethical justifications for foreign aid within mainstream international relations. 
Hattori notes that even liberals who strongly favor foreign aid tend not to make any moral 
claims about it, but look at it as a technical method to facilitate trade and commerce, indirectly 
resulting in peace and prosperity.65 However, aid practitioners and agencies use the language 
of moral values to justify their programs and are reticent about explicitly claiming aid is self-
interested. For example, the USAID statement on Mission, Vision and Values begins: 
“Our Mission: On behalf of the American people, we promote and demonstrate 
democratic values abroad, and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world. In 
support of America's foreign policy, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
leads the U.S. Government's international development and disaster assistance through 
partnerships and investments that save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic 
governance, and help people emerge from humanitarian crises and progress beyond 
assistance.”66 
 
Constructivists can reasonably ask why international relations scholars reject what the 
vast majority of those working in development say they are doing? Hattori argues that it is 
impossible to separate morality from aid purpose because this divorces aid practice from its 
social context.67 
 
Scholars such as Lumsdaine assert that: (i) international relations are governed by the 
principles and morality of the actors in the international system, (ii) that states are influenced 
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by domestic political institutions and the state's role in international society, and (iii) that 
international relations have "inherent social meaning" so that changes in international practices 
tend to be based on moral norms that are ongoing and changing.68  For Lumsdaine, it is not 
surprising that European governments spend much more on foreign aid than the United States 
since they have much more generous domestic social welfare systems which reflect their moral 
priorities. These same priorities and moral norms also manifest themselves in generous foreign 
aid budgets. Some liberals and constructivists like Lumsdaine argue that:  
"foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of the economic and political 
interests of the donor countries alone; the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and 
egalitarian principles of the donor countries….”69 
 
A significant body of literature on aid norms and values based on gift theory 
comfortably fits into the constructivist camp. Hattori argues that aid is an unreciprocated gift 
from one state to another. The importance of the gift is in the social relations that are created 
by the gift rather than the gift itself.70  In other words, what aid is, is more important that what 
aid does. Analogizing aid to a gift also adds insight into the Japanese practice referred to as 
“omiyage” diplomacy (“omiyage” is a gift given on meeting a host or returning from a trip) 
when Prime Ministerial visits were accompanied by large aid packages to the host.71  For 
Hattori, an unreciprocated gift becomes a symbol of domination and by not repaying the gift, 
the recipient becomes a willing participant in the order of things – in this case the structure of 
the international system. 
 
                                                 
68 David Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics, 228. 
69 Ibid., 30. 
70 Tomohisa Hattori, “The moral politics of foreign aid,” 232. 
71 Alan Rix, “Managing Japan's Aid: ASEAN,” in ed. Robert M. Orr and Bruce Koppel, Japan's Foreign Aid: Power 




Hattori further analogizes the aid relationship to Confucian values that hold that social 
responsibilities are determined by social status.  Performance of duties to assist those of lower 
status should accord recognition.  In this way, the provision of foreign aid confirms the virtue 
and moral superiority of the donor in the eyes of its own society and confirms it elevated status. 
By accepting, the recipient acquiesces to its subordinate position.72  One could question how 
this notion comports with the history of the Chinese suzerainty where status was conferred to 
the dominant state by gifts from the subordinate state – the opposite direction of foreign aid.  
 
Lastly, constructivists have asserted that foreign aid is used to project particular 
identities that reflect the donor states power and prestige in the international system. Western 
donors tend to emphasize the symbolism of charity and humanitarianism while emerging 
donors tend to emphasize mutual benefit and shared identity. Under this notion, the 
establishment of foreign aid programs can serve as a symbol of a state arriving as an advanced 
country – in essence, joining the “club” of developed countries by aligning its practices with 
those of the existing donors.73 
 
Aid from certain emerging donors (especially those that are still developing countries) 
is sometimes couched as “South-South” cooperation to emphasize the idea that it is not “aid” 
per se, but a mutually beneficial exchange without the power dynamic implicit in the Western 
model. In fact, China and India tend to avoid the word “aid” when referring to their foreign aid 
programs preferring “international cooperation”.  In these cases, constructivist scholars have 
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argued that these aid programs are meant to communicate solidarity with other developing 
countries and assert a shared identity and development experience.74  
 
Constructivist scholars approach aid from diverse viewpoints and hold a variety of 
views on foreign aid practice and policy.  However, much of the foreign aid literature from this 
perspective suffers from two problems. First, much of this literature conflates states with people 
and therefore applies the methods of anthropology and sociology to explain government policy. 
States are not people – they do not need to die or reproduce, for instance – and do not interact 
in ways analogous to social interactions among people. This is a mistake regarding the level of 
analysis where the actions and motivations of the individual are conflated with the action and 
motivations of the state.  This means that it is also not necessarily true that the purpose of the 
aid professionals implementing foreign aid is the same as the donor’s purpose in providing 
foreign aid. The purpose of one actor in a complex process may not be the same as the overall 
purpose of the endeavor.   
 
Secondly, the need to build domestic coalitions to support particular national policies 
confuses the analysis of the overall purpose of those policies. Like any major program requiring 
substantial budgetary outlays and no obvious domestic constituency, foreign aid attracts a 
coalition of supporters. Carol Lancaster demonstrates the ways that certain interest groups 
affect the size and purpose of foreign aid allocations. She notes the increases and decreases in 
aid amounts from the United States coincide with well-publicized humanitarian crises.75  She 
gives particular emphasis to the growing impact of NGOs interested in international 
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development along with the rise of Christian groups within the United States Republican Party 
who support foreign aid out of the religious duty to help the poor.  Republicans had long been 
the main opposition to more foreign aid believing it to be at best ineffective and at worst 
counterproductive and corrupt. The increasing clout of Christian groups within the party may 
have reduced the opposition to aid allowing its budget to grow again. While this may be true, 
it does little to explain the growth of United States foreign aid since 2001.  The vast majority 
of that new aid went to post conflict reconstruction and development activities associated with 
combatting terrorism and extremism. Further, it is impossible to explain why Christian groups 
would prefer foreign aid spending to domestic welfare spending for the poor.  Why was this 
power of altruism limited to foreign aid? The answer may be that security issues became much 
more important so that the Department of Defense and its contractors and interest groups 
jumped on the foreign aid bandwagon.   
 
While tempting to give credence to domestic political debates and processes, this 
approach can produce more confusion than clarity.  International relations scholars need to 
devise usable theories that explain major movements in foreign policy and the relations between 
states. In the same way it is not illuminating to interpret major increases or decreases in defense 
spending in terms of the interests of defense contractors, it is not particularly illuminating to 
interpret foreign aid policy in terms of the domestic interest groups that support it.  Defense 
policy is meant to promote national security, not to promote employment and foreign aid is 
meant to promote national interests, not fund NGOs or serve the charitable ideals of certain 
groups of citizens even if it incidentally does all of those things.  
 
The explanations of foreign aid policy based on constructivist thinking is difficult to 




this cannot explain why aid declined in the 1990s and rapidly grew after 2000.  In fact, global 
poverty has declined significantly since 199076 which, if aid is primarily to reduce poverty, we 
would expect declining rather than increasing aid commitments – the opposite of what 
happened.  The notion of aid as social domination is also unsatisfactory since this cannot 
explain why emerging states provide substantial and growing amounts of aid. Many emerging 
donors like China and India still receive substantial amounts of aid themselves. It is difficult to 
understand why emerging powers establish aid programs and at the same time choose to 
continue receiving aid if aid is primarily to signify domination and submission in international 
relations. 
 
2.2.5 Theoretical eclecticism 
Overall, past scholarly work on foreign aid has shown that both realist and liberal 
notions of the role and purpose of foreign aid can explain aid giving behavior at different times. 
During the Cold War, the realist position on aid was dominant.  After the Cold War and foreign 
aid budgets were cut in most DAC member countries, the realist arguments for foreign aid 
seemed to wane and liberal arguments for foreign aid came to the fore. Arguments for using 
aid to bolster trade and investment and to socialize states into international institutions were 
common.  However, aid budgets continued to wane until the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001.  Aid has been rapidly growing since then and seemed to validate the realist view that 
security threats drive aid allocations. However, this ignores two features of aid in the post 9/11 
period.  First, the explicit incorporation of democratic peace theory into United States foreign 
aid policy debates which offers a different argument for promoting democracy and governance 
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reform using aid. Second, the justification of foreign aid for post-conflict recovery and 
reconstruction.  DAC donors, the United States, UK, and Japan in particular began to pay close 
attention to promoting democratic governance and state building to counter terrorism and 
promote peace, an approach to aid that seems to bridge realist and liberal thinking on aid policy. 
The foregoing discussion leads directly to the combination of theoretical traditions to enhance 
the explanatory power of theories that explain foreign aid giving and allocation.   
 
Democratic peace theory cuts across, some ideological boundaries in the debate on 
foreign aid. If democratic institutions are the key to peaceful relations between nations, the 
logical conclusion is to promote democracy in other states and one tool for supporting 
development of democratic institutions abroad is foreign aid. The rationale of democratic peace 
was incorporated by "neoconservatives" who had key positions in the United States national 
security establishment under the administration of George W. Bush. The policy of promoting 
democracy worldwide was articulated in the National Security Strategy (2002).77 One rationale 
offered for the 2003-2011 Iraq War was to establish a liberal democracy in the Middle East to 
spread democratic ideals to other countries in the region. The neoconservatives expected that a 
democratic Iraq would promote democratic peace between countries of the Middle East and 
between those countries and other democratic states.78 The result of this policy was that foreign 
aid was directed towards developing democratic institutions in recipient countries as an integral 
part of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts related to the war on terror. 
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The increasing threat of international terrorism from failed states has changed how some 
foreign policy experts think development aid can support national security. Scholars such as 
Patrick Cronin, et. al.79 have argued that foreign aid for economic development is now a 
national security imperative because poverty and failed states have become breeding grounds 
for terrorists and regional conflicts. These scholars believe the national security of the United 
States depends, in part, on addressing poverty and development of democratic institutions in 
the developing world. The foreign policy establishment in the United States was thinking 
primarily of using aid to bolster failed or failing states and to assist in post conflict recovery 
and reconstruction; a purpose that cuts across theoretical boundaries and encompasses both 
liberal and realist ideas about foreign aid.   
 
2.2.6 Aid competition 
Realist scholars emphasized the competitive aspect of foreign aid during the Cold War 
though few studies have quantitatively shown that aid is allocated competitively in the sense 
the donors actively compete with each other using aid.  Donors during the Cold War took sides 
between the United States led liberal order and the Soviet led communist movement.  The rapid 
growth in aid in the post WWII period, first from the United States, and later from Europe and 
Japan, was explained by the perceived need to contain Soviet expansion. This competition 
seemed to play out across the developing world and saw relatively little concern for governance, 
democratic ideals, and corruption in the pursuit of allies.   
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When competing for influence in recipient countries, the donor’s leverage depends on 
its ability to grant or withhold aid.  George Liska80 held that the United States is inevitably 
disadvantaged vis-a-vis the Soviet Union because the United States must spread resources in 
peacetime through its containment strategy, to keep countries in its sphere away from Soviet 
Union influence.  The Soviet Union, as the expansionist power, was able to shift resources from 
one country to another to find weak spots and concentrate on them.  Liska highlights Nasser’s 
Egypt as a country given United States aid even though it was relatively hostile to the United 
States at the time. The Soviet Union could compete for influence by offering more aid and the 
United States would have to either offer competitive aid or offset it with aid to neighboring 
countries. In Cold War competition, aid would likely become a very expensive proposition for 
the power trying to defend its position (the United States) if the challenger (the Soviet Union) 
was willing to strategically use aid to probe for countries willing to break away for a price. 
 
The Soviet Union did actively compete for influence and allies during the Cold War. 
Khrushchev believed that aid could be used to entice former colonies to choose socialism over 
the Western capitalist model. In addition, if newly independent states could be enticed into the 
Soviet sphere of influence, the capitalist world would be deprived of key resources and weaken 
their economies and international ambitions.81 This is an example of using aid to signal state 
power within the international system.  Aid provided national credibility in a strategic 
competition between superpowers. 
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There is surprisingly little literature addressing aid competition outside the Cold War 
context and what little exists focuses on bidding between China and Taiwan for recognition 
among small states primarily in Africa and Pacific Islands states.82  Several Pacific Island 
countries have basically auctioned diplomatic recognition to the highest bidder.83  Van Fossen 
(2012) refers to the practice as “renting diplomatic recognition” and documents the pitched 
competition using escalating aid commitments from Taiwan and China prior to 2008.84  China’s 
aid to Pacific Islands rose by a factor of seven between 2005 and 2008 which effectively 
prevented Taiwan from gaining any additional countries to recognize it despite large aid 
increases over the same period.  In 2008, Taiwan’s President Ma announced that it would 
unilaterally cease the aid competition with China for recognition and while China never 
publicly agreed, the number of Pacific Island states that recognize Taiwan has been relatively 
steady since 2008. Since the election of the Democratic Progressive Party, which China 
perceives as pro-independence, in 2016, there are some indications that China and Taiwan have 
reignited the competition.85   
 
Few studies have demonstrated actual competition more generally. Even the book by 
Kim and Potter (2012) entitled, Foreign Aid Competition in East Asia, does not actually 
demonstrate competition in aid giving beyond the Pacific Islands case and instead simply 
describes the aid practices of Japan, China, and Korea.  This dissertation will attempt to use 
quantitative methods to discern if there is evidence of aid competition between Japan and China 
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(and the United States) by including the ODA of other powers as an explanatory variable in the 
models used to estimate aid commitments. Including aid from the potential competitor as an 
explanatory variable will test if aid allocations of Japan or China depend on the prior aid 
allocations of the other country. The findings and evidence for aid competition is described in 
Chapter 5.5 on page 258. 
 
2.2.7 Aid from emerging powers 
The purpose of this section is to put the aid programs of China and Japan into context 
as one-time emerging donors and support the development of the theoretical framework used 
to guide the analysis of this dissertation.  As one-time emerging donors, Japan and China have 
many similarities in their approach to providing aid.  Japan’s early aid program (and continuing 
to the present though to a lesser degree) and China’s current program are characterized by high 
percentage of loans, emphasis on infrastructure finance, explicit statements about mutual 
benefits of aid, and the coordination of aid with other types of economic cooperation such as 
trade and foreign direct investment. Considering emerging donors gives insight into the reasons 
that growing powers establish aid programs.  
 
Emerging donors challenge many assumptions about foreign aid. Some see threats to 
Western values and influence and support for "rogue" regimes.86 Others admire an alternative 
approach that deemphasizes aid conditionality and may better align with the interests of 
recipients.87 But the lack of data on aid from emerging powers has limited the ability of scholars 
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to align observed aid practices of emerging donors with international relations theories.  Many 
non-DAC donors report their aid activities to the DAC, but two of the largest non-DAC donors, 
China and India, do not.  The DAC makes an effort to track overall ODA budgets for non-
reporting non-DAC members from published budget data, but most observers have found that 
Chinese aid in particular is far higher than the reported aid budget in the China Fiscal Yearbook 
published by the Ministry of Finance which is used by the OECD in its estimates of Chinese 
aid.88 
 
Many new donors such as South Korea have joined the OECD DAC and largely follow 
the norms of the DAC group of established donors.  Other emerging donors have not joined the 
DAC and keep their aid programs under some level of secrecy due to the political sensitivity of 
sending resources abroad while the countries are still poor and the likelihood that aid is meant 
to serve security goals.  The controversy regarding emerging donors rests on the degree to 
which they are perceived as challenging the values and norms of the DAC group.89  The 
criticisms directed at some non-DAC emerging donors include the assertion that such aid 
fragments the aid system causing inefficiency, enables the violation of international standards 
and norms, free-rides on past debt relief efforts by DAC donors, and promotes resource 
extraction based development to the eventual detriment of the recipient country.  Most negative 
critiques of emerging donors point to China as the primary source of concern,90 even though 
Saudi Arabia’s aid is similarly large and it is not a liberal democracy. While Naim singled out 
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Saudi Arabian aid as a threat, most others focus on China. Defenders of emerging donors point 
to the faster implementation of Chinese aid in particular which is enables recipient countries to 
derive benefits from aid much quicker.  Such aid is often less bureaucratic and burdensome to 
the recipient.91 It is likely that it is not the aid that is a threat but the country providing the aid 
that is perceived as a threat to the international system and the sheer size of China relative to 
other emerging donors makes its burgeoning aid program appear more threatening. 
 
Emma Mawdsley (2012) in her major work on emerging donors offers a balanced 
assessment of China’s aid practices in the context of international relations theory and 
highlights the similarities between existing major donors and emerging ones. She notes that 
critics of emerging donors say such aid props up autocratic leaders, funds war and conflict, and 
promotes harmful economic policies; even as the same can be said of aid from existing donors.  
And while some donors like Venezuela explicitly challenged international norms and the 
international system, most, including China, are not explicitly revisionist in their rhetoric, 
though may be revisionist in intent.92 She notes that while China has supported despots in Sudan 
and Zimbabwe with aid, the West has supported equally despicable regimes in the past.  China 
takes more criticism than other states for similar behavior because it is seen as a legitimate 
threat to the Western led international order.  
 
From a recipient country perspective, many appreciate the attitude of emerging donors 
that emphasizes cooperation rather than the perceived condescension of traditional donors.  The 
Western discourse on aid is heavily influenced by notions of morality and charity.  The 
emerging donors tend to have a different discourse.  They emphasize shared experience and 
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shared identity as developing countries.  They reject explicit hierarchies, make statements of 
mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs of the recipient states, and promote the 
idea of mutually beneficial arrangements in their economic cooperation efforts.93  
 
The idea that recipient countries can avoid policy conditions in accepting aid from 
emerging donors and the focus of emerging donors on hard infrastructure rather than soft 
sectors like governance, health and social justice is powerfully attractive to aid recipients.94  
Most aid recipients have severe infrastructure deficits and may perceive the types of projects 
financed by emerging donors to be more directly beneficial than the soft sector aid often 
preferred by Western donors.95  Further, the focus of traditional donors on governance and 
democracy promotion is often perceived as a threat to the recipient state’s leaders causing great 
resistance to using aid as it was intended. Moyo Dambisa in her highly influential book, Dead 
Aid, claims that most aid is never used for its intended purpose, that it increases corruption and 
preempts the link between taxes and government accountability.  She claims that Chinese aid 
is much preferred to the traditional DAC aid because it is investment rather than aid in the 
traditional sense.  It is not charity but investment designed to develop sustainable enterprises 
that benefit both the donor and the recipient.96  
 
Much of the literature on aid from emerging donors does not address why developing 
countries establish or expand aid programs in the first place.  One possible explanation is the 
role of state identity in providing aid. Iain Watson (2014) posits that establishing or scaling up 
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aid programs confers prestige on the emerging power putting it on the same level as developed 
countries. He notes that emerging donors with past imperial influence (Turkey as the seat of the 
Ottoman Empire and China with its suzerainty relations in Asia) are some of the first and most 
aggressive at scaling up aid programs.97 A few other scholars emphasize the strategic uses of 
foreign aid to buy benefits for the donor.  India is an example of this more modest purpose.  
Purushothaman argues that India’s scaling up of its aid program in the 2000s is to promote its 
economic interests.  He claims that India’s aid to African countries is largely an export 
promotion policy.  Indian aid to its immediate neighbors is more security oriented and meant 
to maintain peaceful relations with its immediate neighbors and counter its main rivals Pakistan 
and China.  Aid is seen as a way to project power and influence when military means would be 
prohibitively costly.98 
 
2.3 A theory of aid 
This purpose of this section is to describe the theoretical framework to be tested in this 
study.  The theoretical framework proposed here combines the predictions of realism and 
liberalism. Put simply, states perceiving threats to their security will prioritize realist concerns 
becoming sensitive to relative gains, avoiding mutual dependence and enhancing ties with 
states that can balance against potential threats. States that are secure will prioritize liberal 
concerns such as expanding commercial ties, support for international institutions, mutual 
benefits, and promote interdependence.  The proposed theory challenges both realist and liberal 
thinking on international relations by attempting to explain why and when states prioritize 
                                                 
97 Iain Watson, Foreign Aid and Emerging Powers, 6. 
98 Chithra Purushothaman (Jawaharlal Nehru University), “Foreign Aid and South-South Cooperation: Emerging 






security concerns as realists predict and when they prioritize commercial benefits and 
interdependence as liberals predict. States, in fact, appear to switch between prioritizing 
security and commercial benefits depending on their place in the international system and the 
perceived threats to that position.  
 
The literature on foreign aid to date has largely focused on explaining the motivations 
of donors99 and whether or not aid is effective.  Few studies have considered the conditions that 
lead to changes in state behavior with respect to foreign aid over time.  In order to provide a 
useful story about how states use foreign aid under different conditions, we need a theoretical 
framework that links realism and liberalism.  The following examples that represent changes 
over time are difficult to explain using one international relations paradigm:  
1. Japan provided high levels of aid to China in 1990s but stopped in mid 2000s.  
Realists cannot explain why Japan’s aid program supported a rising and 
potentially hostile power in the 1990s.  Liberals cannot explain why Japan would 
stop ODA lending to China during its highest growth period when commercial 
opportunities were at their most attractive. 
2. Rapid increases in aid from emerging donors – liberals cannot make sense of 
Chinas aid to poor countries during the Mao period when China could not 
reasonably have benefited economically from engagement with Africa. Realists 
cannot explain why the United States has continued to provide aid to China 
(nearly $500 million from 2008-2017)100 which many consider to be a future 
peer competitor and threat to the United States.  
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In the following section, I propose a combined theory based on commercial liberalism 
and balance of threat realism to understand changes in aid programs over time.  The key to 
understanding these changing aid priorities is the level of threat perception of the donor country. 
 
2.3.1 Rationale 
I assume states are rational actors with a reasonable amount of information regarding 
the effectiveness of their aid giving.  States allocate aid for three main purposes: security, 
commercial benefits, and to promote normative values.  Security oriented aid is provided to 
build and support donor alliance networks, to weaken the alliance networks and counter the 
interests of adversaries, to influence international institutions by compelling aid recipients to 
support the donor’s interests, to signal that the donor is not a threat to the recipient or the 
international system, and to directly address security threats posed by unstable countries.  
Commercial aid is provided to provide economic benefits to the donor by supporting trade and 
investment, secure access to recourses needed by the donor, and support mutual beneficial 
economic relations and interdependence. Normative factors are included in the theoretical 
model to capture the influence of humanitarian needs, altruistic intent and donor country values 
on aid commitments.  
 
I expect that most foreign aid will be provided for security and commercial purposes 
though some aid is meant to promote normative values such as promoting democratic norms, 
human rights and humanitarian assistance. The level of aid defined by the OECD DAC as 
“humanitarian” is presented in Figure 2-3. Humanitarian aid is defined as “emergency and 
distress relief in cash or in kind, including emergency response, relief food aid, short-term 




refugees in donor countries.”101  The data show that humanitarian aid has generally increased 
by much more than aid generally.  The proportion of total aid that is humanitarian in nature has 
gone from around 1% in the early 1970s to over 12% in 2014.  This may reflect a general move 
by donors to emphasize aid that is more effective and directly addresses recipient needs, but 
even at 12%, humanitarian aid is a small part of total foreign aid allocations. There may also 
be an information effect where advances in communications and social networking have 
enabled more people to understand the effects of disasters and conflicts and pressure their 
governments to respond. 
 
Figure 2-3: Humanitarian Aid from DAC Donors, 1971-2014 (Constant 2014$) 
 







Source: OECD  
 
Donor states might differentiate between humanitarian aid recipients based on the 
commercial or security importance of the victim state or based on whether the victim state has 
friendly relations with the donor.  For example, the United States or Japan may offer more aid 
to an ally suffering a natural disaster than a potential or actual adversary. If there is a high level 
of threat perception in the donor state, they may discriminate against certain disaster victim 
states with their humanitarian assistance. A state that perceives a substantial external threat may 
provide more generous disaster relief aid packages to states within their alliance network or at 
least to states perceived as sympathetic to the donor’s interests. For instance, in periods where 
Japan feels threatened, it may be less generous with its humanitarian aid for disasters in North 
Korea or China than for disasters in India or the Philippines.  
 
To summarize, the overall purpose of foreign aid is expected to mainly promote the 
national interests of the donor.  Donors pursue their national interests for commercial benefits 
and security benefits through their aid allocations. Normative aid may be provided for the 
benefit of the recipient for purposes such as poverty reduction, promoting democratic and 
human rights, or for humanitarian relief during crises (natural disasters, war, famine, public 
health…etc.). States may discriminate in their normative aid allocations in ways that enhance 
their influence over potential allies and punish potential adversaries. 
 
2.3.2 When do states begin to offer aid? 
The research question concerns how the motivations behind China and Japan’s aid 
commitments have changed as their threat perception has increased.  Both China and Japan 




donors at different times.  In order to understand the motivations behind major changes in aid 
policy, I describe in this section the factors and conditions that lead to states starting aid 
programs with particular attention to Japan and China as typical emerging donors.  
 
States initiate aid programs when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.  But when 
do the benefits begin to exceed the costs and why?  Why did rich states initiate aid programs 
after WWII and emerging powers do the same in recent decades?  The two primary purposes 
for foreign aid can help us understand the answer.  Commercially oriented aid is given when 
the economic opportunities presented to donor state enterprises in foreign countries require 
additional resources in order to be realized.  Security oriented foreign aid is given when the 
donor state perceives a security threat and it has the resources to counter that threat using foreign 
aid.  
 
Commercial Aid. At the point when developing countries produce a commercial sector 
which seeks international markets but is effectively excluded by lack of international 
experience, the state will consider using foreign aid as a tool to enable expansion of its 
commercial sector internationally.  If a state at this stage of development has the resources 
needed to implement aid programs, they will likely do so.  Even very poor countries with a 
large internal market can develop enterprises capable of competing internationally. If the donor 
state already has a security oriented foreign aid program to address perceived threats, the aid 
program will move towards a more commercial orientation once the commercial opportunities 
grow. 
 
Many states that participate actively in the international capitalist system eventually 




country begins actively developing from an agrarian to industrial society, subsistence farming 
declines and cash crop agriculture expands.  In some states, resource extraction industries may 
grow or even dominate the economy when economically significant deposits of important 
minerals and energy resources are found.  As countries develop, commercial enterprises will 
grow and require increasing inputs of labor, capital and materials and their increasing levels of 
production needs access to markets, first domestically and later, internationally.  Infrastructure 
is required to enable the development and growth of fledgling enterprises.  A developing 
economy, therefore, requires increasing investments in roads, power, public transport, ports and 
water systems.  In most developing countries, some of the first major enterprises to develop 
domestically are construction firms for road building.  Roads a relatively simple and require 
some heavy equipment and imported materials for cement and asphalt but mostly rely on access 
to machinery, low-cost labor and organizational skills.  Even very poor developing countries 
can build roads and highways and the firms capable of building them tend to become large in 
rapidly developing large countries.  These firms can, if market conditions allow, further develop 
into major construction and engineering companies capable of more complex projects such as 
buildings, stadiums, ports, railways, and bridges. Once these firms become large and 
internationally competitive, opportunities for further expansion can come only from 
participation in the international market through the implementation of projects in other 
countries. 
 
There are always international firms capable of providing construction and engineering 
services, so when will domestic firms become internationally competitive in a state with access 
to international contractors? This is likely to occur in states that host large internal markets that 
may be initially protected from international competition. Construction projects for roads, 




capable equipment operators and manual laborers is needed to allow domestic contractors to 
flourish. As developing countries build out their road and other infrastructure networks, the 
amount of new work available in the domestic markets tend to level off and domestic 
competition may become fierce, leading contractors to want to compete in other countries. 
Large developing countries like China, India, and Brazil are well down this path with big pools 
of capable low-cost labor and contractors that can skillfully implement big construction projects 
within their own countries, and increasingly, abroad. 
 
The problem faced by construction firms that may be capable, but have no international 
experience is that competing for projects procured through international competitive bidding is 
difficult. International competitive bidding tends to run in two phases.  The first is firm 
qualification and the second is bid evaluation. Firms from developing countries with primarily 
domestic experience often cannot make it past the qualification phase in the bidding process or 
have a difficult time understanding the procedures under the international regime that governs 
the bidding process (typically the International Federation of Consulting Engineers which goes 
by the French abbreviation, FIDIC).  The result is that developing country firms that are 
potentially competitive internationally may find themselves effectively locked out of 
international procurements.  The effect is to limit the development potential of those countries 
that have reached this point in the development process. 
 
States can use foreign aid programs that tie the project procurement to firms from the 
donor state to ensure that donor state firms win international projects. Under open competitive 
bidding, it is unlikely these firms could win the projects against competitors with extensive 
international experience.  For this reason, almost all foreign aid from emerging powers such as 




most of its aid was tied to procurement from Japanese firms, but over time, the percentage of 
tied aid from Japan has declined markedly as shown in Figure 2-4 on page 57.   
 
Figure 2-4: Japan's Share of Tied Aid, 1979-2016 
 
Source: OECD  
 
Tied aid is likely to decline over time for two related reasons. First, as donor state firms 
become more adept at international competition, they no longer require direct state assistance 
to win foreign procurements and tend to rely on the donor’s export-import bank (Ex-Im Bank) 
to provide financing rather that the foreign aid programs. Ex-Im Bank financing is not generally 




in the market.102 Second, aid may become more security oriented as donor states develop and 
it is easier to influence the leaders of states if the recipient state benefits more from the aid. Aid 
that primarily benefits donor state firms is less likely to buy cooperation from the recipient. 
 
Security aid. Threatened states provide resources to other countries as foreign aid when 
that aid can potentially reduce threats to themselves. Not all threatened states are willing or 
capable of providing foreign aid. A few preconditions required for states to initiate a foreign 
aid program include a reasonably capable civil service and sufficient foreign diplomatic 
presence.  These conditions are required in order to negotiate and manage a foreign aid project.  
Failed or failing states without effective governing institutions, even under the gravest threats 
cannot be expected to establish a foreign aid effort, even to improve their security.  
 
There are two different scenarios for states to develop aid programs to counter security 
threats.  First are states under threat from peer competitors that arise external to conditions in 
the donor state.  The external threat forces the threatened state to search for allies and support 
from other states.  If the threated state has the economic capability to develop an effective 
foreign aid program it will do so. For example, India can be expected to provide foreign aid to 
its immediate neighbors to ensure its influence, rather than Pakistan’s, holds sway in South 
Asia.  The Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War largely allocated foreign 
aid for this reason. China began its foreign aid program in the 1950s to promote its status vis-
à-vis Taiwan and to secure its own interests in the three-way competition between itself, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. China and Taiwan continue to compete over a few small 
African, Pacific Island, and Latin-American countries for official recognition. China’s 
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cultivation of allies in Africa beginning in the 1950s helped it regain its UN seat in 1971.103 
China’s attainment of widespread recognition in the early 1970s, its opening to the world in 
1979, followed by the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s substantially reduced the security 
rationale behind China’s aid program which shrank significantly between the mid-70s and late 
1990s and only revived to support the “Going Out” policy around the beginning of the 
millennium.  
 
States in active conflicts will allocate aid to give them an advantage. For example, after 
the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, United States foreign aid policy 
went into wholesale revision to both recruit allies in the “war on terror” and to rebuild Iraq and 
Afghanistan after full scale invasions of those countries. The decade of the 1990s was 
characterized by declining aid budgets and the ascendance of ideas that supported the use of 
foreign aid to promote democracy and international institutions.  This was dramatically reversed 
in 2001 to focus intently on security.  In essence, the United States was likely using foreign aid 
to promote liberal goals like democratic peace and economic interdependence in the 1990s and 
prioritized security in the 2000s.104 
 
A second scenario for developing a security focused aid program occurs when rising 
powers want to project their own power and influence.  As developing countries become 
established as emerging powers, their international ambitions may grow with their power and 
capability. If the rise of an emerging state is potentially destabilizing to the international system, 
other powers may seek to limit the emerging powers rise through a containment strategy.  The 
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emerging power perceives effort to contain its rise as a security threat. This heightened threat 
perception leads them to counter the efforts to contain their rise and influence the international 
system in ways than benefit themselves commensurate with their growing power. At this point, 
foreign aid for security purposes may become increasingly useful.  For example, there is 
evidence that Japan has used foreign aid to improve the likelihood of its selection to a non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2014105 and to garner support for its long running 
campaign for a permanent seat.106 This use is a broadening of Japan’s past focus on commercial 
gains due to its expanding interest in playing a role in the international system and influencing 
the rules to its benefit.  
 
If a rising state such as China is perceived by other states to threaten the balance of 
power and destabilize the international system, they are likely to react by balancing against the 
emerging power and seek to contain its rise.  The rising state will seek to counter these moves 
by attempting to entice states to bandwagon with it to establish their own spheres of influence 
and groups of states that will support the rising power’s position within the international system.  
In a world where emerging states are ascendant in relative power and perceive that their rise is 
being contained and threatened, those states will begin to target an increasing portion of their 
aid to address security concerns.   
 
The greater the perceived threat in the donor state, the more weight will be given to 
security concerns in foreign aid allocation decisions.  Poorer states will likely only provide 
foreign aid when the perceived threats are severe while richer states can allocate their more 
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substantial resources to address smaller and more diffuse threats.  States have multiple 
preferences so even states under severe security threat may also promote commercial interests 
with their aid and could even promote both commercial and security benefits with the same aid 
packages.  The theory proposed here holds is that different levels of security threat will alter 
the balance in predictable ways.  A state that is primarily greedy will have a commercially 
focused program.  A state that is primarily scared will have a security focused program. A state 
the is both greedy and scared will have a mix of the two.   
 
China’s growing economic and military power over the past several decades has led the 
United States and Japan to increasingly perceive a threat from China.107  China in turn believes 
that the United States and Japan are attempting to contain it and prevent its rise.108 Under the 
conditions of mutual threat perception (China threatened by the United States and the United 
States-Japan alliance and Japan threatened by China), foreign aid programs of China and Japan 
are expected to increasingly support security goals at the expense of commercial benefits and 
normative values. 
 
Normative aid.  In addition to commercial and security oriented aid, states sometimes 
transfer resources to other states for the (perceived) benefit of the recipient state.  This type of 
aid includes humanitarian assistance to help victims of natural or man-made disasters, to 
promote public health, and to promote values such as democracy and human rights.  Often, 
even relatively small and poor countries provide aid to victims of particularly horrifying 
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disasters.  Humanitarian aid is given by almost all donors that have foreign aid programs and 
dominates the aid given by certain donors such as the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, 
Kuwait) that are in a volatile region with numerous failing states and ongoing conflicts resulting 
in continuous humanitarian crises and need for stabilization and capacity building to enable 
them to govern themselves. Normative aid to promote democratic values and human rights is 
generally given by developed Western countries, Japan and Korea.  I expect that states that are 
threatened will not just reduce commercial aid but also reduce aid to promote its normative 
values.  For example, during the Cold War the United States repeatedly supported regimes that 
grossly violated human rights and democratic values as long as those states supported the 
United States rather than the Soviet Union.  When states feel threatened, security is prioritized 
above all other concerns. 
 
2.3.3 Where will states give aid? 
The allocation of aid to specific states is a consequence of the donor’s purpose for its 
aid.  The simplest case is humanitarian aid.  Aid will be provided to states that are the victim of 
natural or anthropogenic disasters.  Most states that provide aid will offer some assistance to 
victim states though the amounts would be expected to vary based on the commercial and 
strategic importance of the recipient to the donor.  For instance, when a state is the victim of a 
disaster, potential donors that are in active security competition or conflict with the victim state 
are unlikely to be particularly generous but may provide a token amount in order to maintain 
their international reputation.  When the victim state is a particularly attractive potential market 
for the donor state’s products, a commercially oriented donor is likely to be more generous in 
its allocation of humanitarian aid in order to improve the donor’s image in the victim state, 
provide opportunities for more commercial contacts and better relations among elites in both 





Security oriented aid will flow to recipients that can help improve the donor’s security.  
The most straightforward case is balancing where a donor attempts to use aid to bolster the 
power of an ally or a state in conflict with its main adversary.  Donors can also use security 
oriented aid to induce a potential balancer to bandwagon with the donor instead of balance 
against it.  We would expect that a donor under threat will use aid allocations to reduce the 
influence of aid from its adversary by providing aid to reward recipient countries for defying 
its adversary.  For example, a donor would be expected to increase aid to an ally of its adversary 
if the relations between the two allies deteriorate, thereby reducing the power of the alliance 
against it. 
 
Aid for commercial purposes should be correlated with measures of the economic 
relationship and economic opportunity for the donor in the recipient country.  Recipients with 
large resource endowments needed by the donor, growing trade relations with the donor, and/or 
significant investments by donor country firms would be expected to receive more aid.   
 
2.3.4 How does wealth (economic power) affect aid behavior?  
In order to understand emerging donor behavior, we need to understand the effect of 
economic power on the desire and ability to provide foreign aid. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, emerging donor refers to states that have initiated or rapidly expanded their foreign 
aid programs since the 1990s.  The focus of many observers has been on those donors that 






Establishing a meaningful foreign aid program requires a certain level of resources and 
organization in order to provide the funding and administer the projects.  Very poor countries 
defined as “low income countries” (shown in Figure 2-5 on page 64) are very unlikely to be 
able to provide funds to establish an aid program and most do not have the requisite 
organizational capacity.  Even under extreme security threat, these states would find it very 
difficult to provide aid.  China and India are exceptions.  China established a significant aid 
program in the 1950s during its battle for recognition with Taiwan and India has for decades 
provided aid to its immediate neighbors as it struggled to stabilize South Asia after 
independence and partition in 1947.  China and India, as the world’s most populous countries, 
were able to afford surprisingly robust aid programs during this time due to their massive size 
and relatively effective government institutions.  While two of the world’s poorest countries at 
the time, they could spread the cost of aid over their billion or so people.  
 
Figure 2-5: Country Income Categories, 2016 
 





2.3.5 Path dependence and project development 
Foreign aid policies are subject to path dependency. That is, past decisions with respect 
to foreign aid have an influence on current and future aid decisions.  For this reason, I expect 
that there will be serial correlation in the statistical models of foreign aid commitments from 
China and Japan which must be dealt with in the regression analysis.  The technical details are 
discussed in APPENDIX 8. 
 
Path dependency is primarily the result of bureaucratic familiarity and the need to 
implement multi-year projects.  Bureaucratic familiarity is the idea that implementing a 
successful aid project is rewarding to the civil servants involved and makes them more likely 
to propose and process additional projects in the same country.  This factor is likely to hold 
sway when there are disagreements about aid policy or no strong political or security imperative 
driving aid allocation decisions at the highest levels of government.   
 
Aid bureaucracies tend to be risk averse and, hence, prefer to provide aid to projects 
that are well prepared with a reasonable level of engineering and design work completed. This 
tends to lengthen the process for preparing and approving aid allocations and is especially true 
for the most complex and expensive infrastructure projects which may be the result of several 
years of planning effort on the part of donors and recipients.  For this reason, aid allocations 
may not be annual but can come in large allocations several years apart.  Table 2-2 on page 66 
illustrates that grant allocations tend to be much more consistent than loans commitments.  
Between 2005 and 2006, Japan’s ODA grants to Cambodia increased by about 20 percent while 
loans dropped nearly 90 percent. The following year loans increased over 10 times (1000 
percent) while grants declined by 26 percent. This pattern is caused by the fact that loan projects 




takes longer and is more uncertain than for the types of projects funded by grants.  This pattern 
of ODA will be exaggerated in countries that receive a higher proportion of ODA loans.  
Countries that provide a high percentage of ODA grants relative to loans tend to have more 
consistent year-to-year allocations of foreign aid. 
 








1996  10,576   968   11,543  
1997  18,953   -     18,953  
1998  4,763   -     4,763  
1999  9,620   4,949   14,568  
2000  10,646   -     10,646  
2001  17,848   -     17,848  
2002  16,825   -     16,825  
2003  7,742   -     7,742  
2004  14,249   4,805   19,055  
2005  13,019   3,332   16,351  
2006  15,653   345   15,998  
2007  11,618   3,910   15,528  
2008  8,687   3,875   12,561  
2009  14,125   11,320   25,445  
2010  20,993   -     20,993  
2011  14,487   4,340   18,826  
2012  8,311   7,198   15,509  
2013  15,082   8,853   23,935  
2014  7,860   14,040   21,901  
Source: OECD DAC database. Converted to constant 2013 JPY. 
 
2.3.6 Causal mechanism between threat perception and aid decisions 
The causal mechanism between the level of threat perception and the allocation of aid 
is summarized in this section.  The hypothesis is based on the idea that when states perceive a 
significant threat to their security, they prioritize survival and security above all other 




diplomacy, foreign aid, among others. A high level of threat perception among decision-makers 
and political leaders leads them to prioritize security considerations in their aid decisions. The 
link between threat perception and aid decisions may vary, but in most countries, high-level 
decision-making bodies and political leaders have ultimate authority over aid budgets and 
country allocations.  I assert that threat perception is like a “cloud” that affects all of the actors 
with influence on aid allocation decisions and empowers those actors active in national security.  
For example, when military forces are dispatched to a foreign state (war, UN peacekeeping 
missions, etc.), the aid bureaucracy is likely to be tasked with promoting stability in that state 
with higher aid allocations.  For example, the coordination between the United States’ aid and 
security policy is evident in Iraq becoming the largest aid recipient from 2004-2007 and 
overtaken by Afghanistan in 2007 until 2016 when Syria became the largest recipient; all 
countries with substantial United States military operations in those years.109   
 
States that are threatened will seek allies and balance against the threatening state.  
Political leaders will respond by directing the transfer of resources, including aid, to states in 
conflict with or that are likely to join a balancing coalition against the threatening state.  State 
visits by leader that perceive significant security threats will often be based on security 
considerations.  For example, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe was reported to have visited 49 
countries in his first 20 months in office; far more than any previous prime minister.  The 
purpose of many of these visits, especially to India, Australia and ASEAN in particular, was 
reportedly to discuss and counter Chinese influence.110  State visits by threatened donors to 
developing countries are usually accompanied by aid commitments to the host to secure policy 
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actions that benefit the security of the donor.  All of these effects will manifest by higher 
significance of security variables than all other consideration in the aid commitment decision 
during high threat periods.  
 
When a country perceives no significant threat to its security, it is more likely to 
prioritize economic and social development above other concerns.  Under these low threat 
conditions, based on the logic underpinning the hypothesis, the “cloud” of threat perception 
will lift and economic policy makers will gain bureaucratic power in relation to the national 
security establishment.  Economic arguments around employment and economic 
competitiveness may even begin to dominate debates about military spending.  Under these 
conditions, decision-makers and political leaders will use the policy instruments at their 
disposal, including foreign aid, to promote economic wellbeing and domestic commercial 
interests.  Rather than seek alliances, states will seek markets and investment opportunities.  
Leaders may begin to prioritize state visits to countries where commercial interests are strong 
and seek to promote expanding business ties over security ties. These effects will manifest 
through the higher significance of commercial variables in the aid commitment decision during 
low threat periods. 
 
The theorized relationship between the aid commitments (the DV) to specific recipient 
countries, changes in the level of threat perception, and the explanatory power of the IV 





Figure 2-6: Theoretical framework 
 
Notes: IV = independent variable, DV = dependent variable  
 
The condition variable (CV) that determines the weight given to security and 
commercial importance is threat perception.  The measurement of threat perception is described 
in detail in Chapter 4.4 beginning on page 186. 
 
The IV are categorized as either commercial, security, or normative variables which can 
influence the donor to change its aid commitments.  The commercial IVs are based on recipient 
country resources and the extent of the economic and trade relations between to donor and the 
recipient.  Security variables will indicate the importance of the recipient to the donors security 
either to balance against an adversary, entice bandwagoning, or to buy security cooperation 
from the recipient.  Normative IVs indicate the need of the recipient (e.g. poverty and 
humanitarian crises) or factors that indicate normative values of the donor (either positively or 
negatively) would indicate democracy, freedom, and human rights.  Each variable (DVs, CV, 
and IVs) are explained and justified in detail in Chapter 4 beginning on page 151.   
 
I note that the theory implicitly assumes that the aid recipient has no agency in the aid 




donor decision based on a set of explanatory variables. Some of those variables are under the 
partial control of the recipient (whether to have a territorial conflict with the donor, for example), 
but overall, the model assumes that the amount given is a donor decision.  This is a reasonable 
simplification because aid is highly concessional and most recipients accept the aid that is 
offered.  But sometimes recipients may choose to reject an offer of aid based on their own 
political or security interests. States that become dependent on one donor may attempt to 
diversify their aid donor base in order to prevent excessive dependence on one benefactor.  
While the regression models implicitly assume that aid commitments are a donor decision, the 
case study analysis enables me to consider the impact of recipient actions on the aid 
commitment decisions of donors which provides a richer analysis of the donor-recipient 
relationship.  
 
2.4 Core hypothesis 
Japan and China’s foreign aid increasingly reflects security interests due to increased 
threat perception precipitated by the rise of China.  
 
The core hypothesis is a logical result of the idea that the states without a significant 
security threat will prioritize their economic wellbeing and will be willing to pursue policies 
that enable other states to achieve relative power gains as long as their own economy and 
domestic enterprises also benefit. States without a security threat will be willing to pursue 
economic interdependence and will use the policy instrument of foreign aid towards that end.  
If a state perceives that it is under threat from an adversary, it will prioritize security interests 
over commercial benefits and become sensitive to relative gains.  Threatened states will avoid 
economic interdependence and will use the policy instrument of foreign aid to balance against 





The hypothesis in this dissertation holds that China’s rise has resulted in an increasing 
perception of threat in Japan and the United States.  The rapid increase in China’s military 
capability and increasingly belligerence regarding territorial claims including against Japan has 
caused Japanese threat perception to increase.  China’s increasingly hostile views toward 
Taiwan and its intent to counter the ability of the United States to defend Taiwan, its claims in 
the South China Sea, combined with China’s lack of progress towards democracy and lack of 
respect for human rights have caused the United States and Japan to increasingly perceive 
China’s security interests as opposed to their own.  This has led to increasing China threat 
discourse in both countries which, I claim, reflects an actual increase in threat perception.  
China in turn, perceives that the United States, and Japan through its alliance with the United 
States, seek to contain China’s rise.  The strengthening of the United States – Japan alliance 
around 1996-1997 was perceived as targeting China and to counter China’s intent to eventually 
take control of Taiwan.  China’s rise did not cause China’s threat perception to increase, but its 
rise set in motion a threat spiral that resulted in moderate to high levels of threat perception in 
Japan and China.   
 
Initially, Japan saw China as an economic opportunity. When China opened itself to aid 
in 1979, Japan was the first country to provide it.  Japan rapidly expanded its foreign aid giving 
to China and was consistently the largest single aid donor to China through the 1990s. During 
this time, China’s economy consistently grew at 10% or more and China was then a source of 
raw materials, coal and oil. Until the mid-1990s, China was not a significant threat to Japan but 
was a huge potential commercial opportunity.  Beginning in the mid 1990s with China’s nuclear 
tests and increasing belligerence around territorial disputes with Japan and in the South China 




a security threat from China has slowly increased. For a detailed analysis of the security factors 
that led to Japan ending its ODA lending to China, see APPENDIX 6.  
 
China’s perception of the West’s and Japan’s intentions were always wary, especially 
after the international reaction to the Tiananmen Massacre which saw most countries cut off 
aid to China. The reaffirmation and strengthening of the United States-Japan Security Alliance 
expressed in the 1996 United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the 1997 
Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense cooperation emphasized that the alliance extended 
to situations surrounding Japan that influence Japan’s security.  China interpreted those moves 
as targeting China.  The United States is the dominant military power in Asia so China’s threat 
perception is most likely to be tied to its perception of the United States intentions and the 
degree to which Japan supports them as its most powerful ally.  China's rapidly increasing 
power and big expansion of its aid programs under the “Going Out” initiative may be 
interpreted by Japan as a strategic challenge and potential security threat. Japan would be 
expected to respond by scaling back its own aid to China (which has occurred – see APPENDIX 
6) and to use aid programs to bolster potential allies and balance against China (which will be 
tested in this dissertation). These changes are likely to be interpreted by China as a containment 
strategy by Japan and the United States111 which compels China to increasingly target its own 
aid program towards security goals (which will be tested in this dissertation).   
 
The core hypothesis asserts that China and Japan have increasing levels of threat 
perception.  That increase in threat perception has changed how both countries utilize their 
foreign aid programs.  As both countries become more sensitive to relative gains and attempt 
                                                 




to balance against threats (China in the case of Japan and the United States in the case of China), 
the factors that determine who gets aid from Japan and China and how much will increasingly 
be security variables rather than commercial variables. Normative factors are expected to be a 
minor factor in aid decisions of both countries when under a significant security threat because 
states under threat prioritize survival above all other considerations.  
 
The United States is not included in the hypothesis but plays a major role in the 
international relations between Japan and China and both countries’ relationships with the 
international system.  The main threat to China is not Japan by itself but the threat of the Japan-
United States alliance and the ability of the United States, using its military assets based in 
Japan and Korea, to defend Taiwan.  As Japan’s main security guarantor, Japan is also likely 
to base its security decisions on its place in the alliance and the need to gain reassurance from 
the United States that its security will be protected.  As China becomes more threatened, it is 
likely to counter both United States and Japanese security interests.  As Japan becomes more 
threatened, it is likely to support United States security interests.   
 
2.4.1 Predictions 
The following predictions logically follow from the hypothesis: 
1. Commercial orientation of foreign aid should decline as threat perception 
increases.  I expect commercial variables to be most significant during low threat 
periods and less significant during high threat periods. 
2. Security orientation of foreign aid should increase as threat perception increases.  
I expect security variables to be most significant during high threat periods and 




3. Japan’s aid policy should support United States security goals as threat 
perception increases because of the dependence on the United States-Japan 
alliance for Japan’s security. 
4. China’s aid policy should increasingly counter United States security interests 
as its threat perception of the United States and the Japan-United States alliance 
increases. 
 
2.4.2 Hypothesis testing 
The core hypothesis of the dissertation will be tested using regression 
analysis of panel data to estimate the statistical significance of commercial, security 
and normative factors in explaining variations in aid commitments from Japan and 
China.  Two case studies will supplement the panel regressions to confirm the 
validity of the statistical findings and elaborate on the factors that drove Japan and 
China to make aid commitments over the analysis period.  In this way, each of the 
predictions above will be either confirmed or not.  
 
Predictions 1 and 2 will be tested statistically in two steps.  First, panel 
regressions will estimate the statistically significant variables that cause aid 
commitments from Japan and China to increase or decrease during high and low 
threat periods.  The number of statistically significant variables of each category 
(commercial, security and normative) will be identified to provide a general 
indication of the main variables driving aid commitments.  In step 2, three separate 




each period and the adjusted112 R2 calculated.  Adjusted R2 is the percent of variation 
in aid commitments explained by the variables included in the model.  In this way, 
the explanatory power of each variable category is estimated. 
 
Predictions 3 and 4 will be confirmed or not based on an analysis of the type 
of security variables that are estimated to be significant and the direction of 
causation.  Security variables that represent United States security interests will be 
tested to determine whether Japan is basing its aid commitment decisions on support 
for United States security goals or not.  Likewise, the same variables will be 
estimated for China to determine if it is basing its aid commitment decisions on 
countering United States security interests.  During high threat periods, I expect the 
variables representing United States security interests to be significant and positive 
for Japan and significant and negative for China.  During low threat periods, United 
States security interest variables should become less significant. 
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3 FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS OF JAPAN AND CHINA113 
This literature review chapter describes the development of Japan’s and China’s foreign 
aid programs over time and concludes with a review of the quantitative research on their foreign 
aid programs.  This section is important to enable the reader to understand the context and scale 
of the aid programs established by these major donors and to place this dissertation in relation 
to the existing literature on the foreign aid of Japan and China.  I also critique the methods and 
approach of the quantitative research on foreign aid motivation and highlight areas where this 
dissertation improves on past studies. 
 
3.1 Japan: The first emerging power donor 
Although Japan is one of the largest established DAC donors with a program largely in 
line with the standards of other DAC members, many of the criticisms leveled at emerging 
donors were also leveled at Japan when its aid program was first established.114  The purpose 
of this section is not to review the entire history of Japan’s foreign aid program.  The point is 
to place Japanese foreign aid in context, highlight the key points when Japanese foreign aid 
policy changed, and set the stage for the quantitative analysis later in the dissertation.   
 
It is often said that Japan’s ODA began in the 1950s with war reparations to Southeast 
Asian countries, but this is not entirely accurate. Japan used special loans (so called “Nishihara 
loans”) to China as early as 1916 to induce China to declare war on Germany in WWI.115  Orr 
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describes these as the first concrete example of Japanese aid.  The loans were in the form of 
credits provided by Japanese banks, backed by the government. By 1918, seven loans were 
provided for 145 million yen for infrastructure and investment in various enterprises.  Japan’s 
occupation of Manchuria also coincided with financial schemes, similar to modern aid, to 
incentivize concessions from the Chinese government. 116 
 
After WWII, Japan was initially an aid recipient rather than a donor and was once one 
of the World Bank’s largest borrowers. From 1946 to 1951, Japan received about $5 billion 
through the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas Fund (GARIOA) and the Economic 
Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas Fund (EROA).117  Japan received its last World Bank loan in 
1966 and ceased to be a developing member country of the World Bank in 1967.   
 
Japan joined the OECD DAC in 1964 and reported its economic aid activities to the 
DAC reaching back to 1960.  Japan included both traditional ODA and reparations payments 
in this data.  The history of Japanese ODA commitments and net disbursements is shown in 
Figure 3-1 on page 78. 
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Figure 3-1: Japan's Official Development Assistance, 1960-2017 (constant 2016 USD) 
 
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee 
 
Figure 3-1 on page 78 above highlights the periods of growth and decline in Japan’s 
foreign aid program. Care should be taken in interpreting “net disbursements”.  Since Japan 
gives a substantial portion of its ODA in the form of concessional lending, repayments on prior 
loans are subtracted from new ODA to arrive at the net disbursements figure.  This means that 
if Japan receives substantial repayments, even while growing its overall ODA budget, the net 
disbursements figure could decline, and this is what actually occurs in the mid 2000s. The large 
increases in ODA from the late 80s to the mid 90s were being repaid and subtracted from 
outgoing ODA disbursements.  Even though ODA commitments had been rising strongly since 
2001, the disbursement (net) shows a stagnant program. The net disbursement data is 
misleading, yet the narrative of a stagnant or declining aid budget is the conventional wisdom 
in Japan. 
 
The trajectory of Japan’s aid policy in many ways bears striking resemblance to the aid 




understand the purposes and practices of emerging donors today as well as the reaction of 
established powers, Japan’s experience and history as an emerging donor remains the best prior 
example.  The following sections introduce the phases and evolution of Japan’s aid program 
from the 1950s to the present. 
 
3.1.1 Phase 1 – reparations and commercial orientation 
As part of its efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations with its neighbors after WWII 
and following the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951, Japan agreed to provide 
reparations to the United States and its allies and signed additional peace treaties and bilateral 
agreements with most East Asian states and Micronesia.  Japan’s foreign aid grew from this 
reparations program.  Japan paid reparations to Burma (Myanmar), the Philippines, Indonesia, 
and South Vietnam and provided economic and technical assistance to Laos and Cambodia who 
had renounced the right to receive reparations. By the mid-1970s, most other countries in South 
and East Asia entered into agreements to accept economic aid and technical assistance from 
Japan.  In the cases of South Korea and China,118 reparations were not provided but the 
economic aid programs established by Japan to assist those countries were mutually understood 
to represent aid in lieu of reparations.119 While reparations do not meet the current definition of 
foreign aid since they are meant to compensate victims for costs incurred during wartime rather 
than support donor interest or recipient development. However, if reparations could also lead 
to the benefits that can be derived from providing foreign aid, it would have been foolish not to 
take advantage of the opportunity.   
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In 1954, the same year it began paying reparations, Japan joined the Colombo Plan and 
commenced providing technical cooperation to its Asian neighbors in addition to reparations 
payments.  Japan’s first non-reparations related aid was in the form of soft loans to India in 
1958.  Japan explicitly integrated its foreign aid program with its economic interests. To quote 
a Japanese government official, “In the 1960s, the main motives for Japan's economic 
cooperation were to promote its exports and assist its industries in overseas 
investment…Promoting commercial and industrial interests was the main purpose of such 
cooperation."120   
 
To summarize, the key features of Japan’s first phase of ODA were: 
• Established initially as war reparations 
• Economic aid and technical assistance provided at modest levels 
• Focused almost entirely on Asian countries 
• Largely focused on commercial benefits including access to resources and 
export promotion121 
 
3.1.2 Phase 2 – resource (and other) shocks 
The 70s and 80s were the period of rapidly growing foreign aid from Japan which 
became the world’s largest provider of foreign aid by 1989.  We should be careful about 
inferring policy meaning to the of the growth in Japanese aid during the 1980s since much of it 
was the result of exchange rate fluctuations including a 50% depreciation in the United States 
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Dollar (USD) relative to the Japanese Yen (JPY). Though exaggerated by this exchange rate 
movement, nevertheless, Japan did substantially grow its aid budget during the second phase 
of Japanese aid. 
 
The period 1973-1974 was a major turning point in Japanese ODA policy. First, the 
“Nixon Shock” in 1971 signaled the end of the convertibility of the USD to gold and the era of 
fixed exchange rates established under the Bretton Woods System came to an end by 1973.  
Second, Nixon’s visit and opening to China had a profound effect on Japanese foreign policy 
and eventual approach to foreign aid. Third and most important was the oil price shock of 1973-
74.  The economic impact of rapid oil price escalation clarified Japan’s resource dependency in 
startling fashion. Japan’s economy was thrown into recession after a remarkable period of 
economic growth. Though the economy recovered by the mid 1970s, economic growth never 
again approached the 10% levels seen in the 1960s. The oil crisis was the turning point of Japan 
moving from a rapid growth, developing economy to a moderate to slow growing developed 
country. According to Orr and Yasutomo, Japan quickly moved to include states in the Middle 
East122 in its ODA programs to ensure a steady supply of oil to its economy.123 
 
Overall, the purpose of Japan’s foreign aid broadened in during this phase. Foreign aid 
first became a major tool for Japan's public diplomacy in 1970s124 based on the oil shock and 
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's ASEAN trip in January 1974 which was met with riots in 
Thailand and Indonesia.  Japan changed its foreign aid policy in Southeast Asia to expand aid 
amounts and ease the terms and conditions of Japanese aid. Japan explicitly tied its aid policy 
                                                 
122 Dennis Yasutomo, “Why Aid? Japan as an aid great power,” 492-3. 
123 Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, 39. 




to the goal of improving interstate relations between Indochina and ASEAN states.125 Japan 
also initiated the idea of “omiyage gaiko” or souvenir diplomacy.126 Prime Ministerial visits 
were coordinated with foreign aid packages that were usually announced with some fanfare 
during the visit garnering positive publicity for Japan’s largesse. This practice also had the 
effect of increasing the political influence on aid within the Japanese bureaucracy.  Prime 
Ministers could influence aid amounts and allocations simply by scheduling state visits which 
the Japanese aid bureaucracy would then assist by developing aid packages that would be 
announced during the visit.  
 
The literature on Japan’s foreign aid highlights several key purposes in Japan’s foreign 
aid during this period which to some degree persist to this day.  Commercial interests continued 
to play a role in Japanese aid decisions often combining with foreign direct investment from 
the private sector. But in addition to commercial goals and public diplomacy, aid was finally 
conceived of as a way to promote Japanese national security during this phase. In the late 70s, 
an advisory group to Prime Minister Ohira first coined the term “comprehensive national 
security” and saw a place for foreign aid to support that goal for Japan. The “Report on 
Comprehensive National Security,” sometimes called the Inoki Report, was submitted to the 
government in 1980.127 It defined security broadly and stressed military preparedness and 
maintaining alliances, included energy and food security as well as dealing with natural 
disasters.128 The Diplomatic Blue Book (1981) defined comprehensive national security as 
follows: “to secure our national survival or protect our social order from various kinds of 
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external threats which will or may have serious effects on the foundation of our nation's 
existence, by preventing the arising of such threats, or by properly coping with them in the case 
of their emergence, through the combination of diplomacy, national defense, economic and 
other policy measures."129  The policy of “comprehensive national security” was formally 
introduced by Prime Minister Suzuki in 1980.130 The policy began to articulate how foreign aid 
would be combined with defense and diplomacy as an integrated approach to national security 
and promoting Japan’s security interests.131 
 
By the late 1970s, according to Koppel and Orr, Japan increasingly saw foreign aid as 
part of its contribution to the United States-Japan Security Alliance.132  At the time, many in 
the United States saw Japan as a security free-rider and the Japanese hoped that its foreign aid 
contributions that complimented United States security priorities would lessen trade frictions 
between the United States and Japan.133 As a state with exceptional limits on its military, Japan 
was using its burgeoning aid budget as a way to play a role in international affairs in partnership 
with the United States. Japan repeatedly used aid as a stand-in for more direct contributions to 
the United States-Japan military alliance. In this sense, Japan’s aid program took on an 
increasing role as a strategic tool and, while still supportive of Japan’s commercial interests, 
also came to serve its security interests.  
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Lastly, this period of Japanese ODA was characterized by large and sustained current 
account surpluses that needed to be dealt with to placate trading partners and prevent 
destabilizing the international financial system.134 The two options for dealing with such large 
sustained surpluses were 1) to reduce the current account deficit by raising domestic demand 
(through tax cuts and/or raising investment in Japan), and 2) to “recycle” the surplus as 
investment in countries with corresponding current account deficits. 135  The government 
announced its first “recycling program” in 1987 with a goal of sending $65 billion overseas 
within 5 years.136 Of the $65 billion, about $12.5 billion was ODA. The goal of the government 
was to deflect criticism and argue that Japan’s large surpluses were actually beneficial to the 
rest of the world and, through support for countries of particular interest to the United States, 
should be considered part of Japan’s contribution to the United States – Japan Security 
Alliance.137   
 
3.1.3 Phase 3 – post Cold-War 
Like in many countries, foreign aid became confusing and controversial to Japanese 
policy makers in the aftermath of the Cold War.  The conventional wisdom has been that Japan 
provides aid as a supplement to its economic policies to promote its own export sector138 and 
secure resources for itself.139 Orr140 has argued that the commercial orientation of Japanese aid 
had lessened over time as evidenced by the fact that Japan reduced the amount of aid tied to 
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Japanese contractors throughout the 1980s which reduced the commercial benefits to Japan of 
its aid program. By the early 1990s, most of Japan’s ODA was untied and the Japanese business 
community began to disengage from aid policy debates. Japanese businesses won fewer and 
fewer contracts and, by the late 1990s, had largely lost interest in aid policy.141 
 
Japan has transformed its own discourse around aid.  Stung by criticisms of its past aid 
practices, Japan issued its first ODA Charter in 1992 to explain its rationale for providing aid 
and ground it in Japan’s respect for international norms and values. Subsequent revisions have 
further sharpened the focus on promoting democratic norms, peace, humanitarian assistance, 
environmental benefits and economic development while acknowledging the potential for 
mutual benefits for Japan. At its Houston Summit in 1990, the G7 policy statement adopted 
democracy promotion as an international norm which was quickly adopted in Japan’s 1992 
ODA Charter. See Table 3-1 on page 89 for an overview of the key elements of the 1992, 2003, 
and 2015 ODA/Development Cooperation Charters. 
 
The ODA charters do not emphasize commercial benefits directly. Hirata points to the 
discrediting of the “development state” as the key to understanding the shift away from 
commercially oriented foreign aid.142 Corruption scandals and economic mismanagement led 
to a lack of confidence in existing government institutions and big business among the Japanese 
public and led to demands that Japan change its ODA policies to reflect the norms and values 
becoming more prevalent among the public.  Hirata claims that Japanese citizens and NGOs 
have become more socially active and have adopted the international norms and values of 
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humanitarianism.  The result, she says, has been increasing pressure on the government to 
reflect these values in its ODA. 
 
In addition to Japan’s policy statements in the charters, Japan's ODA/Development 
Cooperation White Papers have increasingly emphasized the promotion of universal values and 
norms as a major purpose for Japanese ODA.  For instance, the White Paper on Development 
Cooperation 2015 begins with a detailed explanation of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) adopted at the United Nations (UN) Millennium Summit in 2000 and details Japan’s 
specific contributions to achieving the MDGs through its ODA.143 These goals have little 
relation to what is normally considered national interests. They include eradicating extreme 
poverty, universal primary education, gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving 
maternal health, combating infectious diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and 
developing global partnerships for development.   
 
In 1998, the Japanese government first adopted the idea of human security, defined as 
“freedom from want and freedom from fear”, as a motivation for ODA.144  The appointment of 
Sadako Ogata, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as the head of JICA in 2003 
was seen as a watershed in the incorporation of humanitarian norms in Japan’s aid policy. At 
that time, Ogata and Amartya Sen co-chaired a Japanese government commission on human 
security that asserted the ODA should fund “human-centered development, peace building, and 
human security.”145 
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Since the early 1990s, Japan has increasingly described ODA as a tool to promote basic 
human needs and democratic values. Even before the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan cut ODA to 
Myanmar in 1988 in response to the military coup146 and cut aid to China after the Tiananmen 
Massacre147. From 1991 to 2000, the Japanese government reported that it applied negative 
sanctions using ODA 18 times.148  When Japan restarted aid to Myanmar in 1995 after Aug San 
Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, ODA focused heavily on meeting basic human 
needs.149  Japan also utilized ODA to address post conflict humanitarian disasters in Sri Lanka 
(2004), Timor Leste (1999) and Afghanistan (2003). According to Kamidohzono, Gomez and 
Mine, Japan has incorporated the international norms of poverty reduction and disaster response 
in its ODA policy.150  
 
Following a peak in giving after the Asian financial crisis (1997), Japanese ODA 
stagnated at much lower levels than pre-1996. In 2002, Japan’s aid commitments reached the 
lowest point since 1989 potentially signaling a turning point in the amount and purpose of 
Japanese ODA in a changing security environment.  
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The recent literature on Japan’s foreign aid policy has pointed to a “securitization” of 
ODA.  Some scholars (Jain151; Yoshimatsu and Trinidad152; Carvalho and Potter153) point to 
Japan’s perception of a threat from China as a driver of Japan’s policy changes.  Relations with 
China deteriorated sharply in 2004 after a series of incidents perceived as threatening to Japan’s 
security including escalation of the Senkaku dispute, China drilling in an area where Japan’s 
and China’s declared Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) overlap, and the intrusion of a Chinese 
nuclear submarine in Japanese territorial waters in southern Okinawa.  There is evidence of 
increasing perception of a China threat in Japan after 2000 (which is explored in more detail in  
Section 4.4 beginning on page 186).  By 2013, Prime Minister Abe gave an interview with the 
Washington Post where he laid out plans for deterring China, which included boosting military 
spending and strengthening ties with Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and other nations that share 
concerns about Chinese actions.154 Whether Japan’s aid program has entered a new phase more 
tied to Japan’s national security strategy will be analyzed in detail later in this dissertation. 
 
3.1.4 Japanese ODA charters 
Japan made major changes to its approach to national security in 2013 which was further 
elaborated and codified in the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter. 155  The National 
Security Strategy published in 2013 describes Japan's security situation as increasingly "severe". 
The first security challenge identified is the changing balance of power which largely refers to 
the relative increase in China's power vis-a-vis Japan and the United States.  Japan's economy 
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depends on secure trade routes which necessitate secure shipping in the East and South China 
Seas.  Japan sees China's increasing assertiveness with respect to territorial claims as a growing 
threat to its national security.  Japan continues to rely on the United States-Japan Security 
Treaty as the foundation of its national security strategy, but also seeks to make Japan a 
"proactive contributor to peace".  To achieve this, a fundamental rethinking of Japan's 
international cooperation initiatives resulted in a removal of the term ODA from the charter to 
emphasize the broader notion of development cooperation. 
 
Since 1992, Japan has published periodic charters to lay out the policy thinking behind 
its foreign aid program. The policy statements do not always coincide with policy changes as 
policy is more reactive to international conditions than policy statements that require extensive 
political discussion and broad-based consensus.  The following table highlights the key 
elements of each ODA Charter (now referred to as the Development Cooperation Charter). Key 
differences are highlights in italics. 
 
Table 3-1: Japanese Aid Charters 




Promote world peace and 
global prosperity. Promote 
friendly relations between 
Japan and other countries 
Contribute to peace and 
development of 
international community 
thereby helping to ensure 
Japans security and 
prosperity 
"Proactive contribution to 
peace".  Secure Japan's 
security and prosperity.  
Maintain international 
order based on universal 
values 
Principles 1) Recipient request (based 
on self-help taking into 
account socioeconomic 
1) Recipient need159 (based 
on self-help taking into 
account socioeconomic 
1) Avoid use of 
development cooperation 
for military purposes or 
aggravation of conflicts  
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conditions and bi-lateral 
relations) 
2) Non-intervention in 
domestic affairs 
3) Avoid use of ODA for 
military purpose or 
aggravation of conflicts 
4) Take account of military 
spending, development of 
WMD and arms exports 
5) Promote democracy, 
market economy and human 
rights 
conditions and bilateral 
relations)  
2) Non-intervention in 
domestic affairs 
3) Avoid use of ODA for 
military purpose or 
aggravation of conflicts 
4) Take account of military 
spending, development of 
WMD and arms exports 
5) Promote democracy, 
market economy and human 
rights 
2) Promote human security  
3) Assist self-help efforts, 
but also proactively 
propose cooperation 
projects (taking into 
account socioeconomic 
conditions and bilateral 
relations) 
4) Promote democracy, 




Focus on East Asia in 
general, ASEAN in particular. 
Extend to rest of world based 
on LDC status. 
Focus on East Asia 
including ASEAN, due 
consideration to poverty in 
South Asia and democracy 
and market economy 
transition in Central Asia 
Prioritize assistance to 
other regions based on 





1) Global problems such as 
environment and population 
2) Basic human needs and 
humanitarian crisis response 
3) HR and technology 
4) Infrastructure 
5) Structural adjustment 
1) Poverty reduction 
2) Sustainable growth 





4) Peace building 
1) Environment and 
climate change 
2) Ensure equity for 
vulnerable populations 
3) Promote women’s 
participation 
4) Prevent fraud and 
corruption 
 
Source: summarized by the author from the charters. 
 
A number of changes in language are notable in Table 3-1 on page 89.  The 2003 charter 
first highlights that the purpose of ODA is to ensure Japan’s security and economic well-being 
and 2015 adds Japan’s adherence to universal values.  Under aid principles, Japan’s charters 
begin with responding to recipient request, which is altered to recipient need in 2003 and 
removed entirely in 2015. The non-intervention principle is also dropped in 2015.  Overall, the 






Another policy change involves how Japan uses ODA for quasi-military activities.  
While explicitly stating that Japan will not provide aid for military purposes, the 2015 Charter 
now allows Japan to provide aid to the armed forces of recipient countries for nonmilitary 
activities such as peacekeeping and disaster response160. These policy changes, combined with 
Japan’s recent practice of providing quasi-military equipment in the form of coast guard patrol 
ships for the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam 161 , imply that the security factors are 
increasingly important to Japanese aid commitment decisions. 
 
3.1.5 Japan’s aid decision-making system 
Japanese aid institutions have gone through multiple reorganizations since the founding 
of Japan’s first professional aid agency, the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) 
in 1962 and its first loan aid fund, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) in 1961. 
OCTA was reorganized into the JICA under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1974 
and combined the technical assistance and training activities of multiple ministries and agencies. 
JICA was primarily responsible for technical assistance and training while MOFA administered 
grant aid. JBIC was formed in 1999 with the merger of the Japan Export Import Bank (JEXIM) 
and OECF. In 2003, JICA was converted to an Incorporated Administrative Agency technically 
independent of MOFA. In 2008, the ODA lending function of JBIC and some of the grant 
making authority of MOFA were transferred to the “new JICA”.162  
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The overall trend beginning in the late 1990s with the establishment of JBIC and 
followed by centralization of aid functions in JICA in 2008, has been an attempt to simplify the 
ODA system structure and to elevate aid policy and decision-making authority to the political 
leadership. In 2006, as a result of a top to bottom review of ODA institutions and policy making, 
the Japanese government established the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council (OECC) 
chaired by the Prime Minister and led by a committee of cabinet ministers.  The OECC was 
responsible for formulating basic ODA strategies, deciding ODA support for specific countries, 
reviewing implementation of important projects, and for leading revisions of ODA charters and 
medium-term policy statements. The ODA implementation system was reorganized and 
consolidated under the “new JICA”.  
 
The OECC, however, was disbanded by the Democratic Party administration in 2011 
leaving no standing high-level committee to review overall ODA policy.163  However, the 
overall elevation of ODA policy making to the highest levels of government during this time 
appeared to lead to some controversial aid allocation for quasi-military equipment in Indonesia 
and the Philippines and an increasing focus on national interests in aid policy.164  Even before 
the establishment of the OECC, Tsukasa Takashi (2015) shows that the power over Japan’s aid 
policy to China had already shifted dramatically from MOFA to the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) beginning in the late 1990s.165  This elevation in decision-making authority resulted in 
Japan’s decision to stop ODA lending to China, which is reviewed in detail in APPENDIX 6: 
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Supplemental Case Study: Japan’s Aid to China.  According to the OECD 2014 Development 
Cooperation Peer Review for Japan, the 2013 National Security Strategy also elevated ODA 
policy as an element of national security by emphasizing the “three Ds” (diplomacy, 
development and defense) under the guidance of the National Security Council.166  The overall 
structure of Japan’s ODA decision-making and allocation system (after the 2006 reform) is 
presented in Figure 3-2 on page 93. 
 
Figure 3-2: Japan’s aid system after 2006 reforms 
 
Sources: Adapted from Izumi Ohno, “Japan’s ODA Policy and Reforms since the 1990s and Role in the New Era 
of Development Cooperation,” Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2014; OECD, Development 
Cooperation Peer Reviews: Japan, Paris: Development Assistance Committee, 2014; and Likki-Lee Pitzen, 
“Japan’s Changing Official Development Assistance: How Institutional Reforms Affected the Role of Japan’s 
Private Sector in ODA Delivery,” Lund University: Center for East and South-East Asian Studies, 2015. 
                                                 







3.2 Evolution of China’s foreign aid 
The purpose of this section is to trace key points in the evolution of China’s aid program, 
review the literature of China’s foreign aid, and identify shifts in China’s approach to foreign 
aid that can be tested in the quantitative analysis later in the dissertation. Though China’s aid 
program has garnered a great deal of attention in recent years, China is not a new donor. China’s 
aid was initially used to support the spread of international communism, then declined after 
China opened to the world in the late 1970s, before becoming a major emerging donor since 
the late 1990s.  China’s aid program has changed over the past 50 years responding to changes 
in both the international system and China’s domestic conditions and needs and has now 
become a major tool in China’s engagement with the rest of the world. 
 
China declines to publish much detailed information on its foreign aid activities. China 
has shown recent signs of openness in publishing the White Paper of China’s Foreign Aid, 
which provides a general policy overview, summary data, and useful information about China’s 
aid structure and distribution.167  It does not provide any detailed information on the country, 
project, or timing of aid allocations or disbursements. This lack of specificity and 
transparency 168 , combined with a general distrust of Chinese intentions among Western 
countries, has led to both unease about China’s aid motivations and impacts and an expanding 
scholarly interest in understanding China’s aid activities.  While China began providing aid in 
the 1950s, it has only become especially controversial since the early 2000s. There is 
widespread suspicion that China uses its aid to draw countries away from the Western powers, 
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enable despotic governments to legitimize its own lack of democratic governance, and secure 
access to natural resources.169  
 
Most of the scholarly work on China’s ODA activities has focused on Africa170 where 
China’s ODA has rapidly expanded171 and overlaps with large aid programs from OECD DAC 
member countries. 172  This supposed aid “competition” has spawned a backlash in DAC 
members due to the lack of information and a perception that such aid is self-interested, rewards 
despotic regimes, and diminishes the supposed effectiveness of aid from DAC members. 
Though such criticism may be self-serving, the lack of data on aid flows by country and by 
project has provided critics of China’s ODA with enough uncertainly to make unprovable 
claims regarding the amount, impact and intent of China’s ODA. 
 
Recent work by scholars knowledgeable of China’s aid practices have generally found 
that China’s aid is not so different from the aid of DAC members. Kobayashi173 presents a 
comprehensive outline of China’s foreign aid policies and practices and notes the historical 
focus of Chinese aid on increasing the number of countries friendly to China and predisposed 
to its interests; a view that corresponds to a realist interpretation of aid.  One of China’s main 
principles for providing aid is the notion of mutual benefit, which parallels Japan’s focus on 
stimulating its domestic economy as a co-benefit of foreign aid.  Brautigam174 claims that the 
aid packages prepared by China resemble the programs promoted by Japan as a means of 
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fostering commercial and investment opportunities in East and Southeast Asia; a view that 
comports with commercial liberalism. 
 
Researchers that have more carefully delved into the question of aid intent have not 
found that China is much different than any other country in their use of aid.  Dreher and 
Fuchs175 utilize the first publicly available project level data set176 on Chinese ODA to Africa 
and found that there is no empirical evidence that China’s ODA is inferior from a humanitarian 
point of view and that the criticisms are largely unjustified.  Many international relations 
scholars find little evidence that DAC donors are motivated by humanitarian concerns, so the 
assertion that China is the same as other donors may or may not calm any nerves regarding the 
intent of China’s aid.  Dreher and Fuchs find that political factors are important for determining 
aid allocations from China, but this also turns out to be true for most other major donors 
including Japan and the United States.177  Aid allocations from traditional donors are often 
associated with security interests and tend to be correlated with UN voting patterns. 178  
Criticizing China for behaving the same as DAC members may be disingenuous, but if China’s 
interests are in conflict with Western powers and promoting competing institutional 
frameworks in the international system, concern about China’s aid may not be entirely 
unfounded.  
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Many studies looking at donor motivations for foreign aid allocations find a mix of 
diplomatic and security goals,179 political self-interest,180 commercial self-interest,181 as well as 
some degree of humanitarian intent.182  So the question is not whether China’s aid is like aid 
from existing donors, but to what extent are China’s interests in conflict with existing donors 
and whether China’s aid harms the interests of DAC members? If China’s aid program is meant 
to support Chinese business and commercial interests, this competition may not be alarming 
and can simply be taken as normal international competition for business.  However, if China’s 
aid allocations are meant to challenge existing institutions in the international system, 
undermine relations between other donors and aid recipients by displacing existing donor-
recipient relationships, or support despotic regimes that reject the established norms, its aid 
could still be destabilizing.  
 
One source of confusion with respect to Chinese aid is the difficulty identifying which 
financial flows from China are aid and which are simply commercial loans and investments. If 
we do not understand what flows represent aid, we can easily confuse trade finance and FDI 
with foreign aid.  For example, a report for the United States Congressional Research Service 
lumps foreign aid and government financed projects together and asserts that China’s aid 
activities grew from around $1.5 billion in 2003 to $27.5 billion just three years later in 2006.183  
Both of these figures are probably inflated.  Work by Kitano and the JICA Research Institute 
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used publicly available Chinese budget information from multiple agencies to estimate that 
China’s gross foreign aid (using the DAC ODA definition) was about $826 million in 2003 and 
reached $1.482 billion in 2006 and about $5.8 billion in 2013.184  Kobayashi’s and Kitano’s 
estimates are probably underestimated because China does not count aid allocations the same 
way the DAC members do and much of what would count as ODA is not reported in official 
Chinese data.185  The lack of a consistent definition of aid used by Lum, et. al., Brautigam, 
Kitano, and others and the fact that many Chinese enterprises are state owned leads to 
misattribution of trade finance and outward FDI as Chinese aid in many published sources.  
Brautigam has shown that much of the purported Chinese aid would be categorized as Other 
Official Finance (OOF) rather than ODA if subjected to the same standard definitions as DAC 
members.  The Chinese government itself argues its export financing tools are largely consistent 
with OECD norms and practices with regards to state support for commercial activities.186   
 
Observers need to be cautious about measuring China’s foreign aid and interpreting the 
amounts in context.  However, China’s aid activities now appear to be substantial and much 
larger than the estimates from Kitano based on Chinese Statistical Yearbooks.187  Based on the 
newly available data provided by Aiddata.org and the manual adjustments made to prepare the 
database used in this dissertation, China’s aid reached a peak of $18.9 billion in 2012 before 
declining to around $14 billion in 2014.  At these levels, China’s aid commitments are 
comparable to Japan’s ($16 billion in 2014) and Germany’s ($15.4 billion) but substantially 
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less than the United States at $29 billion in 2014.  Figure 3-3 on page 99 displays the various 
estimates of China’s overall aid program using the estimates by Lin for 1960-1992,  Kobayashi 
for 1993 to 2005, and Kitano, Aiddata.org, and the adjusted Aiddata.org dataset (used in this 
study) from 2000 – 2014. 
 
Figure 3-3: Historical data on China's aid budget, 1960-2015 (current USD equivalent) 
 
Note: Aid as a % of GDP based on highest estimated aid amount and China current GDP in USD provided by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, USA. 
Sources: 1960-1992 from Lin, Teh-chang, “Beijing’s Foreign Aid Policy in the 1990s: continuity and Change,” 
Issues and Studies: A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1996).  
1993 to 2005 from Kobayashi, Takaaki, Evolution of China’s Aid Policy, Tokyo: JBIC Institute Working Paper No. 
27, April 2008.  
2000-2014 from Aiddata.org and Aiddata.org adjusted by author (top estimate) – see methodology in Chapter 
4.2.2.1. 
2001 to 2015 from Kitano, Naohiro, Estimating China’s Foreign Aid II: 2014 Update, JICA Research Institute, 
JICA-RI Working Paper No. 131, June 2016. 
 
China’s foreign aid is not the same as aid from most DAC donors. In some respects, 
China’s foreign aid is more like Japan’s foreign aid when it too was an emerging donor.  China, 




loans rather than grants. Grants are given but are a much smaller percentage than most DAC 
donors.  Almost all projects financed by Chinese loan aid must choose from a list of approved 
Chinese contractors.188  Chinese companies, usually State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), do not 
have an official role in aid decisions, but do approach recipient governments with proposals 
and help prepare aid requests to win the eventual contracts.189  This process is reminiscent of 
the practice of Japanese trading companies in the past.  In the early stages of Japan’s ODA 
program, Japanese trading companies would propose projects to aid recipient governments and 
support the governments requests to Japan for ODA while lobbying the Japanese government 
to approve the ODA project. This was a common practice at the time when Japan provided 
mostly tied loans.190 As one of the largest recipients of Japanese ODA in the 1990s, China was 
well aware of Japanese aid practices and later adopted a similar approach in its own program.191 
 
Another feature of Chinese aid is that most of the aid projects are provided as “turn-key” 
projects.192  This term refers to the provision of a project as a completed item that is turned over 
to the recipient with little input or contribution from the recipient.  The recipient must only 
“turn the key” to start using the road, port, or building.  This is in direct contrast to the standard 
way that most DAC donors approach aid projects.  DAC member aid is often given to the 
recipient government which is expected to implement and manage the construction of the 
project under the oversight and supervision of the donor’s office in the recipient country.  The 
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stated purpose is for the recipient government to take “ownership” of the projects and learn to 
plan and implement these types of projects themselves.   
 
Sometimes, as in the case of the United States Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), donors set up project implementation and management offices in the recipient countries 
to directly implement and manage aid projects including tendering.  These offices tend to hire 
the most competent staff available in the recipient country, often directly from the government.  
This can deprive the government of its most competent staff and the skills learned working in 
donor offices can mean those staff are now able to earn much more outside of government or 
in the quasi-public aid sector managing development projects as consultants and contractors to 
DAC donors.  Hiring qualified people from the government can have the unintended 
consequence of a brain-drain from developing country government agencies harming their 
ability to implement projects on their own.  China’s approach of providing a completed project 
avoids these issues and greatly accelerates project delivery but does not build domestic capacity 
for project implementation in the recipient. 
 
In contrast to most DAC aid, Chinese aid money often never leaves China.  Until 2018, 
China had no dedicated aid agency and operated its aid program out of the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) which is responsible for foreign aid planning, regulations, and the 
review and approval of projects.193  MOFCOM was responsible for grant aid and interest free 
loans while China Ex-Im Bank was responsible for concessional lending.  When a project has 
been approved, a contractor is competitively selected from the preapproved list of Chinese 
companies using China’s tendering systems specifically set up to conduct tenders for China’s 
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aid financed projects in foreign countries.194 Payment to the contractor generally occurs within 
China directly from the Chinese government to the contractor with funds rarely going through 
the recipient government.  The benefits of China’s approach are clear. Project delivery is faster 
and more efficient compared to the typical DAC funded aid project since the money largely 
stays in China.  These benefits are often valued by many governments who appreciate receiving 
projects faster.  Ironically, many democratic governments may appreciate aid from China more 
than others because they can deliver the project while still in power and claim credit. Many 
governments are tired of the inefficiency and lack of implementation progress dealing with 
DAC aid agencies and appreciate the Chinese approach that delivers a project quickly and 
reliably, even if the recipient government has less involvement in the implementation.   
 
On the other hand, local governments do not learn much that will help them plan and 
develop projects themselves. Critics point to the lack of social, environmental and labor 
standards in Chinese financed project.195 China also does not place many policy conditionalities 
on its aid.  Naim (2007) related the story of proposed World Bank loan to Nigeria to help 
upgrade and reform the Nigerian Railways sector that was cancelled in preference to an offer 
from China to rehabilitate the railway network with no need to reform the institutions.196  
Further criticisms have been leveled at the willingness of China to provide aid to Zimbabwe 
under Robert Mugabe and to Sudan during its civil conflict without imposing requirements for 
political reform or respect for human rights.197   
 
                                                 
194 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 110. 
195 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid, Kindle Location 1794 of 3414. 
196 Moises Naim, "Rogue Aid," 95-6. 




The main criticism from aid recipients (rather than other donors) has been the flip side 
of China’s efficient project implementation system.  The language barrier and access to low-
wage labor within China makes it easier for Chinese contractors to use all or mostly Chinese 
labor even for tasks that require limited skills in countries with a large amount of surplus labor.  
The importation of labor that into impoverished countries where people are desperate for jobs 
has led to social frictions around some Chinese aid financed projects.198  
 
Like Japan before it, the rapid growth of aid from China combined with a lack of 
understanding about the practices and interests at work shaping the aid programs engender 
suspicion.  Japan was even criticized for its desire to quickly resume lending to China after the 
Tiananmen Massacre as an example of its tendency to shy away from policy conditions to its 
aid.  However, Japan was an OECD DAC member and quite transparent about its aid program.  
In the case of China, the unease is magnified by the lack of transparency and inability to 
distinguish aid from other financial flows.   
 
The following sections detail the phases of China’s aid program.  I have largely taken 
the broad 3-phase framework proposed by Tang et. al.199 and Brautigam200 but adjusting the 
endpoints between Phase 2 and Phase 3 to match the year of implementing China’s “Going Out” 
policy (1999) 201  which marks the beginning of China’s concerted effort to develop 
internationally competitive enterprises through outward engagement and foreign direct 
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investment.  China’s own report on the 60-years of its aid program specifies four periods 
dividing what I call Phase 2 into two sections: 1) the “reform” period (late 70s and 80s) and 2) 
the “market” mechanism period (1990s).202 I choose not to distinguish between these periods 
because there is a consistent policy of economic opening and reform during this period and the 
level of foreign aid provided was small over the entire period.  Any choice of phases is to some 
degree arbitrary but the three-phase framework adopted here has the benefit of simplicity and 
corresponds to easily identifiable policy changes on the part of the Chinese Government 
including China’s opening under Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and the “going out” policy of 1999.  
In Phase 1, China’s ideologically driven aid was substantial and far above what other countries 
at China’s level of development provided.  This was followed by a period of retrenchment and 
dropping aid budgets while China, at the same time, became one of the largest aid recipients in 
the world.  By the end of Phase 2, China was a marginal aid provider with annual budgets well 
below $1 billion USD.  During Phase 3, China quickly became a donor on par with the largest 
DAC donors.  
 
3.2.1 Phase 1 – international recognition and ideology (1950s-1978) 
The purpose of this section is to describe the conditions that led to China establishing 
its aid program and the aid policy principles that continue to the present.  The end of WWII did 
not end war in China.  The Chinese civil war broke out and continued to rage until 1949 when 
Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces were pushed to Taiwan and mainland China became the 
People’s Republic.  Almost immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China, North Korea invaded the south and the United States (and its allies) entered the Korean 
war under UN Security Council Authorization.  China responded with support for North Korea 
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which can be interpreted as the initial steps in China’s foreign aid. China’s aid to North Korea 
was of critical importance to China’s security as it had only recently established itself as a state 
and was ideologically aligned with the Soviet Union against the Western international order.  
China perceived the Korean War as a potential existential threat with United States and UN 
forces which were avowedly anti-communist moving towards China’s land border. In similar 
fashion, China aided North Vietnam in the 1950s in its fight against France in the First 
Indochina War which resulted in the establishment of a communist government in North 
Vietnam in 1954. China continued to aid both North Korea and North Vietnam to help them 
recover and rebuild from these conflicts.203 
 
Zhao Enlai, China’s first premier, established the eight principles of foreign aid at a 
conference in Ghana in 1964 and are still referred to as guiding principles today.  These are: 
1) equality and mutual benefit, 
2) respect for sovereignty and no conditionality, 
3) reflect the needs of the recipient, 
4) assistance in self-reliance, 
5) emphasis on quick results, 
6) high quality materials and equipment, 
7) full acquisition of technology by local staff, and 
8) Chinese aid workers will live at the same standards as local staff.204  
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The two most important principles with respect to foreign aid were respect for 
sovereignty and equality and mutual benefit.  By sovereignty, China means its sovereignty over 
Taiwan. All recipients of China’s aid are expected to adhere to the one-China principle and 
recognize the PRC rather than Taiwan.  This policy continues to this.  Aid from China is also 
explicitly expected to benefit both China and the recipient.  The other principles distinguished 
China from other donors as China tried to establish itself as a leader of the non-aligned 
movement against aggression from initially the United States-led Western order, and later the 
Soviet sphere after China’s and the Soviet Union’s relations deteriorated.   
 
At the beginning, China’s aid was not commercially oriented as China was desperately 
poor and had almost no ability to benefit from trade relations with recipient states.  The United 
States and most other developed countries did not recognize the PRC so China used its aid 
program to support its quest for international recognition.  In the 1950s and early 1960s, it also 
offered aid to like-minded communist regimes such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Mongolia, and Cuba.205  The Chinese nationalist government in Taiwan, supported by most 
Western nations, continued to claim legitimacy over the Chinese mainland. As a result, it is 
reasonable to conclude that China’s aid was intended to support China’s quest for survival, 
ideological solidarity, and international legitimacy. 
 
Beginning in the 1950s, China offered aid packages to multiple African countries 
fighting to win their independence from their European colonizers but aid to China’s communist 
neighbors dominated its aid giving in the 1950s. After relations with the Soviet Union 
deteriorated to the point of an official split in 1961, China’s aid program shifted toward 
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promoting its own international legitimacy and leadership of the non-aligned movement against 
both Soviet and United States influence resulting in much higher aid allocations to African 
states.  Though China did provide aid to revolutionary forces in Africa (Zhao Enlai stated that 
Africa was “ripe for revolution” in 1964206) and provided relatively more aid to countries 
inclined towards socialism, aid was provided to most African countries that were willing to 
recognize the PRC as the rightful government of China rather than Taiwan without much regard 
to their commitment to communism.   
 
Providing aid in substantial amounts to African countries succeeded in making many 
African countries positively disposed to China’s interests.  Africa is the single largest regional 
grouping of countries in the UN and provided a substantial boost to the PRC being recognized 
as the government of China over Taiwan in the UN in 1971.  Li Anshan (2007) quotes Mao 
Zedong: “We were brought back into the United Nations by our black African friends.”207 
African countries provided 26 out of 76 votes to grant recognition to the PRC as the government 
of China and strip Taiwan (ROC) of its UN membership.208  
 
Assistance during this phase was quite generous compared to China’s national income. 
In 1970, China’s GDP/capita was only $111 and its total GDP was only $91.5 billion.  China 
was providing foreign aid to countries such as Egypt (GDP/Cap of $220), Algeria (GDP/Cap 
of $334) and Morocco (GDP/Cap of $245) that had much less poverty than China itself.209  
China’s aid allocations during this phase reached nearly 1% of GDP,210 in excess of the 0.7% 
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ODA/national income target promoted by the OECD DAC.  For the sake of comparison, 
according to the OECD, only Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg and Denmark have exceeded 1% 
of gross national income for one or more years since 2000 and the average for all DAC donors 
from 1960 to 1978 was only 0.39% of GDP.211 Some estimates of China’s aid allocations 
suggest that by 1971, foreign aid amounted to as much as 6 percent of government spending; a 
level that was unsustainable.212  China reduced its aid giving in the mid-70s to save money.213 
The early 1970s remain exceptional for aid provided by China based on the official statistics214 
which show China only exceeding these levels again by the late 2000s.  This was also a time 
when China had achieved one of the key purposes behind its aid giving – international 
recognition over Taiwan – potentially reducing the motivation of Chinese leaders to offer aid.  
These budget pressures led to continuing declines in China’s aid budget after peaking in the 
early 1970s (see Figure 3-4 on page 109).   
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Figure 3-4: Estimate of China's Foreign Aid, 1953-1999 
 
Sources: 1953-1992 from Lin, Teh-chang. Beijing’s Foreign Aid Policy in the 1990s: Continuity and Change. 
Issues and Studies: A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1996). 
1993-2005 from Kobayashi, Takaaki, Evolution of China’s Aid Policy, Tokyo: JBIC Institute Working Paper No. 27, 
April 2008, based on Finance Yearbook of China. 
 
During phase 1, China provided aid in the form of grants and interest free loans.  Interest 
free loans were by far the largest share of aid provided by China.  For example, between 1956 
and 1973, Bartke (1975) estimates that less than 10% of China’s aid was in the form of grants 
($309.2 million out of $3.384 billion). 215 Bartke finds that Chinese aid during this period was 
on better financial terms (often zero interest) than most aid provided by both Western countries 
and other communist states and demand for Chinese aid was high.  Further, the requirement 
that Chinese experts were to be paid and live per the standards of citizens in the recipient 
country was a stark contrast to the high salaries and comparatively luxurious accommodations 
                                                 





of Western aid bureaucrats (although the United States Peace Corps volunteers are one 
exception and also agree to live per local standards216).  
 
China’s aid during this period also established the practice of providing turn-key 
projects.  They were largely implemented with Chinese labor under the management of Chinese 
engineers.  For example, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway project (Tan-Zam Railway) was 
China’s largest aid project and was constructed between 1970 and 1975 utilizing 16,000 
Chinese workers at its peak and requiring enormous amounts of materials shipped from 
China.217  Chinese aid projects are still implemented in similar fashion. 
 
Grants paid for Chinese experts such as doctors, nurses, agricultural experts and 
construction engineers. One of the more effective features of Chinese aid were its mobile 
medical teams that provided free medical care in rural areas.  These teams provided services to 
large numbers of people providing major propaganda benefits to China.218  China emphasized 
that its aid came without conditions to emphasize that China did not want to meddle with the 
internal affairs of other countries in contrast to the conditions attached to Western aid.  This 
was an exaggeration. China’s aid depended crucially on acceptance of the one-China principle 
and recognition of the PRC instead of Taiwan.  Countries with poor relations with China were 
punished with less aid and China consistently used its aid program to support states in territorial 
conflicts where China had an interest.  For example, after annexing Tibet in the 1950s China 
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consistently aided states along its border with Tibet (Bhutan and Nepal) and provided very large 
aid packages to Pakistan219 which it backed in its conflict with India.220   
 
3.2.2 Phase 2 – reform and opening up (1979-1998) 
During this phase, ideology became less important and China’s focus shifted to 
domestic development.  Mao Zedong died in 1976 setting off a period of domestic political 
instability before Deng Xiaoping could solidify power in 1978. The Third Plenary Session of 
the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978 established the period of opening and reform 
that transformed China and initiated the increasing emphasis on China’s own economic 
development.  China made the decision to accept foreign aid from other countries, reduced its 
own aid giving to conserve its limited resources, and further emphasized win-win aspects of its 
remaining foreign aid to ensure that aid projects also supported its own economic development.  
Brautigam (2009) references serious disagreements within the Chinese leadership about 
whether China should even have an aid program at all given the extreme poverty and need for 
capital within China at this time.221 The disagreements led to a stagnating aid program that rose 
and fell at levels that rarely exceeded the amounts of aid routinely given in the 1960s and 70s 
(see Figure 3-4 on page 109). This marks the beginning of the second phase of China’s aid 
program. 
 
This period was a time of change in China’s ideas about foreign aid. China’s interests 
with respect to its economy and security were rapidly transitioning.  Economic growth in China 
has been exceptionally high for a generation (shown in Figure 3-5 on page 112), yet China only 
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surpassed GDP per capita of $1,000 in 2001.  Most countries receiving China’s foreign aid 
during this period had similar or higher GDP per capita than China itself.  As such, China’s aid 
policy during this period increasingly sought out mutually beneficial projects that could 
logically support its own development and development of China’s domestic enterprises. 
 
Figure 3-5: Economic Growth and GDP/Capita in China, 1978-2015 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01) 
 
After Mao’s death, China became less interested in Africa as a political force.  China’s 
alignment with the United States against the Soviet Union made ideological conformity less 
important as economic concerns were increasing. At the time, China was a resource exporter 
rather than importer and did not need Africa’s resources.  China continued aid to Africa, albeit 




decisions more on economic and financial viability than on political and ideological factors. 
Brautigam (2009) describes a 1982 proposal to finance a sugarcane plantation and factory from 
Liberia that was rejected by the Chinese due to the finding that the eventual enterprise was 
unlikely to survive without subsidies.222   
 
China’s eventual behavior as a donor after the 1990s was influenced by its experience 
as an aid recipient in the 1980s and early 1990s. The decision to accept foreign aid under Deng 
Xiaoping quickly led to China transitioning to a net recipient of foreign aid rather than a net 
donor. China only became a net donor again, using Kitano’s (2016) estimates, around 2006.223 
Aid to China peaked in 1995 and began to steadily decline until 2008 after which aid allocations 
to China fell precipitously (see net foreign aid to China on Figure 3-6 on page 114). China both 
valued the aid they received and resented it which also informed China’s approach to aid.  The 
response by donors to the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and the subsequent sanctions224 and 
crystalized in the minds of China’s leadership the importance of relations with countries that 
could be counted on to side with China.  The Chinese leadership resented the perceived 
meddling in China’s sovereign affairs and particularly the use of ODA as a tool of leverage 
over Chinese policy.225  After Tiananmen, China’s aid to Africa began to increase again in large 
                                                 
222 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 55. 
223 The World Bank data on net foreign aid received does not include data on aid from China. To determine if 
China is a net donor, the estimate of total aid from China in 2006 ($1.5 billion USD from Naohiro Kitano, JICA 
Research Institute, 2016) is subtracted from the total aid received by China ($1.2 billion USD in Figure 3-6). Note 
that aid to China becomes negative in 2011 due to repayments of ODA loans which are calculated as negative 
ODA.  
224 Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds its Way, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 
(March/April 2011), 70. 




part because African states generally refused to criticize China226 and could be counted on to 
support it in international institutions.227   
 
Figure 3-6: Net foreign aid received (Millions USD) 
 
Sources: For net ODA and official aid received (1979-2015): World Bank World Development Indicators based on 
OECD data. (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=CN) 
For China ODA disbursements 1979-1992: Lin, Teh-chang. Beijing’s Foreign Aid Policy in the 1990s: Continuity 
and Change. Issues and Studies: A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 
1996). 
For China ODA disbursements 1993-2000: Kobayashi, Takaaki, Evolution of China’s Aid Policy, Tokyo: JBIC 
Institute Working Paper No. 27, April 2008, based on Finance Yearbook of China. 
For China ODA disbursements 2001-2015: Kitano, Naohiro. 2017. A Note on Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 
Using New Data: 2015 Preliminary Figures. JICA Research Institute, May 26. 
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During this period, China was also learning about foreign aid policy and practice from 
donor countries active in China, especially Japan.  Japan was the first country to offer foreign 
aid to China in 1979 and quickly became its largest single donor before beginning a steady 
reduction in aid in 2000 (as shown in Figure 7-1 on page 420). Initially, Japan was primarily 
interested in access to Chinese resources such as coal and oil.228  Japan’s initial batch of ODA 
loans to China in 1978 were to be repaid in oil.229  China reportedly appreciated that access to 
technology and credit that resource-backed lending provided as an aid recipient and decided to 
utilize the same mechanism in its aid to resource rich African states.230 
 
In the early 1990s, China began to internally reformulate its own approach to foreign 
aid resulting in the aid reform of 1995.  This effort was largely focused on aid administration, 
but it laid the groundwork for the eventual ramping up of China’s foreign aid in the next phase.  
The 1995 reform followed the establishment of the China Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank in 1994 
and initiated many of the coordination mechanisms between government agencies that were 
developed and adopted in Phase 3.  Until the aid reform of 1995, China’s aid program remained 
primarily interest free loans and grants.  Grants included both cash and in-kind contributions of 
food, equipment and commodities.  Loans were on very good terms of zero-interest with 5 to 
10-year grace periods that were often extended at the request of the recipient.231  With the 
establishment of the China Ex-Im Bank in 1994, China began transitioning away from interest 
free loans to concessional lending (low interest rates but not zero).232 Loans are offered in 
Chinese Yuan (CNY) with government interest rate subsidies to China Ex-Im. China has 
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increasingly emphasized concessional lending through China Ex-Im as its primary foreign aid 
tool. 233  Reportedly, zero-interest loans were to be phased out with the introduction of 
concessional lending, 234  but grant aid and zero-interest loans administered by the China 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) remain a part of the foreign aid menu. China Ex-Im Bank 
provides much more than foreign aid. Its main function is like the Export-Import Banks of other 
countries that provide trade finance such as export buyers credits and suppliers credits. These 
credits are not considered ODA and vastly exceed the ODA-like concessional loans with 
interest rate subsidies.235  
 
The 1995 reform laid the groundwork, but China’s ‘Going out’ policy was first 
articulated in 1997 at the 15th plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party.236 There is not 
a clear moment when China’s aid policy changes, but a continuum of change through the 1980s 
and 1990s of increasing emphasis on China’s domestic economic considerations, less emphasis 
on ideology, and increasing reliance on concessional lending. After the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997, there was a strong reaction in Asia to policy conditions and structural adjustment 
lending from Western and multilateral donors.  China saw this as an opportunity to emphasize 
its long-held view on policy conditions and respect for state sovereignty in its aid.237  China’s 
increased credibility after the 1997 crisis coincided with its burgeoning business ties with 
foreign countries. These factors helped push China towards its ‘going out’ strategy in 1999.238 
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3.2.3 Phase 3 – “going out” (1999-)239 
Like emerging countries before it, China’s domestic enterprises needed help from the 
state to compete abroad. Chinese companies were unfamiliar with foreign markets and could 
not compete with established firms in developed countries prior to gaining international 
experience. One way to ensure foreign markets for firms of emerging countries is to use tied 
foreign aid to ensure contracts are won by the donor’s domestic companies. Over time, these 
companies would presumably establish themselves in the recipient states and transition to 
standard export-import financing or compete on a level playing field with established firms 
from other states. Like Japan’s use of tied foreign aid before it, China used and continues to use 
tied foreign aid to support the external expansion of Chinese enterprises.  China’s so called 
“going out” policy was intended not just to extend China’s influence abroad but also to build 
Chinese brands, increase the value of its exports, and support more overseas investments by 
Chinese firms.240  
 
The groundwork for the going out policy was laid in the 1995 aid reform, but the policy 
was fully articulated and put into practice in the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005).  The plan 
included statements of the need to acquire natural resources, diversify its export markets and 
promote more trade, and to encourage overseas investments by Chinese enterprises.241   
 
The Going Out policy bears similarity to the notion of the “Aid Trinity” model espoused 
by Japan.242  The Aid Trinity model is the explicit combination of aid, trade and investment 
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often facilitated by comprehensive packages that could combine all three types of flows 
between donor and recipient.243  China’s adoption of this approach is often ascribed to its 
positive experience as an aid recipient and for many years, the largest recipient of Japan’s 
ODA.244  Notwithstanding the differences in China’s approach due to the concentration of its 
economy in the government-owned sector through state owned enterprises (SOE),245 the role 
of both private businesses and SOEs in China’s aid program strongly resembles to way in which 
Japanese companies and trading houses used to influence Japan’s ODA policy. Combined with 
a similar approach in the emerging South Korean aid program, the Aid Trinity model is a 
distinctive feature of aid from all the major East Asian donors, including China.246  
 
The Aid Trinity model as implemented by China during the Going Out phase is highly 
conducive to propagandizing Chinese generosity.  The packaging of aid along with trade 
agreements and investment commitments from Chinese businesses inflates the numbers that 
can be announced publicly as China’s commitment to a recipient state.  These packages are 
usually announced at bi-lateral summit meetings with attendant publicity and news media 
coverage. 247   The approach bears more than a passing resemblance to Japan’s Omiyage  
diplomacy.  China’s commitments can be even more impressive given the state control over 
SOEs that Japan never enjoyed.  This level of coordination can ensure that big foreign direct 
investments from Chinese state companies accompany its aid announcements.   
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The types of projects financed by Chinese aid also changed in this period.  Historically, 
China provided aid in the form of investments in local industrial plants and production facilities 
in natural resource processing and simple manufacturing. Kobayashi (2008) notes that after the 
1995 aid reform, Chinese aid to projects in the manufacturing sector dropped from 40% in 1995 
to just 2.9% by 2005.248 This coincided with a scaling up of support for infrastructure finance 
and social sector aid as the China Ex-Im bank increasingly took on the role of providing 
concessional loans.   
 
Finally, the early Going Out phase of Chinese aid coincided with the so called “charm 
offensive”.249 The discourse from China accompanying its aid and external cooperation efforts 
emphasized win-win relations and that everyone will benefit from China’s “peaceful rise”.  The 
Charm Offensive sought to increase high level diplomatic engagement through state visits and 
the signing of multiple agreements, the offer of coordinated aid packages, and increased 
participation in multilateral institutions, especially around ASEAN.250  The Charm Offensive 
was a public relations strategy to minimize the perception of a China threat especially in South 
East Asia where China has had historical conflicts with countries like Vietnam and the 
Philippines. China wanted to reassure ASEAN states that China did not pose a threat and keep 
regional states from aligning with the United States and Japan against China’s interests.251  The 
discourse around China’s growth as “peaceful rise” combined with aid, trade and investment in 
                                                 
248 Takaaki Kobayashi, "Evolution of China’s Aid Policy," 36. 
249   Dennis Trinidad, “China and Japan’s Economic Cooperation with the Southeast Asian Region: The Foreign 
Aid of a Rising and a Mature Asian Power,” Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs (2014, revised draft).  
250 Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The search for security (London: Routledge, 2011), 66-7.  
251 Ian Tsung-Yen Chen and Alan Hao Yang, "A harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory typologies of ASEAN 
countries’ strategies to the rise of China," The Pacific Review (2013), 




the “Going Out” phase reinforced China’s growing influence around the world and promoted 
itself as a responsible stakeholder in the international order.252 
 
China’s charm offensive and peaceful rise discourse nicely complemented its rapid 
expansion in aid during the “Going Out” phase.  However, since Xi Jinping became the 
President of the China, a new discourse has replaced the more cooperative stance of the past 20 
years.  Xi first promoted the idea of the “China Dream” in 2012 and conceived of the dream as 
the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.”253 The idea was to fuse the values of the Chinese 
Communist Party with traditional Chinese culture to justify the return of China to regional 
primacy in Asia and discredit Western values and norms. Xi asserted a “new Asian security 
concept” where he implied that the United States as a non-Asian state should not have a role in 
regional security, expressed resentment towards existing security alliances, and asserted 
China’s rightful place as the primary security guarantor for Asia.254   
 
Yinan He asserts that not only does China reject Western norms such as democracy and 
human rights but insists that other countries in Asia including United States treaty allies 
“accommodate China’s power, acquiesce to illiberal norms, and ideally, depend on China, not 
the United States, for security and prosperity.”255  In short, the peaceful rise narrative of the 
Charm offensive is a thing of the past.  If China feels a threat to its core interests, it now asserts 
its right to militarily defend itself and secure its core interests with violence claiming that China 
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“does to want trouble, but it’s not afraid of any foreign countries and will not tolerate any threat 
to its sovereignty, security or development.”256 This was stated in anticipation of its loss to the 
Philippines in the UNCLOS ruling on the South China Sea claims.   
 
3.2.4 China’s aid decision-making system  
This section will describe how the Chinese government organizes its aid system and 
which Ministries and government bodies are responsible for aid decision-making.  The 
Department of Foreign Aid was first established in 1982 under the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade and remained in this Ministry through several name changes 
culminating in the renaming of the ministry as the Ministry of Commerce in 2003257 where the 
Department of Foreign Aid remained until the establishment of the China International 
Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018.  This dissertation analyzes Chinese aid 
behavior from 2000 until 2014.  Therefore, this section describes China’s aid system as it 
operated between those years.   
 
The main institutions involved in aid decision making were the State Council, the 
Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Aid 
under the Ministry of Commerce is in charge of programming interest free loans and grants, 
prepares the aid budget which is approved at the level of the State Council and coordinates with 
the China Export-Import Bank on concessional loans and preferential buyers credits.258 The 
China Ex-Im Bank is responsible for conducting project appraisals and monitoring 
implementation of aid projects financed with concessional loans and preferential buyers 
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credits,259 and acts as the lender.260 The Ministry of Finance prepares the national budget, but 
does not control the amount of foreign aid. That authority rests with the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) which is the planning agency under the State Council.261 
The Ministry of Finance pays the interest rate subsidies for China Ex-Im Bank administered 
concessional lending. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is involved with Chinese foreign aid primarily through 
the embassies which house the economic councilors’ offices.  As the agency that develops and 
manages China’s overall foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes 
recommendations to the Ministry of Commerce on which countries to offer aid and how much. 
Aid projects are supervised by the economic and commercial councilors in Chinese embassies 
on the ground, although these councilors are under the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
The State Council sits atop the decision-making hierarchy in China’s aid system and 
has broad oversight responsibility for aid and acts through the NDRC.  The State Council 
approves the annual aid budget, grants over $1.5 million, projects over 100 million CNY, aid 
to “politically sensitive countries”, and requests to exceed the approved aid budget.262  
 
The flow chart shown in Figure 3-7 on page 123 summarizes the decision making 
system for Chinese foreign aid. This chart focuses only on provision of flows that are 
considered bi-lateral foreign aid.  Multilateral foreign aid and lending by the China 
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Development Bank are not considered here.  Further, the multiple agencies responsible for aid 
project implementation which are not included in this chart to maintain a level of simplicity.  
For example, the Ministry of Health dispatches Chinese medical teams primarily to address 
humanitarian disasters while the Ministry of Agriculture provides agricultural advice in 
developing countries. 263  Other ministries and agencies provide a wide array of technical 
assistance on a grant basis though the amounts a small fraction of China’s concessional lending. 
 
Figure 3-7: China's aid system before 2018 
 
                                                 




* Only preferential buyers credits provided to governments for development projects would be considered foreign 
aid.  Other such credits to private sector importers of Chinese goods and services would be considered Other 
Official Finance. 
Sources: Flow chart adapted from Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 108 (Fig. 4.1) and modified based on 
Shino Watanabe, "Implementation System: Tools and Institutions," 75-6 and Takaaki Kobayashi, “Evolution of 
China’s Aid Policy,” 14-21. 
 
Outside the structure above, like Japan, China uses a version of “omiyage gaikou”.  
High-level visits by Chinese leaders are often accompanied by large aid donations.  These offers 
of aid may or may not have specific projects associated with them to enable the Chinese 
government to have flexibility in offering aid.  These offers tend to come in the form of a pledge 
of concessional financing using preferential buyers credits though the China Ex-Im Bank which 
can be used for many types of projects decided at a later date as long as they are implemented 
by approved Chinese contractors.  In this way, top leaders of China can directly influence the 
flow of aid to specific countries to serve their foreign policy goals. 
 
3.2.5 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
This dissertation is concerned with bi-lateral development assistance and its role in 
commercial, diplomatic and security policy and competition so I do not dwell on multi-lateral 
initiatives and programs that may have limited connection to bi-lateral development aid.  
However, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an indication of China’s overall strategy for its 
bi-lateral and multilateral aid initiatives.   
 
Initially introduced as the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, the BRI was first 
described by Xi Jinping in September 2013 as an organizing principle for regional cooperation 
around China reaching towards Europe.264  It consists of two conceptual corridors linking 
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Europe to China through Central Asia (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and strengthening the 
existing sea routes to Europe through Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.  
One corridor is a maritime route while the other is an overland route.  The OBOR was formally 
adopted as Chinese policy at the National Party Congress in 2017 and its English title adjusted 
to the BRI.265 
 
The BRI is less a program than an organizing principle for China’s external economic 
cooperation.  There is no BRI agency in China coordinating projects and lining up financing.  
The BRI is an initiative to guide bilateral engagement between China and its neighbors to 
finance mutually beneficial infrastructure, but also utilizing multilateral institutions in which 
China is a participant including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New 
Development Bank, ADB, and the World Bank.   
 
On an economic level, land routes through central Asia have limited utility due to the 
cost advantages of ocean shipping.  Current maritime shipping costs far less than using railways 
for containerized freight.  In 2016, the cost of shipping a 20-foot container from Europe to 
China is 5 times more on railway than via ocean shipping leading logistics professionals to 
predict that the rail route will not account for more than 2 percent of the freight volumes via 
ocean shipping.266  However, railway transport between China and Europe takes only half the 
time than ocean transport and may be able to capture some of the freight market now using air 
freight which is far more expensive and environmentally damaging than either rail or maritime 
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freight.  Freight services between Europe and China by railway are a minor part of the overall 
freight transport market and are likely to remain so but are an important strategic consideration 
for China. China has gone so far as to provide subsidies to shippers to enable the Europe-China 
rail freight market to stabilize. 
 
China has two main strategic goals with the BRI.  First, ocean shipping to Chinese ports 
from Europe and the Middle East passes through the Straits of Malacca which is controlled by 
the United States Navy through its liberal use of Singapore’s military facilities which are 
capable of serving United States aircraft carriers. The United States Navy’s Western Pacific 
Logistics Group has been headquartered in Singapore in 1992 while the United States Air Force 
has a combat training squadron based in Singapore.  In the event of hostilities between the 
United States and China, the United States has the ability to disrupt trade and access to energy 
from the Middle East currently sent via ocean shipping.  China has a strong incentive to develop 
alternative shipping routes for vital commodities to counter the United States’ ability to disrupt 
these vital sea lanes.  
 
Second, China envisions the BRI as a way of inducing neighboring countries into its 
sphere of influence.  China’s Action Plan on the BRI puts it, “…to build a community of shared 
interests, destiny and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and 
cultural inclusiveness.”267 The BRI gives China entre to negotiate and sign agreements with 
countries around the region.  These agreements are bilateral, ensuring China is the dominant 
partner, and provide a way to package multiple types of assistance and financing.  The fact that 
                                                 
267   China State Council, “Full text: Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative,” Government of the People’s 





the Chinese government decided to approach the BRI as a series of bilateral agreements rather 
than work through existing multilateral initiates such as the ADB sponsored Central Asian 
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiatives 
or the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia Pacific (UNESCAP) in 
which China is a member suggests that existing multilateral initiatives are insufficiently 
oriented towards China’s benefit.   
 
3.3 Quantitative research on foreign aid 
This section details the findings of quantitative research on Japanese and Chinese 
foreign aid in the international relations literature. Scholars have used qualitative case studies 
on foreign aid policy to attempt to demonstrate the commercial orientation of China's aid to 
Africa268  and Japan's aid to China269  and Southeast Asia.270  Qualitative research however 
depends on either one or a collection of case studies of specific donor recipient dyads.  Most 
donor countries provide aid to dozens of countries and may have specific purposes for each.  
Therefore, quantitative statistical analysis on the overall aid programs is particularly valuable 
for making generalizable findings about the overall purpose and intent of foreign aid programs. 
 
Research using big-N statistical methods to understand foreign aid tends to fall into two 
major categories: aid effectiveness (development economics) and aid motivation (international 
relations).  This dissertation falls into the aid motivation category in that I am not interested in 
determining whether aid results in faster economic growth or development impacts in the 
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recipient country; I am only interested in determining the reasons that donors commit foreign 
aid to specific countries.  The following sections review the quantitative research on Japanese 
and Chinese foreign aid. 
 
3.3.1 Japanese aid models 
There is an extensive body of literature using quantitative methods to analyze Japanese 
ODA policy and practice.  One of the first to use regression techniques to analyze Japanese aid 
was Maizels and Nissanke who sought to test why aid is given by the United States, France, the 
UK, Germany and Japan.271  They use net aid per capita as the dependent variable and compare 
two periods, 1969-1970 and 1978-1980 by applying two models: a donor interest model and a 
recipient need model to determine which has more explanatory power.  Recipient need does not 
explain the aid allocations for any of the countries in the study.  The donor interest model is 
much better at predicting aid flows than the recipient need model.  The authors find that politics 
and security factors dominate and that the significance of these variables increases in the later 
period.  On a donor country basis, the United States is heavily security oriented; France and the 
UK are focused on their spheres of influence with France more commercially focused than the 
UK; Germany is primarily interested in trade promotion while Japan is focused on its relations 
with Asian countries and trade promotion. 
 
Steve Chan (1992) used the distribution patterns of Japanese foreign aid to try to 
understand the motivations of Japan’s leaders.  He found that Japanese aid was not overtly 
commercial in nature but driven by regional interests in East and Southeast Asian sea lane 
access and provided relatively more aid to larger and more influential countries.  Japan’s aid is 
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also negatively correlated with per capita GDP which Chan claims is evidence of humanitarian 
intent.272  
 
Mark McGillivray and Howard White (1993) reviewed the quantitative literature on 
foreign aid with a view to providing methodological guidance for future studies.273  This 
research identified several of the problems of past regression studies; namely, that aid 
commitments rather than disbursements should be the dependent variable and that lagged 
independent variables should be used to prevent issues with simultaneity.  While the author’s 
purpose is primarily to critique the methods used to evaluate the foreign aid allocations of 
donors, the authors also produce several regressions that demonstrate that political and security 
interests dominate the aid allocation decisions of France, Japan and the UK.  Interestingly, the 
authors find the United States aid is only explained by arms transfers and population (both 
positively correlated) and the other security variables were not significant. 
 
Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) take an international relations theory testing 
approach to the aid giving decision question comparing United States, Japanese, French and 
Swedish aid policies.274  At the time of their research, foreign aid was in a state of flux after the 
end of the Cold War.  Some countries reduced aid in 1990s and some refocused aid priories and 
increased scrutiny on aid effectiveness.  The authors assert that foreign aid is a national security 
policy for most states and highlight the theoretical perspectives through which foreign aid can 
be understood.  Realists focus on security interests of nation-states.  Liberals focus on 
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cooperative relations among states and assert the importance of humanitarian need and broadly 
shared economic development.  Neo-Marxists disagree and focus on economic interests of 
donors claiming aid is given to ensure access to resources and force recipients into economic 
dependency to preserve exploitative relations between richer and poorer countries.  To test these 
theories, the authors conduct panel regressions of aid allocations based on i) humanitarian need, 
ii) strategic importance, iii) economic potential, (iv) cultural similarity, (v) ideological 
similarity to the donor, and (vi) regional favoritism.  The authors modeling suggests that the 
United States is predominantly interested in security and ideological similarity. Japan wanted 
access to raw materials, support for Japanese exports to Africa, rewarded capitalist regimes and 
favored countries relatively better off. Sweden supported socialist and progressive governments, 
provided more aid to poorer countries though life expectancy was not correlated with aid.  
Swedish aid had a positive and significant relationship with trade. France supported the spread 
of French culture with aid with a strong preference for aid to former colonies and heavily 
influenced by perceived strategic interests to maintain their sphere of influence. This study 
emphasizes the multiplicity of aid purposes with certain countries like the United States and 
France more consistent with realist principles and Japan and Sweden more consistent with 
liberalism. 
 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) try to determine if donors (all DAC donors) use aid to reduce 
poverty or reward good governance or if they are targeting political and security goals.275 They 
use DAC data and panel regressions to forecast bilateral aid as function of trade openness, 
democracy, civil liberties, colonial status, foreign direct investment, income, and population, 
UN voting patterns and cultural affinity. Overall the findings for all donors together are that: 
                                                 




1. Countries that are more “open” and more democratic receive more aid 
2. Former colonies receive more aid 
3. UN voting affinity with Japan receives more aid 
4. Egypt and Israel receive more aid than otherwise expected 
 
The country by country analysis shows that Japan has largest coefficient on “UN friend” 
of all donors in the study.  Past colonial relations is a strong predictor of aid from France and 
UK and has some influence on Japanese aid.  UN voting affinity is significant for all donors. 
Nordic countries and the United States favor the poorest countries while France and Japan do 
not. Openness and democracy are rewarded with more aid, but this factor is less important than 
being a former colony or UN friend.  The authors claim that the political and strategic 
orientation is the reason that aid is not more effective at promoting growth and poverty 
reduction; in essence that aid is not allocated with the purpose of producing growth and poverty 
reduction, so it is not surprising that it does not do so.  
 
Berthelemy (2006) uses two-step regression models to characterize country aid 
programs as “altruistic” or “egoistic”.276  The author includes geopolitical variables for colonial 
ties, special cases (e.g. United States-Egypt) and regional dummy variables; commercial 
interests based on exports and indebtedness to the donor; and altruism indicated by poverty 
levels, freedom house ratings, military spending and conflict status. As might be expected, 
especially given the unusual characterization of military spending and conflicts and “altruism” 
indicators rather than the more logical characterization as security indicators, the results suggest 
a mix of altruistic and self-interested motives.  Berthelemy finds that all countries are at least 
                                                 





partly self-interested.  Nordic countries and most small donors are relatively altruistic, major 
donors such as the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada and the UK are “moderately 
egoistic”, while the most egoistic donors are Australia, France and Italy.   
 
Other scholars claim that Japan’s aid program is becoming “securitized,” meaning that 
ODA increasingly serves Japan’s national security interests rather than promoting humanitarian 
values or its commercial interests. Carvalho and Potter277 claim that the notion of human 
security was repurposed by Prime Minister Koizumi away from its original altruistic meaning 
toward traditional “hard” security interests as Japan’s contribution to the “War on Terror”. 
Yoshimatsu and Trinidad 278  find that Japan’s ODA policy toward ASEAN countries 
increasingly reflects a mixed strategic approach of balancing and accommodation of China. The 
authors claim that Japan’s ODA seeks to finance an East-West “arc of freedom” across 
Southeast Asia to counter Chinese influence. Japan promotes human rights and democratic 
values, but only as a way to enhance Japan’s image and strategically pull like-minded countries 
away from China. Jain279 also claims that Japan perceives a significant threat from China and 
its growing aid program. He says that the reduction in Japan’s aid to China in the mid-2000s 
and its recent growth in aid to countries that share concerns about China’s growing power such 
as India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia indicate a growing emphasis on security 
interests in Japan’s ODA.  
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Most prior quantitative studies have weaknesses that may have limited their explanatory 
power. Chan’s280 study looked only at a single year failing to capture variations in Japanese 
ODA policy over time. Chan, Tuman and Strand, and Sato and Asano all use ODA 
disbursements as the dependent variable. This is problematic because most aid projects are 
prepared and implemented well after the aid package was offered and accepted.  Infrastructure 
projects often have construction periods that extend over many years, so the disbursement of 
the ODA is increasingly disconnected from the political and security environment in which the 
decisions were made. When attempting to understand the aid decision-making process and the 
determining factors that drive aid allocations, ODA commitments are much preferred as the 
dependent variable. Berthelemy (2006) 281  and McGillivray and White (1993) 282  used aid 
commitments as the dependent variable.  However, McGillivray and White tested only a limited 
set of explanatory variables over only three years (1978-1980).  Berthelemy found that Japanese 
aid was moderately “egoistic” and responded to trade variables but did not publish his modeling 
results making it difficult to assess the findings on the specific factors that drive Japan’s ODA 
commitments.  Berthelemy based his model on 1980 to 1999 data but did not test for changes 
over time.  
 
Tuman and Strand as well as Sato and Asano further confuse the dependent variable by 
using net disbursements rather than gross disbursements.  Net disbursements consider 
repayments of ODA loans as backward aid flows from the recipient to the donor. In fact, states 
that have graduated from receiving new ODA loans, but are still in repayment, appear as 
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“donors” back to Japan in the net disbursements data. It is incorrect to use data that incorporate 
repayments when the research question focuses on Japanese aid decision-making. In the case 
of Japan which utilizes a high proportion of loans in its ODA portfolio, using net disbursements 
will distort the effect of current political and security conditions on current foreign aid 
commitments.  
 
Further, many quantitative studies of Japanese ODA have expressed the DV in USD 
particularly when comparing the aid policies of several countries (e.g. Berthelemy, Tuman and 
Strand, Alesina and Dollar).  However, expressing Japan’s aid in USD adds exchange rate 
variation which is not relevant to the research question. The decisions of policy makers in Japan 
are based on assessments of their own financial resources in JPY.  If Japan increases its ODA 
budget in JPY by 2 percent, but the JPY depreciates 10 percent against the dollar, ODA 
allocations measured in USD would decline by 8 percent even though policymakers increased 
their aid commitment. Models trying to understand Japanese aid decisions should measure 
Japan’s ODA in JPY. 
 
Lastly, most studies have found that Japanese ODA allocations decline with GDP per 
capita (e.g. Chan, Sato and Asano, McGillivray and White). This suggests poorer countries 
receive more ODA than richer countries, all else being equal.  This finding is reasonably robust 
across studies, but the interpretation of the finding is suspect because Japan utilized a strict 
graduation policy in its ODA (until the recent revision of the 2015 Development Cooperation 
Charter). When countries achieve the status of “high income countries” per the World Bank 




ODA commitments (MOFA).283 Adherence to this policy will result in countries receiving 
small or zero ODA as their incomes pass the threshold which can result in the negative 
correlation between income and ODA in regression models. Researchers have interpreted this 
negative correlation to be evidence of altruistic intent. However, in the case of Japan which 
provides mostly ODA loans and have given ODA to several graduated countries (e.g. Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan), these countries may simply transition to standard export-import bank 
financing at somewhat higher interest rates. Per capita income is a reasonable basis on which 
to assess the credit worthiness of the borrower which can be used to give preferential pricing to 
countries that may not be able to repay at market rates. For this reason, negative correlation 
between income and aid could reflect Japanese export promotion policy as much as altruism.  
There may be altruistic intent, but that is a generous interpretation. Buena De Mesquita and 
Smith (2009) 284 identify the difficulty with distinguishing the impact of per capita GDP on aid 
allocations as humanitarian intent or simply policy concessions. For this reason, definitive 
statements about the degree of humanitarian intent in Japanese ODA based solely on the 
negative correlation between income and ODA are best avoided.  
 
3.3.2 Chinese aid models 
Until recently, much of the research on China’s foreign aid program has been 
descriptive, qualitative or based on case studies.  This study attempts to analyze the purpose 
and intent of China’s aid program by analyzing the allocation of Chinese aid to specific 
countries in a similar manner as the analysis conducted for Japan’s aid program. While the lack 
of data has limited the number of quantitative studies of China’s foreign aid, there are a few 
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studies that attempted to collect country specific Chinese aid data to analyze its purpose. Few 
used country specific data for statistical analysis due to data limitations and the nature of the 
early Chinese aid programs which provided aid to no more than 10 countries annually until 
1970.285  Further, the following studies do not agree with each other on aid amounts and 
recipients and some studies look at commitments while other look at disbursements. For 
example, Bartke (1975) finds that Chinese aid in 1971 was $567.7 million, Tansky (1972) finds 
$467 million, and Lin (1996) finds $590 million in the same year. The difficulty of collecting 
data on Chinese aid limited the ability to make judgements about the overall intent and purpose 
of China’s aid at that time. 
 
One of the earliest enumerations of specific aid allocations by country was prepared in 
a 1972 report to the United States Congress on the China’s foreign aid.286  Like much of the 
analysis of this period, China’s aid program was interpreted through the lens of the Cold War 
and competition with both the West and the Soviet Union for international influence and 
legitimacy.  Aid allocations to individual countries were published confirming the focus on 
African states followed by Asian countries but no statistical analysis was done on this data.  
The late 50s and 60s were a time when many African states were gaining independence and 
were receptive to Chinese aid, especially those countries with a revolutionary bent.287 As 
competition between China and the Soviet Union intensified, Chinese aid increased rapidly. 
China sought to distinguish itself from other donors by emphasizing Zhao Enlai’s eight 
principles for foreign aid (see Section 3.2.1 beginning on page 104). Tansky notes a change in 
the early 1970s towards a less ideological aid program more focused on diplomatic benefits to 
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China.  This change coincided with the warming of relations with the United States and the 
PRC’s replacement of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the UN in 1971 with the support of 
many countries receiving aid from China.  For Tansky, foreign aid from China was intended to 
support diplomatic recognition and solidify China’s leadership position in the developing world.   
 
Bartke (1975) published one of the first detailed assessments of Chinese aid allocations 
using country specific aid data to determine the purpose of Chinese aid.  The author collected 
data on the majority of loans and grants provided by China from 1956 until 1973 and analyzed 
the overall practices of Chinese foreign aid compared to aid provided by other, primarily 
Western, donors.288  Over his analysis period, China provided about $3.384 billion in aid 
commitments, of which 70.2 million was in the form of loans at 2.5% interest, $2.99 billion 
was interest free loans, and $309.2 million was grant aid.  Aid to Asian countries was 32.2% of 
the total while aid to African countries was about 48.6%; remarkably similar to the allocation 
of Chinese aid between 2000 and 2014 (regional commitments are shown in Figure 5-2 and 
Figure 5-3 on page 237). 
 
Bartke criticized aid from both Western countries and other socialist countries besides 
China for the lack of altruistic intent.  Aid donors, except for China he says, were motivated by 
profit while Chinese aid represented the only “selfless” foreign aid.289  Bartke’s asserted that 
aid from China was not self-interested but provided for the benefit of the recipient based mostly 
on the distinguishing characteristics of Chinese aid which were: 1) extremely low interest or no 
interest with terms much more favorable than other donors, and 2) Chinese aid workers which 
were paid in accordance with the standards of the receiving country.  Bartke’s argument that 
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Chinese aid was “selfless” is belied by his own analysis of the purpose of China’s aid, 
particularly in Asia.  He finds that competition between the Soviet Union and China for 
influence in Pakistan drove China to allocate more aid to Pakistan ($445.7 million) than any 
other single country over the period.  It is difficult to imagine that aid meant to prevent Soviet 
influence in Pakistan in favor or China’s reflects an entirely “selfless” purpose.  Bartke argues 
that aid to Asian countries was intended to improve relations between China and its immediate 
neighbors and that aid to Africa was intended to cement China’s place as a representative of the 
“Third World”.290  In Bartke’s view, as long as aid was not commercial in nature, it was 
“selfless” even though he argued that its real purposes were security and diplomacy.   
 
One of the most comprehensive research studies on China’s aid practices up until the 
early 1990s was done by Teh-chang Lin, first in his dissertation291 and in a subsequent article 
based on that research.292  This is one of the first quantitative big-N studies on Chinese foreign 
aid commitments.  The author began by collecting agreements on economic and technical 
cooperation and loan agreements based on recipient country reports, the Xinhua News Agency, 
a variety of PRC government reports, and government reports produced by agencies in Taiwan. 
He then methodically attempted to weed out duplicate records and distinguish between 
commitments and completed projects.  Lin’s methodology is a mix of descriptive and 
qualitative analysis with regressions to test particular hypotheses.  For example, he regresses 
economic variables including GDP, national income, economic growth, trade balance and 
government budget balance on aid commitments to determine if domestic economic factors 
explain total aid commitments (though not specific commitments to individual countries). He 
                                                 
290 Ibid.,18. 
291 Teh-chang Lin, “The Foreign Aid Policy of the People’s Republic of China: A Theoretical Analysis” (PhD. 
Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois, 1993. 




finds that none of the economic indicators are significant suggesting to Lin that China’s aid was 
primarily politically motivated.293  Lin traces the changes in political leadership and domestic 
political conflicts in China and finds that some changes in PRC aid commitments in the 60s and 
early 70s were related to domestic political factors.  The ideological fervor in the 60s led to 
support for mostly leftist regimes, while the waning power of Mao and the struggle for 
succession in the 1970s led to drops in aid commitments overall.  China’s opening under Deng 
Xiaoping led to a focus on domestic development and economic factors (rather than domestic 
politics) resulting in a continued drop in aid commitments in the 1980s.294   
 
Lin then tests the variables that determine China’s aid commitments to specific 
countries.  The following explanatory variables are tested: geographical proximity, historical 
association, diplomatic relations, security concerns (neighbor countries with deteriorating 
security situation and military alliances for example), UN voting, regime type, independence, 
inertia (what I refer to as path dependence), population, trade, recipient country economic 
situation, and ODA from other donors. He then analyzes these factors in four different time 
periods (‘53-‘63, ‘64-‘71, ‘72-‘78, ‘79-‘89) reflecting different domestic political conditions in 
China.   
 
Lin utilizes bi-variate regression (limited to analyzing the relationship between two 
variables) and multiple regression (several explanatory variables and one dependent variable) 
to test his hypotheses.  He tests both the selection of aid recipients (which countries receive aid) 
and the determination of the amount of aid.  In periods 1 (’53-’63) and 2 (’64-’71), Lin finds 
that foreign aid was tightly tied to China’s foreign policy goals focused on leftist regimes and 
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countering both United States and Soviet influence as well as support for its legitimacy 
campaign against Taiwan.295  Communist ideology was the best predictor of aid amounts during 
this period.  In the third period (’72-’78), China’s aid continued to reflect its antagonism to the 
Soviet Union, but the United States Ally variable was no longer significant reflecting the 
rapprochement between China and the United States. In addition, economic factors began to 
have explanatory power with China exports becoming a significant predictor of aid from China. 
In the last period, Lin finds a dramatic change to China’s aid policy which is much less 
ideological and emphasized lower income countries, historical relations (prior suzerainty 
countries) and countries with large ODA flows from other states.296  Overall, China’s aid 
programs in all periods reflect the foreign policy and security goals of China while increasing 
emphasis on commercial factors is noted in the 1980s. 
 
Lin’s subsequent research found that China scaled down its aid programs significantly 
in the early 1990s and focused more on economic interests and less on foreign policy and 
security interests. It targeted a few high-profile projects and attempted to secure good publicity 
for China as a responsible member of the international community. 297   China’s aid 
commitments in the 1990s dropped significantly though the number of recipients increased. At 
the same time aid flows into China from DAC countries increased substantially.   
 
Dreher and Fuchs set out to quantitatively test, using several incomplete data sets, 
whether the common criticisms of China’s aid program (e.g. “rogue aid”298) were justified 
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based on actual aid allocations from China.299 The authors made use of whatever extant datasets 
on China’s aid flows could be readily utilized including:  
1) a data set prepared by Bartke (1989)300 based on news reports of China aid from 1956 
to 1987; 
2) the China Commerce Yearbook (CCY)301 from 1984 to 2009 which gives number of 
aid projects completed and the size of dispatched medical teams;  
3) CIA data from its periodic reports on aid from communist countries (unclassified)302;  
4) OECD data on commitments for 1970 – 1985 from a study conducted in 1987303; and  
5) data on food aid through the UN World Food Program which includes tons of foodstuffs 
provided by donors including China since 1988.   
 
The authors test the determinants of China’s aid by running regressions for 5 different 
periods: 1956-69, 1970-78, 1979-89, 1990-95, and 1996-2005.  The primary dependent variable 
used by Dreher and Fuchs was the number of aid projects completed by China (data sets 1 and 
2 above) which, by definition, does not include the aid amount nor the year of commitment; 
both factors that would be important for understanding the strategic environment and the 
importance placed by China on the recipient country.  Estimated aid amounts are given in the 
CIA and OECD datasets, but only through the mid 1980s.  The explanatory variables included 
commercial factors (exports, oil production, population), security factors (Taiwan recognition, 
UN voting, proximity to China), and normative factors (GDP per capita, natural disasters, 
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democracy). The regression models were estimated using Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) in order to compensate for the large number of zeros in the data which are problematic 
in OLS and Tobit regressions.304  I also adopt this method in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 
5.3.2 for the same reason.  Further, to account for volatility in China’s aid allocations (i.e. large 
variations from year to year) the authors model five cross-sections, one for each time period, 
with explanatory variables averaged over each period, rather than using a pooled time series 
approach.   
 
The results indicate that geographic proximity is not significant while population is 
significant after 1990 with larger countries receiving fewer projects.  Recipient need, measured 
by GDP per capita, is significant from 1970 onward but natural disasters are not significant in 
any phase. Democracy is not important except in the 1979 to 1987 period when China provided 
less aid to democracies and Taiwan recognition is significant and negatively affects China aid.  
UN voting is significant in all periods with more aid flowing to countries that vote with China.  
On commercial factors, exports are significant in the 1979-1987 and 1996-2005 periods, but 
the effect is minor.  Oil production is significant during 1979-1987 period but in no other.305  
Overall , the authors find that China’s aid is mostly political (what I would characterize as 
security oriented based on the factors tested) and only weakly commercial in nature.  Dreher 
and Fuchs claim the GDP per cap estimates indicate China considers recipient need in its aid 
though this interpretation is generous (see discussion in Chapter 5.2).  The authors then go on 
to test whether the determinants of Chinese aid are any different than other donors grouped as: 
1) large donors (United States, Japan, UK, Germany, France), 2) “good” donors (Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Norway), and 3) emerging donors (Korea, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). 
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Overall, there is little evidence that China’s aid is any more or less “political” than aid from 
others.  For example, even the “good donors” allocate less aid to democracies and the United 
States and Japan also reward UN voting. Further, the authors do not find that China’s aid is 
provided to secure natural resources, a common criticism of Chinese aid.306   
 
The finding by Dreher and Fuchs essentially claim that the criticisms of China’s aid 
program are misdirected because other countries aid programs are just as political and self-
interested as China’s.  The implicit assumption in Dreher and Fuchs assertion that China’s aid 
is unfairly criticized rests on the assumption that there is no difference between China and 
Western countries self-interests; that those interests are equally valid and there would be no 
reason for a disinterested observer to question the overall preferability of one countries interests 
over another.  Critics of China’s aid program may be reasonable from the perspective of DAC 
countries if China’s interests are opposed to the interests of the DAC countries or the larger 
international community.  Foreign aid programs are one means of pursuing a state’s national 
interests which may conflict with the interests of existing donors. If this is the case, it is natural 
that existing donors would criticize China’s program. If China’s aid program is primarily 
political (or security oriented as I define it), it may engender more criticism from existing 
donors if China’s security interests’ conflict with those donors.   
 
There are a variety of problems with the analysis by Dreher and Fuchs caused mostly 
by limitations on the datasets.  The only information on aid commitments came from a 1987 
study by the OECD which was based on news reports.  Recent aid estimates (1990 and later) 
were only from the completed project lists in the China Commerce Yearbooks.  These data have 
                                                 




no aid amounts, no start date, no commitment date and no information on commitments of aid 
projects that were never completed.  Further, it included no information on China Ex-Im Bank 
financing which, especially after the Chinese aid reforms in 1995, took an increasing role in 
delivering Chinese aid through interest rate subsidies for major development projects.  This is 
rather flimsy data on which to base the authors findings, particularly in more recent time periods. 
 
More recent studies have made use of the first Aiddata.org China aid dataset focusing 
on Africa and first published in 2012.307  Aiddata.org collected detailed project information on 
1,422 projects in 50 African countries and distinguished aid commitments from disbursements 
and categorized financial flows as ODA-like, OOF-like or vague-official finance.  Strange et. 
al. (2012) find that Chinese aid to Africa, while significant and growing rapidly, was still 
dwarfed by DAC donor aid and investment flows.  China provided aid to nearly every country 
in Africa from 2000-2011 except for Burkina Faso, Swaziland, the Gambia, and Sao Tome and 
Principe which did not have diplomatic relations with China.308  
 
Scholars at Aiddata published a study using a dataset covering 2000 to 2013 to test the 
determinants of China’s aid allocations to Africa.309  The authors posit a theory of official flows 
which suggests that non-concessional official finance (OOF-like flows) should reflect the types 
of factors that determine private commercial flows, namely, market size, political stability, 
governance quality, repayment capacity, and expected returns while concessional aid (ODA-
like flows) would reflect political and foreign policy interests.  The Aiddata study used pooled 
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time series regression techniques estimated first using OLS and then adding in country fixed 
effects to estimate the determinants of China’s aid commitments to Africa over the analysis 
period. Their finding show that China’s ODA-like flows are indeed different than OOF-like 
flows.  OOF like flows are more commercial in nature and less political/security oriented than 
ODA-like flows.310  The authors claim that much of the antagonism of Western donors and 
observers towards Chinese aid is a result of the failure to distinguish ODA-like flows from 
OOF-like flows.   
 
The Aiddata.org findings, while interesting, are rather limited.  First, it is quite obvious 
that OOF-like flows should be commercially oriented since OOF-like flows are predominantly 
trade finance and foreign direct investments by SOEs.  Second, it is unclear why Western 
donors and observers should be less critical of or threatened by China’s ODA-like flows if these 
flows are less commercial and more political/security oriented.  If Western donors perceive 
China as a threat to their interests or a state bent on challenging the status quo, it seems 
reasonable to interpret China’s ODA-like programs as a direct threat to other donors’ interests.  
Third, the Aiddata study was based only on flows to Africa (this was the only data available at 
the time) which, while important to Western aid agencies and China, is a limited sample and 
geographically distant from China.  Fourth, the period of analysis covers a time when China’s 
aid flows were growing extremely rapidly. Aid to Africa increased from about $760 million in 
2000 to over $10 billion in 2012 before dropping to around $5.3 billion in 2014. A pooled time 
series analysis with so much variation in the total amount of aid will potentially give spurious 
results since much of the variation in aid to specific countries may have more to do with total 
budget fluctuations rather than any of the explanatory variables. A supplementary regression 
                                                 




using percent of total aid commitments given to a recipient by year rather than the financial 
amount of aid to a recipient country by year, as I do in the China regressions in this dissertation, 
would enable the authors to correct for this potential problem. And finally, the authors test a 
fairly limited set of variables with only a few indicators for each type (e.g. security variables 
limited to Taiwan recognition, regime type and UN voting, commercial variables limited to 
trade and energy resources) which may limit that range of commercial, diplomatic and security 
interest that could be tested for their influence on aid commitments.  
 
3.3.3 Learning from the literature 
While many studies in the literature have made valuable contributions to understanding 
the foreign aid motivations of Japan and China, many quantitative studies have flaws with may 
affect their findings.   
1) Aid commitments not disbursements.  The point of the analysis in this dissertation 
is to understand aid motivations at the time the decision to allocate aid was made.  
Aid disbursements happen well after the commitment decision was made and are 
not as useful as commitment data for understanding aid motivation. 
2) Donor aid data should be in domestic currency units.  Many past studies used 
aid allocation data in USD rather than the currency of the donor.  This injects 
exchange rate fluctuations into the data and obscures the decisions of the donor 
which are made in the donor’s own currency. 
3) Use lagged IVs.  Independent variables should usually be lagged one period so that 
the donor can make a decision based on knowledge of the value of the IV.  This is 
particularly important for economic variables such as trade and foreign direct 




than the other way around). If the causal variable and the decision are likely to 







4 METHODS AND DATA 
Most research on foreign aid is based on quantitative techniques for the obvious reason 
that good quantitative data normally exists.  OECD data on the foreign aid programs of most 
major donors has allowed a body of research on aid policy and practice as well as aid 
effectiveness to develop.  Even when regression models are not used, the richness of the 
quantitative information available at the project level makes case study analysis much easier.  
However, there have always been data challenges when researchers have looked at aid from 
non-OECD DAC members, but the recent completion and release of the China dataset on 
worldwide financial flows from Aiddata.org has finally enabled the analysis of Chinese aid 
practices using panel regression techniques.  The following sections detail the research design, 
variable selections and sources, and the role of the supplementary case studies. 
 
4.1 Research design 
The nature of the research question and data availability drove the decisions on research 
design.  The research question is about broad factors that drive aid commitment decisions from 
the perspective of the overall aid program. Aid commitments is a quantitative variable that is 
well suited to statistical analysis.  It rises and falls based on policy decisions of the donor and 
it can be measured precisely on an annual basis.  Subject to sufficient data over a long enough 
period of time, statistical analysis using regression is the most appropriate available method.  
The literature on aid decision-making bears this out.  Most studies of aid purpose are based on 
regression analysis, either using panel data or cross-section analysis. 
 
To estimate the overall motivations driving aid commitments from China and Japan, the 




of aid commitments to specific countries in ways that control for heterogeneity of countries and 
enables the simultaneous estimation of effects that vary over time and across countries.  Panel 
data enable more variability in the regressors, more degrees of freedom and higher estimation 
efficiency compared to cross-section analysis.  Panel regression is also particularly well suited 
to the analysis of change over time which is the key to answering the research question.  
However, data requirements for panel regression are high and have prevented most prior studies 
of China’s foreign aid from using panel regression. The research design used in this study was 
made possible by the release of the first comprehensive dataset on China’s worldwide aid 
activities.   
 
The dissertation will test the hypothesis using a nested analysis following Lieberman,311 
which combines large-N regression analysis techniques with nested qualitative case studies. 
Case study analysis would be subject to doubts about selection bias and whether the cases are 
unique or representative. Subject to sufficient data, Large-N studies have the benefit of 
establishing more generalizable results across many cases simultaneously. Further, since 
several IVs (alliances, geographic location, regime type, territorial disputes, resource 
endowments) tend not to change within cases, many country cases would be required to 
establish variation in the IVs making the small-N case study approach impractical as the sole 
method.   
 
Typical criticisms of large-N quantitative studies include direction of causation, 
spurious correlation, coding, and data measurement issues. A nested analysis incorporating 
small-N case studies can provide a check on spurious correlation, can establish the order of 
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causation, and can provide information that is useful for revising and fine-tuning the theoretical 
framework, including identification of other useful IVs or CVs.312 In the nested approach, large-
N quantitative research and small-N case studies complement each other and make up for the 
weaknesses in each approach.  
 
Supplementary case studies are conducted to deconstruct the sequence of events leading 
to aid increases, decreases and the types of projects being funded by China and Japan.  Key 
factors that drive aid commitments from Japan and China are identified in the regressions. 
Countries that best illustrate the effects of key independent variables are selected and the aid 
behavior of China and Japan carefully traced to illustrate how the independent variables caused 
China and Japan to change their aid commitments.  The case studies are not intended to look 
inside the decision-making processes of Japanese and Chinese aid officials but to demonstrate 
the plausibility of the estimated relationships in the regression models.  It is not possible to see 
inside the heads of the key decisionmakers so the case studies are designed only to demonstrate 
that the aid commitment decisions can be reasonably attributed to the factors that the regression 
analysis has shown to be statistically significant.  In the nested analysis approach, one or more 
cases are chosen to illustrate the important relationships between IVs and the DVs. In this study, 
two cases are sufficient to achieve enough variation across the key explanatory variables to 
confirm the regression findings.  
 
To summarize, the research design chosen for this dissertation takes advantage of a 
newly available dataset than enables the application of the most appropriate quantitative 
methods to analyze aid commitment decision-making.  The relationships estimated in the 
                                                 




statistical models are then confirmed based on case studies chosen to illuminate the impact of 
the most important independent variables on the dependent variable. 
 
4.2 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in this dissertation are the share of total aid commitments of 
the donor country to the recipient country in a specific year. The regression analysis utilizes a 
large panel data set on aid commitments from China and Japan.  The definition of aid 
commitments follows the definition of ODA commitments established by the OECD DAC.  
ODA is defines as follows: “resource flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients (developing countries)…which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with 
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional 
financial terms….Technical co-operation is included in aid.”313 Commitments are defined by 
the OECD DAC as: “A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, 
undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country….Bilateral 
commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time 
required for the completion of disbursements.”314   
 
The OECD publishes detailed project level foreign aid data for Japan from 1964. China 
does not publish any project level or country specific data on its foreign aid requiring alternative 
non-official sources to be used. The dissertation used the data collected by Aiddata,315 and 
processed and adjusted by the author to produce a bespoke dataset on Chinese project level 
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foreign aid. Aiddata first developed a dataset on China’s foreign aid to African countries316 and 
completed a new dataset in 2017 covering 2000 to 2014 for China’s worldwide aid 
allocations.317 The China dataset follows the OECD DAC definition of ODA commitments as 
closely as possible. 
 
The dissertation is concerned with bi-lateral aid, rather than multilateral aid for the 
simple reason that bi-lateral aid is more clearly tied to political decisions by the donor and 
recipient.  Aid channeled through multilateral institutions and aid given regionally rather than 
to a specific recipient is more difficult to interpret and predict because national interests are 
diffused among partners and the decision making is often not directly with the donor.  The 
purpose of aid channeled through multilateral agencies may reflect the desire of the donor 
country to influence the policies of the multilateral institution rather than influence the eventual 
recipient.  Since the purpose of this research is to predict and analyze the commitment patterns 
of ODA to specific recipients, multilateral and regional ODA are excluded from the DV, which 
is based on bi-lateral aid commitments. 
 
All ODA allocations are expressed in constant 2013 Japanese yen (JPY) in the case of 
Japan and in CNY in the case of China. The data is reported in USD equivalent units by OECD 
and Aiddata.org, but I have converted these measures back to the national currencies because 
budget decisions are made in the national currency.  Using ODA allocations expressed in USD 
would inject irrelevant variation based only on exchange rate movements that are external to 
the decision-making that I want to model.   
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4.2.1 Japan’s aid commitments 
For Japan and other members of the OECD DAC, the OECD International Development 
Statistics online database provided annual foreign aid data by donor and recipient.  Japan’s 
share of total ODA commitments to the recipient are the DV in the models of Japanese foreign 
aid.  Japan’s ODA commitments are tested as an IV in the regression on Chinese aid 
commitments.  This dissertation is concerned with aid decisions rather than aid effectiveness.  
For this reason, I utilize the DAC3a data set318 which provides aid commitments from DAC 
donors to all recipients in the year in which they are promised rather than aid disbursements 
which occur over time, sometimes years after the initial commitment.  Aid commitments are 
defined by the OECD as written obligations by the donor to provide the stated funds under 
specific terms and conditions for the benefit of the recipient. Aid disbursements are the annual 
payments based on the commitment and may not reflect the political conditions predominant at 
the time the commitment was made.  Sometimes aid commitments are not fulfilled.  However, 
for the purposes of this research, the commitment should reflect the decision-making at the time 
it was made.  If the recipient and donor have a conflict at some later date and the project is 
canceled, the political conditions at the time of cancellation will be reflected in a lack of new 
aid commitments from the donor.  The aid commitment to the recipient is converted to the share 
of total ODA committed that year to correct for large changes in the overall aid budgets of 
Japan and China. 
 
                                                 




4.2.2 China’s aid commitments 
There are two main methods to determine why China gives aid.  The first is to construct 
a database of aid activities to replicate, as much as possible, the type of data available from 
DAC donor countries.  The second approach is the case study method where either China’s aid 
practices are interpreted by looking at specific aid projects funded by China or by looking at 
China’s overall aid to specific countries, often through the data available only from the recipient 
country and analyzing the economic, political, and security factors that help explain those aid 
commitments.   
 
In this dissertation, I utilize both approaches.  The fact that China is an emerging donor 
with rapid year-on-year increases as well as a less professionalized aid program which was 
without a dedicated aid bureaucracy until the establishment of the China International 
Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018,319 the project by project data may not be 
sufficient to reveal China’s systematic aid purposes.  Therefore, I begin with a big-N analysis 
of China’s overall aid program using a modified bespoke dataset based on the dataset developed 
by AidData.org to track China’s underreported financial flows. 320   This analysis is then 
augmented by carefully selected case studies that can show why China increased or decreased 
aid to specific countries. 
 
The Aiddata.org effort is not the first effort at developing a comprehensive dataset on 
Chinese foreign aid.  Past efforts include a seminal work by Wolfgang Bartke (1989), The 
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Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries.321 The key problem with 
the Bartke study for the purposes of this dissertation is that Bartke’s data provide information 
on project completions for the years 1956 to 1987.  The analysis in this dissertation seeks to 
understand the motivation of the decision to commit aid funds which occurs well before and 
project is complete.  Bartke’s data will also miss any commitments that were made but later 
abandoned for whatever reason.  The analysis in this dissertation is not particularly concerned 
with whether or not an aid project has been completed or not.   
 
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released a series of reports 
entitled “Communist Aid to Non-Communist LDCs” which were prepared at least until 1987.322  
These reports include estimates of both the aid extended and the aid utilized which generally 
conform to the commitment and disbursement categories in the OECD DAC data.  However, 
the reports are declassified decades after their preparation. As of this writing (2018) 1987 is the 
last available report.  These data have either not been collected since 1987 or the reports remain 
secret which limits their usefulness except as historical information.  Problematically, the CIA 
data excludes aid to other communist countries and includes loans that would not be categorized 
as aid. The tables include grants and economic credits if the loan terms are longer than 5 years 
but does not try to determine if the loan is concessional in character.  The CIA also publishes 
no information on the data collection methodology and provides limited information on data 
definitions.  Each published version of the reports from 1981 include annual estimates of aid 
from China to specific non-communist countries for the prior 10 years.  Previous reports only 
provided data on aid estimates as cumulative sums over many years (i.e. 1954-1971).  Therefore, 
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annual CIA estimates of China’s economic aid can only be presented for 1972 until 1987, a 
period when China’s aid was relatively low, and fails to separately identify grants and loans in 
the annual country allocation data.   
 
Other authors have attempted to make use of the data published by the China Ministry 
of Commerce’s China Commerce Yearbooks. The problem with these data is that they only 
indicate if an aid project was completed in a country in a given year, not the amount of aid. 
Datasets based on these data simply list the number of aid projects completed in a given year.  
The problem with these data is that there is no way to distinguish large projects from small 
projects and no way to determine when the commitment was made.323 
 
The alternative data sources of Chinese foreign aid allocation all have significant 
drawbacks compared to the Aiddata.org worldwide dataset.  Aiddata’s methodology is 
transparent and replicable, the year of commitment is clear, the amount of grant or loan 
financing is usually clear, and the time period covered by the dataset is relevant to this 
dissertation and coincides with China’s emergence as a significant new donor and its rise as a 
potential superpower.  The Aiddata.org dataset is the best available source of information on 
China’s foreign aid flows worldwide and the most appropriate source of data for quantitative 
analysis. 
 
AidData.org’s dataset of worldwide Chinese development activities was the result of a 
five-year effort between the College of William and Mary and the National University of 
Singapore and augmented by other data collected by associated researchers including this 
                                                 




author.324  The methodology used to build this database is based on an augmented media-based 
data collection methodology which is described in more detail in APPENDIX 7.  This data set 
is similar to the OECD CRS data set in that it is project level with substantial detail about the 
scope, sector and terms of the identified project.  Projects are categorized as ODA-like, OOF-
like, or Vague-official finance.  OOF refers to Other Official Flows and includes direct 
investments by SOEs and import-export bank financing that is not subsidized.  Vague-official 
finance means the Aiddata was not comfortable categorizing the specific flow as ODA or OOF.  
AidData attempts to follow the OECD definitions of ODA and OOF to ensure the comparability 
of the variables in each data set.  For this research, I inspected every project categorized by 
Aiddata as Vague-official finance to determine if they should be recoded as ODA-like or OOF-
like.  This manually modified dataset of ODA-like projects is then used to generate China’s aid 
allocations by recipient country. Like Japanese ODA, China’s aid is converted to domestic 
currency units – constant 2013 CNY – and measured as commitments rather than disbursements 
for the same reasons articulated previously.  
 
While the Aiddata.org dataset provided a comprehensive list of probable aid projects 
financed by China, there are some issues with both China’s aid program and the data that need 
to be dealt with, particularly for statistical analysis.  The main problems that must be dealt with 
include: 
1) Erratic nature of China’s aid program.  Unlike Japan and most other DAC donors, 
during the analysis period of this dissertation China did not have a professional aid 
agency (CIDCA was established in 2018), did not develop country strategies to 
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guide aid activities, and therefore did not have a consistent program that allocates 
funds every or nearly every year.  The practical result is that there are many zero 
values in China’s aid commitment data. Addressing this problem is not a simple 
matter but various approaches are described in APPENDIX 8.  
 
2) Extraordinary growth. China’s aid program has grown exceedingly quickly over 
the analysis period. Based on the Aiddata.org dataset and my recoding, I estimate 
that China’s foreign aid increased from around $1 billion equivalent in 2000 to 
around $19 billion in 2014. This is a problem for time series regression analysis 
because the models in this dissertation are designed to illuminate the purpose of 
China’s foreign aid by explaining its variation among recipients.  If a substantial 
portion of the variation is explained by changes in the donor’s own economy and 
national budget, that will reduce the explanatory power of a regression that uses 
China’s annual aid commitments as the dependent variable.  The solution is to 
transform the dependent variable (aid commitments in 2013CNY) into the share of 
China’s total aid program in the year in which it is made. This approach then focuses 
on the relative importance of a specific recipient country compared to all other 
countries that year, rather than simply the amount of aid provided.  Since Japan’s 
aid is also growing, the same approach was used in the analysis of Japan’s ODA.   
 
3) China foreign aid does not conform to DAC definitions.  The Chinese 
government is not concerned about meeting the definition of the OECD DAC for 
ODA.  China provides a wide array of assistance that includes flows that meet the 
DAC definition of ODA, but other flows might not.  As discussed in some detail in 




trade finance or non-concessional lending as the equivalent of ODA leading to large 
overestimation of China’s foreign aid program. The Aiddata.org worldwide dataset 
of Chinese official flows attempts to maintain the DAC definition of ODA when 
categorizing possible aid projects.  
 
4) Peculiarities of Aiddata.org coding conventions. Aiddata.org takes a very 
conservative approach to categorizing projects as “ODA-like” and when a definitive 
determination regarding the degree of concessionality cannot be made, the project 
is categorized as “vague – official finance”.  The problem with this approach is that 
a large percentage of China’s official flows are categorized as neither ODA nor OOF 
in the Aiddata.org database even when it is clear from the project description that 
the recipient is highly likely to consider the project an aid project.  
 
Overall, the Aiddata.org worldwide China aid dataset is imperfect, but represents the 
only comprehensive accounting of China’s aid and foreign economic cooperation activities 
available after the 1990s.  For this dissertation, I have made numerous manual adjustments to 
Aiddata’s China dataset to better serve my purposes.  The following section details the manual 
changes made to the Aiddata.org database. 
 
4.2.2.1 Revisions to Aiddata.org China database 
The dataset used in this dissertation is significantly different from the one published by 
Aiddata.org.  The changes were made carefully and transparently. The main principle behind 
all revisions is to make an educated determination of the intent of the financial flow and the 




from China and the Chinese were likely to intend the project as aid, then the project should be 
categorized as ODA-like. The revisions are detailed below: 
• Recategorize Vague-Official Finance.  The most significant change to the 
dataset involves the manual categorization of all projects Aiddata.org considers 
vague-official finance. Aiddata.org was very conservative in its categorization 
of projects as ODA-like.  Only projects where Aiddata.org could be confident 
that the project was concessional enough to meet the DAC ODA definition were 
categorized as ODA-like. Projects reported as concessional but where the terms 
are unknown, even when the type of project suggests it is similar to an ODA 
project were categorized as vague-official finance.  This conservative approach 
is likely to underestimate Chinese foreign aid and should be considered a lower 
bound estimate. The magnitude of the financial flows categorized as vague-
official finance are so large as to significantly affect how China’s aid program 
is perceived. Aiddata.org’s estimate of ODA-like flows is about $97.5 billion 
over the 2000-2014 period while flows categorized as Vague-official finance are 
over $98.8 billion over the same period (amounts given in constant 2014 USD).  
Even if a relatively small percentage of those vague-official finance projects 
were actually ODA-like, the amount of aid attributed to China could be 
substantially higher than the estimate by Aiddata.org. 
 
In order to achieve a more realistic understanding of China’s aid efforts, 
I manually inspected each project record that was categorized as vague-official 
to review its project description and, if still unclear, media reports of the projects 
to determine if the project is likely to have been perceived as aid by the recipient. 




of 5447 records, around 10 percent of the total.  I devised the following set of 
rules to determine whether aid recipients are likely to perceive the flow as ODA-
like: 
o If the loan was described as “concessional”, “soft”, “below market” the 
project was deemed to be ODA-like. These terms are the language by 
which ODA is described in recipient states. Aiddata.org categorized all 
projects financed by loans, even when described by these terms, as 
vague-official finance if the specific loan terms were not clear. 
o If the project was revenue generating without mention of concessional 
character, the project was deemed to have had a significant likelihood of 
private sector involvement and unlikely to be ODA. I categorized these 
projects as OOF-like.   
o Loans for private business or to state owned enterprises were categorized 
as OOF-like. Many of these projects were in the telecommunications and 
energy sectors. 
o Projects that were essentially governmental in character and provided 
directly to the recipient governments and announced at high-level visits 
of Chinese government officials were categorized as ODA-like. Many of 
these projects were for roads, bridges, water supply, and government 
buildings.  
o Projects that represent equity investments in recipient country 
enterprises or joint ventures were categorized as OOF-like. These 
projects include those financed by the China-Africa Development Fund 




o Projects targeting poverty alleviation or services to the poor were 
categorized as ODA-like. Based on China’s historical approach to 
funding these types of investments, these projects are likely to be grants 
or highly concessional loans. Several projects of this nature referred to 
the construction of low-income housing or clean water access for the 
poor. 
 
Of the $98.8 billion categorized as Vague-official finance by 
Aiddata.org, about $53.9 billion was recategorized as ODA-like and $44.9 
billion recategorized as OOF-like.  I consider Aiddata.org’s estimates a 
lower bound ODA estimate. The upper bound for Chinese ODA constructed 
by the author is labeled “perceived ODA” and used in the quantitative 
modeling of Chinese foreign aid commitments and case studies. 
• Include projects “not recommended for research”. Projects coded in the 
Aiddata.org database as “not recommended for research” should be included in 
my analysis because these reflect the commitment of the donor to fund a project 
even when the subsequent project was never carried out or cancelled. All 
summary figures and the data used in the quantitative models and case studies 
include projects that Aiddata.org categorizes as “not recommended for research”. 
• Exclude umbrella projects. The dataset used in this study excludes all umbrella 
projects from the analysis since they will double count individual project records.  
Umbrella projects arise from announcements by China or recipients of large 
multi-project investment programs that are to be financed over an extended 




government officials of the establishment of large funds to finance a series of 
projects. The projects financed under the umbrella project are included.   
• Regional vs. bi-lateral aid. There are a few projects that span borders and are 
considered “regional” projects.  These projects tend to be large umbrella projects 
in the dataset, but not exclusively.  One of the highest profile projects in China’s 
aid history was the TANZAM Railway constructed between 1970 and 1975, 
which spanned Tanzania and Zambia. China continues to support this railway 
with aid including a $23 million grant in 2012 to the railway operator to 
rehabilitate the infrastructure. Unfortunately, without detailed information on 
the financing arrangements and the degree of individual government 
participation in these transactions, it is impossible to allocate the Chinese 
funding to a specific recipient. Projects without a primary recipient that 
Aiddata.org terms regional are included in summary statistics of China’s aid 
program presented in this dissertation but are not included in the data used in the 
regressions.  By necessity, the modeling of bi-lateral aid allocations links 
specific data on the recipient country to the decision to commit aid to that 
country.  Without a clear means of determining the amount provided to each 
country in the regional effort, there is no plausible means of including regional 
project records in the bi-lateral aid dataset. 
• Recategorize OOF-like grants as ODA-like. Grants are very likely to be 
perceived as aid by the recipient state. Aiddata.org was extremely conservative 
in its categorization of grants for cultural projects, language education, and 
government buildings.  I disagree with Aiddata’s interpretation of the projects 
financed by Chinese grants if the recipient is likely to perceive a substantial 




Aiddata.org as OOF-like grants are related to providing funding for Chinese 
language education in the recipient country’s schools and universities. Most of 
these grants are small (under $10 million).  The OECD DAC is quite clear that 
many of these types of projects can be categorized as ODA, “the promotion of 
museums, libraries, art and music schools, and sports training facilities and 
venues counts as ODA”.325  The larger projects categorized as OOF-like grants 
are usually government buildings and stadiums. For example, China donated 
about $60 million to build a government ministerial complex in Liberia in 2012.  
Another example is the donation of 10 million CNY to Cambodia to restore a 
temple in Angkor Wat. I recategorized these grant projects as ODA-like. The 
Aiddata.org base data set estimated China’s total ODA-like flows between 2000 
and 2014 at about $97.5 billion while OOF- like grants were just under $1.2 
billion or about 1.2 percent the estimated ODA.  Some OOF-like grants were 
categorized as OOF-like because the recipient country is not an ODA 
recipient326 as determined by the OECD.  These projects are excluded from the 
dataset used for this research since the countries do not appear in it.   
 
Case Study Data.  For the case studies, China’s aid project data are based on the project 
level dataset developed for this dissertation. Additional data was collected from other scholarly 
articles, published agreements signed between China and the recipient country during state 
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visits, and the records of recipient country governments if they publish aid received.  The 
sources are documented in each case study and all data can be provided upon request. 
 
4.3 Independent variables 
Independent variables attempt to explain variation in the dependent variable.  Based on 
the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 2, the variables are either commercial factors, 
security factors or normative factors and all may have explanatory power at different times and 
for different donor-recipient dyads. Dependent variables (foreign aid commitments) can also 
serve as independent variables when attempting to explain the aid giving behavior of donors, 
Japan or China in this case.  That is, Japan’s aid to a specific country may either encourage 
China to give aid to the same country or avoid giving aid to that country.  
 
Some economic variables are difficult to categorize.  GDP and population indicate the 
size of the country and its economy but do not relate specifically to economic relations between 
the donor and the recipient.  Recipient country size variables are used as control variables but 
are not interpreted to represent any category.  Variables that represent commercial importance 
are resources, trade and investment.  Many of the economic and socio-economic statistics used 
in this research were provided by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
dataset.327 This dataset is extensive and includes development indicators, economic and social 
statistics, budget and financial sector statistics and trade indicators.   
 
                                                 




4.3.1 Commercial variables 
The IVs that indicate commercial importance are based on resource exports, trade and 
investment. States that depend on imports of raw materials may provide aid to develop the 
resource export sector of states that may provide that resource. Levels of trade and investment 
can indicate the extent of commercial relations between the donor and recipient which may 
indicate opportunities for commercially beneficial aid.  The specific commercial variables 
tested in the analysis are explained in the following sections. 
 
4.3.1.1 Resource endowment 
Observers often argue that donors want access to developing country resources and 
provide aid as a way to gain access and control over those resources.  For example, Japan 
increased aid to Middle-Eastern oil exporters after the 1973 oil shock328 and China is often 
accused of channeling aid to secure resources.329  States may provide more aid to countries that 
export key commodities, the most important of which is oil.  The WDI dataset provides a variety 
of variables related to resource exports.  Statistical testing showed that oil rent as a percentage 
of GDP for each country had the fewest missing observations and was more significant than 
the other resource indicators so it was chosen to capture the effect of resource endowment on 
aid commitment decisions.  If aid is provided to secured access to resources, countries with 
higher oil exports should attract more aid. 
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4.3.1.2 Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
States that prioritize commercial factors in the foreign aid, may display correlation 
between FDI and foreign aid.  If states use foreign aid to support domestic businesses in 
developing countries it stands to reason that the benefitting businesses will follow up with their 
own investment in the recipient countries. Many previous studies330 have used Japan’s outward 
FDI as an explanatory variable in its foreign aid allocations and have found a positive 
correlation. However, there are some conceptual problems with theorizing that FDI should an 
explanatory variable for foreign aid.  Foreign aid may precede FDI by some number of years 
rather than be explained by it. If that is the case, we may expect that foreign aid for commercial 
purposes may have what Kimura and Toda (2007) called the “vanguard effect”.331 The authors 
find that in fact, Japan’s foreign aid does have a measurable vanguard effect on FDI suggesting 
that Japanese foreign aid goes first to help establish Japanese businesses in developing countries 
and the FDI comes later. The authors also find that the same effect is not found in foreign aid 
from the United States, UK, Germany or France. Kimura and Toda find that ODA allocations 
help explain future FDI, not the other way around. For this reason, other indicators of potential 
business opportunity such as resource exports and market size may be better predictors of ODA 
allocations for commercial purposes than FDI.  Nevertheless, FDI is included in the model as 
a potential explanatory factor due to the fact that it has been shown to be a significant predictor 
of Japanese ODA in past studies and the coordinated nature of both Japan’s and China’s aid 
programs (combining aid, trade and investment) would argue for including this variable as an 
explanatory factor in the donor’s aid decisions. 
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The FDI data for Japan is combined from two primary sources. First, the OECD 
international direct investment database which reports inward and outward FDI as reported by 
the OECD member states and is available from 1985 to 2013.  Second, the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) publishes data on FDI based Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
statistics for Japan's inward and outward FDI. The overlapping data matches well with only 
minor differences most likely due to rounding issues and exchange rate variation.  These two 
data sets are combined using JETRO’s data as the base and OECD data filling in missing values 
and all years after 2004. 
 
FDI data for China is more difficult to collect.  The primary source is the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development which publishes data on Chinese outward FDI to 
specific countries from 2003 to 2012.332 The dataset was expanded to 2014 using data from 
Johns Hopkins University SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative.  The main problem with FDI 
data generally and especially for China, is that much of the foreign investment flowing around 
the world is routed through tax havens.  In fact, 63% of all Chinese FDI in 2012 was channeled 
through just four tax haven countries: Luxembourg, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and 
Hong Kong.  The vast majority of these flows will go on to other countries. In this way, the 
FDI data for both China and Japan is significantly distorted.  As an alternative in the China 
analysis, I use an interesting dataset from the University of Tokyo on establishments of Chinese 
firms abroad.333  These data do not allow us to distinguish large firms from small firms, but 
overall should be quite correlated with actual foreign direct investment from China. This 
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measure is tested as an instrumental variable for Chinese outward FDI.  These data cover 1980 
– 2013. 
 
4.3.1.3 Imports and exports 
If foreign aid is meant to promote the commercial interests of the donor, it is reasonable 
to expect that foreign aid will flow to countries that have growing imports from or exports to 
the donor state. Further, if foreign aid is being utilized as a form of highly subsidized trade 
finance, we would expect to see high levels of foreign aid result in additional exports from the 
donor to the recipient which would cause endogeneity problems in the models. It could also be 
the case that foreign aid flows to recipients with natural resources with the expectation that the 
recipient state will export more of the given resource to the donor state.  If this is the case, 
foreign aid should result in more exports from the recipient to the donor rather than the other 
way around.  To correct for endogeneity, trade variables are lagged one period in the panel 
regressions. 
 
The data on international trade is provided by the International Monetary Fund’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) dataset.  This dataset includes all imports and exports 
from most countries, including Japan and China, and each trading partner beginning in 1950 
until 2015.334  Note that China data begins around 1978 when it began opening its economy 
and reporting statistics to international organizations. I use the import and export figures 
between the two trading partners as explanatory variables to predict foreign aid allocations. 
These variables indicate the magnitude of the economic relationship between the donor-
                                                 




recipient dyad which could indicate whether the donor believes that the recipient holds potential 
future economic opportunities. 
 
4.3.2 Security variables 
Variables that indicate the security importance of the recipient include geographic 
location variables. Foreign aid should be higher for states that can help secure key shipping 
lanes and promote regional peace and stability in areas critical for the donor.  States may also 
attempt to establish a sphere of influence to protect their regional security interests such that 
aid flows from donors to states in a specific strategic geographic region.  Security variables 
may also point to the political or ideological affinity between donor and recipient.  Such aid 
could reward for states voting with the donor in international organizations and institutions or 
try to influence states with important roles in international institutions.  Threatened states may 
also provide more aid to political or ideological compatriots if their own governance structure 
is subject to international criticism or subject to threats of “regime change” from other powers.  
Aid from adversaries may indicate that a recipient has more affinity for a competitor state.  This 
variable would indicate aid competition between donors and would be expected to result in less 
aid from adversarial donors.  Alternatively, if the recipient state is amenable to auctioning its 
allegiance, donor adversaries could actively bid for the recipient’s allegiance through escalating 
their aid.  Donors concerned with direct threats are likely to allocate aid to provide leverage in 
territorial disputes, wars and other conflicts with a potential recipient should result in less 
foreign aid from the disputant and increases in foreign aid from the adversary. Allies or 
potential allies against common threats would be expected to receive more aid. In this 
dissertation, the United States plays a critical security role in Asia and, as Japan’s key ally and 




United States security interests are particularly important.  The security variables chosen for 
this analysis are detailed in the following sections.  
 
4.3.2.1 United States military personnel 
The reactive state hypothesis335 of Japanese foreign policy claims that Japan uses its 
foreign aid to support United States security goals either explicitly based on requests or pressure 
from the United States or implicitly to emphasize Japan’s value as an ally and prevent 
abandonment by its alliance partner.  If Japan has a high level of threat perception, it will 
logically align its aid policy to support United States security interests.  The stationing of United 
States troops in a country indicates that it has important security interests in that country.  
Therefore, if Japan is supporting United States security interests, it is likely to provide more aid 
to countries with a larger contingent of United States troops.  China, on the other hand, may 
provide aid to states with fewer United States troops or punish states that accept the basing of 
such military personnel.  This dissertation utilizes data on the number of United States military 
personnel posted to the recipient country as one indicator of the importance of the state to 
United States security. The data set is based on the DOD Deployment of Military Personnel by 
Country Dataset (309 reports).  I utilize the data compiled by the Heritage Foundation336 for 
1950 to 2005 and manually completed the dataset using the 309A reports from the United States 
Department of Defense.337   
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4.3.2.2 Relations with the United States  
If China is trying to balance against the United States and weaken the United States 
alliance network, I expect that states with worsening relations with the United States will be 
rewarded with more aid from China.  However, no existing database exists that indicates this 
rather qualitative idea of good or bad relations between states.  Therefore, I constructed a 
heuristic measure of the strength of a state’s relationship with the United States to help create 
a targeted test of whether Japan and China consider a country’s relationship with the United 
States in their aid decisions.  If aid is used to support or counter United States interests, I expect 
countries with stronger United States ties will enjoy more aid from Japan and countries with 
weaker ties will enjoy more aid from China.  The indicator is an ordinal measure from 0 to 4 
based on a qualitative assessment of the overall bilateral relationship with the United States.  
The measure increases with the closeness of the bilateral relationship as follows: 
 
0 no relations or antagonistic relations (e.g. at war, actively isolated by United 
States, no diplomatic relations)  
1 ambivalent or strained relations 
2 generally friendly relations or formal alliance partners with badly deteriorating 
relations with United States resulting is adverse policy actions against the ally 
3 strategic partner or major non-NATO ally designation or formal alliance partner 
with strained relations with United States 
4 formal alliance (including Taiwan/Israel based on legal obligation to protect) 
with good ongoing relations 
 
As an example, the measure applied to the Afghanistan – United States bilateral 




States policy beyond its status as a source of opium. The measure is 0 from 1979 to 1989 when 
the country was controlled by a government installed by the Soviet Union which the United 
States actively tried to overthrow. The measure becomes a 1 after the Soviets leave until 
returning to 0 in 1997 when the Taliban take over and Afghanistan becomes a haven for 
international terrorism. The measure is 2 after the United States overthrows the Taliban in 2002 
and installs a new government.  The measure increases to 3 in 2012 when Afghanistan becomes 
a major non-NATO United States ally.   
 
Sometimes formal allies have strained relations which is reflected by a reduction in the 
measure from 4 to 3.  Examples of these events include the Philippines in 2003-4 when the 
country pulled its support for the war in Iraq and the United States cancelled a large military 
aid package.  Thailand is also a formal ally whose relations with the United States deteriorated 
in 2014 due to a military coup.  The measure drops from 4 to 2 in this instance.  The United 
States relationship with Turkey has also gone up and down over time despite its membership 
in NATO due to its differing security interests in Northern Iraq. Normally rated 4, the measure 
drops to 3 in 2003 due to its opposition to the United States invasion of Iraq. Turkey – United 
States relations were particularly poor during 2007 and 2008 due to Turkeys opposition to any 
role for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Northern Iraq which the United States was 
perceived to be supporting. The United States Relations measure drops to 2 during these years. 
The Obama administration attempted to improve relations in 2009 resulting in the United States 
Relations measure returning to 3.   
 
This measure is particularly interesting for analyzing how China might use aid to 
balance against the United States. It may be that China targets aid to countries with normally 




States.  If China perceives the United States as its main threat, it is in China’s interests to weaken 
United States relations with allies to reduce aggregate United States power, consistent with the 
a wedge strategy.  Wedge strategies are meant to disrupt or prevent or disrupt alliances from 
forming.338  If China is pursuing a wedge strategy against the United States and its alliance 
network, we may find that Chinese aid flows to countries like the Philippines, Thailand and 
Turkey when relations with the United States deteriorate, essentially to promote that 
deterioration.  Japan, on the other hand, may support states within the United States alliance 
network or potential allies as part of its alliance maintenance and management strategy. 
 
4.3.2.3 Coups 
Suspicion that China uses its aid to violate international norms and that Japan, as a status 
quo power, would use its aid to support international norms suggests that countries that have 
experience a coup may receive different treatment by Japan and China.  States that experience 
a military coup may be targeted by status-quo powers like the United States, Europe and to a 
lesser extent Japan with aid sanctions.  Examples of coups resulting in some aid sanctions 
include Myanmar (1988), Thailand (2014) and Fiji (2000 and 2006). If China wants to disrupt 
the status quo it may increase aid to countries after a successful coup, especially if the state is 
being punished by status quo powers. To test whether China and Japan consider coups in their 
aid decisions, I utilize the Global Instances of Coups dataset maintained by Jonathan Powell 
and Clayton Thyne.339  Indicator (dummy340) variables are provided for each coup and given 
separately for successful and unsuccessful instances. 
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4.3.2.4 Constructed security indicators 
Several security factors are handled with dummy variables constructed to indicate 
certain characteristics that could be important to donor security.  The variables are constructed 
as follows: 
• Border China: countries may seek a “sphere of influence” which would 
logically imply that countries in the immediate vicinity of the donor would 
receive high aid commitments.  In this analysis countries that share a land border 
with China are indicated with a 1, other countries are 0.   
• US ally: If Japan is supporting the United States alliance network, allies would 
be expected to receive more aid from Japan.  If China is balancing against the 
United States, it may either use aid to support a worsening the relationship 
between allies or punish countries with a security treaty with the United States.  
This variable takes a 1 if the country is a United States ally (including those 
states with implicit security guarantees in United States law such as Taiwan and 
Israel) while all other states are 0. 
• China conflict: When Japan perceives a China threat, countries with a maritime 
or land border dispute with China may receive more aid from Japan.  China may 
punish countries in a border dispute to push them to resolve the dispute in 
China’s favor.  If countries settle a border conflict with China, I expect China to 
reward them with more aid.  Chine conflicts are coded as 1 while other states 




separately as land border conflicts have tended to be resolved between China 
and its adversary while maritime conflicts tend to linger.341   
• US military base: another indicator of United States security interest is the 
establishment of a military base in a foreign country.  When threatened, Japan 
may increase aid to states that host United States military bases as part of its 
contribution to the alliance.  China may do the opposite to punish countries that 
enable the United States to station troops on their territory.  Countries that host 
an official United States military base are coded 1 and states without are coded 
0.  Most United States bases are in developed countries, but several are in aid 
recipients.  Examples include Kyrgyzstan (2002-2014), Djibouti (2001-present), 
Pakistan (2001-2011), Philippines (1966-1991), and Turkey (1966-present). 
• Taiwan recognition: A great deal of research shows that recognition is 
important to China and it is implicitly listed as one of the 8 principles of China’s 
foreign aid (as respect for sovereignty).  This factor is likely to be an important 
security consideration in Chinese aid commitments.  Countries that recognize 
Taiwan (coded 1) are likely to receive little or no aid from China while states 
that recognize China or switch recognition from Taiwan to China (coded 0) 
should be rewarded with more aid from China.  
 
4.3.2.5 Political violence 
Regional stability is important to the security of states in that region and, sometimes, to 
states outside the region if failed states become a haven for terrorism, piracy or other activities 
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that threaten the security of other states.  To test whether Japan and China utilize ODA to 
intervene in international conflicts or to aid unstable governments fighting insurgencies, I 
incorporate the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset prepared by the Center 
for Systemic Peace.342 The dataset covers 1946 to 2015 and includes ordinal measures to 
indicate the magnitude of the conflict that occurred with 1 being the lowest intensity and 10 
being the highest.  Different variables indicate the type of conflict involved. The type of 
conflicts that are measured separately include: 1) wars of independence, 2) international 
violence, 3) international war, 4) civil violence, 5) civil war, 6) ethnic violence, and 7) ethnic 
war. Composite scores for all interstate conflicts, civil conflicts and a summed measure of all 
violence are provided.343   The summed measure of total political violence is used in the 
regression models. 
 
4.3.2.6 Sanctions and the international system 
To test whether the aid donor supports or opposes international sanctions regimes 
through foreign aid policy, various sanctions regimes have been coded as indicator (dummy) 
variables.  If the donor country uses its aid program to punish states that are subject to 
international sanctions, we expect aid to decline to states that are being sanctioned.  Under 
certain circumstances, the use of aid sanctions to support other international sanctions, 
particularly UN sanctions with broad international support, indicates general support for the 
international system.  If the donor country is using aid to support “rogue” states that violate 
international norms, we would then expect aid to increase to states under broad international 
sanctions.   
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The interpretation of aid behavior with respect to sanctions variables should be cautious 
due to the ambiguities of what is meant by the “international system” and by the occurrence of 
humanitarian crises in states that are the target of sanctions.  We need to take care not to conflate 
policies contrary to United States or EU interests with policies contrary to the international 
system. China could very well promote policies contrary to United States or EU interests while 
still promoting the strength of the international system. If, for example, China is using its aid 
program to counter United States (or EU) interests but not upend the “international system”, 
we would expect that Chinese aid would increase to states under US-only (or US/EU only) 
sanctions but decline to states under UN sanctions.  China, being a permanent member of the 
UN security council, would have at a minimum abstained from the UN vote to sanction a 
country.  We expect China to reduce aid to states sanctioned by the UN.  If China increased its 
aid to a state that China either actively or passively supported the application of sanctions upon, 
it would imply a lack of policy coherence and potentially evidence that China votes in the UN 
with the international order but acts contrary to it. 
 
However, there are many cases where a state in conflict with its neighbors or in civil 
conflict may be the subject of a UN arms embargo yet still be the target of increasing foreign 
aid flows to mitigate humanitarian disasters.  To distinguish various scenarios, the following 
sanctions regimes are individually coded: 1) US sanctions only, 2) EU sanctions only, and 3) 
UN sanctions (by definition include the United States and European Union).  If China were 
seeking to counter United States security interests, it would likely provide aid to states under 
US-only sanctions while Japan may support United States interests by reducing aid to United 
States only sanction targets.  Sanctions categories are coded as indicator variables for the years 




there is no perfect way to model the various possible motivations for aid to sanctioned states 
and the interpretation of any changes in aid behavior based on sanctions will be difficult.  For 
example, there are many cases of countries under arms embargoes that still receive 
humanitarian aid.  In some cases, humanitarian aid is provided to regimes like North Korea that 
are under some of the most restrictive sanctions applied anywhere. 
 
The sanctions data were based on a comprehensive sanctions dataset from the German 
Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) which includes every sanctions episode from 1990 
to 2010 and distinguishes between US sanctions, EU sanctions and UN sanctions.344  After 
establishing the GIGA dataset as the basis, the list of multilateral arms embargoes provided by 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is included.  SIPRI provides data 
on most (all since 1998) multilateral arms embargoes since 1951 up until 2016.  The Targeted 
Sanctions Consortium (TSC) database (1991-2014) was used to update and augment the GIGA 
sanctions episodes until 2014.345  The dataset was then manually augmented by sanctions data 
from the United States treasury Sanctions Programs and Country Information - Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)346 and the United States State Department data on Defense 
Trade Controls.347  
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4.3.2.7 Aid from other donors 
Aid allocations from other donors will also be tested as a possible explanatory variable 
for donor aid commitments.  Does the donor increase aid when the United States reduces aid? 
What about cases where the United States attempts to punish an aid recipient for behavior 
counter to United States interests?  Do other donors make up the difference, negating the 
punishment?  Aid scholars and policymakers have often touted the ability to use aid to 
incentivize policy concessions.  However, the incentive only functions if other donors are 
unwilling to make up the difference when a donor cuts its aid.  The argument that China is a 
“rogue” donor often rests on the idea that China increases its aid as Western donors decrease 
their aid to punish aid recipients for failing to support the Western donor or adjust their internal 
policies in a way that suits the Western donor.  The models in this dissertation will test United 
States foreign aid as a potential explanatory variable in the aid commitment decision. Based on 
the logic and hypothesis in Chapter 2, I expect Chinese aid to be negatively correlated with 
United States aid and Japanese aid to be positively correlated with United States aid. 
 
4.3.2.8 International organizations 
International organizations have the power to affect the security interests of countries 
around the world.  The UN controls a sanctions regime and helps settle international disputes 
which countries may want to influence in their favor.  ASEAN is particularly important in Asia 
due to the membership of key states with territorial disputes with China and along the most 
important sea lanes of communication anywhere in the world.  Aid commitments are likely to 
flow to states with decision-making power in international organizations that affect regional 
stability and security.348 Positions in two key organizations are tested: 1) the UN security 
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council, and 2) ASEAN chairmanship.  Different donors may respond differently to 
membership in these organizations.  China, being a permanent member of the UN security 
council with veto power, may not seek to influence the temporary members of the security 
council because it needs no help in stopping actions against its interests.  Japan may be much 
more sensitive to trying to buy support on the UN security council especially given its long-
term ambition to become a permanent member. There are 5 permanent members of the security 
council with veto power including China, United States, UK, Russia, and France and 10 
temporary members which hold seats on a rotating basis by geographic region and are elected 
by the general assembly to two-year terms.  The data on security council membership was 
provided by Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) and updated in 2016.349   
 
Both Japan and China may actively compete for influence within ASEAN.  The ASEAN 
chairmanship rotates among the 12-member states with the Chair having agenda setting 
responsibility. If China or Japan prefers that ASEAN either focus on or steer clear of areas of 
concern to the donor state, sovereignty in the South China Sea for instance, donor states may 
increase aid to the ASEAN Chair.  A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the state is the 
ASEAN Chair and 0 if not.  Another dummy variable is constructed to take the value of 1 if the 
states is on the UN security council and a 0 if not.350  These variables included in the model and 
tested to determine if, ceteris paribus, donor states increase aid commitments to UN security 
council members and the ASEAN Chair. 
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4.3.2.9 UN voting 
To test the impact of political affinity between two countries, data on UN voting patterns 
are used. We may expect that countries allocating aid for security purposes will compel 
recipient states to vote together on issues before the United Nations.351 This hypothesis has 
been confirmed by several studies that have found a statistical relationship between foreign aid 
and UN voting patterns.352 The dataset for UN General Assembly Voting is available from the 
Harvard University Dataverse website353 and includes raw vote data,354 dyadic affinity scores 
between countries, and ideal point estimates (explained under normative variables) derived 
from those votes.355 Affinity scores can be used to estimate whether foreign aid donors reward 
or punish states based on their UN voting patterns, or whether recipient states votes are “bought” 
by foreign aid allocations. 
 
4.3.3 Normative variables 
Normative variables are included in the model to account for the possibility that aid is 
allocated for altruistic purposes, to promote the values of the donor, or to respond to 
humanitarian crises that periodically occur.  IVs that indicate normative intent for aid include 
poverty indicators, the occurrence of natural or anthropogenic disasters, and variables that 
indicate support for values like democracy and human rights. 
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4.3.3.1 Humanitarian crises 
Humanitarian disasters often draw wide ranging aid support from countries around the 
world.  At a minimum, the model needs to account for variation in the DV when a humanitarian 
crisis occurs.  Including a variable that indicates the occurrence of a major disaster captures the 
degree to which recipient need is important to the decision to commit aid.  The data on 
humanitarian crises is based on OECD DAC data on ODA provided for that purpose by DAC 
member states.  Beginning in 1990, the DAC began specifically categorizing aid as 
“humanitarian” in its dataset.  Humanitarian aid includes aid that is given in response to an 
emergency; reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation; or disaster prevention and preparedness.  
The vast majority (84% in 2014) of aid categorized as humanitarian by the OECD is for 
emergency response and nearly all of it is given as grants (over 95% in 2014).356 The total 
amount of humanitarian ODA received by the recipient state is used to indicate the magnitude 
of the humanitarian crisis.  For example, the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China engendered 
$339.5 million in humanitarian assistance to China in that year, while other years are in the 
$10-$30 million range. Years where a country receives over about $500 million indicates the 
most severe humanitarian crises and tend to track civil and other wars such as Iraq (2003-5), 
Afghanistan (2001-2, 2008-11), Sudan (2004-11) among others.357  I expect that foreign aid 
donors that utilize aid for humanitarian purposes will prioritize aid to countries that are having 
or have experienced a major crisis demanding international assistance.   
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4.3.3.2 Recipient poverty 
States may allocate aid for the purpose of reducing or alleviating the effects of poverty 
in the recipient country.  Two variables are used to test whether aid is given for this purpose. 
GDP per capita is an overall measure of a countries level of development but does not capture 
the distribution of income and may over or understate the level of extreme poverty in a country.  
A better measure of recipient need is infant mortality which is highly correlated with the 
prevalence of extreme poverty.  Donors allocating aid for altruistic purposes should provide 
more aid to those with lower GDP per capita and higher levels of infant mortality.  These 
variables are provided by the WDI. 
 
4.3.3.3 Political freedom 
Many aid agencies around the world refer to support for democracy and human rights 
in justifying their aid programs.  Japan explicitly states in its development cooperation charter 
(2015)358 that ODA will support democratization, respect for human rights and other “universal” 
values.  China may use its foreign aid to support regimes more like itself to promote its own 
values.359 The Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV dataset is used to measure political 
freedom and respect for human rights. The Polity IV dataset360 is the latest iteration of the Polity 
data series to categorize the authority characteristics of countries around the world for the 
purpose of comparing them quantitatively.  The data is on a -10 to +10 scale with the -10 being 
the most repressive and +10 be the most open and democratic.  To help researchers, the Policy 
IV data set was augmented with a new variable “fixing” the standardized specialty codes (-66: 
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foreign interruption, -77: anarchy, and -88: transition) to place them on the -10 to +10 scale.361  
This allows the direct use in time-series analysis.   
 
4.3.3.4 UN “ideal point” estimates 
A countries overall “respect” for human rights and liberal values are likely to be 
reflected in the manner in which they vote in the United Nations.  Voting affinity with the donor 
is included as a security variable, but degree to which those votes conform to liberal and 
democratic ideals is included as a normative variable.  The UN voting dataset includes what are 
termed “ideal point” estimates which focus on the values content of UN voting.362 Ideal point 
estimates are designed to distinguish among votes according to support for political and 
economic freedom, democracy and respect for human rights.  The ideal point estimates in this 
dataset are normalized around zero and designed to capture the degree to which each country’s 
voting conforms to the general parameters of a “liberal world order.”363 Using these ideal points 
estimates, it is possible to determine whether foreign aid from Japan or China rewards or 
punishes states for their ideological voting profiles in the UN rather than simply whether their 
votes are correlated with the donors.  The models are tested using both ideal point estimates 
and affinity scores reflecting the correlation of an aid recipient’s vote with the donor or the 
donor’s competitor. 
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4.4 The condition variable: threat perception 
According to the proposed theory, the level of threat perception in the donor state 
determines whether the donor acts as liberalism predicts or as realists predict.  A high level of 
threat perception implies an aid strategy the reflects balancing behavior as predicted by realism.  
A lack of significant security threats would lead states to use their aid programs to support 
commercial goals in the manner that liberalism would predict.  But threat perception, while 
intuitively simple, is often unclear.  How can we determine whether a state is sufficiently 
threatened that we expect its behavior, especially regarding foreign aid, to change?  When does 
a state change from low to high threat perception? 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I define “threat” as a danger to a nation that 
originates from another nation involving a military aspect. “Threat perception” is the perception 
of that danger. I attempt to measure threat perception based primarily on the discourse of 
political leaders and security agencies in the perceiving countries and augment that analysis 
with an analysis of threat arguments in the media and overall public opinion.  I cannot look into 
the minds of political leaders, but the proliferation of discourse that refers to specific military 
security threats by political leaders and security agency documents is an observable indication 
of the beliefs of political leaders will act on this observable declaration of threat perception.  
This study is not meant to look at the internal policy making process of threatened states, but 
the mechanism that transmits increasing levels of threat perception to foreign aid policy is 
through the political leaders who make both security and foreign aid policy.  The specific policy 
making process is not observed, but the result of the policy making process in terms of aid 
commitments to specific countries and the factors that lead to those commitments are observed 





Considering its importance in the international relations literature, surprisingly little 
work has been done on quantitatively measuring threat perception beyond its existence or lack 
thereof.  Walt’s balance of threat theory hypothesizes the sources of threat (power, proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions)364, yet provides no means of determining if a 
state perceives itself to be especially threatened.  Some states may face the same threat 
conditions yet interpret intentions differently.  For instance, South Korea and Japan would 
appear to be similar in their regard to the threat posed by China.  Each is a formal United States 
ally, each has varying degrees of territorial dispute with China (and with each other) and are 
both in close proximity to China.  Yet South Korea perceives relatively little threat from China 
to the consternation of Japan and the United States whose threat perceptions of China appear 
much greater.365  Ueki shows that China threat arguments emerged in the United States in the 
1990s and in Japan around 2000.366 
 
Much of the literature on threat perception focuses on the psychology of threat and the 
problem of misperception.  Jervis, focusing on deterrence, compellence, signaling and 
containment policies, was interested in how states can prevent misinterpretation of threatening 
intentions to avoid arms races and threat spirals.367 Spiral theorists spend a substantial amount 
of time on the psychology of threat perception, but almost no time on methods for determining 
whether or not a state feels threatened.  Writing during the Cold War, it seems that the 
perception of threat was taken as a given and each side was predisposed to perceive the 
opposing country in the most threatening light.  Therefore, the focus of the threat perception 
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literature emphasized ways to reduce misperception of threat by understanding the psychology 
of key actors. Because of the disconnect between Walt’s sources of threat and the perceptions 
of the potentially threatened state, the analysis of threat perception quickly requires an analysis 
of the psychology of the leaders or populace in the perceiving state. Lake (2011) shows that a 
rationalist analysis of the United States perception of threat from Iraq cannot explain why threat 
perception should have been greater in 2003 than in the mid-1990s. Iraq was no more powerful, 
and its leader was the same. The difference was what Lake terms “cognitive and decision-
making biases” of the Bush and Hussein regimes.368 To Lake, the essentially important factors 
in threat perception are psychological processes combined with the rationalist sources of threat.  
Some recent scholars note that threat perceptions are socially constructed through a process of 
public and private conversations among experts, opinion leaders, politicians, and the general 
public.369 The characterizations support my contention that threat perception is like a cloud that 
envelops the discourse and eventual actions of policy makers.  
 
The question of how to characterize threat depends not so much on how faithfully it 
reflects reality, but on how useful the characterization is to understand the relations between 
the states and the forces driving their decision-making.  A binary conception of threat 
perception has been usefully applied in international relations to describe and predict state 
behavior in a number of studies.  Walt (1987) does not characterize threat with much clarity 
aside from the four sources but implicitly utilizes a binary conception of threat. To Walt, states 
balance against “significant” threats, implying that a state is either threatened “significantly” or 
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not.370  Tsunekawa (2009) utilizes a binary conception of threat and opportunity to characterize 
the ways that Japan and Southeast Asian states perceive the rise of China.371 Many international 
relations scholars characterize states as “threatening”372 or not but do not make any judgement 
on the intensity of the perception of threat.  Chen and Yang (2013) utilize a binary threat 
condition variable combined with a binary economic opportunity variable to predict which 
countries in Southeast Asia will balance, bandwagon or hedge against China’s rising power.373 
Such a binary characterization provides the opportunity to characterize security policies and 
conditions utilizing the 2 x 2 matrix often used by international relations scholars (Schweller 
(1999)374, Cha (2010)375, Chen and Yang (2013)376).  This dissertation seeks to characterize 
China and Japan as under the condition of perceiving 1) a high level of threat, or 2) a low level 
of threat in a similar manner as Chen and Yang. Time periods of high and low threat will then 
be quantitatively tested to determine how different security, economic and normative factors 
influence aid commitment behavior under the various threat conditions. 
 
4.4.1 Measuring threat perception 
Where does that leave us in assessing whether or not Japan or China perceives itself 
under significant threat?  We have no way of knowing exactly what the leaders of Japan and 
China think about the threats they face and precisely when they begin to alter national policy 
to address those perceived threats.  However, the idea that a state is threatened by another state 
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is a perception that can proliferate in a society and spread through many levels of discourse in 
a society.  Mearsheimer (2013) describes how security competition leads to nationalist 
discourse which can be used by leaders to inflate the level of threat perception of the society or 
can bubble up from ordinary citizens377 – basically enveloping a country in a “cloud” of threat 
perception.  Either way, heightened levels of threat perception course through societies and will 
be reflected in multiple levels of discourse.  The extent of the discourse referring to perceived 
threats is an indication of the level of threat perception in the society where the discourse is 
occurring.  Discourse on perceived threats among leaders and high-level decision-makers is 
reasonable grounds for determining that a country perceives itself under threat and is likely to 
act to address those threats.  
 
The analysis of threats is the work of political leaders at the highest level and supported 
by a country’s national security apparatus.  Policy and budget decisions regarding aid are 
centered in the Ministry of Commerce in China and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan.  
However, the development of aid strategies and budgets are affected by the assessment and 
perception of threats at the highest levels of each government.  For Japan, the trend in aid policy 
making has been to elevate decision-making authority from MOFA towards the Cabinet Office 
and has become a component of Japan’s National Security Strategy in 2013.  Earlier, the 2005 
decision to stop ODA lending to China is an example of political leaders pre-empting the 
bureaucracy in MOFA on a major aid policy and budget issue (see APPENDIX 6 for a case 
study on this major decision).  In China, the State Council has long held the ultimate decision-
making authority regarding aid policy and has ultimate control of significant budget and country 
allocation decisions. Further, both countries use a form of “omiyage gaikou” where the 
                                                 




countries’ top leaders de fact direct aid packages to preferred countries through the strategic 
planning of high level and state visits.  Through these mechanisms, the overall perception of 
threats at the highest levels of government translates into changes in aid commitments to 
strategically important countries to promote national security goals.  
 
Since it is impossible to see inside the heads of decision-makers, the clearest indication 
of the level of threat perception at the highest level of government is likely to be the content of 
the debates of political leaders.  In the case of Japan, the content of diet debates is likely to be 
the most reliable indicator of overall threat perception with respect to China.  In China, such 
debates are not publicly available so other sources are needed to assess the level of threat. There 
is a limited scholarly literature on Chinese threat perception which I will describe and assess to 
help determine when China’s perceived threat of the US and the US-Japan alliance increased. 
 
For both China and Japan, the national defense agencies publish white papers on their 
overall security situations and strategies. These white papers present an official view of each 
government on the perceived threats they face. These documents, through their coordinated 
internal reviews and approval, reflect and help inform the views of top political leaders and the 
high level decision-making bodies (Japan Cabinet Office and China State Council) in both 
countries which have ultimate authority over aid policies and allocations.  In the case of Japan, 
the Diplomatic Bluebook published by MOFA also discusses the overall security situation 
confronting Japan. The benefit of using the Bluebook is that aid policies and budgets generally 
originate in MOFA and aid policy directions are addressed in the Bluebook along with some 
discussion of security threats.  However the Defense of Japan white papers were selected for 
discourse analysis because: 1) the assessment of security threats and strategies is the main 




in the Defense of Japan white paper than the Bluebook, 3) the Bluebook content is more event 
based as it catalogues the various diplomatic incidents related to national security with less 
emphasis on strategic vision in comparison to the Defense of Japan, and 4) the overall trends 
in threat perception are evident in both documents so that even if the Bluebook were selected, 
the overall judgement on the threats faced by Japan would be the same.  As an illustration, the 
opening of Chapter 1 of the Defense of Japan reads: “The security environment surrounding 
Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors 
becoming more tangible and acute.”378 The Bluebook of the same year includes the following 
in its opening paragraph: “With these major trends, the security environment surrounding Japan 
in the Asia-Pacific region is also becoming increasingly severe.” 379  The Bluebook uses 
precisely the same descriptor “ increasingly severe” but using less clear and concise language.  
Overall, I decided that the Defense of Japan white papers are preferable for the purpose of this 
dissertation due to their source, clarity, and content. 
 
Media discourse is another avenue to analyze threat perception at a broader level.  In 
China, media is controlled by the government and reflects the views of the state and, therefore, 
should be a reasonably reliable indicator of its threat perception.  In Japan, the media represents 
a diverse set of views but ultimately reflects, through its reporting of security incidents, 
government reports and debates of political leaders, the trends in perceived threats of the 
country.  Media discourse is analyzed by looking at the number of unique articles published 
referring to Japan and China’s perceived threats. 
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As the “cloud” of threat perception spreads through a society, it will also affect the 
views of the general public.  Therefore, as a final indicator of threat perception, I have chosen 
to look at public opinion surveys. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments are cognizant of 
public opinion which they both respond to and try to mold.  So while aid decisions are not made 
by the public, the extent to which the “cloud” of threat perception pervades a country should be 
reflected in the opinions of each countries’ citizens.  Analyses of these sources will attempt to 
identify inflection points that represent changes in the threat discourse to identify when threat 
perception is higher or lower. 
 
The analysis of threat perception in Japan and China will be presented in the order of 
predictive strength.  For Japan, the order is: 1) Diet debates, 2) Defense of Japan white papers, 
3) media discourse, and 4) public opinion.  For China, the order is 1) National Defense white 
papers, 2) media discourse, 3) review of past literature on Chinese threat perception, and 4) 
public opinion. 
 
Through these analyses, I choose the high and low threat periods on which to analysis 
aid commitment decisions.  In reality, threat perception is a continuum of perceived 
vulnerability with near infinite variation but there are periods of time when most observers can 
agree that a state perceives a high enough level of threat for that perception to begin to drive an 
array of policy decisions.  This state would exhibit a high-threat condition.   
 
4.4.2 Japan’s overall threat perception 
Beginning in the mid 1990s with China’s nuclear tests and increasing belligerence 
around territorial disputes with Japan and in the South China Sea, combined with China’s 




has slowly increased. 380   Since China’s opening to the West, Japan considered China an 
economic opportunity, but as its power continued to grow and relations between China and 
Japan deteriorated, “China threat” arguments increased markedly in Japan around 2000.381  By 
2005, anti-Japan riots in China and its economy on the verge of surpassing Japan’s combined 
with exceptionally poor public perceptions of each other’s intentions on both sides brought 
relations to a nadir. Sino-Japanese relations were already on a downward trajectory by around 
2003 so many observers point to domestic politics as the reason for the 2005 decision to end 
ODA loans to China.  However, many Japanese leaders had been arguing for ending ODA loans 
to China as early as 1995.382 The reason commonly cited was to stop promoting China's 
prosperity at Japan's expense, a realist relative power argument. 383  Newspaper editorials 
frequently called for Japan to stop helping China who was claimed to be building up its military 
contrary to Japan's 1992 ODA charter and providing aid to third countries. 384  By 2003, 
editorials opposed ODA to China because it was becoming a military and economic "threat" to 
Japan.385 These debates preceded the sharp deterioration in relations in 2004 and 2005 that 
appears to continue up until this writing in 2018. 
 
Given the apparent proliferation of “China threat” arguments in Japan, how can we 
choose a point where Japanese decision-makers act to alter Japan’s ODA and security policies 
to address those threats? It is impossible to see into the mind of decision-makers, but we can 
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look at the content of the debates of political leaders, threat assessments of the defense agency 
(no Ministry), media discourse and public opinion. 
 
Diet debates in Japan. The Japanese Government provides a useful tool for tracking 
Diet debates though its Diet Proceedings Search System available online on its National Diet 
Library website.386 The results of searches for “China threat” and “threat from China” are given 
in Figure 4-2 on page 200 presented together with the media analysis.  In the mid-1990s, China 
threat arguments swelled with the 1995 nuclear tests and tensions in the Taiwan Straits before 
dropping in 1999.  The early 2000s saw a sustained increase in China threat arguments peaking 
in 2006 before dropping again in 2007-8 at the height of the worldwide financial crisis.  China 
threat arguments in the Diet then increased steadily until 2015 reaching the highest level ever. 
The pattern of Diet debates suggests that “China threat” discourse emerged around 2001-2002.  
 
Defense White Papers. Japan’s national defense white papers provide another potential 
source of information on threat perception from the perspective of the defense establishment.  
Interpreting the tone and content of these documents is difficult as many of the same phrases 
are carried over from white paper to white paper. However, looking at the tone of the white 
paper Section 1 which consistently presents the overall security environment surrounding Japan, 
a change in tone and evident perception of threats to Japan becomes clearer.  For example, the 
1993 white paper states in the first few paragraphs: 
“Under such current international military situations with many 
factors in flux, there exists a sense of uneasiness and uncertainties for the 
future while various efforts toward stabilization continue.  As a whole, 
however, it can be recognized that the world is moving in a favorable 
                                                 




direction, as a result of the certain end of the Cold War due to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.”387 
 
Contrasted to the 2014 Defense of Japan (official English translation), which begins: 
“The security environment surrounding Japan has become 
increasingly severe, being encompassed by various challenges and 
destabilizing factors, which are becoming more tangible and acute. 
 
Above all, as conflicts between countries, etc., remain, major 
changes in the security environment in the vicinity of Japan have yet to 
emerge even after the end of the Cold War, unlike in Europe. Opaque 
and uncertain factors such as issues of territorial claims and reunification 
remain. There is also an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” 
situations that is neither purely peacetime nor contingencies over 
territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests, etc. In addition, 
there are clearer trends for neighboring states to modernize and reinforce 
their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. As 
such, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific 
region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious.” 
(Defense of Japan 2014)388 
 
The 1993 white paper’s tone is more optimistic about the overall security situation 
around Japan and emphasizes the likelihood of the security situation improving.  The 2014 
white paper’s tone is negative and pessimistic about the direction of Japan’s security situation 
and emphasizes threats which implicitly refer to actions by China (“grey zone” situations refer 
to Chinese incursions into disputed territorial waters among other acts).  The expressed 
perception of threat appears quite different in these two documents.  The task is to discern more 
subtle changes over time to characterize the level of threat perceived by Japan’s military 
establishment.  
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I attempt to characterize the level of threat implied by the language used in the section 
of the defense white papers referring to Japan’s overall security situation augmented by the 
specific references to any threats from China.  The language and content of the Defense of 
Japan white papers is assessed qualitatively in order to rate threat on a 5-point scale from low 
(1) to high (5) (See APPENDIX 3 for specific language and citations).  The factors assessed 
qualitatively to reach each rating are as follows: 
(1) Reflects a situation where Japan’s overall security situation is expressed as positive 
and moving in a positive direction.  No specific threats identified though 
uncertainties may be mentioned. Discussion of China (if included) emphasizes a 
positive direction of opening up. (Low threat) 
(2) Reflects an emphasis on uncertainty but does not identify any particular threats. 
Discussion of China (if included) emphasizes the rapid modernization of China’s 
military but no specific threat to Japan. (Low-medium threat) 
(3) Identifies specific threats to Japan’s security (such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, 
or territorial issues) and direction is either unclear or negative.  China discussion (if 
included) highlights China’s rising power and military modernization. (Medium 
threat) 
(4) Highlights emerging specific threats to Japan including territorial conflicts and 
nuclear proliferation.  Discussion of China (if included) emphasized China’s rising 
power and military modernization and mentions specific actions threatening to 
Japan. (Medium-high threat) 
(5) Clearly states that Japan’s security situation is “severe” and deteriorating.  Identifies 
specific threats to Japan’s territory and security.  Discussion of China (if included) 




of territorial integrity and actions meant to infringe on Japan’s perceived rights and 
interests. (High threat) 
 
The following chart (Figure 4-1 on page 199) shows the qualitative assessment of the 
language and content of the Defense of Japan white papers. The overall trend is up with the 
most recent years reaching a “high threat” condition.  Looking at direction, the trend from 
immediately after the Cold War is of declining threats until around 2002 and increasing threats 
afterwards.  Threat perception expressed by the Defense Agency/Ministry reached moderate 
levels by 2004 and has been medium-high to high since 2009.  The Defense of Japan white 
papers are political documents that don’t change much year to year and there could be different 
interpretations of the modest year to year changes, but assessed over a long period of time, the 
trend is quite clear.  Japan’s military and security institutions expressed increasing levels of 





Figure 4-1: Japan's Threat Perception - Qualitative review of Defense White Papers 
 
Source: Authors assessment of language/content of annual Defense White Paper of the Government of Japan. 
 
Media discourse in Japan. I conducted targeted media searches via Factiva to assess 
the number of unique articles referring to China threats.  Searches were conducted in Japanese 
to find references to “China threat” and “threats from China”.389  Factiva began indexing 
Japanese language newspapers from 1995 so the first media references found were in 1995 (as 
shown in Figure 4-2 on page 200). The number of times “China threat” was mentioned was low 
in the 1990s remaining below 40 until 2001 when the number of references begin to climb.  
Articles mentioning “China threat” steadily rose to around 400 by 2005-6 before dropping back 
to below 200 in 2008.  Since then, the prevalence of articles referencing “China threat” have 
increased enormously to over 1400 by 2015.   
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Figure 4-2: China threat discourse in the National Diet and Japanese newspapers 
 
Sources: Factiva for Japanese newspaper search results conducted on 25 April 2017, National Diet Proceedings 
Search System (国会会議録検索システム) .  
 
Some caution interpreting the media discourse findings may be warranted.  During the 
period of analysis, the news media business entered and continues to experience significant 
disruption caused by the internet and social media. Changes in the newspaper market which has 
experienced declining circulation and profitability worldwide may have affected the results.  
Factiva does enable filtering out duplicate articles that may appear on numerous sites, so the 
results do reflect distinct articles. However, social media has increased the speed at which ideas 
and news articles are disseminated while at the same time reduced the ability of news 
organizations to profit through subscriptions.  Economic pressures on individual newspapers 
have increased their reliance on social media to gather information which may amplify the most 





Public opinion in Japan (and China).  Public opinion polling on Japan-China relations 
comes from two primary sources.  The Cabinet Office has conducted public opinion surveys on 
Japanese views on international diplomacy including questions about the Japanese people’s 
feelings of “affinity” or feelings of friendship390 with China (see Figure 4-3 on page 202).  The 
question posed is not specifically about perceived threat from China, but it is clear from the 
survey results that behavior by China that can be perceived as threatening has a powerful effect 
on the survey results.  From China’s opening and through much of the 1980s, Japanese people 
had markedly friendly feelings towards China. The Chinese crackdown on demonstrators in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 was the first major disruption in the relationship and it resulted in a 
persistent 20 percent drop in the number of Japanese expressing friendly feelings towards China.  
When China conducted nuclear tests in 1995 before signing the test ban treaty, the percentage 
of Japanese with unfriendly feelings towards China exceeded the percentage with friendly 
feelings for the first time in this survey.  In 2003, Japanese feelings of friendship toward China 
began a rapid deterioration, but not clearly linked to any particular incident.  Rather, the 
deterioration appears to be a culmination of a series of controversies regarding 1) China’s 
increasing incursions into Japan’s territorial seas around the Senkaku Islands in the early 2000s, 
2) frustration at a perceived lack of appreciation by China for Japan’s ODA, and 3) the 
increasing perception that China’s military was being strengthened and modernized in a way 
that threatened Japan.391  
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Figure 4-3: Public opinion survey results - Japanese affinity with China 
 
Source: Cabinet Office - 内閣府、外交に関する世論調査 - Annual (see http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-
gai.html), blue lines represent the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, 1995 nuclear tests and 2005 decision to stop ODA 
lending to China.  
 
The other source of survey data on Japanese (and Chinese) public attitudes towards 
China (and Japan) is the annual survey by the Genron NPO.392 This survey was initially 
conducted only in 2005 so the time frame is limited. However, the results confirm the findings 
of the Japan Cabinet Office survey and provide reciprocal data on the attitudes of the Chinese 
people. The Genron NPO survey results are presented in Figure 4-4 on page 203. 
 
                                                 





Figure 4-4: Attitudes of Japanese and Chinese people about the other country 
 
Source: Genron NPO (2016) www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/ctegory/267.html (accessed March 2018). 
 
Overall, the Genron survey shows that both Japanese and Chinese people have poor 
overall impressions of the other country with an improvement in 2007-2008 (though still 
negative feelings overall) and a sharp worsening in 2013. The Cabinet Office surveys are more 
useful due to the long period over which comparisons can be made.  From opinion surveys, the 
Japanese public appeared unthreatened by China in the 1980s, somewhat more threatened, but 
not strongly so during the 1990s, and increasingly concerned with threats from China in the 
2000s.  
 
Taking the previous analyses as a whole considering public opinion, news media and 
Diet debates as well as defense white papers, there appears to be a divide occurring in the early 




coverage of China threats started increasing in 2001-2002 and public opinion deteriorating after 
2003.  Japan’s threat perception can be divided into low and high-threat period with 2002 
chosen as a reasonable break point.  Based on the overall security related discourse in Japan 
with respect to China, the 1991-2001 period is a low threat period while 2002 onward is a high 
threat period.   
 
4.4.3 China’s overall threat perception 
China provides less official analysis of its security strategy than Japan, has no publicly 
available transcripts of policy debates within the Chinese Communist Party, and a general lack 
of press freedom and internet censorship make it more difficult to determine how threatened it 
may perceive itself to be.  Further, there may be times when the Chinese government wants 
heightened discussion of threats to proliferate and may suppress those discussions at other times 
according to diplomatic or other needs.  However, the Ministry of National Defense of China 
publishes a national defense white paper on China’s Military Strategy393 every two years.  This 
document provides valuable insight into the Chinese military’s perception of its overall security 
environment. In addition, news and policy articles may be searched in both English and Chinese 
there are a few scholarly articles on Chinese threat perception. Lastly, the Genron NPO public 
opinion surveys on Japan-China relations have been done since 2005 (see Figure 4-4 on page 
203) and include the Chinese public’s attitudes. 
 
Japan is a diminishing military threat to China due to its declining relative power and 
limited offensive military capability though Japan certainly has high defensive military 
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capabilities, some of which may also have offensive utility.  The threat to China is the from the 
United States and any threat from Japan is derived from Japan’s association with the United 
States and the overall power represented by the United States-Japan alliance.  If China perceives 
the United States and the United States-Japan alliance as a significant threat, China’s security 
interests are served by weakening United States alliances in East Asia and countering United 
States security interests.   
 
China’s National Defense white papers.  China’s national defense white papers, like 
Japan’s, provide key source of information on threat perception from the perspective of the 
military establishment.  China’s white papers have been published in English since 1995 and 
biennially since 1998.  The Chinese white papers are not as comprehensive as the Defense of 
Japan white papers but give a broad overview of the regional security situation, identify the 
outlook for China’s security and list what they consider the key threats.  Like the analysis for 
Japan, I utilize a 5-point scale from low (1) to high (5) (See APPENDIX 3 for specific language 
and citations).  The factors behind each rating are as follows: 
 
(1) Reflects a situation where China’s overall security situation is expressed as positive 
and moving in a positive direction.  No specific threats identified though 
uncertainties may be mentioned. (Low threat) 
(2) Reflects an emphasis on uncertainty, but do not identify any particular threats. 
(Low-medium threat) 
(3) Identifies specific threats to China’s security and direction is either unclear or 




(4) Highlights emerging specific threats to China including territorial conflicts, 
maritime rights, military challenges.  Specific mention of Japan or United States or 
“external countries” infringing on China’s security (Medium-high threat) 
(5) Clearly states that China’s security situation is bad and deteriorating.  Identifies 
specific threats to China’s territory and security.  (High threat) 
 
The following chart shows the qualitative assessment of the language and content of the 
China’s National Defense white papers. The overall trend is up though with a distinct drop in 
2008. The highest assessed level of threat is the most recent year, 2014.  China’s defense white 
papers tend to emphasize a positive overall outlook but do increasingly identify territorial issues 
with regard to the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea as key concerns.  Defense white 
papers are political documents that don’t change much year to year and there could be different 
interpretations of modest year to year changes. However, 2008 stands out as a particularly 
positive version of China’s defense white paper.  The language is replete with expressions of 
confidence and positive views of the future.  Considering this was in the midst of a worldwide 
financial crisis, I am tempted to conclude that China’s security apparatus believes its national 
security interests are best served by weakness in the developed world.  China’s economy was 
relatively insulated from the crisis and China’s massive stimulus program restarted economic 
growth more quickly than nearly anywhere else.  As the rest of the world recovered, China’s 
threat perception appeared to increase.  The assessment of the threat perception based on 





Figure 4-5: China's threat perception - Qualitative review of defense White Papers 
 
Source: Authors assessment of language/content of the biennial China’s National Defense White Papers, 1998-
2014.  
 
Chinese Media Discourse.  Like the analysis of Japanese discourse of the threat from 
China, I also analyzed the content of news articles to determine the extent to which threat 
arguments appear in Chinese media.  Using Factiva, both English language Chinese media and 
Chinese language media were analyzed to count the number of articles that contain phrases that 
indicate threat perception of the United States-Japan alliance.  First, the phases “threaten 
China”/“threat to China” and “contain China”/“containment policy” were searched in China 
based English language media (only articles that include these terms and refer to the United 
States, America, or Japan were counted).  The results are in Figure 4-6 on page 208 and show 
a generally upward sloping pattern.  The “contain China” narrative appears more reactive to 
current events.  There is a noticeable but small increase in 1995 around the update of the United 




and a sharp increase during the Abe administration (from 2012 to this writing) when the number 
of articles referencing “contain China” roughly doubled and remained elevated.  
 
Figure 4-6: Articles Containing "threaten China” and “contain China” 
 
Source: Factiva search on (i) US or American or Japan(ese) and “contain China” or “containment policy” and (ii) 
US or American or Japan(ese) and “threat to China” or “threaten China”.  
 
“Threaten China”/“threat to China” narratives increase more slowly and appear less 
responsive to current events though there is a decided increase between 2009 and 2010 perhaps 
related to the collision of a Chinese fishing trawler and the Japanese coast guard near the 
Senkakus.394 The problem with the “threaten China” findings is that many of the included 
articles refer to non-security threats, especially economic and trade threats.  Articles may 
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mention “US threatens to impose tariffs on Chinese solar panels” and would be included in the 
Factiva figures.  Some of the articles are referring to threats made by the United States in 
relation to the so-called war on terror and not specifically threatening China.  The “contain 
China” narrative is much more targeted at security concerns and expresses the main perceived 
threat to China’s rise: namely that the United States, with Japan’s cooperation, seeks to prevent 
China from rising and claiming its rightful place of regional dominance; in essence the United 
States following a strategy of maintaining primacy as its grand strategy.395 The vast majority of 
the articles referring to “contain China” or its variations such as “containment policy” against 
China or “encircle China” refer to the perception of specific threats against China to prevent 
China’s rise. For this reason, the best keyword searches in Factiva are “contain” or “encircle” 
China. 
 
China based media is controlled by the state and, as such, the contents are likely to 
reflect the diplomatic strategy of the CCP.  The news outlets available in English such as the 
China Daily and Global Times are published not just to inform an international audience about 
China, but to promote “global reputation” and “muffle foreign criticism”.396 The Global Times 
was launched in 1993 but the English version has only been published since 2009.397  Therefore, 
the English language searches are likely distorted by the introduction of a major new CCP 
affiliated news source in English and may explain the large jump in articles after 2009.  
                                                 
395 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21. 
No. 3 (Winter 1996-97), 5-53. 
396 Gary Rawnsley, “China’s English Language Media: A Case of Overconfidence,” University of Southern 
California Center on Public Diplomacy: CPD Blog, 21 April 2009, accessed 2 April 2018, 
https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/china’s-english-language-media-case-over-confidence.  
397 Christopher Bodeen, "China launches new English language newspaper," Associated Press, 20 April 2009, 





Therefore, I conducted Factiva searches in Chinese to better track the development of China’s 
threat perception. 
 
Though not proficient at Chinese, I consulted with Chinese international relations 
experts on the proper phrasing of “contain China” used when Chinese news media discuss the 
containment policy with respect to the United States and Japan.398 The two phrases most 
commonly used are 围堵 (wei du) and 遏制 (e zhi) which can be translated as “encircle” and 
“contain” respectively. Factiva searches were conducted to determine the number of articles 
containing these phrases along with references to China and the United States or Japan.  The 
searches were then limited by topical category to only show articles categorized as 
“international relations”.  Then, to ensure that the proliferation of news sources did not skew 
the results, the searches were limited to Xinhua only – the state-owned news agency that is the 
largest in China (and the world) 399 which has operated since 1931.400 The results are given in 
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 on page 211. 
 
                                                 
398 The author would like to thank Zhang Hao and Kalvin Fung, fellow PhD candidates at Waseda University (as 
of 2017), for kindly advising on Factiva search phrasing and content analysis.   
399 International Media and Newspapers, "Top News Agencies in the World," access at 
https://www.4imn.com/news-agencies/ on 15 April 2018. 





Figure 4-7: Factiva search on “contain China” narrative – Chinese language/international 
relations (IR) only 
 
Source: Factiva search on US (美国)or Japan  (日本) and China (中国) and 围堵 (encircle) or 遏制 (contain) for all 
articles and IR (international relations) only.  
 
Figure 4-8: Factiva search on “contain China” narrative, international relations (IR) category 
and Xinhua only 
 
Source: Factiva search on US (美国)or Japan  (日本) and China (中国) and 围堵 (encircle) or 遏制 (contain) for all 





These results show that many Chinese language articles have not been indexed by 
Factiva until the early 2000s.  Xinhua is the oldest and largest Chinese language news source 
and the first articles in these searches appear in 2002.  Prior years are simply not searchable so 
making statements about the trends seen in Figure 4-7 on page 211 that indicate a major increase 
in “containment” discourse around 1999-2000 is probably not reliable and reflects the lack of 
inclusion of Chinese language media sources in the database.  Factiva introduced Chinese 
language search functions only in early 2003 with expanded content in Chinese. 401   So, 
assuming that a full complement of Chinese language sources only became available in the 
early 2000s, we can say that a peak in the discourse appears in 2005 and a decline around the 
worldwide financial crisis followed by an increase thereafter.  The Chinese language media 
content analysis suggests that threat discourse in China has been relatively consistent over time 
with an apparent general increase after 2008.   
 
Literature on Chinese Threat Perception. The conventional wisdom in international 
relations before the mid-1990s was that China viewed the United States-Japan security alliance 
positively402 as a way to keep Japan from re-militarizing and threatening China – the “cork in 
the bottle” analogy.403  Many scholars404 point to the changes begun by the Nye commission as 
the trigger that changed how China views the United States-Japan alliance. China began to 
                                                 
401 Dow Jones and Company. Factiva expands Asian content set with key Chinese language sources. PR Wire: 
Press Release, accessed at https://prwire.com.au/pr/4764/factiva-expands-asian-content-set-with-key-chinese-
language-sources on 15 April 2018. 
402 Thomas Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Security Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 
International Security, Vol 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), 49-80. 
403 Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Farrar, “Through Beijing's Eyes: How China Sees the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” The 
National Interest: Foreign Policy Experts Roundtable, 12 May 2015, accessed on 14 April 2018, 
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worry that Japan would take an increasingly active role in the alliance405 and may have come 
to see the alliance as targeted at containing China rather than defending Japan.406  
 
Sasaki (2010) finds that there was a significant increase in China’s threat perception of 
Japan in the mid-1990s resulting from the perceived strengthening of the United States-Japan 
alliance.407 He utilized discourse analysis of Chinese government journals of the People’s 
Liberation Army, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Economic Journals in the China Academic 
Journals database. Articles were coded as “neutral”, “suspicious”, or “critical” with regards to 
Japan’s defense policy.  Threat perception of Japan was found to have jumped between 1995 
and 1996 due to the revised defense guidelines of the United States-Japan security alliance.408  
Sasaki found that China rarely distinguished Japan as a specific threat outside of its role in the 
United States-Japan alliance and that perception of the alliance continued to worsen with 1) 
cooperation on ballistic missile defense, and 2) the increasing emphasis of the guidelines on the 
defense of areas surrounding Japan which is taken by China to mean Taiwan.409 By Sasaki’s 
analysis, China perceived the United States-Japan alliance as a threat beginning around 1996 
and increasing throughout the 2000s.  
 
Chen (2001) studied the perception of the United States/Japan Threat to China in the 
late 1990s through surveys of urban Chinese.410  Chen uses a two-part concept of perceived 
external threat that considers 1) the intention to inflict harm, and 2) the capability to inflict harm.  
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In combination, these two elements reflect a status of intimidation by an external threat, 
according to Chen.  The survey was taken in Beijing in 1999 and included the following 
statements and findings411: 
Statement 1: “Each of the countries listed below, in your view, has hostile 
intentions against our country's vital interests and security.”  
Japan – 66.8% agree or strongly agree 
US – 74.3% agree of strongly agree 
 
Statement 2: “Each of the countries listed below, in your view, has the 
military and/or economic power that poses a real and immediate danger to our 
country.” 
Japan – 70% agree or strongly agree 
US – 84.6% agree or strongly agree 
 
The literature on China’s threat perception (Chen 2001, Sasaki 2010, Green 1999, Bin 
2001, Glaser and Farrar 2015, Christensen 1999) generally finds that Chinese perceptions of 
threat from the United States-Japan alliance began in the mid 1990s and has escalated since.  
But the literature does not indicate a specific level of threat perception.  It is not entirely clear 
if threats perceived were low, moderate or high or when those threats became significant 
enough to influence China’s foreign aid policy.  It appears likely that China’s threat perception 
of the United States-Japan alliance has been significant for the entire period for which we have 
detailed data on China’s foreign aid activities (2000-2014).  If this is the case, we may not 
                                                 




expect to see much change in aid commitment behavior from China but would expect aid 
allocations to primarily reflect China’s security interests over its commercial interests. 
 
Overall, China was threatened by the United States-Japan alliance since the mid to late 
1990s with a drop around the worldwide financial crisis in 2007-8 evident in all sources 
(scholarly literature, public opinion, media discourse and defense white papers) followed by an 
escalation in perceived threats as the crisis abates in 2009 onward.  This leaves us with a 
decision about whether the temporary reduction in threat around 2008 is sufficient to have 
altered aid allocations over that short period.  The annual data on Chinese aid commitments 
enables me to test whether aid commitment behavior was significantly different in this period 
compared to before or after the financial crisis with the caveat that such a short period may be 
insufficient data to reliably estimate the panel regressions. 
 
4.5 Deflators and exchange rates 
All relevant data series’ are converted to the donor countries currency to remove the 
impact of currency fluctuations.  The data are then adjusted to 2013 constant JPY or CNY 
remove the impact of inflation over time. The JPY/USD exchange rate data is provided by the 
OECD.  The CNY/USD exchange rate is provided by the Economic Research Department of 
the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of the United States.412 The USD GDP deflator is published 
by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis. The historical Japanese GDP deflator 
(1966-1998) is provided by Statistics Japan 413  while recent deflators (1999-2015) were 
accessed through the Cabinet Office’s Economic and Social Research Institute’s website.414 
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Economic data were converted from current USD to constant 2013 USD equivalent.  I 
use USD as the unit for recipient country data because most comparative international data are 
provided in USD equivalent units, most trade and trade finance is provided in USD, and 
recipient country poverty statistics used by all large international financial institutions are based 
on USD equivalent data. Japan uses poverty statistics and country income classifications 
expressed in USD based on World Bank income statistics and reported by the OECD DAC 
when deciding whether a recipient should “graduate” from receiving ODA.415 The Japanese 
government does not scrupulously adhere to the DAC eligibility criterion and explicitly allows 
for ODA to flow to middle income countries if it is deemed to be in Japan’s foreign policy 
interest.416 
 
4.6 Nested analysis process 
The first step is the regression analysis on panel data to establish the key relationships 
in the theoretical framework. Regression analysis is used to test the relative importance and 
significance of the security, commercial and normative variables in predicting the share of 
bilateral foreign aid allocations (DV). Changes over time are established by running separate 
regressions for different time periods representing low and high levels of threat perception to 
test for structural change in the relationships between security, commercial and normative 
variables and the dependent variable. The next step is to select and conduct case studies to 
elaborate and confirm the results of the regression analysis. Cases are selected that illustrate the 
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significant statistical relationships estimated in the regression analysis. 417  The cases are 
analyzed to specifically determine the main reasons for increasing or decreasing aid allocations 
by China and Japan over the key analysis periods to confirm (or not) the estimates derived from 
the panel regressions. 
 
One benefit of the case study analysis is to analyze dynamics that the regressions cannot. 
For example, the regression models assume that the aid commitments of the donor are purely 
the decision of the donor. Since most aid recipients are poor and aid is given on very beneficial 
terms, this is a reasonable simplification.  Most recipient countries accept the aid that is offered 
to them.  However, the decision to provide an aid commitment also needs a decision by the 
recipient to take the aid offered.  For example, India has an official policy of accepting bi-lateral 
aid only from Japan, the United States, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom. 418  
Therefore, the lack of aid from China to India does not necessarily mean that China and India 
have poor relations, though that might also be the case. The regression analysis is not capable 
of illuminating every dynamic in the aid relationship.  The case studies, by tracking the offer 
and acceptance of aid, can show how aid commitments are made in more detail and show how 
other factors not included in the regression models may have some impact on the DV. 
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5 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This section of the dissertation describes the design of the large-N regression analyses 
conducted for Japanese and Chinese ODA commitments and the results.  In the first section, I 
describe the data and present descriptive statistics and a diagnostic analysis of IV correlations 
and explain the model specification adjustments used to improve the results.  Then the model 
specifications and estimation results are presented for Japan and China. I interpret the findings 
in light of the predictions; and finally, I conduct supplementary regressions to determine if there 
is any evidence of direct aid competition between Japan and China. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
The purpose of this section in to assess the reasonableness of the variable values and 
conduct diagnostic analysis of IV correlations to ensure the regression models are not affected 
by multicollinearity.  Table 5-1 on page 219 shows descriptive statistics of all variables included 
in the Japan and China panel regressions.  All values are reasonable given the nature of the 





Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ODACom_JPtot_M2013Y 6,764 7,913.86 30,161.88 0.00 568,454.40 
ChODA_max_tot_M2013Y 2,505 271.09 1,287.37 0.00 37,038.71 
GDP_2013 6,560 44,800,000,000 283,000,000,000 2,607,506 10,700,000,000,000 
Population 8,131 25,500,000 113,000,000 5,563 1,360,000,000 
Oil_rent_gdp 8,183 3.83 11.14 0.00 95.82 
JP_FDI_M2013Y 8,183 9,511.88 59,358.30 (334,195.10) 2,424,301.00 
Jp_exp_Mill2013Y 7,536 142,950.30 693,081.60 0.00 13,900,000.00 
Jp_imp_Mill2013Y 7,536 144,445.50 756,168.20 0.00 19,500,000.00 
CN_exp_Mill2013Y 5,882 9,210.39 71,034.45 0.00 2,384,604.00 
CN_imp_Mill2013Y 5,883 8,129.90 52,287.35 0.00 1,178,693.00 
CN_FDI_Out_2013Y 8,183 361.83 8,952.74 (5,032.01) 438,975.00 
CN_Firm_Est 4,896 3.98 48.42 0.00 2,266.00a 
Inf_Mort_rate 7,037 60.95 44.25 2.20 244.70 
GDP_cap_2013 6,557 3,012.03 7,139.58 6.76 97,655.20b 
UN_IdealPoints 6,264 (0.30) 0.70 (2.48) 2.77 
Humanitarian_M 4,175 41.03 138.97 0.00 3,223.70 
Polity2_use 5,770 (0.60) 6.83 (10.00) 10.00 
UN_pctwUS 6,264 0.22 0.14 0.00 1.00 
UN_pctwChina 5,780 0.81 0.14 0.06 1.00 
UN_pctwJap 6,263 0.84 0.10 0.00 1.00 
UNSC 7,056 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
ASEANChr 8,183 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
BorderChina 8,183 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
ChinaMaritimeConflict 8,183 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
ChinaBorderConflict 8,183 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
USTreatyAlly 8,183 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
USMilBase 8,183 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Total_viol_war 5,777 0.93 2.01 0.00 14.00 
USMil_Pers 8,178 1,056.00 13,060.47 0.00 537,377.00c 
Taiwan_Recog 8,183 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
US_Sanctions 8,183 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
UN_Sanctions 8,183 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
US_Relations_Ind 8,183 1.68 0.97 0.00 4.00 
Coup_Success 8,183 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Coup_Fail 8,183 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
USAODA_M2013 6,764 50.17 240.82 (0.12)d 8,397.76 
Notes on some high values: 
a High value for Chinese firm establishments is for Hong Kong. 
b High values for GDP per capita reflect the high levels of average income achieved in former aid recipients like Qatar, Macau, 
China, Singapore, Kuwait and Bermuda among others. 
c Large value for US troops reflects war in Viet Nam which saw troops peak in 1968. 
d Negative values are possible when prior aid commitments are cancelled. 
 
In addition to the descriptive statistics, I conducted a correlation analysis to check for 
multicollinearity between the variables (see Table 5-2 on page 221 for the correlation 
coefficients for the Japan regressions and Table 5-3 on page 223 for the correlation coefficients 
for the China regressions).  The rows and columns of the correlation tables represent all 




with all of the other regressors. 419 On the diagonal, the value is 1 since the correlation of each 
variable to itself is 1.0.  Multicollinearity can result in biased estimates and can lead to erratic 
changes in regression coefficients from minor variations in the model.  A separate correlation 
analysis is conducted for the Japan and China regressions because some of the variables and 
the analysis periods are different.  In both regressions, there was limited evidence of 
multicollinearity (erratic sign switching) between Population and GDP so the Population 
variable was dropped.  For the Japan regressions, the potentially problematic variables are Japan 
imports, exports and FDI which are moderately correlated with each other and the UN affinity 
score for China shows a reasonably high negative correlation with the UN ideal points score.  
Multiple alternative specifications were conducted to test for evidence of erratic coefficient 
estimates due to multicollinearity between the trade and FDI variables.  Overall, the coefficient 
estimates for these variables are stable between specifications, there is no evidence of erratic 
changes in the signs on coefficients, and the significance of key variables is robust across a 
wide range of specifications. Therefore, the trade variable and FDI remain included in the Japan 
regressions.  Nevertheless, Japan’s and China’s imports and exports show moderately high 
correlation so they were summed into a single trade variable (trade = imports + exports).  The 
China UN affinity score was removed from the Japan regression while the UN ideal points 
score was removed from the China regression due to collinearity. The variable to remove in 
each case was decided based on model specification testing using each variable.  The correlation 
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Table 5-2: Correlation matrix – Japan regression variables 
 
ODAJp_M2013Y GDP_2013* Pop* Oil_rent_gdp Jp_FDI~2013Y Jp_exp~2013Y Jp_imp~2013Y JP_tra~2013y Inf_Mort GDP_cap_2013 
ODAJp_M2013Y 1          
GDP_2013* 0.3406 1         
Pop* 0.4494 0.7304 1        
Oil_rent_gdp -0.0205 0.1638 -0.0467 1       
Jp_FDI~2013Y 0.3329 0.3188 0.2983 -0.0398 1      
Jp_exp~2013Y 0.2896 0.3581 0.3235 -0.0065 0.7425 1     
Jp_imp~2013Y 0.3103 0.3564 0.3199 0.0736 0.6892 0.9334 1    
JP_tra~2013y 0.3062 0.3632 0.3269 0.0389 0.7247 0.979 0.987 1   
Inf_Mort -0.0832 -0.5209 0.0204 -0.0371 -0.1407 -0.1691 -0.1477 -0.1598 1  
GDP_cap_2013 -0.0678 0.4692 -0.0811 0.2954 0.099 0.1388 0.1644 0.1557 -0.4956 1 
UN_IdealPo~s -0.1216 -0.1673 -0.1664 -0.1499 -0.046 -0.0468 -0.0832 -0.0682 -0.04 -0.0234 
Polity2_use 0.0582 0.2402 0.0567 -0.273 0.0178 -0.0133 -0.0751 -0.0486 -0.4107 0.0992 
UN_pctwUS -0.0975 -0.1929 -0.1073 -0.1045 -0.0547 -0.0592 -0.0733 -0.0682 0.0729 -0.0222 
UN_pctwChina 0.1248 0.0831 0.1177 0.1398 0.0897 0.1067 0.1374 0.1259 0.097 -0.0317 
UN_pct~2vote -0.05 -0.1201 -0.069 -0.0676 -0.0329 -0.0348 -0.0637 -0.0518 0.0054 -0.0719 
UNSC 0.1525 0.1771 0.1965 0.0018 0.1888 0.2402 0.2386 0.2433 -0.0466 0.0531 
ASEANChr 0.142 0.0691 0.0676 -0.0146 0.1016 0.0869 0.0627 0.0746 -0.0432 0.0102 
BorderChina 0.1416 0.0598 0.1972 -0.0725 -0.0111 -0.0245 -0.0344 -0.0305 0.1198 -0.0895 
ChinaMarit~t 0.374 0.1961 0.2311 -0.0169 0.2057 0.2159 0.2241 0.2242 -0.1161 0.0141 
ChinaBorde~t 0.1871 0.0994 0.2113 -0.0316 0.0418 0.0087 -0.001 0.0033 0.058 -0.0662 
USTreatyAlly 0.1988 0.2096 0.1995 -0.0806 0.128 0.1797 0.0753 0.1234 -0.1259 0.062 
USMilBase 0.0487 0.09 0.0185 0.0163 0.0773 0.0314 -0.0011 0.0134 -0.0994 0.0955 
Total_viol~r 0.2532 0.1865 0.3531 0.0009 0.0508 0.0394 0.0427 0.0419 0.1111 -0.1179 
USMil_Pers 0.2129 0.0806 0.0707 0.1124 0.0178 0.0396 0.0172 0.0275 -0.0502 0.0206 
US_Sanctions 0.0492 0.1402 0.115 0.0307 -0.0127 -0.0178 0.0059 -0.0046 -0.1155 0.0243 
UN_Sanctions -0.04 0.0193 0.0232 0.0202 -0.028 -0.0244 -0.0105 -0.0169 0.0241 -0.0048 
US_Relatio~d 0.0937 0.0421 -0.0122 -0.1173 0.0486 0.0936 0.0214 0.0542 -0.1246 0.0703 
Coup_Success -0.0314 -0.0744 -0.0093 -0.0297 -0.0181 -0.0102 -0.0181 -0.0149 0.1072 -0.0586 
Coup_Fail -0.0031 -0.069 -0.0048 -0.0245 -0.0106 -0.0218 -0.0241 -0.0235 0.1036 -0.0632 
USAODA_M2013 0.2195 0.1755 0.1726 0.0667 -0.0116 -0.0074 -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.062 0.0054            
 
UN_IdealPo~s Polity2_use UN_pctwUS UN_pctwChina UN_pctwJp UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina ChinaMarit~t ChinaBorde~t 
UN_IdealPo~s 1          
Polity2_use 0.1735 1         




UN_pctwChina -0.7215 -0.1755 -0.6457 1       
UN_pctwJp 0.4092 0.1004 0.4628 -0.3327 1      
UNSC -0.0259 -0.0083 -0.0134 0.0698 -0.0073 1     
ASEANChr -0.0361 0.0228 -0.0201 0.0196 0.0079 -0.0044 1    
BorderChina -0.0672 0.022 -0.0561 0.0317 -0.0441 0.0047 0.0118 1   
ChinaMarit~t -0.0445 0.052 -0.0015 0.0517 0.0266 0.0286 0.1903 -0.0491 1  
ChinaBorde~t -0.0153 0.0499 -0.0166 -0.0465 -0.0311 0.0256 -0.0091 0.5285 -0.0259 1 
USTreatyAlly 0.2277 0.1385 0.184 -0.1896 0.0528 -0.0093 0.0999 -0.0531 0.3246 -0.0281 
USMilBase 0.0645 -0.0182 0.0407 -0.0158 0.0569 0.0044 0.0226 0.0576 0.1058 -0.0038 
Total_viol~r -0.0841 -0.0369 -0.0388 0.0397 -0.1194 0.0143 0.0278 0.1217 0.1824 0.1931 
USMil_Pers -0.007 0.0007 -0.0056 0.0036 0.0254 -0.007 0.0016 0.0465 0.0957 -0.0141 
US_Sanctions -0.2913 -0.1353 -0.1309 0.0992 -0.1468 -0.0298 0.0208 -0.0576 0.0132 -0.0414 
UN_Sanctions -0.1153 -0.0324 -0.01 0.0038 -0.0486 -0.0327 -0.0103 -0.0298 -0.0291 -0.0222 
US_Relations 0.3476 0.1949 0.168 -0.1658 0.1911 -0.0068 0.0489 -0.0371 0.1565 -0.0639 
Coup_Success 0.0276 -0.0896 0.04 -0.0046 0.0207 -0.0179 -0.0098 -0.0082 -0.0278 -0.0212 
Coup_Fail -0.0019 -0.042 0.0105 0.0317 0.0188 0.0036 0.0137 -0.0414 0.0058 -0.0219 
USAODA_M2013 -0.0345 0.0592 -0.0445 0.0037 -0.073 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0956 0.0011 -0.0018            
 
USTreatyAlly USMilBase Total_viol~r USMil_Pers US_Sanctions UN_Sanctions US_Relations Coup_Success Coup_Fail USAODA_M2013 
USTreatyAlly 1          
USMilBase 0.3608 1         
Total_viol~r 0.1898 0.081 1        
USMil_Pers 0.1406 0.1164 0.1278 1       
US_Sanctions -0.0498 -0.0571 0.1033 -0.0175 1      
UN_Sanctions -0.0315 -0.0329 0.0904 -0.0064 0.2277 1     
US_Relations 0.4898 0.2782 -0.0059 0.1075 -0.3509 -0.1315 1    
Coup_Success 0.0195 -0.0155 0.0334 -0.0126 0.0433 -0.0032 -0.0121 1   
Coup_Fail 0.0251 0.0139 0.0392 0.0025 0.0223 -0.0045 -0.0056 -0.0234 1  
USAODA_M2013 0.0464 0.0127 0.1484 0.6191 -0.0112 0.0309 0.0966 -0.0223 -0.0205 1 





Table 5-3: Correlation matrix - China regression variables 
 
ChODA_max GDP_2013* Pop* Oil_rent_gdp CN_exp~2013Y CN_imp~2013Y CN_tra~2013y CN_FDI~2013Y CN_Firm_Est Inf_Mort GDP_cap_2013 
ChODA_max 1 
          
GDP_2013* 0.0639 1          
Pop* 0.1033 0.7476 1         
Oil_rent_gdp -0.0234 0.1339 -0.0365 1        
CN_exp~2013Y 0.0009 0.5813 0.4734 -0.0385 1       
CN_imp~2013Y -0.0219 0.5012 0.3468 0.0822 0.7865 1      
CN_tra~2013y -0.0124 0.5674 0.4259 0.0304 0.9315 0.9572 1     
CN_FDI~2013Y 0.0558 0.1935 0.144 0.0225 0.2682 0.2219 0.2563 1    
CN_Firm_Est 0.1412 0.3765 0.3393 -0.0379 0.6106 0.5176 0.5908 0.3868 1   
Inf_Mort 0.05 -0.4307 0.0396 0.1285 -0.2146 -0.1828 -0.2082 -0.0418 -0.0748 1  
GDP_cap_2013 -0.0564 0.4739 -0.1082 0.2588 0.2893 0.3507 0.342 0.1039 0.0988 -0.4957 1 
UN_IdealPo~s -0.0867 -0.0457 -0.1464 -0.1947 -0.0485 -0.1163 -0.0912 -0.0793 -0.119 -0.2323 0.0521 
Polity2_use -0.0592 0.0984 0.0114 -0.4296 0.1622 0.0696 0.117 0.0049 0.0186 -0.2142 0.0304 
UN_pctwUS 0.0118 0.0506 -0.0892 -0.1621 0.0815 0.0122 0.0453 -0.0183 -0.0013 -0.25 0.1625 
UN_pctwChina 0.0425 0.0063 0.1158 0.1609 0.0061 0.0678 0.0428 0.0342 0.0859 0.2542 -0.072 
UN_pctwJp -0.0878 0.0183 -0.0707 -0.1024 -0.0527 -0.0633 -0.062 -0.0475 -0.0875 -0.2392 0.0243 
UNSC -0.032 0.2056 0.1502 0.0019 0.1311 0.082 0.1097 0.0618 0.0437 -0.0543 0.1209 
ASEANChr 0.0618 0.0612 0.0761 -0.0251 0.1012 0.1337 0.1261 0.0482 0.1828 -0.028 -0.0156 
BorderChina 0.0353 0.0047 0.1539 -0.0687 0.1286 0.0077 0.0648 0.1147 0.2213 0.0993 -0.1376 
ChinaMarit~t 0.0047 0.2391 0.2398 -0.0409 0.3592 0.4281 0.4203 0.0912 0.2694 -0.1305 0.0209 
ChinaBorde~t -0.0316 0.1281 0.2357 -0.0196 0.2751 0.0951 0.1849 -0.0064 0.0938 0.0314 -0.0798 
USTreatyAlly -0.0071 0.2535 0.228 -0.0728 0.2424 0.2393 0.2544 0.0441 0.1498 -0.1315 0.059 
USMilBase 0.0202 0.0395 0.0118 -0.0394 0.0562 -0.0326 0.0071 0.0148 -0.0047 0.0043 0.054 
Total_viol~r 0.0249 0.2931 0.447 0.0941 0.2531 0.0863 0.1694 0.0279 0.0785 0.1414 -0.1014 
USMil_Pers -0.0214 0.0569 0.0648 0.1914 -0.0214 -0.0141 -0.0183 -0.0044 -0.0392 0.0062 -0.0173 
US_Sanctions 0.0818 0.0651 0.0869 0.0193 -0.0319 0.0092 -0.0095 0.029 -0.0175 -0.0724 0.0043 
UN_Sanctions 0.0221 -0.0635 0.0372 0.0193 -0.0086 0.0305 0.0139 0.0196 -0.0257 0.1999 -0.0831 
US_Relations -0.0427 -0.0152 -0.0247 -0.1575 0.0996 0.008 0.0514 -0.0123 0.0531 -0.0295 0.0163 
Coup_Success -0.0029 -0.0182 -0.0047 -0.0344 0.0055 -0.0034 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0014 0.0074 -0.0331 
Coup_Fail -0.0237 -0.0541 -0.0157 -0.0038 -0.0357 -0.0309 -0.0349 -0.018 -0.037 0.0768 -0.0574 
USAODA_M2013 0.0503 0.1412 0.2207 0.1145 0.0269 -0.0061 0.009 0.052 0.0414 0.0577 -0.0898 
ODAJp_M2013Y 0.0483 0.2791 0.3897 0.0174 0.3174 0.148 0.2358 0.0233 0.1906 0.0008 -0.1016             
 
UN_IdealPo~s Polity2_use UN_pctwUS UN_pctwChina UN_pctwJp UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina ChinaMarit~t ChinaBorde~t USTreatyAlly 




Polity2_use 0.3756 1          
UN_pctwUS 0.6156 0.2433 1         
UN_pctwChina -0.8531 -0.2738 -0.6902 1        
UN_pctwJp 0.5665 0.302 0.3938 -0.4796 1       
UNSC 0.0323 0.0822 0.034 -0.0059 0.0287 1      
ASEANChr -0.0368 0.0089 -0.0398 0.0343 -0.0064 -0.0211 1     
BorderChina -0.002 -0.0932 -0.0629 0.0803 -0.0701 -0.0201 0.0067 1    
ChinaMarit~t -0.1102 0.1172 -0.0389 0.0895 -0.027 0.0387 0.1955 -0.0543 1   
ChinaBorde~t 0.0556 0.0349 -0.0018 -0.0425 -0.0725 0.0117 -0.0104 0.4165 -0.0226 1  
USTreatyAlly 0.1183 0.1323 0.0861 -0.0781 0.1121 0.0218 0.1431 -0.0543 0.3128 -0.0226 1 
USMilBase 0.0344 -0.0415 0.029 -0.005 0.0286 0.0017 -0.0169 0.2211 -0.037 0.056 0.2523 
Total_viol~r -0.121 0.0083 -0.0743 0.079 -0.0814 0.0612 0.0044 0.2526 0.0846 0.3296 0.1428 
USMil_Pers -0.0554 -0.0431 -0.0349 0.0534 0.0004 -0.0264 -0.0081 0.085 -0.0169 -0.0127 -0.0078 
US_Sanctions -0.2829 -0.2916 -0.1198 0.1559 -0.1754 -0.0702 0.0021 -0.0719 0.0229 -0.0437 -0.0595 
UN_Sanctions -0.1445 -0.1278 -0.0339 0.0595 -0.0912 -0.0588 -0.018 -0.0456 -0.0393 -0.0288 -0.0393 
US_Relations 0.3189 0.1922 0.189 -0.2145 0.2185 0.0455 0.0476 0.074 0.1162 0.0385 0.4192 
Coup_Success -0.0255 -0.0689 -0.0102 -0.0019 0.0028 -0.0234 -0.0071 -0.0275 -0.0156 -0.0115 0.0318 
Coup_Fail -0.01 -0.0171 0.0101 -0.0012 0.0462 -0.0273 -0.0083 -0.0322 -0.0182 -0.0134 -0.0182 
USAODA_M2013 -0.0919 -0.0268 -0.0579 0.0763 -0.0219 0.0078 -0.0095 0.1402 0.0006 -0.0112 -0.0185 
ODAJp_M2013Y -0.0825 0.0702 -0.0624 0.0875 -0.047 0.073 0.1493 0.1967 0.3 0.3187 0.1233             
 





USMilBase 1          
 
Total_viol~r 0.1051 1         
 
USMil_Pers 0.0008 0.2815 1        
 
US_Sanctions -0.06 0.1 -0.0314 1       
 
UN_Sanctions -0.0472 0.1638 -0.0204 0.2754 1      
 
US_Relations 0.2732 0.0389 0.0273 -0.4583 -0.1499 1     
 
Coup_Success -0.0187 -0.0129 -0.0089 0.0495 -0.0199 -0.0137 1    
 
Coup_Fail -0.0219 0.0471 -0.0106 0.1241 0.0093 -0.0288 -0.0092 1   
 
USAODA_M2013 0.0266 0.373 0.7834 -0.0283 0.0158 0.0603 -0.0093 -0.0199 1  
 
ODAJp_M2013Y 0.0538 0.3504 0.3372 0.0146 -0.0509 0.0703 -0.0225 -0.0155 0.3622 1 
 







5.2 Japan’s foreign aid commitments420 
Japan’s foreign aid commitments are modeled using panel regressions to predict who 
receives aid from Japan, how much and why. Foreign aid commitments are expressed as the 
share of total aid commitments given by Japan that year.  
 
5.2.1 A model of Japanese aid: approach and methodology 
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is: Japan and China’s foreign aid increasingly 
reflects security interests due to increased threat perception precipitated by the rise of China. 
If this is true, security variables will have the most explanatory power when threat perception 
is highest.  Conversely, when threat perception is low, commercial variables are expected to be 
the most important determinants of aid commitments.   
 
An alternative hypothesis is that Japan’s aid is allocated to promote normative values 
of altruism, human rights and democracy. If this hypothesis is true, Japan will allocate more aid 
to countries with higher levels of poverty, that have experienced humanitarian crises, and those 
states with more democratic governance and respect for human rights, all else being equal. If 
Japan has adopted these norms over time, as the changes in the ODA/Development Cooperation 
Charters would suggest, the strength of normative factors should increase over time.  
 
Compared to past research using panel regressions analysis, I utilize a more robust data 
set, more appropriate specification of the dependent and independent variables, and a study 
design that illuminates the changes in Japan’s aid policy over time.  The regressions are run for 
                                                 
420 Substantial portions of Section 5.2 were published previously in Steven Lewis-Workman, “International Norms 




three periods that can reasonably be expected to represent three different sets of motivations for 
Japanese foreign aid: 1) the Cold War era (1966-1991), 2) the post-Cold War/1992 ODA charter 
(1992-2001) period, and 3) the increasing threats/2003 ODA charter (2002-2014) period.  
Periods 1 and 3 are high threat and period 2 is low threat.  
 
5.2.2 The models 
Panel regression models simultaneously estimate the impact of commercial, security 
and normative factors in Japan’s ODA allocations in the three different time periods. The 
structure of the model is as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝜀𝜀 
where the betas (𝛽𝛽) are parameters to be estimated and 𝜀𝜀 is the error term. 
 
The same model is applied in the three separate time periods except for the humanitarian 
aid variable. This variable is omitted from the 1966-1991 period because the OECD did not 
specifically report ODA for humanitarian purposes in the ODA commitment dataset until 1990. 
Regressions were also run limiting the countries to the Asia-Pacific region to determine if Japan 
utilizes aid for different purposes in different regions.  It is reasonable to expect that Asian 
countries would be more salient for Japan’s security than countries further away. 
 
5.2.3 Results 
The worldwide estimation results are given in the following Table 5-4 on page 227.  
Table 5-5 on page 228 present the results of the Asia-only regressions utilizing share of Japan’s 
ODA commitments and total ODA commitments by country respectively.  After the regression 





Table 5-4: Panel GLS regression results, robust standard errors, worldwide. Dependent 
variable: share of ODA commitments 
Independent Dependent Variable 1966-1991 1992-2001 2002-2014 
Variable 
Type 
Share_allJPODAcom Coef. P>|z| Sig Coef. P>|z| Sig Coef. P>|z| Sig 
Size LnGDP.L1 0.0009739 0.007 *** 0.0012945 0.011 ** 0.0014168 0.004 *** 






Com Jp_FDI_M2013Y.L1 1.51E-08 0.297 
 
9.58E-08 0.001 *** 5.63E-09 0.641 
 
Com Jp_trade_Mill2013Y.L1 2.50E-09 0.391 
 
9.71E-09 0 *** 4.19E-10 0.219 
 






Value GDP_cap_2013.L1 -6.69E-07 0.134 
 
-2.13E-06 0 *** -7.50E-07 0.006 *** 
Value UN_IdealPoints.L1 -0.0017043 0.044 ** -2.16E-03 0.083 * -1.36E-03 0.17 
 
























Sec UNSC 0.0026375 0.21 
 
0.006261 0.034 ** 3.07E-03 0.183 
 




0.0284134 0.03 ** 
Sec BorderChina 0.0023052 0.414 
 
0.007003 0.001 *** -6.55E-05 0.974 
 




Sec ChinaBorderConflict 0.0096652 0.046 ** 0.0019339 0.758 
 
0.064874 0.002 *** 
Sec USTreatyAlly 0.0051516 0.504 
 
0.0135222 0.026 ** 0.0001673 0.969 
 












Sec USMil_Pers.L1 9.77E-08 0.468 
 
-2.18E-06 0 *** 1.47E-07 0.019 *** 






Sec UN_Sanctions -3.88E-03 0.233 
 
-5.01E-03 0.064 * -0.0026122 0.079 * 
















Sec USAODA_M2013.L1 2.81E-06 0.001 *** 0.0000106 0.121 
 
1.23E-05 0.017 ** 






NA Share_allJPODAcom.L1 6.28E-01 0 *** 0.1055852 0.367 
 
0.3577731 0.005 *** 








within  = 0.0348 
 
within  = 0.0009 
 
within  = 0.0910 
 
  
between = 0.9655 
 
between = 0.8889 
 
between = 0.9325 
 
  
overall = 0.7204 
 
overall = 0.6363 
 
overall = 0.5601 
 
Notes: Variable descriptions in text 
*: significant at the 90% level 
**: significant at the 95% level 




Table 5-5: Panel GLS regression results, robust standard errors, Asia only. Dependent 
variable: share of ODA commitments 
Independent Dependent Variable 1966-1991 1992-2001 2002-2014 
Variable 
Type 
Share_allJPODAcom Coef. P>|z| Sig Coef. P>|z| Sig Coef. P>|z| Sig 
Size LnGDP.L1 0.0040391 0.076 * 0.0037001 0.03 ** 0.0077594 0.001 *** 
Com Oil_rent_gdp.L1 -0.0006645 0.479  -0.0005746 0.069 * -0.0001249 0.358  
Com Jp_FDI_M2013Y.L1 1.57E-10 0.996  9.35E-08 0.008 *** -7.65E-10 0.947  
Com Jp_Trade_Mill2013Y.L1 1.39E-10 0.988  9.51E-09 0.008 *** -1.60E-09 0.013 ** 
Value Inf_Mort_rate.L1 0.0002134 0.024 ** -2.44E-05 0.793  -0.000077 0.554  
Value GDP_cap_2013.L1 -1.67E-06 0.646  -7.56E-06 0 *** -4.08E-06 0.014 ** 
Value UN_IdealPoints.L1 -0.0085143 0.133  -0.0091377 0.041 ** -5.27E-03 0.33  
Value Humanitarian_M    1.94E-05 0.888  -6.56E-06 0.572  
Value Polity2_use.L1 -0.0005208 0.433  0.0002313 0.564  2.59E-04 0.463  
Sec UN_pctwUS.L1 0.0443849 0.063 * 0.0151312 0.539  0.0055567 0.75  
Sec UN_pctwJap.L1 -0.0219285 0.282  -0.0461432 0.100 * 1.18E-02 0.764  
Sec UNSC 0.0118519 0.238  0.0252595 0.067 * 0.0204505 0.036 ** 
Sec ASEANChr -0.0076688 0.666  -0.0066013 0.679  0.0243012 0.089 * 
Sec BorderChina -0.0278312 0.044 ** -0.0062446 0.269  -0.0018149 0.619  
Sec ChinaMaritimeConflict 0.0362429 0.192  0.016779 0.206  0.0002575 0.965  
Sec ChinaBorderConflict 0.0187132 0.031 ** 0.0100242 0.171  0.0457404 0.065 * 
Sec USTreatyAlly 0.0029026 0.766  0.0332059 0 *** 0.0011536 0.9  
Sec USMilBase -0.0405866 0.194  0.0215343 0.114  0.0075252 0.591  
Sec Total_viol_war.L1 0.0017753 0.195  0.0018078 0.006 *** -0.001112 0.591  
Sec USMil_Pers.L1 -5.84E-07 0.15  -1.94E-06 0 *** 2.99E-08 0.899  
Sec US_Sanctions -5.45E-04 0.979  0.0297517 0.053 * 0.0051617 0.549  
Sec UN_Sanctions       0.0123664 0.552  
Sec US_Relations_ind.L1 0.0124493 0.027 ** 0.0006075 0.894  -4.99E-03 0.241  
Sec Coup_Success.L1 -0.0040536 0.693  -0.0206211 0.392  -0.0014128 0.771  
Sec Coup_Fail.L1 0.0080527 0.045 ** -0.0175933 0.121  -0.0013357 0.729  
Sec USAODA_M2013.L1 0.0000275 0.507  -0.0000102 0.864  7.88E-06 0.475  
Sec ChODA_max_tot_m2013Y.L1       -1.76E-06 0.183  
NA Share_allJPODAcom.L1 0.4732282 0 *** -0.2111606 0.067 * 0.351333 0.012 ** 
NA _cons -0.100234 0.057 * -0.0307499 0.514  -0.1638955 0.018 ** 
  R-sq:   R-sq:   R-sq:   
  within  = 0.0475 within  = 0.1166 within  = 0.1908 
  between = 0.9661 
 
between = 0.9501 
 
between = 0.9742 
 
  overall = 0.6954 
 
overall = 0.7126 
 
overall = 0.6549 
 
Notes: Variable descriptions in text 
*: significant at the 90% level 
**: significant at the 95% level 




5.2.3.1 Japan’s aid commitments under high threat – Cold War (1966-1991) period 
Security variables are the main drivers of Japan’s aid commitments in this period.  
Commercial factors are weak determinants of Japan’s aid commitments during this period. No 
commercial variables were significant during this period.  GDP is significant, so Japan preferred 
larger economies, all else being equal but this factor could also indicate security considerations 
since GDP can indicate overall national power as much as market size. Previous studies have 
found that Japanese ODA was provided for its commercial benefit and the statements of 
Japanese officials at that time tended to reinforce this widely held belief. The data do not 
support that view.  In the worldwide regression, Japanese ODA is strongly predicted by United 
States ODA, maritime and border disputes with China, countries with stronger relations with 
the United States. The only normative variable that is significant during this period was UN 
Ideal Points (liberal voting pattern in UN) but states with more liberal voting patterns in the UN 
received less aid from Japan during this period rather than more.  In the Asia-only regression, 
Japan still rewards countries with good US relations and those in border conflicts with China 
but also rewards Asian states that tend to vote with the US in the UN and those Asian countries 
that endured a failed coup suggesting an interest in promoting regional stability.  Japan also 
favored Asian countries with higher infant mortality suggesting some consideration was given 
to normative factors. 
 
5.2.3.2 Japan’s aid commitments under low threat – the post-Cold War period 
Under low threat, commercial variables become significant determinants of Japanese 
ODA commitments.  In both the worldwide and Asia only regressions, Japan rewarded 
countries with more ODA if they also had high levels of FDI and/or trade with Japan.  All 
regressions also indicate that GDP/cap become much more significant determinant consistent 




(altruism) were an influence aid decisions during this lower threat period.  However, the 
significance of the GDP/cap variable is questionable during this period. During the 1990s, 
several fast-growing states including South Korea, Singapore, Brunei, Kuwait and the quasi-
states of Hong Kong and Macau graduated from receiving ODA from Japan.  These higher 
income recipients no longer receiving ODA may explain the negative relationship between per 
capita income and Japanese ODA commitments. Whether this is a sign of altruistic intent is not 
clear.  Variables reflecting democratic values and liberal values are either not significant 
(Polity2) or significant but in the opposite direction expected (UN_idealpoints) implying Japan 
provides more aid to less democratic regimes all else being equal.  
 
Security variables are mixed during this period. In all regressions, Japan rewarded 
members of the UN security council and United States treaty allies. Countries with larger 
contingents of United States military personnel are given less aid.  In contrast to the Cold War 
Period, United States ODA allocations are not significant predictors of Japanese aid 
commitments in any regression suggesting that coordination of ODA between the United States 
and Japan was much less during the 1992-2001 period than the Cold War Period. Japan 
provided more aid to Asian countries that experienced high levels of political violence and war 
suggesting that Japan was ramping up its ODA to support peace-making missions in Asia 
during the 1990s.  Japan also provide more aid to Asian countries under United States sanctions 
indicating it was pursuing its own security interests rather than the interests of the United States 
during this period.  Overall, Japan’s ODA was determined by a mix of commercial and security 
interests during the 1992-2001 period.  Overall, the results support the theory that commercial 
factors will be stronger predictors as threat perception declines. However, security factors 





5.2.3.3 Japan’s aid commitments under high threat - emerging China threat period  
Japan emphasized security over all other considerations in its aid commitment decisions 
during this period. Commercial factors became weaker predictors of ODA commitments.  The 
only variable that was significant was trade in the Asia only regression but the sign is negative 
implying that Japan actually preferred to give ODA to Asian countries with less trade with 
Japan.  In all regressions, Japan preferred larger economies and GDP was positively (and 
statistically significant) associated with ODA.   
 
Humanitarian and democratic values had little to no impact during this period and only 
GDP/capita was significant (both regressions).  Security variables were strongest factors 
explaining ODA commitments during this period and the worldwide regression indicates a high 
degree of coordination with United States security interests.  United States related security 
variables were not significant in the Asia only specification suggesting that Japan focused more 
on its own security interests in Asia.  In the worldwide regression, Japan’s ODA commitments 
are positively correlated with United States ODA allocations, after being insignificant in the 
prior low threat period. States with more United States military personnel received higher aid 
commitments. While we would expect that United States treaty allies would receive more ODA 
from Japan in the high threat period, I note that South Korea graduated from ODA eligibility 
in 1999 and Taiwan received a significant aid allocation in 1996 coincident with the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis (1995-1996), but none afterwards. The ceasing of aid to these two states in the late 
1990s may explain the lack of significance of the alliance variable after 2002.  In all regressions, 
states in border disputes with China received more ODA. In the worldwide regression, the UN 
security council variable became insignificant, but the ASEAN Chair was rewarded with higher 
aid commitments from Japan.  In the Asia only regression, both UN security council members 




ODA commitments reflects an increasing level of coordination of Japanese aid with United 
States security interests.  The results support the hypothesis that higher threat perception led 
Japan to consider security factors more strongly than during the low threat period. Commercial 
and normative factors are less significant in high threat periods. 
 
5.2.4 Japan’s aid purpose – summarizing the findings 
This analysis sought to determine the motivations behind Japan’s overall aid 
commitments in time periods that reflect high and low levels of threat perception.  The overall 
results for Japan are summarized in Table 5-6 on page 233 which identifies every variable that 
is statistically significant in each regression under each threat condition.  Independent variable 
types are categorized as “significant”, “moderate”, or “insignificant”. The decision rules for the 
categorization are as follows: 
Significant: 3 or more variables are significant (theoretically correct sign) 
Moderate:  2 variables are significant (theoretically correct sign) 









Cold war period – high 
threat 
1992-2001 
Post-Cold War – low 
threat 
2002-2014 
Emerging China – high 
threat  
Security Significant (WW) 
CN maritime conflict (+) 
CN border conflict (+) 
US ODA (++) 
US relations (+) 
 
Significant (ASIA) 
Border with China (-) 
UN vote with US (+) 
US relations (+) 
Coup fail (+) 
Significant (WW) 
UN security council (+) 
Border with China (++) 
US treaty ally (+) 
US military personnel (--) 
UN sanctions (-) 
 
Significant (ASIA) 
UN vote with Japan (-) 
UN security council (++) 
US treaty ally (++) 
US military personnel (--) 
Total violence/war (++) 
US sanctions (+) 
Significant (WW) 
ASEAN chair (+) 
CN border conflict (++) 
US military personnel (++) 
US ODA (+) 
UN sanctions (-) 
 
Significant (ASIA) 
ASEAN chair (+) 
UN security council (+) 
CN border conflict (+) 
Normative Insignificant (WW) 





GDP per capita (--) 
Ideal points (-) 
 
Insignificant (ASIA) 
GDP per capita (--) 
Ideal points (-) 
Insignificant (WW) 
GDP per capita (--) 
 
Insignificant (ASIA) 
GDP per capita (-) 





JP FDI (++) 
JP trade (++) 
 
Moderate (ASIA) 
JP FDI (++) 




JP trade (--) 
Notes: (+) = positive relationship at 90 or 95% significance, (++) = positive relationship at 99% significance, (-) = 
negative relationship at 90 or 95% significance, (--) = negative relationship at 99% significance, WW = regression 
done on worldwide dataset, ASIA = regression done for countries of the Asia-Pacific region only. 
 
Variables highlighted in red and italics have a sign (+,-) that is opposite to what we expect for the variable.  For 
example, the negative sign on US military base is counter intuitive in that we may reasonably expect Japan to 
give more aid to countries hosting US military which also serves Japan’s security interests. Another variable, Ideal 
points, indicates the degree of “liberal democratic” voting profile in the UN and negative coefficient indicates that 
Japan provides more aid to countries with illiberal voting profiles, contrary to expectations given Japan’s overall 
commitment to liberal democratic values. 
 
While commercial variables are significant during the low threat period as expected, 
Japan’s aid program has been significantly determined by security variables over the entire 
period for which we have data. Japan’s aid was more commercially oriented during the low 
threat period after the Cold War and before the rise of China when commercial factors become 
more salient.  After 2001, Japan deemphasized commercial factors in its aid commitment 
decisions. Japan’s ODA commitment decisions supported United States security policies in all 
high threat periods.  In the low threat period, Japan provide less aid to countries with higher 
levels of United States military personnel and Asian states under US sanctions suggesting less 




ASEAN chair with more aid in the later high threat period.  There is no substantial evidence 
that normative factors were a significant determinant of Japan’s aid during any period.   
 
5.3 China’s foreign aid commitments  
This sections describes the quantitative analysis and results which indicate the 
motivations driving China’s aid commitments between 2000-2014. 421  China’s foreign aid 
commitments (DV) are expressed as the share of total aid commitments from China in that year.  
The DV used in the regression analysis is based on what I refer to as “perceived ODA” and 
represents the upper bound of China’s ODA-like foreign aid while the Aiddata.org definition 
represents the lower bound estimate of China’s ODA (these are shown in Figure 5-1 on page 
235 along with OOF).  On average, the perceived ODA measure is about $3.7 billion per year 
higher on average than the Aiddata.org estimate. The two measures of ODA-like flows have 
the same pattern of increases and decreases while OOF-like flows follow a different pattern 
with a major peak in 2010-2011 and a large jump between 2013 and 2014. 
 
                                                 
421 The regressions were initially run on both the original Aiddata.org data set and my modified dataset described 
in Section 4.2.2.1 beginning on page 159.  The regressions on the modified dataset perform better than the 





Figure 5-1: China Foreign Aid - Aiddata vs. authors recoding 
 
Source: Aiddata.org and authors estimates based on recategorization of “vague” aid projects into ODA-like and 
OOF-like. 
 
Over the 15-year analysis period (2000-2014), African countries received about 52% of 
all China’s foreign aid commitments while Asian countries received about 33%.  No other 
region exceeded 10% of China’s foreign aid allocations (see Figure 5-2 on page 236).  These 
percentages are quite close to the published figures from China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 
which states that 32.8% of Chinese aid from 1951-2009 went to Asia while 45.7% went to 
Africa. From 2010 to 2012, 30.5% of Chinese aid went to Asia while 51.8% went to Africa.422 
 
                                                 
422 China State Council Information Office, "White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid," Beijing: Government of the 




Figure 5-2: Regional allocation of China's foreign aid - perceived ODA definition 
 
Source: Aiddata.org as adjusted by the auther.  
 
Comparing the regional allocation over time, we see a similar emphasis on Africa and 




Figure 5-3: China's regional allocation of perceived aid in different periods 
 
Source: Aiddata.org as adjusted by the author. 
 
However, we need to be cautious about interpreting these apparent trends over short 
periods of time.  China’s aid program data totals are highly affected by outlier aid events.  For 
example, in 2011 China forgave $6 billion of Cuba’s external debt which was over 1/3 of 




flow to the Americas.  There are also enormous variations in aid to African countries with 2006, 
2012 and 2013 notably higher than other years.  For example, aid to Africa in 2005 was about 
$1.8 billion while 2006 was nearly $9 billion.   
 
5.3.1 A model of Chinese aid: approach and methodology 
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is: Japan and China’s foreign aid increasingly 
reflects security interests due to increased threat perception precipitated by the rise of China. 
If this is true, security variables will have the most explanatory power when threat 
perception is highest.  Conversely, when threat perception is lowest, commercial variables are 
expected to be relatively more important.  Unfortunately, there is no low threat period to test 
for China.  Therefore, we can expect that the hypothesis for China can only be partially 
confirmed.  However, there remains great value in understanding the various motivations 
behind China’s aid program under elevated threat perception.   
 
5.3.2 The models 
Panel regression models and a cross section regression are used to simultaneously 
estimate the impact of commercial, security and normative factors in China’s foreign aid 
allocations. The structure of the models is the same as the models estimated for Japan and given 
as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝜀𝜀 
where the betas (𝛽𝛽) are parameters to be estimated and 𝜀𝜀 is the error term. 
 
ODA commitments to country i in year j are regressed on factors representing the 




framework presented in Chapter 2.  The overall structure of the modeling exercise is similar to 
Dreher and Fuchs (2011) and Dreher et. al. (2015) in that variables representing commercial, 
normative and security factors are tested for their explanatory power.  The approach also 
follows Lin (1993) in that variations over time are tested to determine if we can distinguish 
differences in China’s aid commitment behavior when threat perception is higher or lower.   
 
The analysis of China’s threat perception of the United States and the United States-
Japan alliance indicates some moderate level of threat beginning in the mid 1990s so that 
China’s threat perception appears elevated over the entire analysis period.  However, the threat 
perception analysis did indicate that China’s threat perception was on a general upward trend 
over the analysis period with the exception of a temporary drop during the worldwide financial 
crisis. To estimate the degree to which the determinants of Chinese aid commitments changed, 
I have run regressions for the entire period (2000-2014), the early moderate threat period (2000-
2008) and the higher threat period (2009-2014) with a regression for 2007-2008 to see if a low 
threat period could be established.  I expected that if commercial factors were to be found 
significant for China, it would be during the period of the worldwide financial crises when 
China was trying to support its own economy and its threat perception was lower.  
 
5.3.3 Results  
The results of the model estimation are provided below in the following order: 1) Panel 
regression GLS with heteroskedasticity423 robust standard errors, 2) regression on cross-section 
                                                 
423 Generalized least squares (GLS) is used to estimate a linear regression on pooled cross-sectional time series 
(panel) data. The correlation of the error terms across countries (heteroscedasticity) is corrected by using panel 
corrected (robust) standard errors in the estimation procedure. Correlation of the error terms across time (serial 






(CS) averages estimated using fractional probit and robust standard errors, and 3) Pseudo 
Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML). The CS and PPML regressions are meant to account 
for the large numbers of zeros in the China aid commitment data set.  Please refer to 
APPENDIX 8 for a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of each approach. All models were 
estimated for the worldwide dataset and again for Asia-Pacific only.  The cross-section models 
could not be estimated for Asia-Pacific since there are more explanatory variables than 
countries. Constraining the dataset geographically and temporally significantly reduces the 
observations in the models with commensurate declines in reliability – a particular concern for 
the 2007-2008 regression.  Reducing the number of observations often leads to a significant 
decline in the variability of certain regressors and/or collinearity. Stata automatically excludes 
problematic variables from the regressions.  For example, for regression on the Asia-only data 
set, the Taiwan recognition variable is automatically excluded since there is not enough 
variation to estimate the parameter – i.e. the Asian countries included in the data have 
recognized China rather than Taiwan over the analysis period.  The PPML estimation is more 
sensitive to lack of data variability and collinearity and excludes more variables from the 
models estimated by PPML. The regression results for GLS are in Table 5-7 on page 241, cross-
section regression in Table 5-8 on page 242, PPML in Table 5-9 on page 243 and GLS and 
PPML for Asia-only in Table 5-10 on page 244 and Table 5-11 on page 245 respectively.  
Significant independent variables are indicated by * = 90% confidence level, ** = 95% 





Table 5-7: China Worldwide Regression – Panel GLS Random Effects, Robust Standard Errors 
   Panel Regression GLS Random Effects 
Independent Dependent Var 2000-2014     2000-2008     2009-2014     2007-2008   
Variable 
Type Share_AllChnODA_max Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig  
Size LnGDP_2013.L 0.0013833 0.038 ** 0.0006813 0.321  0.0025918 0.018 ** -0.0000896 0.938   
Com Oil_rent_gdp.L -0.0000346 0.605   0.000014 0.871  -0.000102 0.346   -0.0000984 0.384   
Com CN_Firm_Est.L 0.0001524 0.141   -0.0000148 0.957  0.0001814 0.056 * -0.0004932 0.169   
Com CN_FDIout_2013Y.L -2.21E-07 0.499   8.38E-06 0.018 ** -4.85E-07 0.188   6.20E-06 0.005  *** 
Com CN_trade_Mill2013Y.L -4.88E-08 0.025  ** -9.84E-08 0.351  -4.30E-08 0.006  *** 2.17E-08 0.578   
Value Inf_Mort_rate.L 0.0001281 0.001 *** 0.0001037 0.027 ** 0.0001442 0.027  ** 0.0001211 0.125  
Value GDP_cap_2013.L -5.23E-07 0.067  * -6.96E-07 0.182  -5.74E-07 0.032  ** -3.37E-07 0.434   
Value Humanitarian_M 0.0000114 0.048 ** 0.000014 0.277  0.0000101 0.389   0.0000193 0.169   
Value Polity2_use.L -0.0000987 0.565   -0.0001623 0.407  -0.0000247 0.931   -0.0003553 0.206   
Sec UN_pctwUS.L 0.0132102 0.196   0.0259452 0.202  -0.0014576 0.916   0.0160901 0.572   
Sec UN_pctwChina.L 0.0078383 0.375   0.0210313 0.083 * -0.0056057 0.72   0.0038914 0.828   
Sec UNSC -0.0019988 0.319   0.0033651 0.524  -0.0091158 0.012 ** 0.0096009 0.254   
Sec ASEANChr 0.0225228 0.066 * 0.03036 0.133  0.0045697 0.453   0.1161222 0 *** 
Sec BorderChina 0.0080233 0.22   0.0120789 0.21  0.0025035 0.588   0.0003793 0.96   
Sec ChinaMaritimeConflict.L 0.0110137 0.125   0.0193073 0.173  -0.0005296 0.916  -0.0006043 0.947   
Sec ChinaBorderConflict.L -0.0235413 0.018 ** -0.0213943 0.07 ** -0.0348789 0.022 ** -0.0279581 0.117   
Sec USTreatyAlly 0.0074184 0.365   0.0193119 0.182  -0.0073763 0.149   -0.0095144 0.313   
Sec USMilBase 0.001744 0.755   -0.0000279 0.998  0.0012986 0.802   0.0156745 0.101  
Sec Total_viol_war.L 0.0018594 0.012 ** 0.0016391 0.093 * 0.0021569 0.106   0.0033173 0.135  
Sec USMil_Pers.L -1.84E-07 0.042 ** -8.23E-08 0.168  -2.26E-07 0.048  ** 5.99E-08 0.703   
Sec Taiwan_Recog -0.005386 0 *** -0.0041997 0.016 ** -0.0075932 0.003 *** -0.0052987 0.211   
Sec US_Sanctions.L 0.0052228 0.282   0.0079638 0.349  0.0023425 0.596   -0.0071998 0.234   
Sec UN_Sanctions -0.0062046 0.136   -0.0038738 0.543  -0.0078052 0.232   -0.0030038 0.575   
Sec US_Relations_ind.L -0.0025604 0.074  * -0.0003425 0.873  -0.0037502 0.127   -0.0068597 0.059 ** 
Sec Coup_Success.L -0.0042205 0.399   -0.0017865 0.778  -0.0079487 0.2   0.0218377 0 *** 
Sec Coup_Fail.L -0.0111769 0.001 *** -0.008867 0.027 ** -0.0201912 0.004 *** 0.0076381 0.279   
Sec USAODA_M2013.L -5.29E-08 0.984   -2.38E-06 0.437  -7.70E-07 0.895   -0.0000119 0.223   
Sec ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y.L -3.16E-09 0.915   -2.87E-09 0.947  2.32E-08 0.617   3.28E-08 0.418   
NA Share_AllChnODA_max.L 0.0478553 0.277   0.028693 0.675  0.0366639 0.614   0.2858314 0.002 *** 
NA _cons -0.0326672 0.064   -0.0338563 0.111  -0.0430998 0.08  * 0.0131214 0.724   
    R-sq:     R-sq:     R-sq:     R-sq:     
   within  = 0.0037   within  = 0.0067   within  = 0.0001   within  = 0.1412   
   between = 0.5591   between = 0.4962   between = 0.4165   between = 0.5356   
    overall = 0.0937   overall = 0.1131   overall = 0.1151   overall = 0.4101   
Notes: * = 90% confidence level, ** = 95% confidence level, and *** = 99% confidence level, ‘.L’ indicates variable was lagged one year. 
Com = Commercial variable, Value = Values or normative variables, Sec = Security variables, Size = indicates recipient country size, NA = not applicable (e.g. technical 




Table 5-8: China Worldwide Regression – Fractional Probit on Cross Section Averages, Robust Standard Errors 
    Cross Section Regression on Period Averages, Fractional Probit, Robust Standard Errors 
Variable 
Type 
Dependent Var 2000-2014     2000-2008     2009-2014     2007-2008     
Share_AllChnODA_max Coef. P>|t| Sig Coef. P>|t|  Sig Coef. P>|t|  Sig Coef. P>|t|  Sig 
Size GDP_2013 0.0863219 0.082 * 0.0571839 0.327  0.277742 0 *** -0.015482 0.797  
Com Oil_rent_gdp 0.0125518 0 *** 0.0109578 0 *** 0.0102404 0.133  0.0043535 0.297   
Com CN_Firm_Est 0.0066773 0.506   -0.0210882 0.271  0.0208316 0 *** -0.0045292 0.548   
Com CN_FDIout_2013Y -0.000199 0.279   0.0001987 0.02 ** -0.0003791 0.001 *** -0.0000288 0.543   
Com CN_trade_Mill2013Y -6.29E-06 0.001 ***  -0.000013 0.002 *** -8.41E-06 0 *** -6.63E-08 0.973   
Value Inf_Mort_rate 0.0042351 0.04 ** 0.0027878 0.166  0.0098594 0 *** 0.0054038 0.054 *  
Value GDP_cap_2013 -0.0000957 0.014 ** -0.0001955 0.001 *** -0.0000231 0.298   -0.0000424 0.128   
Value Humanitarian_M 0.0008123 0.028 ** 0.0012826 0.001 *** -0.0000227 0.968   0.0000427 0.897  
Value Polity2_use 0.0254566 0.02 ** 0.0134272 0.189  0.0226528 0.086 * -0.0004315 0.976   
Sec UN_pctwUS -3.288682 0.076 * -0.8930766 0.721  -1.447334 0.426  -2.958936 0.127   
Sec UN_pctwChina -0.794121 0.398  0.8910481 0.448  -0.9316181 0.438  -0.3756576 0.738   
Sec UNSC 0.2016065 0.75   0.4061286 0.412  -1.214726 0.006 *** 0.5035937 0.293  
Sec ASEANChr 2.201957 0.267   0.2713701 0.915  2.882155 0.05 **  1.089076 0.392   
Sec BorderChina 0.3616769 0.026 **  0.4907781 0.022 ** 0.0852871 0.533   0.2062493 0.367   
Sec ChinaMaritimeConflict 0.3026267 0.161   0.2450345 0.217  2.023799 0.001 *** -0.6422131 0.298   
Sec ChinaBorderConflict -0.3225059 0.579   -0.5907875 0.26  -0.8137285 0.374  -4.250091 0 *** 
Sec USTreatyAlly -0.9325498 0 *** -0.7143756 0 *** -3.189519 0 *** -0.4967463 0.059 * 
Sec USMilBase 1.108344 0 *** 1.91486 0 *** -1.662611 0.001 ***  0.7948433 0.058 * 
Sec Total_viol_war -0.014813 0.95   -0.2460924 0.464  0.7284575 0.005 *** 0.3015347 0.196   
Sec USMil_Pers -0.0793367 0.067  * -0.0337858 0.316  -0.0369347 0.417   0.058484 0.283   
Sec Taiwan_Recog -0.0000374 0.034 ** -0.0000457 0.382  -0.0000255 0.065 * -0.0000387 0.188   
Sec US_Sanctions 0.3506276 0.105 * 0.2156213 0.462  0.4658667 0.013 ** 0.0721566 0.829   
Sec UN_Sanctions -0.187068 0.395   -0.6376931 0.058 * -0.1189606 0.315   -0.1507398 0.416   
Sec US_Relations_ind -0.1626837 0.033 ** -0.1789561 0.115  -0.0961401 0.315  -0.1137107 0.344   
Sec Coup_Success 0.3620771 0.743   1.844849 0.005 *** -0.5595082 0.238   1.837763 0 *** 
Sec Coup_Fail -1.442686 0.44  -1.34714 0.257  -2.033275 0.028 ** 0    
Sec USAODA_M2013 0.0003438 0.425  -0.0000801 0.914  0.0005746 0.239  0.000329 0.349   
Sec ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y 2.70E-06 0.326   3.54E-06 0.183  -4.00E-06 0.245   3.82E-06 0.261   
NA _cons -3.152393 0.015 * -4.092493 0.021 ** -8.153293 0 *** -1.617079 0.43   
    Obs 106   Obs 105   Obs 103   Obs 103   
    Wald chi2(30)= 649.6   Wald chi2(29) = 466.75   Wald chi2(29) = 1893   Wald chi2(28) = 860.3  
    Prob > chi2 = 0   Prob > chi2 = 0   Prob > chi2 = 0   Prob > chi2  = 0  
    Pseudo R2 = 0.1069   Pseudo R2 = 0.1263   Pseudo R2  = 0.1190  Pseudo R2 = 0.1092   
Notes: * = 90% confidence level, ** = 95% confidence level, and *** = 99% confidence level. 
Com = Commercial variable, Value = Values or normative variables, Sec = Security variables, Size = indicates recipient country size, NA = not applicable (e.g. technical 




Table 5-9: China Worldwide Regression - Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
China Worldwide ODA Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Variable 
Type 
Dependent Var 2000-2014     2000-2008     2009-2014     2007-2008     
Share_AllChnODA_max Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig  
Size GDP_2013.L 0.2085714 0.001 *** 0.0993351 0.186  0.4264324 0.007 *** -0.0954086 0.48  
Com Oil_rent_gdp.L -0.0053713 0.434   0.0028205 0.723   -0.0124267 0.456   -0.010948 0.225  
Com CN_Firm_Est.L 0.0110273 0.035 ** 0.0115727 0.56   0.0117137 0.015 ** -0.0298835 0.455   
Com CN_FDIout_2013Y.L 0.0000112 0.853   0.0002102 0.073 * -0.0000529 0.559   0.0000554 0.551   
Com CN_trade_Mill2013Y.L -7.31E-06 0.082 * -5.59E-06 0.569   -9.79E-06 0.063 * -4.33E-06 0.509   
Value Inf_Mort_rate.L 0.0130346 0 *** 0.010196 0.025 ** 0.0152412 0.016 ** 0.0171246 0.021 ** 
Value GDP_cap_2013.L -0.0001691 0.046 ** -0.0003752 0.007 *** -0.0001553 0.1   -0.0000834 0.453   
Value Humanitarian_M 0.0002498 0.483   0.0006839 0.154   -0.0000838 0.881   0.0006697 0.336   
Value Polity2_use.L -0.0219245 0.253   -0.0262021 0.289   -0.0048526 0.869   -0.0477666 0.204   
Sec UN_pctwUS.L 1.394686 0.195   2.568846 0.308   -0.1963336 0.89   -2.6306 0.491   
Sec UN_pctwChina.L 1.586808 0.118   3.610032 0.02 ** -0.5774865 0.636   0.7309255 0.691   
Sec UNSC -0.4665072 0.313   0.1375902 0.772   -2.066897 0.001 *** 1.60969 0.006 *** 
Sec ASEANChr 0.7144228 0.175   0.7100394 0.223   0.7131526 0.306  5.712417 0 *** 
Sec BorderChina 0.5901798 0.081 * 0.8622017 0.087   0.2883675 0.411   0.0770125 0.912   
Sec ChinaMaritimeConflict.L 0.7124142 0.216   0.6241934 0.416   0.9370158 0.434   0.1129085 0.92   
Sec ChinaBorderConflict.L -3.237645 0 *** -2.863177 0.001 ***         
Sec USTreatyAlly 1.500409 0.019 ** 2.114102 0.006 *** -3.906477 0 *** 1.662103 0.09 * 
Sec USMilBase -0.2009858 0.696   -0.23443 0.73   0.2408248 0.781   1.144441 0.082 * 
Sec Total_viol_war.L 0.0869969 0.088 * 0.0594842 0.285   0.1070185 0.267   0.1742168 0.134   
Sec USMil_Pers.L -0.0001005 0.017 ** -0.0002359 0.04 ** -0.0000394 0.071 * -0.0000701 0.432   
Sec Taiwan_Recog -2.802687 0 *** -2.348955 0 ***     -1.620105 0.075 * 
Sec US_Sanctions.L 0.2845036 0.35   0.3674951 0.507   0.2274021 0.398   -0.8524938 0.225   
Sec UN_Sanctions -0.5704905 0.173   -0.5954411 0.282   -0.7082274 0.26   -0.464275 0.309   
Sec US_Relations_ind.L -0.3379225 0.024 ** -0.1972369 0.34  -0.5258355 0.018 ** -0.9735181 0.002 *** 
Sec Coup_Success.L -0.4183045 0.476   -0.2851242 0.792   -0.7283628 0.335   1.981097 0.001 *** 
Sec Coup_Fail.L -1.619076 0.005 *** -1.317415 0.052 ** -3.249025 0.002 *** 0.1589444 0.774   
Sec USAODA_M2013.L 0.0003539 0.36   0.0002161 0.754   0.000151 0.769   1.39E-06 0.999   
Sec ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y.L -1.21E-06 0.513   -7.72E-07 0.737   -1.14E-07 0.988   3.32E-06 0.39  
NA Share_AllChnODA_max.L 1.444527 0.423   -0.010695 0.997   0.5921491 0.834   18.63184 0 *** 
NA _cons -10.85059 0 *** -10.42634 0 *** -13.36527 0 ***  -2.138819 0.588   
    Parameters: 30   Parameters: 30   Parameters: 28   Parameters: 29   
    Observations: 1406 Observations: 802   Observations: 557 Observations: 204 
    Pseudo log-likelihood: -59.162075 Pseudo log-likelihood: -32.160419 Pseudo log-likelihood: -25.630962 Pseudo log-likelihood: -8.1254228 
    R-squared: .10555734   R-squared: .14191311   R-squared: .16953592   R-squared: .57435135   
Notes: * = 90% confidence level, ** = 95% confidence level, and *** = 99% confidence level, ‘.L’ indicates variable was lagged one year. 
Com = Commercial variable, Value = Values or normative variables, Sec = Security variables, Size = indicates recipient country size, NA = not applicable (e.g. technical 




Table 5-10: China Asia-Only Regression - Panel GLS Random Effects, Robust Standard Errors 
Asia Only Panel Regression GLS Random Effects 
Independent Dependent Var 2000-2014     2000-2008     2009-2014     2007-2008     
Variable 
Type Share_AllChnODA_max Coef. P>|z| Sig  Coef. P>|z| Sig Coef. P>|z|  Sig Coef. P>|z| Sig  
Size GDP_2013.L 0.0018498 0.45  -0.0002095 0.959  0.0015336 0.637  0.007198 0.16  
Com Oil_rent_gdp.L -0.0003004 0.146  -0.000426 0.257  0.0000457 0.86  -0.0002586 0.307  
Com CN_Firm_Est.L -0.0000242 0.863  -0.000017 0.98  0.0000493 0.672  -0.0004737 0.272  
Com CN_FDIout_2013Y.L 1.30E-06 0.236  0.0000112 0.008 *** 7.99E-07 0.48  3.48E-06 0.19  
Com CN_trade_Mill2013Y.L -4.12E-08 0.436  -2.19E-07 0.419  2.61E-08 0.38  -1.23E-07 0.13  
Value Inf_Mort_rate.L 0.0000892 0.663  0.0002205 0.521  -0.000214 0.233  0.0007622 0.039 ** 
Value GDP_cap_2013.L -2.04E-06 0.322  -3.82E-07 0.949  -3.43E-06 0.038 ** 3.22E-06 0.487  
Value Humanitarian_M 0.0000114 0.451  0.0000276 0.521  0.0000148 0.081 ** -0.0000579 0.082 * 
Value Polity2_use.L -0.0003274 0.697  -0.0009728 0.423  0.0006087 0.231  0.0009212 0.337  
Sec UN_pctwUS.L 0.0469661 0.113  -0.0152984 0.697  0.0484317 0.311  0.0075672 0.945  
Sec UN_pctwChina.L 0.0410641 0.043 ** 0.0061321 0.789  0.1030815 0.018 ** 0.0055363 0.947  
Sec UNSC 0.0036408 0.63  0.0085832 0.848  -0.0333401 0.373  -0.0440826 0.074 * 
Sec ASEANChr 0.020313 0.141  0.0260414 0.23  0.0134722 0.388  0.1250816 0 *** 
Sec BorderChina 0.0075167 0.311  0.0116855 0.346  -0.0071399 0.284  0.0088789 0.329  
Sec ChinaMaritimeConflict.L 0.0100592 0.252  0.0341577 0.12  -0.0272904 0 *** 0.0207907 0.195  
Sec ChinaBorderConflict.L -0.0293444 0.03 ** -0.0207283 0.176  -0.0874862 0.001 *** -0.0354284 0.08 * 
Sec USTreatyAlly 0.0182231 0.129  0.0377697 0.045 ** -0.0231116 0.247  0.0915947 0.001 *** 
Sec USMilBase 0.0175818 0.141  0.0072542 0.742  0.0070625 0.572  0.0724976 0 ** 
Sec Total_viol_war.L 0.0029048 0.119  0.0024654 0.215  0.0105863 0 *** -0.002734 0.158  
Sec USMil_Pers.L -3.22E-07 0.284  -2.88E-06 0.333  -1.56E-07 0.401  -3.86E-06 0.04  
Sec Taiwan_Recog 0   0   0   0   
Sec US_Sanctions.L 0.0032008 0.753  -0.0077717 0.542  -0.0022856 0.852  -0.0263743 0.31  
Sec UN_Sanctions -0.0649939 0 *** -0.0631989 0.201  0   0   
Sec US_Relations_ind.L -0.0042777 0.238  0.0018595 0.824  -0.0088512 0.408  -0.0478642 0.002 ** 
Sec Coup_Success.L 0.0003878 0.961  0.0040309 0.717  0   0.0298398 0.056 * 
Sec Coup_Fail.L 0.0019702 0.765  0   0.0111977 0.188  0   
Sec USAODA_M2013.L -6.66E-06 0.415  1.91E-06 0.96  -0.0000125 0.07 * 0.0000632 0.046 ** 
Sec ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y.L -1.79E-08 0.767  1.54E-08 0.876  -3.26E-08 0.799  1.03E-07 0.421  
NA Share_AllChnODA_max.L -0.0875049 0.108  -0.1592697 0.022 ** -0.2884281 0.23  0.1085555 0.512  
NA _cons -0.0646056 0.279  -0.0003892 0.997  -0.0792486 0.334  -0.1083759 0.238  
  R-sq:   R-sq:   R-sq:   R-sq:   
  within  = 0.0242  within  = 0.0774  within  = 0.1980  within  = 0.3976  
  between = 0.7212  between = 0.5795  between = 0.8451  between = 0.9599  
  overall = 0.1313  overall = 0.1832  overall = 0.3997  overall = 0.7804  
Notes: * = 90% confidence level, ** = 95% confidence level, and *** = 99% confidence level, ‘.L’ indicates variable was lagged one year. 
Com = Commercial variable, Value = Values or normative variables, Sec = Security variables, Size = indicates recipient country size, NA = not applicable (e.g. technical 




Table 5-11: China Asia-Only Regression - Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Asia Only Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
Independent Dependent Var 2000-2014     2000-2008     2009-2014     2007-2008     
Variable 
Type Share_AllChnODA_max Coef. P>|t|  Sig Coef. P>|t|  Sig Coef. P>|t| Sig Coef. P>|t| Sig 
Size LnGDP_2013.L 0.1274373 0.3   0.1958271 0.529   -0.1254501 0.653  2.709218 0.003  *** 
Com Oil_rent_gdp.L -0.0594254 0.071 * -0.029551 0.349   -0.263694 0.005 *** -0.8884331 0.297  
Com CN_Firm_Est.L -0.0015298 0.857   0.0072189 0.789   0.0045498 0.629   -0.0140795 0.784  
Com CN_FDIout_2013Y.L 0.0001875 0.108   0.000361 0.013 ** 0.0000986 0.378   0.00073 0.503  
Com CN_trade_Mill2013Y.L -5.56E-06 0.343   -0.0000122 0.403   7.71E-06 0.067  * -0.000028 0.714  
Value Inf_Mort_rate.L -0.0067334 0.621   -0.0114628 0.718   0.0209673 0.142  -0.1631155 0.377   
Value GDP_cap_2013.L -0.0003683 0.119   -0.0007944 0.363   -0.0003887 0.141   -0.0016013 0.558   
Value Humanitarian_M 0.0001736 0.794   0.0012532 0.272   0.0002409 0.713   -0.0199536 0.14  
Value Polity2_use.L -0.0211456 0.693   -0.0555904 0.498   0.0967798 0.047 ** -0.2937644 0.399   
Sec UN_pctwUS.L 2.988118 0.161   -1.071121 0.822   2.209223 0.268   59.55154 0.4  
Sec UN_pctwChina.L 5.618022 0.009 *** 1.625892 0.631   6.377787 0.075  * 25.18487 0.326   
Sec UNSC -0.1062424 0.896   -0.085693 0.92   -4.139752 0 *** -9.909032 0.183   
Sec ASEANChr 0.7360088 0.178  0.7606715 0.304   0.3707075 0.588   10.38114 0 *** 
Sec BorderChina 0.4892322 0.301   1.044004 0.257   -0.2392737 0.733   12.51542 0.217  
Sec ChinaMaritimeConflict.L 0.3592463 0.592   1.378176 0.258   -2.616589 0.03 * 9.157136 0.013 ** 
Sec ChinaBorderConflict.L -3.052562 0 *** -2.728943 0.002 ***         
Sec USTreatyAlly 1.134309 0.065 * 2.108042 0.017 ** -4.94565 0.041 ** 21.67669 0.134  
Sec USMilBase 0.4826887 0.429   0.4651444 0.566   0.6678915 0.55   10.69974 0.059 ** 
Sec Total_viol_war.L 0.082815 0.283   -0.0796761 0.565   0.1276128 0.035 ** -1.61494 0.105  
Sec USMil_Pers.L -0.0001162 0.072 * -0.000235 0.037 * -0.0000437 0.102   -0.0004278 0.236   
Sec Taiwan_Recog                 
Sec US_Sanctions.L 0.2718138 0.594   -0.9022972 0.463   1.5615 0.223   2.808903 0.664  
Sec UN_Sanctions -3.206088 0.011 ** -2.21485 0.282          
Sec US_Relations_ind.L -0.1157815 0.659   -0.2107933 0.686   -0.3215936 0.754   -10.16901 0.15  
Sec Coup_Success.L 0.2924664 0.796   1.190405 0.614       0.7684078 0.638   
Sec Coup_Fail.L 0.4574 0.546       -0.0818764 0.898       
Sec USAODA_M2013.L 0.0004288 0.639   0.0010579 0.496   -0.0002276 0.71   0.0159947 0.198   
Sec ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y.L -2.66E-07 0.908   1.44E-06 0.561   3.39E-06 0.395   0.0000333 0.602  
NA Share_AllChnODA_max.L -7.474581 0.013 ** -10.84498 0.012 *** -12.60329 0.01 *** -23.24586 0.228  
NA _cons -11.63638 0 *** -8.947952 0.145   -7.01591 0.341  -73.07287 0.009 *** 
    Parameters: 29   Parameters: 28 Parameters: 26 Parameters: 26 
    Observations: 318   Observations: 180 Observations: 132 Observations: 44 
    Pseudo log-likelihood:  -18.851698 
Pseudo log-likelihood:  
-11.057147 




    R-squared: .18827872   R-squared: .28480236 R-squared: .69965775   R-squared: .92328654   
Notes: * = 90% confidence level, ** = 95% confidence level, and *** = 99% confidence level, ‘.L’ indicates variable was lagged one year. 
Com = Commercial variable, Value = Values or normative variables, Sec = Security variables, Size = indicates recipient country size, NA = not applicable (e.g. technical 






Overall, the panel regressions on the China worldwide data set perform reasonably well 
and most variables have the theoretically expected sign. The regressions on cross-section 
averages indicate endogeneity between the DV and the commercial IVs. The time series 
regressions use lagged IVs to prevent endogeneity which is not possible in the cross section 
regressions. Therefore, the cross-section regressions’ coefficients on the commercial variables 
are not reliable.   
 
5.3.3.1 Security factors in China’s aid commitments 
Security factors are the most statistically significant variables explaining China’s aid 
commitments over the entire analysis period, but different variables are significant in the early 
and later periods.  Prior literature on Chinese ODA has emphasized one continuous factor in 
China’s aid decisions since the beginning of China’s aid giving program in the 1950s, namely, 
the recognition of Taiwan. All regressions show the expected sign on the Taiwan recognition 
variable (-) and it is highly significant in explaining China’s aid commitments in 8 of 12 models.  
Recognizing Taiwan results in little to no aid from China and switching recognition from 
Taiwan to China generally results in major aid commitments from China. UN voting with China 
results in more aid commitments in the 2000-2008 period in 1 of 3 models while UN voting 
with the US results in less aid for 2000-2014 in 1 of 3 models.  The only period where UN 
security council member is significant in 2009-2014 (GLS and PPML), but the parameter is the 
wrong sign – UNSC members tend to receive less aid from China not more.  ASEAN 
chairmanship is significant for the 2000-2014 period (1 of 3 models) and 2009 – 2014 in 1 of 3 
models and indicates that China rewards the ASEAN chair with more aid in the year of the 





The results show interesting differences between the early (2000-2008) and later period 
(2009-2014) which confirm the so called “charm offensive” strategy.424  In the 2000-2008 
period, the Asia-only regressions (Table 5-10 on page 244) shows that in the 2009-2014 period, 
China punished states with maritime conflicts (2 of 2 models).  Border conflicts are consistently 
negative in both periods (5 of 6 of the Asia only models).  Aid to United States treaty allies also 
shows differences over time. The worldwide PPML regressions (Table 5-9 on page 243) show 
United States treaty allies receive more aid from China in the early period and less in the later 
period.  In the Asia only regressions, aid to United States treaty allies was positive in the early 
period (2 of 2 models) but changed to negative in the later period (1 of 2 models), consistent 
with the view that China’s policy in Southeast Asia was of reassurance (i.e. the Charm 
Offensive) in the early period.  After 2008 China’s aid policy became more punitive toward 
countries aligned with the United States.  The carrot turned to a stick consistent with the 
prediction from the threat perception analysis showing China’s threat perception was increasing 
from moderate to high over the analysis period.  
 
One consistent result is that China uses its ODA commitments to reward countries that 
have worsening relations with the United States.  All worldwide regressions estimate a negative 
coefficient on the United States Relations indicator variable and it is statistically significant in 
6 of 12 specifications.  Table 5-9 on page 243 (PPML) indicates that the variable is significant 
in 3 out of 4 periods and that the magnitude of the relationship increased in the later period. 
This means that in 2009-2014 period, having a deteriorating relationship with the United States 
results in a larger share of China’s aid flows than in the 2000-2008 period. Other regressions 
show a weaker effect but are consistent in the direction. Countries with deteriorating relations 
                                                 
424 Joshua Kurlantzick, "China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia," Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 




with the United States tend to receive more aid from China all else being equal and this effect 
appears to have intensified over time.  This same pattern can be seen in the United States 
sanctions variable.  China increases aid to states under United States sanctions but the variable 
is only statistically significant in the cross-section regressions (2 of 12 models) for the 2000-
2014 and 2009-2014 time periods (Table 5-8 on page 242).  
 
One consistently negative relationships in the China models is the failed coup indicator 
variable (7 of 11 models).  China aid commitments tend to decline when a country experiences 
a failed coup and this relationship is generally strong and highly significant.  Interestingly, a 
successful coup is positive and significant for the 2007-2008 models and the cross-section 
model for 2000-2008, perhaps indicating that China uses aid to curry favor from new 
governments. The indicator for violence and war is also generally positive and significant in 
several of the models (4 of 12 worldwide and 2 of 12 Asia only). This variable is a composite 
score for international and civil violence with higher numbers indicating greater levels and 
intensity of violence.  The models suggest that China generally provides more aid to states with 
more international and civil conflict and this effect is stronger in the later period (2009-2014).   
 
Lastly, China’s aid commitments do not appear to respond to United States or Japanese 
ODA commitments. ODA from the United States and Japan is not significant in any worldwide 
regression (0 of 12 models), Japan ODA is not significant in any Asia only regression, and 
United States ODA is only significant in 2 of 8 Asia only models and the sign is inconsistent.  
Overall, there is no evidence of direct aid competition between China and Japan or the United 





5.3.3.2 Normative factors in China’s aid commitments 
Normative factors reflecting recipient need are generally significant in explaining 
China’s aid commitments.  China’s ODA commitments are generally responsive to recipient 
country poverty. China aid is not generally affected by any of the ideological measures (Ideal 
Points and Polity).  The coefficient on infant mortality (indicator of poverty) is positive and 
statistically significant in 10 of 12 worldwide models (Table 5-7, Table 5-8, Table 5-9 on pages 
241, 242, and 243 respectively).  The effect is much weaker in the Asia-only regressions 
(significant in 1 of 8 models) implying that China’s aid to Africa is more altruistic than its aid 
to Asian states, in line with the prediction that countries closer to China are more salient to its 
security.  The coefficient on GDP per capita (another indicator of poverty) is generally negative 
(higher average income leads to less aid from China) and is statistically significant in 6 of 12 
worldwide models but is only significant in the 2000-2008 but not significant in the later period.  
The coefficient on Humanitarian crises is positive and significant for the whole period in the 
GLS and CS regressions and the 2000-2008 period in the CS regression.  The coefficients on 
UN Ideal Points (measure of voting aligned with liberal democratic norms) and the Polity 
indicator (democratic governance) are not generally significant in any time period except in the 
cross-section regression where China’s aid commitments are higher to more democratic 
countries.   
 
5.3.3.3 Commercial factors in China’s aid commitments 
Commercial factors are a minor consideration in China’s aid commitment decisions – 
even less than normative factors.  There is no evidence that China gave significant weight to 
commercial factors during any period tested – including the 2007-2008 period which may have 
represented a lower perceived threat condition.  The results from the cross-section regressions 




and investment variables rather than the other way around so should be heavily discounted.  
Commercial factors are mostly insignificant in the panel regressions using lagged commercial 
variables but are often highly significant in the cross-section regressions on period averages 
suggesting that ODA-like flows from China tend to inflate the trade, investment and 
establishment of Chinese firms in recipient countries – which is a result of endogeneity.  It is 
also advisable to discount the foreign direct investment (FDI) variable due to the well-known 
problem of channeling FDI through international tax havens.425   
 
The panel regressions (Table 5-7, Table 5-9, Table 5-10, Table 5-11 on pages 241, 243, 
244, and 245 respectively) show generally small impacts of commercial variables on China’s 
ODA commitments with a notable disparity in the significance of commercial variables in the 
worldwide vs. Asia-only regressions.  The signs on the coefficients are generally sensible with 
positive relationship between Chinese aid and establishment of Chinese firms (CN_Firm_Est) 
and China exports and negative relationship between aid and Chinese imports from the recipient.  
The establishment of Chinese firms is significant in 3 of 8 worldwide models, trade is 
significant in 4 of 8 worldwide models but the sign is negative meaning China is channeling 
aid to countries with less trade with China rather than more.  The significance of the commercial 
variables disappears in almost all (except trade (positive) in 2009-2014 PPML and oil exports 
(negative) in 2 of 8 models) of the Asia-only regression suggesting that commercial factors, if 
important at all, are primarily salient in China’s aid commitments outside Asia.   
 
                                                 
425 Caution is warranted interpreting FDI flows by country data. The level of FDI distorted due to the concentration 
of FDI flows through multinational enterprises in low tax jurisdictions which include Hong Kong, China and 
Singapore which record an inordinate amount of the FDI flows in the Asian region. The majority of China’s FDI is 
funneled through Hong Kong and does not show up in China’s FDI data. See OECD. 2015. “How Multinational 
Enterprises Channel Investments Through Multiple Countries.” Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/How-MNEs-channel-investments.pdf for a discussion of this 




5.3.4 China’s aid purpose – summarizing the findings 
The analysis sought to determine the motivations behind China’s overall aid 
commitments between 2000 and 2014 and distinguish any differences between the early and 
later high threat periods.  The overall results for China are presented in Table 5-12 on page 252.  
Independent variable types are categorized as “significant”, “moderate”, or “insignificant.  The 
decision rules426 for each categorization are as follows: 
 
Significant:  2 or more variables are significant, with the same sign, in two or more 
models. 
Moderate:  1 variable is significant, with the same sign, in two or more models, or 
 3 variables are significant in one model with the theoretically correct 
sign.427 
Insignificant: No variable is significant in two or more models. 
 
 
                                                 
426 These rules differ from the rules for the Japan regressions because of more models were estimated for China 
to deal with the large numbers of zero observations in the data set.  The intent is to remain as consistent as 
possible in the assessments of China and Japan’s ODA commitment decsions. 
427 Some estimated coefficients have the theoretically incorrect sign.  A prominent example is the Oil Rent as a % 
of GDP variable. The estimated coefficients in the panel regressions (GLS and PPML) are negative implying that 
China provides less aid while oil production increases in a recipient country while the coefficients in the cross-
section models are positive, implying that countries with higher average oil production over the analysis period 
receive more aid. The pattern can be explained by the possibility that China’s aid pattern, with large allocations in 
some years followed by years with no aid, may result in the negative coefficient in the time series regressions.  If 
aid from China (mostly infrastructure) results in higher oil production just as China’s aid drops after a large aid 
package is committed, the negative coefficient is quite possible even as China delivers more aid to states with 




Table 5-12: China regression results summary 
Independent 
var. type 
2000-2014 (high threat) 2000-2008 (early high threat) 2009-2014 (late high threat) 2007-2008 (financial crisis) 
Security Significant (WW) 
Taiwan recognition (--, All) 
ASEAN chair (+, GLS) 
Border conflict (--, CS, PPML) 
US relations (-, All) 
US military personnel (- All) 
US military base (++, CS) 
US treaty ally (+, PPML), (--, CS) 
US sanctions (+, CS) 
Violence (+, GLS, PPML) 
Failed coup (--, GLS, PPML) 
UN vote with US (-, CS) 
 
Moderate (ASIA) 
Border conflict (--, PPML, GLS) 
US treaty ally (+, PPML) 
US military personnel (-, PPML) 
UN vote with China (+, GLS, ++, PPML) 
UN sanctions (--, GLS, PPML) 
Significant (WW) 
Taiwan recognition (--, All) 
Border conflict (--, GLS, PPML) 
US military personnel (-, PPML) 
US military base (++, CS) 
US treaty ally (++, PPML), (--, CS) 
Failed coup (-, GLS, PPML) 
Successful coup (++, CS) 
UN vote with China (+, GLS, PPLL) 
 
Moderate (ASIA) 
Border conflict (--, PPML) 
US treaty ally (+, GLS, PPML) 
US military personnel (-, PPML) 
 
Significant (WW) 
Taiwan recognition (--, All) 
ASEAN chair (+, CS) 
Border conflict (-, GLS) 
Maritime conflict (+, CS) 
UN security council (--, All) 
US relations (--, PPML) 
US treaty ally (--, PPML, CS) 
US military personnel (-, GLS, PPML) 
US sanctions (++, CS) 
Failed coup (--, All) 
 
Significant (ASIA) 
Maritime conflict (--, GLS, -, PPML) 
US treaty ally (-, PPML) 
Violence (++, GLS, PPML) 
UN security council (--, PPML) 
UN vote with China (+, GLS, PPML) 
Significant (WW) 
ASEAN chair (++, GLS, PPML) 
Border conflict (--, CS) 
US relations (--, GLS, PPML) 
US military base (+, GLS, PPML) 
US treaty ally (-, CS), (+, PPML) 
Successful coup (++, All) 
UN security council, (++, PPML) 
 
Significant (ASIA) 
ASEAN chair (++, GLS, PPML) 
US treaty ally (++, GLS) 
US military base (+, GLS, PPML) 
US relations (--, GLS) 
US ODA (+, GLS) 
Normative Moderate (WW) 
Human crises (+, GLS) 
Infant mortality (++, GLS, PPML) 
GDP per capita (-, All) 





Infant mortality (+, GLS, PPML) 
GDP per capita (--, PPML, CS) 





Infant mortality (++, All) 
GDP per capita (--, GLS) 
Polity (+, CS) 
 
Moderate (ASIA) 
GDP per capita (-, GLS) 
Human crisis (+, GLS, PPML) 
Polity (+, PPML) 
Moderate (WW) 
Infant mortality (+, All) 
 
Moderate (ASIA) 
Human crisis (-, GLS) 
Infant mortality (+, GLS) 
 
Commercial Moderate (WW) 
CN firms (+, PPML) 
CN trade (-, All) 
Oil rent (++, CS) 
 
Insignificant (ASIA) 
Oil rent (-, PPML) 
Moderate (WW) 
CN FDI (+, GLS, PPML) 
CN trade (--, CS) 
Oil rent (++, CS) 
 
Insignificant (ASIA) 
CD FDI (++, GLS, PPML) 
Moderate (WW) 
CN firms (+, GLS, PPML) 
CN trade (-, All) 
Oil rent (++, CS) 
 
Insignificant (ASIA) 
Oil rent (--, PPML) 
CN trade (+, PPML) 
Insignificant (WW) 





Notes: (+) = positive relationship, (++) = positive relationship at 99% significance, (-) = negative relationship, (--) = negative relationship at 99% significance, PPML = 
Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood, GLS = Generalized least squares random effects panel regression, CS = Cross-section regression on period averages, WW = 
regression done on worldwide dataset, ASIA = regression done for countries of the Asia-Pacific region only. 
 
Variables highlighted in red and italics have a sign (+,-) to that expected for the variable.  For example, the negative sign on Human crisis in 2007-2008 suggest China gave 
less aid to states that experienced a humanitarian disaster. Oil rent in the time series regressions also suggest the increasing oil production is correlated with less aid from 





Trade and investment variables excluded from cross-section regression results due to endogeneity, coefficients on FDI are excluded due to data issues that result from the 
majority of China FDI being transmitted through tax havens. 
 
The Asia only regressions generally excluded the Taiwan recognition variable since there were no countries that switched recognition to/from Taiwan during the period. 






The results in the above table (Table 5-12 on page 252) lead to the following conclusions 
regarding China’s foreign aid policy over the analysis period.  First, China’s aid has been 
primarily security oriented over the entire period.  Security variables are the most salient 
explanatory variables in China’s aid commitments and the effect appears to be greater in the 
later periods than the earlier periods.  Second, China’s aid program appears targeted at 
undermining United States interests around the world.  Relations between the recipient and the 
United States is a powerful explanatory variable which indicates that deteriorating United States 
relations causes increased aid from China and the magnitude of the effect increased over time.  
United States sanctions is significant and positive in the later period in the cross section model 
implying states under United States sanctions receive more aid from China (2009-2014).  
Further, United States allies tended to receive more aid from China in the early period (2000-
2008) but less in the later period (2009-2014).  As Japan utilized ODA to increasingly support 
United States interests over time, China did the opposite.  Third, normative factors are 
sometimes significant, but the normative factors that China considers in its aid commitments 
are generally the poverty indicators rather than the political values indicators.  The effect of the 
normative variables appears to be declining over time, but are surprisingly significant in the 
regressions. Fourth, commercial factors are moderate or insignificant in all periods with no 
apparent trend. 
 
The China regression results are much more valuable for assessing the significance of 
the main IVs in determining China’s aid commitments than in testing the hypothesis because 
there is little variation in the CV (threat perception) for China.  However, the fact that China’s 
aid commitments are primarily driven by security factors is consistent with the hypothesis that 
high threat perception leads to more security oriented foreign aid, but the lack of a low threat 




without a perceived threat.  In the case of China, the change observed over time suggests that 
increasing threat perception from the United States-Japan alliance led to a reorientation of its 
aid policies from the charm offensive to a more explicit countering of United States security 
interests. 
 
5.4 Explaining the variation in ODA over time for Japan and China 
In addition to assessing the significance of the various categories of variables in the 
regression outputs, I have utilized a statistical approach to assess the relative importance of 
commercial, normative and security factors on the allocation of ODA commitments over time.  
Individual panel regressions are run using commercial variables, then normative variables, then 
security variables in individual regressions to estimate the impact on ODA commitments under 
different threat environments for Japan and China.  Variables that simply indicate country size 
(GDP and population) and variables used for technical reasons (lagged dependent variable) are 
excluded.  The adjusted R2 is then compared between each regression. I utilize adjusted R2 to 
account for the fact that the number of variables in each category are different and adding 
variables will increase R2 regardless of the significance of the variable.  The adjusted R2 
indicates the percent of variation in the DV (share of ODA commitments) explained by the IVs 
included in each regression adjusted for the degrees of freedom in each regression to account 
to different numbers of variables. Therefore, the regression including only commercial 
variables will estimate the amount of variation in the DV attributable to commercial factors.  
Likewise, for regressions including only normative and security variables.  For each time period, 
the variable category with the highest adjusted R2 has the highest explanatory power.  For Japan, 





Table 5-13: Overall adjusted R2 of panel regression by category of independent variables, DV 
share of ODA committed (Japan) 
Japan panel regression, GLS 








Commercial variables 0.1022 (10.2%) 0.3771 (37.7%) 0.0203 (2.0%) 
Normative variables -0.001* (0.0%) .0746 (7.5%) 0.0201 (2.0%) 
Security variables 0.408 (40.1%) 0.312 (31.2%) 0.2790 (27.9%) 
Note: * negative adjusted R2 is possible when the residual sum of squares is close to the total sum of squares.  
The interpretation is that the model explains a negligible amount of the variation in the DV. 
 
The results for Japan align with the predictions based on the theoretical framework 
proposed in this dissertation.  In both high threat periods, security factors are the dominant 
predictors of changes in the DV.  Only during the low threat period are commercial factors 
dominant.  Interestingly, during the low threat period, normative factors, while still a minor 
factor, are more significant than at any other time.  One major finding of this analysis is the 
persistence of security factors even during the low threat period.  Although commercial factors 
are most important in the low threat period, security factors remain strong.  In the most recent 
period, commercial factors have minimal explanatory power, approximately on par with 
normative factors. 
 
In the case of China, I adjusted the years between the lower threat and higher threat 
periods by one year to more evenly split the data.  Since the number of included observations 
can have strong impacts on the adjusted R2 result, it is better to ensure that any differences are 
the result of actual structural differences in impact of the IVs on the DV rather than a reflection 
of the amount of data points included between the time periods. In the results below, the number 
of observations between time periods is balanced. The adjusted R2 is calculated for both GLS 





Table 5-14: Overall adjusted R2 of panel regression by category of independent variables, DV 
share of ODA committed (China) 
China panel regression, GLS random 
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Note: * negative adjusted R2 is possible when the residual sum of squares is close to the total sum of squares.  
The interpretation is that the model explains a negligible amount of the variation in the DV. 
 
Interestingly, commercial factors have little influence on the DV in both periods.  
Normative factors have much higher explanatory power in both periods than commercial 
factors. The results suggest that Chinese foreign aid does consider recipient need more than 
commercial benefits. Security variables are the most significant in both periods but not much 
different between periods.  The strength of the variable categories for China’s ODA 
commitments are not clearly different between the early and late period.  As described in the 
panel regression results, the main difference is not in the importance of security factors but in 
the different security factors that are salient and the direction of causality between the two 
periods.   
 
The adjusted R2 (and unadjusted) values were expected to be much lower for the China 
regressions than the Japan regressions because the Japan ODA data is much more robust, 
available for longer periods of time, and the program is more consistent which substantially 
minimizes the problem with 0 values.  For example, with the China program where large 
commitments are often interspersed with years with no commitment (0 value), this variation 
between large commitments and 0 cannot be explained by the IVs which significantly reduces 
R2.  However, the overall finding that security factors dominate normative and commercial 





5.5 Testing for aid competition 
There are two ways in which foreign aid competition can arise.  First, states can give 
aid within balancing coalitions against other threatening states.  In this case, we expect states 
that are threatened by other donors to use aid to support states that are willing to balance against 
the common threat.  In other words, both donor and recipient must be threatened by another 
donor for aid to flow in a manner predicted by balancing behavior.  If this dynamic is operative, 
we expect competing donors to provide more aid to different states as was observed during the 
Cold War.  The United States and Soviet Union provided aid to different groups of countries 
within their own coalitions.  The second type of aid competition can arise when states do not 
feel threatened or when the recipient state is not threatened by either donor.  If the donor is not 
threatened or the recipient state does not share the threat perception of the donor, aid would not 
be used to support a balancing coalition.  In this case, we expect to see donor states giving aid 
to the same recipients. The purpose of that aid is unlikely to be power balancing but is likely to 
be either commercial in nature or bidding for policy concessions.   
 
Aid from China and Japan may fall into both categories depending on the target location 
of the recipients.  African states are not threatened by either Japan or China, due to their location 
and place in the international system and should not be expected to join a balancing coalition 
against either donor.  In this case, we may expect aid competition to reflect commercial interests 
(e.g. access to resources, granting of contracts, etc.) or bidding for policy concessions such as 
UN votes, official recognition of China (e.g. PRC vs Taiwan), or support in other international 
institutions.  In Southeast Asia, aid competition, if it exists, is likely to reflect more classic 





The regression analysis does not provide much evidence for aid competition between 
China and Japan since aid commitments of the other are not significant IVs in any regression.  
Aid from Japan does not explain aid commitments from China and aid from China does not 
explain aid commitments from Japan in the worldwide data and when restricted to Asian 
countries.  From the basis of the regression analysis thus far, there is no substantial evidence 
that Japan and China consider aid from each other in their aid commitment decisions.   
 
To more carefully assess whether or not the aid commitments of Japan and China affect 
the commitments of the other state, I ran some supplemental regressions limiting the analysis 
to specific groups of countries where it may be more likely that aid competition would occur.  
Further, the time period was set at 2000-2014 so that the entire period where there is data on 
China’s aid commitments can be tested for interaction between Japan and China’s aid 
commitment decisions. Even though the time period spans periods of varying levels of threat 
perception, I decided to maximize the amount of data included in the regressions to offer the 
best chance to estimate interaction between the aid commitment variables.  Separate panel 
regressions were run for both China and Japan’s ODA commitments over the 2000-2014 time 
period with the ODA commitment from Japan lagged one year included in the China 
regressions and the ODA commitment from China lagged one year included in the Japan 
regressions.  Countries were then grouped regionally to test if Japan and China aid 
commitments considered, either positively or negatively, the prior year aid commitments of the 
other country in their aid commitments.  The panel regressions were run using Share of ODA 
committed as the DV, all of the same IVs from the prior regressions and again estimated using 
GLS, random effects and robust standard errors.  Separate regressions are run for Asia-Pacific 
countries only, African countries only, Southeast Asian countries only, and only Pacific Island 




Pacific Islands have relatively few observations so the regressions on such small groups of 
countries perform quite poorly.  The results for the regionally limited regressions for Japan and 
China are given in Table 5-15 on page 260 and Table 5-16 on page 260. 
 
Table 5-15: Japan ODA commitments, testing for aid competition with China, various 
regional groupings, 2000-2014 
DV: Total ODA commitments Coefficient Significance 
IV: China ODA commitment prior year 
Worldwide regression -2.89e-07 69.9% 
Asia-Pacific only regression -2.17e-06 89.3% 
Africa only regression -4.21e-07 81.5% 
Southeast Asia only regression -2.15e-06 45.9% 
Pacific Islands only regression 3.64e-07 27.3% 
 
Table 5-16: China ODA commitments, testing for aid competition with Japan, various 
regional groupings, 2000-2014 
DV: Total ODA commitments Coefficient Significance 
IV: Japan ODA commitment prior year 
Worldwide regression -3.16e-09 8.5% 
Asia-Pacific only regression -1.79e-08 23.3% 
Africa only regression -4.21e-08 74.2% 
Southeast Asia only regression 1.99e-07 7.6% 
Pacific Islands only regression 2.015e-07 9.3% 
 
If China and Japan were actively competing for influence in the same countries, I expect 
that aid commitments from Japan or China in the previous year would make aid commitments 
from the other state more likely.  This would imply a positive and significant value on the 
estimated coefficient for the lagged ODA commitment variable from the other state.  If China 
and Japan were actively building a balancing coalition against the other state, I would expect 
aid from Japan or China to displace aid from the other state.  This would imply a negative and 
significant value on the estimated coefficient for the lagged ODA commitment variable form 





In the Japan case, all regressions save one (Pacific Islands) indicate a negative 
relationship between Japanese aid commitment and Chinese aid commitments in the prior year. 
None of these negative relationships are statistically significant however.  The only regression 
with a positive coefficient is for the Pacific Islands but is not significant.  The Asia-Pacific and 
Africa regressions are the closest to achieving significance and display a negative relationship 
between Japan aid commitments and China aid, but do not achieve a 90% significance level.  
Overall, the findings are weak for Japan using its aid to compete with China.   
 
In the case of China, the pattern of coefficient signs are the same as Japan except for 
Southeast Asia but none of the relationships are statistically significant.  The regression analysis 
suggests that there is not a broad, systematic competition using foreign aid between Japan and 
China.  However, the results do not mean that Japan and China never compete using aid. A case 
study analysis may be able to uncover specific instances of aid competition, but panel 
regressions are simply not the best tool for determining if such behavior occurs. Based solely 
on the regression analysis, the evidence for aid competition between China and Japan is weak.  
The case studies for the Philippines and Cambodia may illuminate competitive aspects that 
could not be found in the regressions.   
 
5.6 Quantitative analysis summary 
The panel regressions on Japan’s and China’s foreign aid commitments confirm the 
hypothesis for Japan and partially confirm the hypothesis for China.  The panel regressions 
show that security variables were the most significant factors explaining Japan’s aid 
commitments during the two high threat periods and commercial factors were the most 
significant factors explaining Japan’s aid commitments during the low threat period, confirming 




aid commitments were targeted to support United States security interests, especially during 
high threat periods.  In the first high threat period (1966-1991) Japan’s aid was coordinated 
with ODA from the United States and rewarded countries with better relations with the United 
States.  In the later high threat period (2002-2014) Japan’s aid commitments was also 
coordinated with ODA form the United States and provided more aid to countries with larger 
contingents of United States military personnel.  In the low threat period, Japan actually provide 
less aid to countries with larger contingents of United States military personnel but did reward 
United States allies with more aid. 
 
In the case of China, the threat perception analysis indicated that China did not have 
low threat perception during the analysis period and, as such, prediction 2 could not be 
confirmed.  However, the quantitative analysis confirmed that security factors were the most 
significant determinants of China’s aid commitments over 2000-2014 confirming prediction 1.  
Prediction 4 was confirmed by the quantitative analysis which indicated that China’s foreign 
aid program was indeed targeted at countering United States security interests and this focus 
has increased over time.  China has consistently used its aid commitments to reward countries 
with deteriorating relations with the United States.  In the early period (2000-2008), China first 
rewarded United States allies but punished them in the later period (2009-2014).  In Asia, China 
rewarded countries with a maritime conflict with China but punished them in the later period.  
In the later period, China also began rewarding countries under United States sanctions.  Overall, 
the findings support the prediction that China’s aid commitments are increasingly meant to 






6 CASE STUDIES 
The preceding quantitative analysis using large-N regression models identified broad 
trends in aid policy as it responds to commercial, normative and security factors and threat 
perception.  Regression models, however, tend to gloss over the mechanisms by which 
decisions are made and can be subject to spurious correlations and affected by major events 
that are not explicitly controlled for in the models.  For example, the models suggest that Japan 
provides more aid to states in maritime territorial disputes with China.  However, these states 
tend to cluster around the South China Sea which is also a major sea lane of communication for 
Japanese imports and exports.  If the regression analysis indicates that Japan favors states in the 
in maritime conflict with China with aid, it could be that Japan is using aid to balance against 
China’s rising power.  But it could also simply indicate that Japan is concerned about access to 
its critical sea lanes of communication through the South China Sea where China’s territorial 
conflicts are concentrated.  In this way, regression models can be difficult to interpret when two 
different effects can be entangled in single variables.  In these cases, confirmation of the 
estimated relationship through a detailed case study can help determine which interpretation is 
the correct one.   
 
Supplementary case studies were conducted to deconstruct the sequence of events 
leading to aid increases, decreases and the types of projects being funded by both China and 
Japan. The cases are selected based on the results of the regressions conducted in Chapter 5.  
Key factors that drive aid commitments from Japan and China are identified in the regressions.  
Then countries that best illustrate the effects of key independent variables are selected and the 
aid behavior of China and Japan carefully traced to illustrate how the independent variables 




regressions show that security factors are the most salient variables explaining variations in aid 
commitments and that United States security interests are central to both Chinese and Japanese 
aid giving.  Countries for case studies should have one or more of the following features which 
are significant predictors of aid from both Japan and China base on the regressions in Chapter 
5: 
- Maritime dispute with China (i.e. plausibly threatened by China) 
- United States treaty ally 
- Successful coup 
- Large variation in relations with the United States (including period of deterioration) 
- Serves as ASEAN Chair 
 
In the nested analysis approach, one or more cases are chosen to illustrate the important 
relationships between IVs and the DVs estimated in the regression analysis. In this study, two 
cases are sufficient to achieve enough variation across the variables identified above to confirm 
the regression findings.  The countries chosen that best illustrate the effects of the above 
variables are the Philippines and Cambodia; both countries that have experienced significant 
swings in relations between them and China, Japan, and the United States. Both countries are 
economic laggards in Southeast Asia and are highly motivated to accept aid and, due to their 
relative poverty, likely to be susceptible to quid pro quo demands of donors.  The Philippines 
has an ongoing and periodically bitter maritime dispute with China in the Spratly Islands and 
Scarborough Shoal and large variations in aid allocations from China and Japan. The case of 
Cambodia will contrast the Philippines case as a state with no border with China and no 
maritime dispute in the South China Sea.  Cambodia is also a case where Japan was the largest 
aid donor in the 1990s and successfully led the mediation of the Cambodian peace process in 




joined the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) in April of that year.428 China 
rapidly expanded its aid to Cambodia after 1997 culminating in particularly generous aid 
packages around the time of Cambodia’s assumptions of the ASEAN Chair first in 2002 and 
later in 2012.429  The case studies will examine the conditions and pressures that led to changes 
in aid allocations over time for both China and Japan.  Since many of the IVs do not vary much 
within cases (e.g. the Philippines has been in the United States alliance network since 1952 and 
has had a maritime territorial dispute with China for decades), using Cambodia and the 
Philippines provides variation across cases in the IVs for regime type, location along trade 
routes, territorial disputes, and donor alliance network. 
 
Essentially, the case studies will demonstrate the way that the IVs and CVs in the 
proposed theory explain the changes in ODA commitments from Japan and China to the case 
study countries.  These cases seek to bolster the findings of the regression models to 
demonstrate that the IVs and CVs interact in the manner specified in the theory in specific cases.   
 
6.1 Case study objectives 
The research objective of the case studies is the same as for the overall study. Using 
case studies of Japan’s and China’s aid to the Philippines and Cambodia, I seek to test the 
following hypothesis: Japan and China’s foreign aid increasingly reflects security interests due 
to increased threat perception precipitated by the rise of China. 
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The theory proposed in Chapter 2 suggests threat perception as the key factor in 
predicting whether a state allocates ODA to promote commercial interests or security interests.  
The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates that Japan’s ODA has become increasingly focused on 
national security as China became perceived as a security threat.  The results for China are 
similar though at no point in in the period for which data is available (2000-2014) has China’s 
aid been primarily commercial in nature.  Early in the analysis period, China’s aid was used to 
reassure states about China intentions while later in the analysis period, China’s aid was used 
to punish states in conflict with China.  Over the entire analysis period, China’s aid counters 
United States interests. 
 
The case studies are of the “theory testing” type and demonstrate the conditions that led 
to variations in the DV (ODA commitments). The cases are “most-likely” test cases of impact 
of threat perception on ODA allocation decisions. The case study approach also allows me to 
enrich the analysis with a more detailed analysis of the interaction between recipient and donor 
in the eventual aid commitment decision.   
 
6.2 Case study design and structure 
The design of the case study analysis uses the congruence procedure using within case 
comparison.430  This approach is well suited to the study of ODA commitments from Japan and 
China to the Philippines and Cambodia because the values on the IVs and DV vary greatly over 
the analysis period within the case.  The case studies involve tracking the timing and interaction 
among variables based on specific events that occur that affect aid decisions and statements and 
actions of key actors in the aid relationship.  Aid commitments are a decision made by 
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policymakers. The proposed theory is the basis for predictions about the motivations of those 
policymakers.  Therefore, following the steps in the decision-making process and the events 
that accompanied those decisions can help to illuminate the factors that bore on that decision.  
 
The DV is ODA commitments. The IVs are grouped into categories representing 
security and commercial factors with one wildcard for humanitarian crises. The IVs considered 
in the case studies are presented in the Table 6-1 on page 267.  
 
Table 6-1: Independent variables considered in the case study analysis 
Security IVs Commercial IVs 
Alliances (aid from mutual ally) GDP 
Relations with the US Foreign direct investment from donor 
ASEAN Chair Imports from donor 
Successful coup Exports to donor 
Territorial disputes (with donor or adversary)  
Note: Some variables in the regression are not included because they may be irrelevant to the specific cases in 
this study (e.g. border states/resources) while other (e.g. regime type/population) are meant to help explain 
variation in the DV between countries rather than variation over time for the same country. There is not generally 
much or any variation in such IVs so they are not considered in these within country case studies. 
 
The two cases in this dissertation are both before-after cases which are used to uncover 
how variation in the DV is explained by the causal factors in different time periods that 
represent lower threat and higher threat perception periods. The case studies also allow a more 
nuanced analysis of territorial disputes.  The regression analysis assumes that there is or is not 
a territorial dispute (a dummy variable taking 1 if a dispute exists or 0 if not), but a case study 
helps to analyze times when territorial disputes are more intense or less intense.  For example, 
during the early 2000s, many observers referred to China’s “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia 
which coincided with a lessening of the intensity of territorial disputes over a period of several 
years. The pattern of aid commitments from China shown in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 
5.3.3 is largely consistent with the “charm offensive” policy in the early part of the 2000s.  This 




made in the lower threat period vs the higher threat period, particularly in the case of the 
Philippines which has historically been threatened by China’s territorial claims and remains in 
the United States alliance network. 
 
The case studies proceed by describing in some detail the overall patterns of Japan’s 
and China’s aid commitments to the Philippines and Cambodia.  I then consider the case study 
hypothesis and predictions to determine if the empirical evidence supports the results of the 
regression analyses or not.  I then draw conclusions about the overall determinants of Japanese 
and Chinese aid commitments under different threat perception conditions. 
 
6.3 Case 1: Japan and China’s Aid to the Philippines 
6.3.1 The pattern of Japanese ODA to the Philippines 
Japan’s aid program in the Philippines began with war reparations. Reparations to the 
Philippines were settled on 9 May 1956 when Japan agreed to provide the Philippines with 
capital goods valued at $550 million USD over 20 years.431 This reparations package was the 
largest negotiated with any country reflecting both the proximity of the Philippines to Japan, 
the importance of the Philippines as a former United States colony, and the heavy damage 
inflicted on it during the war. 
 
The Philippines was once considered one of the Southeast Asian countries with the 
greatest development potential.  In the 1960s, it was one of the more advanced countries in the 
region and its close security and economic relationship with the United States, reasonably well 
developed political and legal system, and relatively free press led many commentators to 
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assume the Philippines would continue its economic transformation and become a leading 
Asian economy.432  For these reasons, the Philippines was chosen as the headquarters site of 
the Asian Development Bank in 1965.433 However, poor economic performance since that time 
has flummoxed many observers.  In 2016, within ASEAN the Philippines ranked ahead of only 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam in per capita income 434 ; all countries that had 
experienced significant national disruptions and political chaos.  But in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the overall optimism regarding the Philippines economic potential led to large aid flows 
from developed countries attempting to spur economic transformation and take advantage of 
the expected economic boom.  In 1969, Japan began offering aid to the Philippines in addition 
to reparations with $30 million in ODA loans for road construction.  Grant aid followed in 1972 
to fund a flood forecasting system.435 Japan quickly became the Philippines largest DAC donor 
in 1967 (DAC ODA data included disbursements of reparations) and has maintained that status 
aside from 1974, 1976-1977 and 1985, and 2006 when aid from the United States exceeded 
Japan’s (see Figure 6-1 on page 270) and 2005 when aid from the United States, Germany and 
Australia exceeded Japan’s. 
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ODA commitments from Japan to the Philippines have gone up and down over the years.  
The most obvious trends are 1) the large and sustained increase at the beginning of the Aquino 
regime in 1986.  Elevated levels of ODA were provided consistently until around 2000 when 
ODA commitments from Japan declined until 2006.  In 2007, ODA commitments began rising 
and reached the highest levels ever in 2015.  During this 2000s, Japan’s total ODA 
commitments were slowly increasing (see Figure 3-1 on page 78) so Japan’s declining ODA 
allocations to the Philippines after 2000 cannot be explained by a general ODA budget decline.   
 
The 2003-2006 period represents a major reordering of Japan’s ODA commitments with 




ODA ranking in the top 10 recipients of ODA commitments in nearly every year for decades.  
Table 6-2 on page 267 presents the top 10 recipients of Japan’s ODA commitments by year. 
The Philippines is in the top 10 each year aside from 2004-2006.  The Philippines was ranked 
18th, 29th, and 31st is each of those years respectively. Japan provided no loan commitments to 
the Philippines at all in 2005 and 2006. 
 
Table 6-2: Ranking Japan's ODA Recipients by Annual Commitments, 2001-2014 
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 Indonesia China Pakistan China Iraq Nigeria India 
2 China Philippines Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia India Indonesia 
3 Philippines Viet Nam China India India Indonesia China 
4 Viet Nam Indonesia India Ghana China China Viet Nam 
5 Sri Lanka India Viet Nam Viet Nam Turkey Viet Nam Iraq 
6 Bangladesh Thailand Sri Lanka Iraq Viet Nam Iraq Tanzania 
7 Tanzania Pakistan Egypt Bolivia Malaysia Bangladesh Bangladesh 
8 Tunisia Sri Lanka Bangladesh Thailand Zambia Egypt Sri Lanka 
9 India Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Bangladesh Honduras Pakistan Kenya 
10 Nepal Bangladesh Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Sri Lanka Philippines 
        
Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Iraq Viet Nam India Viet Nam India Myanmar India 
2 India Indonesia Indonesia India Viet Nam India Viet Nam 
3 Indonesia India Iraq Bangladesh Philippines Viet Nam Bangladesh 
4 Viet Nam Thailand Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Bangladesh Myanmar 
5 Bangladesh Philippines Kenya Pakistan Iraq Philippines Uzbekistan 
6 Thailand Bangladesh Viet Nam Indonesia Brazil Afghanistan Indonesia 
7 Pakistan Iraq Bangladesh Philippines Sri Lanka Indonesia Philippines 
8 Sri Lanka Azerbaijan Philippines Sri Lanka Egypt Sri Lanka Sri Lanka 
9 Mongolia Afghanistan Sri Lanka China Kenya Uzbekistan Tunisia 
10 Philippines China Egypt Serbia Peru Tanzania Turkey 
Source: OECD  
 
6.3.2 The pattern of China’s ODA to the Philippines 
China and the Philippines have not historically had positive relations and the Philippines 




aid to the Philippines actually began long before the 2000s, but it was not to the government of 
the Philippines but to communist separatists, which the Philippines has not forgotten.436  In 
addition, the Philippines harbored distrust of China from the 1995 Mischief Reef occupation 
by China which included the detention of Filipino fisherman by the Chinese military.  The 
Philippines reacted by detaining Chinese fisherman and destroying Chinese survey equipment 
on reefs in the Spratlys.437  Chinese aid allocations to Southeast Asian countries did not initially 
prioritize the Philippines.  
 
The initial warming of ties between China and the Philippines stems from the agreed 
Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century signed on 16 May 2000 in 
Beijing.438 This agreement outlines, in a general way, the intention to expand trade, commerce 
and investment and agreeing to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea and to 
resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations.  The agreement also mentions cultural, law 
enforcement and defense cooperation.  The agreement does not specifically mention aid to the 
Philippines and does not contain any specific measures to advance the principles elaborated in 
the framework.  
 
China’s modern aid program in the Philippines started small with loans on $25 and $35 
million in 2001 and 2002 but ramped up quickly with a pledge of $400 million for the Northrail 
project (segment of the Philippines National Railway from Manila to the North) in February 
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2004.439 Later the same year, $980 million more was offered for the Southrail project (segment 
of the Philippines National Railway from Manila to the South) followed by a series of some of 
the largest concessional loans ever proposed for the Philippines.  The pipeline of China funded 
aid projects quickly grew through 2007, but collapsed in a breathtaking series of corruption 
scandals eventually leading to the arrest of then former President Macapagal-Arroyo in 2012.440  
 
The OECD DAC data shows a big drop in ODA to the Philippines from Japan and other 
DAC donors during 2004-2006 (shown in Figure 6-1 on page 270) when China’s aid was very 
high.  In fact, if Chinese aid is included, total ODA to the Philippines was as high as ever.  The 
change was the donor.  China committed to finance at least $2.824 billion in projects through 
concessional loans between 2004 and 2007 though few of these projects made it to completion. 
Since the collapse of the large loan projects in late 2007 until 2014, China has only given a few 
small grants to the Philippines (see Table 6-3 on page 273 for a list of major Chinese aid 
commitments to the Philippines). 
 
Table 6-3: List of Proposed Chinese Aid Funded Projects in the Philippines, 2001-2014 
Year Name Type Amount 
(millions) 
2001 Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project Loan $35 
2002 General Santos Fishing Port Complex Improvement project Loan $25 
2003 Philippine-Sino Center for Agricultural Technology Grant $7 
2004 Northrail phase 1 Caloocan-Malolos Section Loan $400 
2004 South Luzon Railway Project (Southrail)  Loan $980 
2006 Cyber-Education Project Loan $465.5 
2006 Non-Intrusive Container Inspection System Phase 1 Loan $50 
2007 Non-Intrusive Container Inspection System Phase 2 Loan $100 
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2007 Northrail phase 1 Malolos-Clark section Loan $500 
2007 National Broadband Network Loan $329 
2010 Mobile Clinics  Grant PhP85 
2013 Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Grant $0.1 
2013 Typhoon Haiyan Recovery - Supplemental Grant $1.5 
Sources: Assembled by the author from the following sources including: Trinidad, Dennis, “Institutional mismatch 
and Chinese aid to the Philippines: challenges and implications”, Asian Perspective 40 (2016), pp. 299-328. 
Official Development Assistance Watch, Time to Dismantle the Roots of Evil: A Citizens Report on Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to the Philippines, Quezon City: The Alternative People’s Development Forum, 
25 March 2008. 
Sen. Madrigal, M.A., Senate P.S. Res. No. 317, Manila: Fourteenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, 5 
March 2008. 
Note: The Northrail, Southrail, National Broadband Network, and Cyber Education Projects were cancelled due to 
corruption scandals. 
 
6.3.3 Case study hypotheses and predictions 
Why did Japan provide such high levels of ODA throughout the 1990s? Why did Japan 
reduce its ODA commitments to the Philippines in the early 2000s to such an extent that loan 
aid was zero in 2005-2006 only to increase aid to the Philippines from 2007 onward? Why did 
China provide extremely large aid packages the Philippines in the mid 2000s but cease most 
aid afterward? This case study attempts to explain the patterns of Japan and China’s ODA to 
the Philippines and link these changes to the commercial and security interests of Japan, China 
and the Philippines.   
 
The case studies in this dissertation are designed to establish the causal relations 
between security factors and commercial factors in the ODA allocation decisions of China and 
Japan that were estimated in the panel regressions.  The Philippines offers an intriguing case 
because it reflects several important variables in the regression analysis for both China and 
Japan including: United States ally, ASEAN chair, maritime dispute with China, large variation 
in its relations with the United States.  This case study allows us to explore how Japan and 
China’s ODA commitments to the Philippines react to these variables over time.  ODA 




since in the early 2000s.  When Japan’s aid fell, China’s rose and when China’s aid fell, Japan’s 
rose.  What are the causal factors that led to this variation?  The case of the Philippines is 
evaluated to determine if the observable conditions conform to findings of the regression 
analysis.   
 
The core predictions of this dissertation are as follows:  
1. Commercial orientation of foreign aid should decline with the degree of threat 
perception. Japan’s aid should reflect commercial interests in the Philippines in the 
low threat period. 
2. Security orientation of foreign aid should increase with the degree of threat 
perceptions. Japan and China’s aid should reflect security interests in the higher 
threat period. 
3. In the case of Japan, I expect its aid policy to increase support for United States 
security goals as perceived threat increase because of the dependence on the United 
States-Japan alliance for Japan’s security.  
4. In the case of China, I expect its aid policy to increasingly counter United States 
security interests as its threat perception of the United States-Japan alliance 
increases. China’s aid to the Philippines should reflect the charm offensive early in 
the analysis period and a punitive policy later. 
 
Prediction 1) During the low threat period (1992-2001), Japan allocated its aid to 
the Philippines to promote its commercial interests.  In the 1990s, the Cold War had just 
ended and Japan’s security situation was better than it had been in decades.  As shown in Section 
4.4, Japan’s level of threat perception was low.  According to the theory developed for this 




means that increasing aid to the Philippines should be explained more by increasing commercial 
opportunities for Japanese firms than by Japan’s security interests.  This is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom that Japan’s ODA program was intended to promote Japan’s commercial 
interests.441  
 
Two events make it unlikely that the high levels of Japanese ODA to the Philippines in 
the 1990s were security related.  First, the end of the Cold War in 1991 improved Japan’s overall 
security situation markedly.  Japan no longer had to deal with the Soviet threat and China had 
not yet grown into a major economic power. China’s military capabilities were relatively poor, 
though rapidly improving.  Even with China’s growing military spending, Japan spent more on 
its military than China throughout the 1990s (see Figure 6-2 on page 277).  Second, the 
departure of United States forces from their Philippines442 bases reduced the importance of the 
Philippines to the regional security architecture.  
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Figure 6-2: Military Spending by China and Japan, Millions of 2015 USD 
 
Source: Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, 2017.  
 
 
To the extent that Japan provided aid as a corollary to United States military 
commitments to support the United States alliance network, the removal of United States 
military personnel and equipment from the Philippines by the end of 1992 means that Japanese 
aid to the Philippines would be expected to decline after 1992 if aid was being allocated to 
support Japan’s security.  Japan’s aid to the Philippines declined slightly in 1994 but was 
consistently high throughout the 1990s reaching its highest point in 1999 before beginning its 
long and pronounced decline from 2000 to 2006.  During the 1990s, trade between Japan and 
the Philippines was growing enormously.  Japanese exports tripled between 1991 and 1997 (see 
Figure 6-3 on page 278 for comparison of ODA commitments and trade between Japan and the 
Philippines).  The commercial importance of the Philippines to Japan was increasing rapidly 




Philippines rapidly declined after 1990 while Japan’s aid remained high.  Commercial factors 
offer the most compelling explanation for the sustained high levels of foreign aid from Japan 
to the Philippines throughout the 1990s.  The prediction is confirmed in this case. 
 
Figure 6-3: Japanese ODA vs Trade, Millions of 2013 JPY 
 
Source: Trade statistics from the IMF, ODA commitments from OECD.  
 
 
Prediction 2) During the high threat period (2002-2014), Japan’s and China’s aid 
programs reflect security rather than commercial factors. The distinguishing characteristics 
of aid to the Philippines after 2000 were first, a decline in aid from Japan eventually leading to 
no ODA loans in 2005-2006 followed by a quick resumption of aid from Japan in 2007 which 
generally increased thereafter.  Aid from China began in 2001 and took off between 2004 and 
2007.  After 2007, China made no more ODA loans to the Philippines and only some small 





One argument is that Japan continued to allocate aid to support its commercial interests.  
If so, Japan’s large reductions in aid to the Philippines in 2004-2006 may have been the result 
of poor economic conditions in the Philippines.  According to the theoretical framework 
proposed in the dissertation, when a donor is not under security threat, ODA allocations depend 
on the commercial importance of the recipient to the donor.  If Japan prioritized commercial 
benefits to itself when allocating ODA, a deterioration in economic prospects in the Philippines 
could have precipitated the reduced aid.  To test this hypothesis, I compare economic conditions 
in the Philippines to Japan’s ODA levels over time to discern any relationship between them.   
 
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) was negotiated and 
agreed in principle in 2004 and signed in 2006.443 The agreement is a bi-lateral free trade 
agreement that cancelled or gradually reduced tariffs on trade in goods in a variety of categories, 
achieved some limited improvement in access for Filipino citizens to work in Japan, and 
relaxing of barriers to investment among other changes.  The JPEPA does not explicitly address 
any policy issues related to ODA, but does help to illuminate the state of the overall economic 
relationship.  The JPEPA sends the signal the trade and investment opportunities in the 
Philippines were improving for Japan during the period when ODA declined.  In 2004, the 
JPEPA was widely expected to coincide with increased ODA from Japan, higher levels of 
investment and trade, and improved growth prospects in the Philippines.444  The fact that Japan 
and the Philippines had recently negotiated a free trade agreement put the Philippines in a 
relatively advantageous position vis-à-vis other countries in the region.  The JPEPA was the 
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third bilateral FTA Japan signed in the Asia-Pacific region after Singapore and Malaysia.  The 
policy environment was highly conducive to increased economic cooperation between Japan 
and the Philippines which should have resulted in increased ODA allocations if Japan 
prioritized commercial factors in its aid to the Philippines; all else being equal.   
 
Economic prospects. If the policy environment was supportive of more ODA, perhaps 
actual economic conditions in the Philippines deteriorated causing the country to decline in 
relative economic importance to Japan.  If Japan prioritized commercial benefits when 
allocating its ODA, large reduction in ODA lending may be an indication of deteriorating 
economic conditions in the Philippines during this period.  Under this scenario, we would 
expect to see a change for the worse in the Philippines economic performance.  However, 
economic conditions in the Philippines were strong in the early 2000s and only deteriorated 
after 2007 when Japan’s ODA lending had already resumed.   
 
Poverty in the Philippines was also declining during this period as per capita income 
increased (see Figure 6-4 on page 281).  The Philippines also made gains in infant mortality 
and life expectancy during this period implying that the attractiveness of the Philippines as a 




Figure 6-4: Growth in the Philippines GDP per Capita, 2000-2015 (Constant PHP) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
 
 
The economic performance of the Philippines was strong after recovering from the 
Asian financial crisis on 1997-1998.  Economic growth was on an upward trend during the 
period when Japan’s ODA lending declined reaching nearly 7% in 2004 and the Philippines 
economy did not deteriorate significantly until just after the worldwide financial crisis of 2007-
2008 (Figure 6-5 on page 282 presents the figures for economic growth in the Philippines).  
Economic opportunities for Japanese business in the Philippines would have been strong. 





Figure 6-5: Economic Growth in the Philippines, 1990-2015 (Constant 2010$) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
 
External debt in the Philippines. Even if economic conditions in the Philippines were 
positive, the credit worthiness of the Philippines may have declined during this period.  The 
primary source of the large reduction in aid commitment to the Philippines was in the ODA 
loan category.  Loan commitments to the Philippines declined precipitously in 2004 compared 
to the year earlier and were zero in 2005-2006; the only years with no loan aid since 1968 before 
Japan’s first ODA loan to the Philippines.  If the Philippines was financing its economic 
performance with rapidly increasing external debt, the Japanese government may have reduced 
its ODA lending due to deteriorating ability to repay its loans from Japan.  Japanese ODA loans 
are provided partially out of savings of Japanese citizens through the postal savings system.  
Any failure of recipient countries to repay Japanese ODA loans would be problematic for the 




system.  Therefore, Japan is likely to be quite sensitive to the credit-worthiness of ODA loan 
recipients.   
 
But was the Philippines external debt situation deteriorating at the time that Japan’s 
ODA lending was declining?  First, the total public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external 
debt of the Philippines was slowly increasing from 2001 to 2010 when it peaked and began to 
decline.  External PPG debt as a percent of GDP reached about 43% in 2003 and declined 
quickly thereafter.  Debt service as a percent of GDP peaked in 2004 at 7.5% and began a steady 
decline towards around 2% by 2015.  At no time was the level of the Philippines external debt 
particularly high, but the debt situation was generally worse pre-2004 than post-2004 (as shown 
in Figure 6-6 on page 283).  
 






Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics  
 
Countries assess the credit worthiness of borrowers in a variety of ways.  Private and 
public sector lenders utilize credit ratings as general indicators of credit worthiness. Figure 6-7 
on page 285 displays the sovereign debt ratings for the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam.  
Indonesia had a lower sovereign debt rating than the Philippines in 2004 and 2005 and the same 
rating in 2006, yet Japan maintained high ODA lending to Indonesia at $1.5 billion in 2005 and 
$825 million in 2006.  Vietnam’s credit rating deteriorated significantly after 2008 yet received 
escalating amounts of lending from Japan reaching $2.4 billion in 2011 while maintaining a 
credit rating worse than the Philippines since 1993.  Japan appears willing to lend ODA funds 
to states with relatively poor creditworthiness.  Indonesia’s creditworthiness declined 
precipitously after the Asian Financial Crisis, yet Japan provided very high levels of ODA 
lending to Indonesia during this period.  The Philippines creditworthiness did not decline nearly 
as much as Indonesia, yet lending the Philippines declined precipitously.  The ability of the 
Philippines to repay Japan’s loans was not a likely reason for the reduction in lending from 





Figure 6-7: Sovereign Debt Ratings for Select Countries, 1993-2014 
 
Notes: Baa3 is considered investment grade, Ba3 – Ba1 are considered below investment grade with substantial 
credit risk, B3-B1 are below investment grade with high credit risk. 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.  
While debt burdens in the Philippines never reached critical levels, the country has 
experienced fiscal crises with fiscal deficits periodically reaching unsustainable levels. During 
the relevant period to this analysis, the Philippines experienced an alarming decline in tax 
revenues after the Asian Financial Crisis (1997).  The fiscal deficit peaked in 2004 at over 5% 
of GDP necessitating a fiscal austerity program and tax reform.445  The Philippines responded 
by reforming the value-added tax (VAT) to extend it to more products and increased the rate 
from 10 to 12% in February 2006.  Tax revenues grew rapidly, and the fiscal deficit returned 
to less than 1% of GDP in 2006.  However, ODA lending does not have a major impact on the 
near-term financial conditions of recipient governments due to the extremely soft terms of 
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Japan’s ODA loans.  ODA loans from Japan to the Philippines have between 30 and 40-year 
repayment periods and generally 10 to 12-year grace periods when no repayment is due.  
Interest rates were between 0.75% and 2.2% in the early 2000s.446  If anything, Japanese ODA 
lending would positively affect the near-term fiscal condition of the Philippines by replacing 
much more expensive market rate debt and pushing the budgetary costs of current spending and 
investment far into the future due to the long grace periods of Japanese ODA.  
 
Japan and the Philippines have had a long running dispute regarding the payment of the 
VAT under ODA financed projects. There are two main issues that Japan has complained about 
in the implementation of ODA projects in the Philippines.  It is normal practice, though not 
universal, that ODA recipient governments either exempt from taxation or pay the tax due that 
is associated with ODA financed projects (income tax on individuals and contractors as well as 
value added taxes).  In 1999, the Philippines Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a circular that 
complicated the income and VAT tax treatment of JICA-funding projects.447 For the VAT, 
suppliers and subcontractors were to pass on the VAT in their billings to the prime contractor, 
which then passes on the VAT to the government agency executing the ODA financed project; 
in essence, the government taking over the payment of the VAT to itself. At the same time the 
government passed Republic Act No. 9337 which introduced a 5% final withholding VAT on 
government payments, though government project executing agencies, reportedly, did not 
withhold VAT payments to ODA contractors.448  Further, the increase in the VAT from 10% 
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to 12% caught several Japanese contractors off-guard. The JICA loan for the Second 
Magsaysay Bridge and Butuuan City Bypass Road Construction Project was affected by the 
VAT increase. The contracts were awarded (and priced) assuming a 10% VAT but the 
government expected 12% VAT to be paid by the contractors.  JICA withheld concurrence on 
tendering processes until the issue was resolved.449  VAT issues continued to plague the JICA 
ODA program in the Philippines. A Revenue Memorandum Circular issued in 2015 (RMC No. 
45-2015) complicated the issue by stating that ODA contractors could not include the full 12% 
VAT in their billings.  This circular confused contractors and government implementing 
agencies and caused contractors to be unsure about how much VAT could be included in their 
billings and whether they could be assured that they would be reimbursed by the project 
executing agencies for the VAT paid.  The Philippine Government finally issued a new Revenue 
Memorandum Circular in 2017 (RMC No. 08-2017) that clarifies that the Government of the 
Philippines will assume all taxes due from Japanese contractors and employees working on 
ODA financed projects. 
As troubling as the tax issues have been to the ODA relationship between the 
Philippines and Japan, it cannot explain Japan’s ODA reductions from 2004-2006. The VAT 
issues continued from that period all the way through 2017.  However, Japan’s ODA loan 
commitments have rapidly rebounded and have reached the highest levels ever provided by 
Japan to the Philippines in 2015; all happening while VAT disputes continued.  Further, VAT 
issues apply to both grants and loans, yet only loans were not committed in 2005 and 2006. 
Grants continued in both years at lower, but still substantial levels.  Commercial factors do not 
explain the patterns of Japans aid to the Philippines in the high threat period. 
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Security factors. The factors that drive security-oriented ODA revolve around the 
security benefits that the recipient can provide to the donor and the alignment of the recipient 
countries interests with that of the donor.  The Philippines is a relatively weak country militarily 
and cannot be reasonably expected to provide significant security benefits to Japan or China.  
However, the Japanese government has emphasized the importance of the Philippines to its 
security and the stability of Southeast Asia.  The Japanese Government’s Country Assistance 
Policy (2000) and Country Assistance Plan (2008) for the Philippines lists the points 
highlighted in Table 6-4 on page 288 to justify providing ODA to the Philippines. The language 
in Table 6-4 on page 288 is notable for the emphasis on economic factors in 2000 and the 
heightened sense of the importance of security in 2008.   
 
Table 6-4: Japan's ODA policy towards the Philippines, 2000 vs. 2008 
2000 Country Assistance Policy450 2008 Country Assistance Plan451 
The Philippines shares values of freedom, 
democracy and market economics, 
The Philippines location along vital sea lanes 
of communication make it important for 
geopolitical and regional security, 
Japan is vital economic partner, second 
largest export market and leader source of 
Philippines imports, economies are bound by 
mutual interdependence, and 
The Philippines shares Japan’s democratic 
values, respect for human rights and free 
market economics, and 
Japan has extremely close a favorable 
relations, frequent exchanges and Filipinos 
are large group of foreign residents in Japan. 
The Philippines and Japan have long term 
economically beneficial relations. 
 
The Philippines drift towards China. The Philippines, a United States ally and 
embroiled in territorial disputes with China would at first glance seem to be a poor candidate 
to bandwagon with China rather than balance against it. It is a former United States colony, 
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host of massive United States military assets until the early 1990s, and the destination of large 
amounts of aid from the United States and its ally, Japan.  However, deterioration in the United 
States – Philippines relationship in the early 2000s led to a move toward China and away from 
the United States and, by association, Japan.   
 
When China announced its “Going Out” policy (1999) and adopted what has been called 
China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia around the same time,452 relations between the 
Philippines and the United States remained reasonably strong and Japan’s ODA was at a 
historic high in 2000 having supported the recovery of Southeast Asian nations after the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. For this reason, the Philippines initially received only small aid 
allocations from China amounting to about $67 million between 2001 and 2003 (see Table 6-3 
on page 273).  According to Kurlantzick, China’s strategy has been to take advantage of 
situations when another country’s relations with the United States deteriorate.453 Further, the 
quantitative analysis in Chapter 5.3.4 shows that when relations with the United States 
deteriorate, aid commitments from China increase; an effect that is both statistically significant 
and persistent.  If the United States backs away from a country due to failure to support United 
States interests or are being punished for human rights abuses and the like, China may offer an 
alternative source of support, in exchange for consideration for its own interests.  China saw its 
chance with the Philippines in 2004.  This case study allows us to interrogate this variable to 
see how China might approach a country with a historically strong but deteriorating relationship 
with the United States. 
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After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and subsequent United 
States invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Philippines was one of the first supporters of the 
United States response.  The Philippines dispatched a team of 500 peacekeeping and 
humanitarian workers to Iraq in 2003454 and officially become a member of the “coalition of 
the willing”.455  The United States responded by more than doubling its annual aid to the 
Philippines from less than $100 million in 2000 to over $200 million in 2003.  President George 
W. Bush even stopped in the Philippines to address the Philippines Congress during a visit to 
Asia456 and designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally (joining Australia, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand among several others) which exempts the Philippines from the 
United States Arms Export Control Act provisions and confers other military cooperation and 
joint training benefits and access to United States financing for weapons purchases.457 
 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stated that the 
Philippines partnership with the United States to fight terrorism was mutually beneficial 
pointing to the higher levels of support for improving the capabilities of the Philippines military 
and the increased training and equipment to helping to counter Abu-Sayyaf (a militant group in 
Mindanao) in the southern Philippines. 458   President Arroyo conducted a State Visit to 
Washington on 19 May 2003459 and received pledges of over $95 million in additional military 
aid and a renewed deployment of United States special forces to train the Philippines military 
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on anti-terrorism operations.460 The Philippines status as a member of the coalition supporting 
the United States war in Iraq resulting in many tangible benefits including economic and 
military aid. 
 
However, the kidnapping of a Filipino hostage in Iraq and subsequent capitulation of 
the Philippines to withdraw their contingent from Iraq in exchange of the release of the hostage 
caused a serious deterioration in United States-Philippines relations in July 2004.  The United 
States and other coalition governments condemned the Philippines actions as encouragement 
for kidnapping and terrorism that would endanger other coalition partners. 461   Relations 
between the countries went into a tailspin with the Philippines exiting the coalition supporting 
the United States in Iraq combined with intelligence reports on widespread corruption in 
President Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidential campaign. 462   The United States subsequently 
reduced and delayed its aid allocations to the Philippines, reportedly because of the withdrawal 
from the coalition supporting operations in Iraq.463  As shown in Figure 6-8 on page 292, aid 
from the United States only rebounded significantly after 2009.   
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Figure 6-8: United States Aid to the Philippines, 2000-2013 (Millions of current $) 
 
Source: USAID, The GreenBook, 2015.  
Note: Large increase in 2011 due to Philippines becoming a Millennium Challenge Compact country which 
provided a commitment of over $415 million for that year.  
 
Worsening United States-Philippines relations was a factor in growing cooperation 
between the Philippines and China. The Philippine and Chinese militaries signed a 
memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in November 2004 and expanded their 
military relationship with agreements on defense exchanges and military assistance from 
China.464  China made what became a highly controversial overture to the Philippines on joint 
exploration for resources in the South China Sea.  President Macapagal-Arroyo flew to Beijing 
and signed the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) agreement on September 1, 2004.465  
Vietnam harshly criticized the agreement for infringing on its own sovereignty and breaking 
ranks with ASEAN by dealing with China bilaterally when it was the Philippines advocating 
                                                 
464 International Business Publications, Philippines Foreign Policy and Government Guide: Volume 1 Strategic 
Information and Developments (Washington DC, 2013), 109.  
465 Miriam Grace A. Go, "Arroyo gov’t pleasing China since Day 1, A Policy of Betrayal (Part 1 of 3)," ABS-CBN 





for ASEAN unity during the conflict over Mischief Reef in 1995.466 Having few alternatives, 
Vietnam eventually joined the agreement on 14 March 2005.   
 
The agreement on joint exploration might appear to be a tabling of contentious territorial 
issues to derive mutual economic benefits, but this agreement was highly controversial in the 
Philippines.  Two factors led to suspicions of corruption. First, the JMSU included substantial 
areas within the Philippines EEZ that were established Philippine territory and not claimed by 
China which was taken as a sell-out of the Philippines sovereignty to China. It was also a 
violation of the Philippines constitution which dictates that any exploratory activities in 
Philippine territory must have 60% or more ownership by Filipinos.467   And second, the 
massive increase in ODA from China beginning in 2004 led to the suspicion that the territorial 
concessions to China were a quid pro quo for aid that financially benefitted top government 
officials including members of the Macapagal-Arroyo family. The JMSU agreement was 
entered into over the objection of the Philippines Foreign Ministry but supported by politicians 
with business ties to China.468 
 
The sequence of ODA offers from China strongly suggests that the JMSU deal was 
bought by the promise of huge ODA allocations from China to the Philippines. The Manila 
Standard reported that “After the oil agreement, China committed $2 billion a year in official 
development aid until the year 2010.  Sources tell me that the Spratly deal was a pre-condition 
of the ODA…”469  Critics of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration continued to accuse the 
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President of selling out the sovereignty of the Philippines for ODA loans from China that would 
directly benefit government officials through corruption.470   
 
ODA corruption was documented in detail in the Philippines Senate committee report 
on the corrupt practices uncovered in the China ODA financed National Broadband Network 
project which was canceled in 2008.471 This report details how the President of the Philippines, 
her husband and numerous top government officials including the Secretary of the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Romulo Neri, received bribes and kickbacks 
related to the contracts with the Chinese telecom company, ZTE.  NEDA, which is responsible 
for requesting and managing ODA projects in the Philippines, including those from Japan and 
China, was found to have wrongfully approved non-competitive bidding for the ZTE contract 
which was found to be overpriced by at least $130 million.  The excess was used to pay 
kickbacks to top officials.  The President’s office was found to have directed NEDA to approve 
the non-competitive contract with ZTE.   
 
Overall, the findings of the senate report and the pattern of China’s ODA to the 
Philippines suggest that the Philippines relationship with China was the main reason that 
Japan’s ODA to the Philippines dropped from 2004 to 2007.  Japan’s drop in ODA to the 
Philippines was primarily due to the Philippines preference for ODA from China and not a 
result of Japan withholding aid from the Philippines. There is no evidence that Japan denied 
ODA requests from the Philippines or failed to offer ODA during this period.  In fact, the Japan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stated that the Philippine government did not request any 
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ODA loans from Japan during this period and claimed the reason was the Philippines fiscal 
austerity measures and issues with VAT reimbursement.472  This explanation is unsatisfactory 
for two reasons.  If the Philippines did not request ODA from Japan because of fiscal austerity, 
it would not have pursued ODA from China.  Including ODA commitments473 from Japan and 
China, the level of ODA received by the Philippines did not decline overall (see Figure 6-9 on 
page 296) and was higher in 2004 and 2007 than every year in the period aside from 1999 and 
2015.  Chinese ODA commitments replaced much of Japan’s ODA leaving the Philippines with 
approximately as much incoming ODA as before.  In addition, the Philippine’s own Medium-
Term Philippine Development Plan (2004) indicated that it would continue to seek ODA loans 
rather than market rate financing to lessen its debt burden by taking advantage of the low 
interest rates and long repayment terms of ODA lending.474  There is no indication in the 
development plan that ODA loans would cease.  I conclude that the Philippines preferred loans 
from China over loans from Japan. 
 
The rapid inflow of ODA from China was extremely controversial in the Philippines 
and accompanied by accusations of corruption and violation of the Philippines procurement 
laws. Many investigations were launched by the Philippines Senate to investigate bidding 
irregularities. Most accusations claimed that the prices paid for the projects were inflated to 
fund kickback schemes for high level government officials.  Inflated prices were made possible 
by the exemption of the ODA financed projects from competitive bidding for tied aid projects 
which government officials used to extract kickbacks.475  
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Figure 6-9: ODA Commitments from Japan and China, 1997-2015 (millions of USD) 
 
Sources: OECD for Japan and Table 6-3 on page 273 sources for China.  
 
If the VAT issue was the impediment for Japan, it would not have provided increasing 
amounts of ODA after 2006 since the VAT issue continued to be an irritant for Japanese 
policymakers until the VAT policy was resolved in 2017.  The VAT issue had not changed, but 
Japan’s ODA increased enormously once the aid from China was canceled. The actual reason 
that the Japan did not offer aid to the Philippines was most likely that the Philippines did not 
want aid from Japan. 
 
The evidence and sequence of events show that the Philippines preferred ODA from 
China compared to ODA from Japan between 2004 and 2007.  The Philippines decided that 
ODA from China was in its interests and that it could replace Japan’s ODA with as much or 




because of its preference for enhancing its bilateral relationship with China over Japan rather 
than simply taking a better deal? In other words, was China’s ODA more concessional than 
Japan’s? The answer is no.  China’s ODA was and remains less concessional than Japan’s.  
Comparison of aid terms shows that Japanese ODA is extremely beneficial to the recipient 
country compared to China.  The ODA loan terms provided by Japan and China from 2000 to 
2015 are given in Table 6-5 on page 297: 
 







% of loans tied 
to donor 
Japan     
Average 2000-2004   1.58%   34.4   10.0  37.0% 
Average 2007-2015   0.75%   34.4   9.7  32.1% 
China 3.0% 20.0 5 100.0% 
Sources: JICA for Japanese ODA, Official Development Watch (2008) for Chinese ODA. 
 
Japanese ODA is much less expensive than China’s concessional lending.  The interest 
rates are lower, the terms and grace periods are longer and the percentage of loans tied to the 
donor’s contractors is lower for Japanese ODA. All else being equal, the Philippines should 
have preferred to request ODA from Japan rather than China suggesting that the decision to 
prefer aid from China was political or to enable corruption. 
 
Another possibility is that exchange rate variation makes Japanese ODA unattractive.  
If the value of the yen rises relative to the value of the Philippine peso, repaying ODA yen loans 
to Japan may be more difficult.  Figure 6-10 on page 298 shows the pattern of exchange rate 
movements for CNY and JPY vs the Philippine Peso (PHP).  The PHP/JPY exchange rate is 
more volatile than the PHP/CNY exchange rate.  This is unsurprising given that the CNY is a 




movements do not explain why the Philippines preferred Chinese ODA from 2004-2007 but 
Japanese ODA from 2000-2003 and 2008 onward.  In fact, the preference for Japanese or 
Chinese ODA does not seem related to exchange rates at all.  When the Philippines first began 
preferring Chinese ODA in 2004, the PHP/JPY exchange rate was at its most favorable for 
borrowing yen, but when the Philippine started requesting Japanese ODA again in 2007, the 
exchange rate was unfavorable for yen loans. 
 
Figure 6-10: Peso-Yen Exchange Rate (PHP/JPY), 2000-2014 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics  
 
Relations between China and the Philippines improved enormously during President 
Macapagal-Arroyo’s time in in office.  Not just in terms of ODA, but a series of bi-lateral 
agreements between the Philippines and China were signed on a wide range of topics.  Prior 




their terms, but President Macapagal-Arroyo visited 12 times.476  She also signed 65 bi-lateral 
agreements with China, more than eight times the number signed by the president with the 
second highest number of agreements (President Marcos with eight).477   
 
China did not only partner with the Philippines for ODA financed infrastructure, but 
also offered military assistance immediately after the United States withdrew support to punish 
the Philippines for abandoning its commitment to Iraq.  Military cooperation between 
Philippines and China expanded along with the ODA. In September 2007, China’s Minister of 
Defense (Cao Gangchuan) visited the Philippines and came with the promise of more than $6 
million in grants to purchase (from China) military equipment for the Philippine army and fund 
Chinese language training, participation in joint exercises and training for Philippine officials 
in China. China also reportedly hoped to become a major supplier of military equipment to the 
Philippines Army478 offering helicopters.479   
 
The Philippine’s drift away from China. The Philippines preference for Chinese 
ODA from 2004 to 2007 is clear.  ODA from Japan was depressed in 2003 and 2004.  The 
Philippines made no request for Japanese ODA in 2005 and 2006 at a time when ODA loans 
from China were burgeoning.  I have shown that the reasons were not related to favorable loan 
terms from China, Philippines fiscal austerity, or disputes with Japan over the VAT treatment 
of ODA.  The reason the Philippines preferred Chinese ODA is because the Philippines 
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prioritized Philippines-China relations over Philippines-Japan relations at a time when United 
States-Philippines relations also took a serious turn for the worse.480  China was seen as a deep 
pocketed potential partner for the Philippines and an alternative source of military aid and 
economic aid.  It is also clear that the Philippines emphasis on China ended in 2008 and relations 
deteriorated badly after the election of President Ninoy Aquino in 2010. From 2004-2008, the 
Philippines offered China security benefits by cooperating on the South China Sea and not 
aggressively challenging China’s claims.  The deteriorating relations with the United States 
enabled China to use its aid to reduce the Philippines resistance to its territorial claims.  The 
large size of the aid packages from China also enable the Philippines to shift from Japanese aid 
to Chinese aid to finance infrastructure.  Towards the end of 2007, the relationship between 
China and the Philippines began to unravel. The seeds of this deterioration lie with the two 
countries’ first major deal, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in the South China 
Sea. 
 
From its initial signing, the JMSU was controversial in the Philippines. The sensitive 
territorial nature of the agreement combined with the massive upswing in ODA lending from 
China immediately before and after the signing of the JMSU led many Filipinos to question 
whether President Macapagal-Arroyo had signed away Philippine sovereignty for ODA loans 
that her family and top administration officials would benefit from personally. While in 
negotiation for an extended period, the Northrail481 ODA loan agreement was signed only a few 
days after the JMSU.  Newspaper reports in the Philippines stated that the Chinese Ambassador 
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explicitly offered ODA to support the Northrail project in exchange for signing the JMSU.482 
There does not appear to be concrete proof that these agreements were related, but the 
appearance and timing of the signings gave ammunition for opposition politicians to make 
damaging accusations against the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.483   These agreements 
between the Philippines and China brought two major domestic political issues to the forefront 
of Philippine-China relations: corruption and territorial sovereignty. 
 
Corruption and the decline of Philippines China relations. The furor surrounding 
the JMSU and the insinuations of quid pro quo for Chinese ODA aroused deep suspicion in the 
Philippines press and in the political opposition.  An investigation in the Philippines Senate was 
launched in August 2007 after many allegations of irregularities in the Chinese ODA financed 
National Broadband Network (NBN) project.  The Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a 
restraining order against the project halting its implementation in September 2007.  In response, 
the President suspended the NBN and Cyber Education projects.484  The Senate investigation 
found that numerous officials including the President’s husband and the head of NEDA violated 
the Philippines anti-graft and corrupt practices act by taking millions of dollars in bribes and 
kickbacks from the Chinese contractor ZTE. 485  Even non-ODA funded projects suffered 
including a Chinese company’s proposed $3.8 billion commercial investment in the agricultural 
sector in the Philippines which was suspended by the Philippines in late 2007.486 The Northrail 
project was cancelled by President Aquino in 2011 because of continuing corruption allegations.  
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Even projects that were completed such as the Non-Intrusive Container Inspection System 
project were alleged to have been rife with corruption.487  
 
The scandals related to China’s ODA project in the Philippines dovetailed into a 
narrative about Chinese corruption and harmed the image of China among Filipinos.  Even 
though the Philippines (ranked 101 out of 176 countries) is regarded by Transparency 
International to have more serious corruption problems than China (ranked 79 out of 176 
countries)488 , Philippines Senator Miriam Santiago, head of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, stated on national television that “China invented civilization in the East, but as 
well it invented corruption for all of human civilization.”489 The steady stream of corruption 
scandals with respect to Chinese financed ODA to the Philippines led to the prevailing 
sentiment that ODA from China was particularly corrupt and prone to abuse.490  Of course 
corruption had to be reciprocated by the Philippines. But to protect themselves, China became 
an easy target to deflect allegations against the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. The negative 
publicity regarding corruption and China reinforced negative stereotypes against China and has 
discredited the Chinese system for providing ODA and foreign investments with little oversight 
and no accountability.491 
 
Many Chinese ODA financed projects failed before being implemented (NBN) or were 
canceled mid-implementation (Northrail).  As a result, the amount of ODA committed by China 
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is far more than the amount disbursed. The purported attractiveness of ODA from China is that 
it comes with no strings, is quickly implemented, and focuses on economic infrastructure492 
that developing countries like the Philippines value.  These benefits did not materialize for the 
Philippines. 
 
Part of the problem with China’s ODA in the Philippines is that the loan projects from 
China tend to be initiated by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that will become the final 
beneficiaries of the ODA loan.  Japan and many other donors respond to requests from the 
recipient government for ODA to support locally identified priorities – the so-called request 
principle in Japanese ODA.  The Japanese aid bureaucracy then keeps reasonably effective 
control of the project design and implementation.  In the case of China, loans have tended to be 
driven by the offer principle rather than request principle.  Since the loans were supply driven, 
the government did not conduct much oversight and project evaluation, instead relying on the 
Chinese SOE or Philippine implementing agency to conduct due diligence on the proposed 
projects.493 The result was a series of Chinese ODA financed projects that could not withstand 
the scrutiny of the Philippines free-wheeling press and highly competitive political culture.   
 
The return of territorial disputes.  The collapse of China’s ODA financed projects in 
the Philippines cannot be understood without understanding the nexus of Philippines 
nationalism and corruption.  The offer of large ODA loans from China coincided with a policy 
of suppressing territorial disputes with China that had been intense in the mid-1990s after the 
Mischief Reef incident in 1995.  It was not a surprise that when the JMSU was signed at the 
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same time as several ODA loan agreements, that nationalist politicians and members of the 
Philippines press would question the arrangements. 
 
The JMSU agreement was signed in secret and the contents sealed for a period of 8 
years though the contents were leaked to researchers.494  It was widely asserted at the time of 
the JMSU that the agreement violated the Philippines constitution.  A large percentage of the 
area covered by the JMSU was found to be within the Philippines presumed EEZ which puts it 
in violation of constitutional provision that all natural resources belong to the government and 
any joint development needed to have at least 60 percent Filipino control.495 When the actual 
agreements were exposed, not only territorial waters in the Spratlys, but also seven islands that 
are an undisputed part of Palawan and as such were not even claimed by China nor Vietnam 
were shown to be included in the JMSU.496 This escalated the scandal in the Philippines press, 
but also exposed the fact that the Philippines had not explicitly established its territorial 
baselines under UNCLOS.  Without the territorial baselines established under Philippines law, 
the constitutionality of the JMSU was not clear.  The scandals surrounding the JMSU and 
confusion about its constitutionality led President Macapagal-Arroyo to allow the JMSU 
agreement to lapse in June 2008.497 
 
In 2007, debate began in the Philippines House of Representatives on establishing its 
archipelagic baselines.  The baseline bill was needed to support the Philippines submission to 
the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to define the boundaries under 
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UNCLOS by the 13 May 2009 United Nations imposed deadline.498  China reacted forcefully 
to the direction of the debate in the Philippines which included Scarborough Shoal and the 
Spratly Islands within the Philippine’s territory.  Representative Antonio Cuenco claimed that 
China had officially objected to the bill in communications with the Philippines Embassy in 
Beijing in December 2007.499  China stated that such inclusion would harm bilateral relations, 
inhibit cooperation under the JMSU, and claimed it violated the terms of the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.500  China’s objection should be considered in light 
of the fact that the China State Council approved a measure to establish a county level city in 
Hainan province (Sansha) that included the Spratlys and the Paracels, also in December 2007.501  
In March 2009, the Philippines House of Representatives passed the law to clarify the 
archipelagic baselines which include the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal.502  The law refers to 
the Spratlys (called Kalayaan Island Group in the Philippines) and Scarborough Shoal as a 
“Regime of Islands”503 over which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction (Section 2 
of Republic Act No. 9522), but not within the archipelagic baseline defining the continental 
shelf. The Philippines made this distinction for the Spratlys to appease China and other 
claimants.  China still reacted furiously claiming the “Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) 
and Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) have always been parts of Chinese territory” and that the 
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Philippines claim is “illegal and invalid”.504  China subsequently dispatched patrol ships to the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands to assert its sovereignty claims.  Norberto Gonzales, the Philippines 
National Security Advisor, was quoted saying, “The deployment…should remind us that even 
in this era of dialogue and understanding, there will always be nations that will show might and 
threaten perceived weak nations like us” and said the Philippines may seek support from 
ASEAN and the United States.505 
 
The December 2007 debates on archipelagic baselines, exacerbated by the collapse of 
Chinese ODA funded projects in September 2007, marked a key turning point in Philippines 
China relations which became increasingly strained during the last 2 years of the Macapagal-
Arroyo administration and even worse under President Aquino.  China did not provide any 
substantial ODA commitments to the Philippines until 2017 after relations between the United 
States and the Philippines deteriorated under President Duterte.506  
 
The territorial disputes with China were intimately entwined with the corruption 
allegations.  Allegations of corruption are common in the Philippines but became incendiary 
when linked to territorial disputes with the appearance of selling out the Philippines sovereignty 
for personal gain.  The combination of these two issues led to impeachment hearings against 
President Macapagal-Arroyo throughout her tenure and eventually, her arrest in 2012.507  The 
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persistence of the scandals involving Chinese ODA made further Chinese financed projects 
politically untenable.  
 
By 2012, not only was there no new ODA from China but China was actively 
demanding its previous ODA loans be returned.  After the Philippines cancelled the Northrail 
project in 2012, the Chinese government demanded the ODA loan that had already been 
disbursed be repaid immediately.508  At the same time, China and the Philippines were in a 
heated dispute over Scarborough Shoal.  Chinese fishing vessels were discovered by the 
Philippines Navy in Scarborough Shoal on 8 April 2012 leading to a tense standoff and 
continued presence of Chinese Coast Guard ships.509  In addition to calling the ODA loan, 
China began a crackdown on Philippines banana exports to China in a move widely perceived 
as economic sanctions for the Philippines stance in the territorial dispute in Scarborough 
Shoal.510  The Philippines also became unhappy with the role of the State Grid Corporation of 
China’s (SGCC) role in managing the Philippines National Grid Corporation.  The SGCC 
associated consortium won a privatization auction for the Philippines national power grid in 
2007.  However, as tensions flared with China, the government of the Philippines began to 
distrust Chinese influence in its power supply system.  Interior Secretary Manuel Roxas met 
with Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry to ask the transfer key responsibility for management of 
the Philippines national grid back to Filipinos.511  In February 2015, the Philippines forced the 
issue by denying visa renewals for 18 Chinese nationals employed by the Philippines national 
grid corporation to ensure key position were filled by Filipinos.  The role of Chinese citizens 
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in the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines was a national security concern because 
Filipino politicians suspected that the Chinese Government could exert control over the 
Philippines energy supply. Philippines Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago referred to the 
Chinese role as a “national security virus”.512  In such a charged environment, the Philippines 
received no significant aid from China. 
 
The April 2012 standoff was the tipping point for the Philippines in its appeal to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).  The Philippines and China seemingly 
agreed to both depart the Shoal, but Chinese Coast Guard ships remained leaving the 
Philippines powerless to do much in response.  In May 2012, the Philippines Department of 
Foreign Affairs began preparing to submit the conflict to the ITLOS.513  The Philippines 
initiated its arbitration claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS on 22 
January 2013.514 China, however, refused to participate in the proceedings even though it has 
been a signatory to the convention since 7 June 1996.  The UNCLOS does not address 
sovereignty issues.  It does address delimiting maritime boundaries, but China does not accept 
compulsory arbitration related to this issue, which is within China’s rights under UNCLOS.515  
The arbitration then dealt only with maritime rights and entitlements with regard the South 
China Sea.  Effectively, even if China has sovereignty over various features in the South China 
Sea, the Philippines asserts that these features do not constitute islands that would entitle China 
to an EEZ or continental shelf and the Philippines should retain those rights based on 
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international law under the UNCLOS.  The arbitration award issued in July 2016 found largely 
in the Philippines favor and included the sweeping finding that the 9-dashed line has no standing 
under international law.516  China, however, continues to reject the award findings and rejects 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal in adjudicating the issue.517   
 
Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda in the Philippines) hit the Philippines on 8 November 2013, 
one of the most severe tropical storms on record killing around 6,300 people and displacing 
over 1.4 million people.518  The international reaction to the disaster provides a useful case for 
analyzing foreign aid donor recipient relationships, particularly with respect to China’s foreign 
aid.  Japan was by far the largest single donor to the Philippines for disaster recovery with 
pledges of $627.2 million out of a total of $1.643 billion in total foreign aid commitments.519 
China provided an initial pledge of just $100,000 plus another $100,000 from the Chinese Red 
Cross.  After a firestorm of criticism, China increased this to a still paltry $1.8 million.520 Still, 
the aid given by China to the Philippines for Typhoon Haiyan is extremely small compared to 
previous disasters (see Table 6-6 on page 309). 
 
Table 6-6: China aid for recent Asian disasters 
Year Disaster Affected Countries China Aid 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami  Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka $83 milliona 
2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake Indonesia $3.25 millionb 
2008 Cyclone Nargis Myanmar $10 millionc 
2010 Floods Pakistan $247 milliond  
2011 Tohoku Earthquake - Tsunami Japan $4.57 millione 
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2013 Typhoon Haiyan Philippines $1.8 million 
Sources:  
a - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4145259.stm 
b - http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-06/04/content_299710.htm 
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China’s animus towards the Philippines and President Aquino for their defiance of 
China’s claims in the South China Sea were widely reported to be the cause of withholding aid 
for Typhoon Hiayan.521 Xu Liping of the Chinese Academy of Social Science was quoted 
saying, “the Sino-Philippines relationship is not in a normal state, so the government cannot 
handle the situation through normal means.”522 Reaction to China’s small scale response to the 
Hiayan disaster was overwhelmingly negative internationally and even some inside China 
argued for more aid to prevent China from appearing petty.  The nationalist English language 
newspaper, the Global Times, editorialized against the small aid offering claiming that it 
tarnishes China’s international image and was counter to China’s national interests.523  China 
claims that its aid comes with no strings attached, but as demonstrated in the China-Philippines 
case international politics cannot be divorced from aid giving and receiving decisions. China’s 
aid may not be conditioned in the same sense as DAC donors, but the evidence in the case of 
the Philippines shows that the decision to offer aid and how much depends not only on 
recognition of China’s views on Taiwan, but also on other policy choices deemed important to 
China’s leaders.  Foreign aid is a tool used by China to promote its own commercial and security 
interests just like other donors and if recipient countries like the Philippines do not act in a 
manner consistent with China’s national interests, aid is used to punish them.524   
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The Philippines drift back to the United States and Japan – and back to China.  
The Philippines relationship with China deteriorated because the basis of the relationship rested 
more on an unresolved territorial dispute than the burgeoning commercial relationship.  This 
fact made the improvements in Sino-Philippines relations unstable and susceptible to nationalist 
pressures in both countries.  The Philippine’s response to deteriorating Sino-Philippine relations 
was to improve security cooperation with the United States and economic cooperation through 
its ODA relationship with Japan.  
 
The election of President Duterte in 2016 and his support and promotion of extra-
judicial killings of those suspected of drug crimes led to widespread denunciations around the 
world including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.  President Duterte responded 
by calling the High Commissioner an “idiot” and threatened to leave the UN525 and distanced 
the government’s foreign policy from the United States and European countries and sought to 
align with China.526 After a decade with no substantial aid from China, new aid commitments 
began in 2017. Given that territorial disputes remain, and the Philippines public remains the 
most pro-American people in the world with 83% of the population reporting a positive 
perception in 2018 527 , there is good reason to suspect that improving China-Philippines 
relations may be more a result of the peculiarities of President Duterte than of any structural 
alignment of interests. 
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Japan’s ODA policy shift with regards to the Philippines.  Japan’s 2008 Country 
Assistance Program528 for the Philippines cites three priority development issues: 1) sustained 
economic growth aimed at creating employment opportunities, 2) empowerment and improved 
living conditions for the poor, and 3) peace and stability in Mindanao.529  Under item 1, Japan 
states that its priority ODA financed investments will support fiscal reform, implementation 
capacity, governance, promote foreign direct investment, infrastructure, and infrastructure 
management and maintenance.  In April 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a brief 
statement of its Country Assistance Policy for the Philippines which adjusted the 2008 program.  
The three priority areas were reformulated as follows: 1) achieving sustainable economic 
growth through further promotion of investment, 2) overcoming vulnerability and stabilizing 
human life and productive activities, and 3) peace and development in Mindanao.530  Further, 
under item 1 Japan’s new priority areas now include transport in Metro Manila, energy and 
water infrastructure, governance, securing maritime safety, and human resource development.  
The main changes from 2008 and to 2012 are a diminished emphasis on poverty alleviation and 
elevation of maritime security as a key assistance sector.   
 
Aid scandals and Japanese aid commitment to the Philippines.  One possible 
alternative hypothesis for Japan’s aid behavior in the Philippines is the reaction of Japan to 
corruption scandals in the Philippines aid program. In cases of major corruption in the past, 
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Japan has briefly suspended ODA activities. In this section, I determine if corruption could 
have affected Japan’s ODA commitments to the Philippines over the analysis period.   
 
In 1986, two major scandals hit Japan’s foreign aid program.  The Marcos scandal 
occurred with the United States Senate released a report indicating that the Japanese 
government paid kickbacks to the Marcos regime to secure the contracts with Japanese 
companies for ODA financed projects.531  The kickbacks were estimated at up to 15 percent of 
the loan amounts and were provided to the Marcos family and other top leaders through firms 
based in the Philippines that were contracted to implement Japanese ODA financed projects.532  
The second scandal resulted in the arrest of JICA staff for taking bribes to steer consulting 
assignments to specific Japanese consulting firms for conducting ODA development surveys.533 
These concurrent scandals led to a rethinking of Japan’s aid practices generally and to the 
Philippines in particular.  However, it did not result in a major reduction in aid to the Philippines.  
Japan formed country study groups composed of a mix of scholars and ODA related agencies 
including JICA, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Japan Ex-Im Bank, 
to analyze the state of recipient country economies and policies and recommended appropriate 
aid strategies in that context. The first country study group report was done for the Philippines, 
published in 1987.534  
 
While other major ODA corruption scandals have hit JICA and the Japanese 
government over the years including several past incidents of corrupt practices in Japan’s ODA 
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to Vietnam535 in 2009 and 2014 and Thailand in 2008536, the only scandals regarding the 
Philippines after 2000 were relatively minor.  One involved providing golf equipment to 
Philippines officials by a Japanese engineering firm (Kyudenko Co.) in 2007 followed by a 
minor embezzlement scandal involving a Japanese employee working in JICAs local 
Philippines office in 2013.537 Both incidents pale in comparison to the repeated kickback 
schemes uncovered in Vietnam and represented small sums of money.538   
 
The major scandals in Vietnam led to the temporary suspension of new loans to Vietnam 
in 2008 lasting for 4 months.539 Japan only suspended new ODA to Vietnam Railways in the 
2014 case but continued offering aid for other projects in Vietnam.  Due to the short duration 
of the aid suspensions, overall aid to Vietnam was not discernably affected by the scandals (see 
Figure 6-11 on page 315). Total ODA spiked to its highest ever in 2009 even though aid was 
suspended until March 2009.  Aid dropped in 2010 but no scandal was apparent. Aid dropped 
in 2014 from the year earlier but remained high. Scandals have not had a demonstrable effect 
on Japan’s ODA to Vietnam even when the scale of corruption was very high. 
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Likewise, scandals have not had a major impact on ODA commitments from Japan to 
the Philippines.  The Marcos scandal in the mid-1980s remains one of the largest ODA scandals 
in the history of Japan’s ODA program, yet had only limited impact on overall ODA to the 
Philippines. After 2000, scandals related to Japanese ODA to the Philippines were minor and 
not the focus of much media scrutiny.  The first occurred in 2007 occurring well after the major 
dip in ODA from Japan that spanned 2004-2006.  By 2007, ODA had already begun increasing 
again.  The increase in ODA to the Philippines has continued until 2015 when aid commitments 
reached their highest levels ever.  The reduction in Japan’s ODA to the Philippines in 2004-






In the case of China’s aid to the Philippines, China tentatively began its aid program in 
2001 with some small loans.  The Philippines was growing rapidly and had a burgeoning trade 
relationship with China.  When its security interests are threatened in the South China Sea, 
China’s aid became increasingly targeted at security factors.  As relations between the United 
States and the Philippines deteriorated in 2004, China saw an opportunity to step in and pull 
the Philippines away from the United States while also giving incentives to ignore China’s 
efforts to develop its claims in the South China Sea.  The Philippines is economically and 
militarily weak, but is in the United States alliance network.  With a strong United States-
Philippines relationship, the Philippines would be expected to balance against China.  A 
weakened United States-Philippines relationship suggest that the Philippines might have been 
more open to bandwagoning with China. 
 
Corruption and territorial disputes eventually overwhelmed the budding relationship 
between China and the Philippines causing China to stop providing aid, going so far as to 
demand its past aid returned. There is no evidence that Chinese aid was affected by the 
corruption scandals in its aid program to the Philippines. The Philippines, however, was highly 
sensitive to the corruption scandals because of the links made in the media and in the Philippine 
Congress to territorial sovereignty with the implication being that the Macapagal-Arroyo 
administration sold out Philippine sovereignty for personal gain.  Even after Typhoon Hiayan, 
one of the worst recent natural disasters in Asia, China gave only a token amount of aid, far 
less than China has given to other similar disasters in other countries.  The evidence in this case 
study indicates that commercial opportunities explain the initial ODA from China in 2001-3. 
These initial aid offers were small scale.  However, the “charm offensive” strategy coupled 




as the main drivers of China’s aid policy towards the Philippines between the 2004s and 2015. 
China acted opportunistically to rapidly scale up ODA to the Philippines as soon as relations 
between Manila and Washington deteriorated.  The thaw in Sino-Philippine relations was short 
lived. 
 
This case study highlights the volatility of territorial disputes in aid relationships.  
China’s increased aid to the Philippines coincided with a relaxation of the South China Sea 
dispute and a decrease in aid from Japan.  The burgeoning aid relationship with China was a 
quid pro quo for agreeing to joint seismic exploration for resources in disputed (and undisputed) 
areas of the South China Sea.  However, the combination of corruption in the aid projects 
financed by China and nationalist sentiments in both the Philippines and China quickly 
overwhelmed the relationship. The media and opposition politicians, by linking the bribery and 
kickbacks in Chinese aid projects to the signing of the JMSU, accused the Macapagal-Arroyo 
administration of betraying the country’s sovereignty.  This led the Philippines, first under 
President Macapagal-Arroyo and continued under President Aquino (2010), to become 
increasingly assertive of its territorial claims to satisfy domestic audiences. The reassertion of 
the Philippines claims in the South China Sea led to the deterioration in Sino-Philippines 
relations and to China cutting off almost all aid to the Philippines. Deterioration in the 
relationship led the Philippine’s to prefer aid from Japan rather than China. This case study also 
highlights the fact that aid recipients have agency in the donor-recipient relationship. One 
benefit of the case study is that it more fully captures the role and importance of aid recipients 
in the aid commitment decision by the donor.  In the real world, donors and recipients will agree 





Overall, the Philippines case study confirms the core predictions based on the study 
hypothesis. Each prediction is assessed below: 
1. Commercial orientation of foreign aid should decline with the degree of threat 
perception.  This case study demonstrated that commercial factors were only salient 
for Japan’s ODA commitments during the low threat period. Commercial factors 
were not important for China and Japan during the high threat period.  Since China 
had no low threat period, prediction 1 could not be confirmed for China. 
2. Security orientation of foreign aid should increase with the degree of threat 
perception. During the higher threat period, China’s aid was given to support the 
Philippines as its relations with the United States deteriorated.  Consistent with the 
charm offensive policy of reassurance, China offered aid to the Philippines to 
manage its maritime territorial dispute and switched to a punitive aid policy when 
the charm offensive no longer had the desired effect.  When China cut aid to the 
Philippines, Japan resumed its ODA at high levels as territorial disputes between 
China and the Philippines flared.   
3. In the case of Japan, I expect its aid policy to increasingly support United States 
security goals as its level of threat perception increases.  In this case, Japan’s ODA 
increases followed increases in United States aid and growing military cooperation. 
The United States continually increased its troop presence in the Philippines after 
2004 with a large jump in 2012 to over 1000 coinciding with major increases in aid 
commitments from Japan.   
4. In the case of China, I expect its aid policy to increasingly counter United States 
security interests as its threat perception of the United States-Japan alliance 
increases. The study shows how China uses aid to counter United States interests 




Philippines, China approved several large aid packages within a few months and 
offered expanded military cooperation to a formal United States ally.  This same 
dynamic is clear since the 2016 election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines who 
has made a habit of antagonizing the United States.  China responded with large aid 
packages to the Philippines. 
 
6.4 Case 2: Japan and China’s Aid to Cambodia 
Cambodia is an interesting case with complex interactions between Japan and 
Cambodia and China and Cambodia.  Japan was uniquely involved in the Cambodia peace 
process in the 1990s and had a major role coordinating aid to support reconstruction after the 
civil war.  China also has been deeply involved in Cambodian relations since supporting the 
Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian civil war and has developed a close relationship with the 
Cambodia leadership since the 1997 Coup.  Cambodia has routinely sided with China in 
international institutions which will be analyzed for the relationship between aid and support 
for Chinese interests.  I will test the impact of security factors (coups, relations with the United 
States, ASEAN Chair) and economic factors (trade, investment and growth) on Japan’s and 
China’s aid commitment to Cambodia.  These factors will be assessed during Japan’s low threat 
period (1991-2001) and high threat period (2002-2014).  China’s behavior will be assessed over 
the period for which aid data is available (1997-2014).  China had elevated level of threat 
perception over this entire period.   
 
China and Cambodia have had a diplomatic relationship since the 13th century and there 
is an ethnic Chinese minority in Cambodia (less than 1% of the population) that plays a 
disproportionate role in commerce and politics.  The relationship between the two countries 




occupied the country during World War II having taken it from the French. After the war, 
France granted Cambodia its independence, but stability was difficult to establish from the start.  
China supported Cambodia against the Japanese during the war and developed a close 
relationship with Cambodia after formal independence from the French in 1953.  In 1958, 
Cambodia recognized the PRC over Taiwan as the government of China resulting in the United 
States recalling its ambassador in protest.540 Cambodia maintained neutrality between Western 
and communist countries accepting aid from both.  United States policy focused on containing 
communism and Chinese influence and countering the North Vietnamese during the war in 
Vietnam.  As the United States war in Vietnam escalated, relations between Cambodia and the 
United States deteriorated badly due to border incursions by the South Vietnamese and 
Cambodia accepting military aid from the Soviet Union.541  Relations between the United States 
and Cambodia officially ended in 1965 with King Sihanouk insisting the United States 
recognize Cambodia’s territorial integrity, compensate it for spillover damage from the war, 
and end United States bombing on Cambodian territory.  During this time, Cambodia 
increasingly allied itself with China and sought aid from communist countries to make up for 
lost aid from the United States.  Cambodia and the United States reestablished diplomatic 
relations in 1969 but the ongoing war activities spilling across the border into Cambodia meant 
overall relations were poor.   
 
The relationship with China became much more complex as the country descended into 
instability and civil war.  The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK) was established in 
1968 as a communist guerrilla movement aided by the North Vietnamese and China although 
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China and Russia also provided arms to the Government of King Sihanouk.542 Sihanouk was 
deposed in 1970 while on vacation in France in a coup that Sihanouk, North Vietnam, China 
and the Soviet Union blamed on the CIA.  Lon Nol took power and tried to remove Vietnamese 
communists from Cambodia. The United States provided agricultural commodities to the Lon 
Nol government in the early 1970s which were never paid for. The United States government 
still claims that it is owed about $450 million which the Cambodians reject.543  This issue is an 
ongoing impediment to improving relations with the United States. 
 
From exile, Sihanouk actively promoted the Khmer Rouge and opposed the government 
of Lon Nol. Cambodia descended into a brutal civil war and extended period of instability 
between 1970 and 1991.  King Sihanouk fled to China in 1970 after the coup. Meanwhile, the 
forces of the government of Cambodia battled the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong and communist 
Khmer Rouge guerrillas for control of the country.  In 1975, the Khmer Rouge took full control 
of Cambodia before perpetrating one of the most horrific campaigns of mass murder in history 
that is estimated to have killed at least 1.7 million people between 1975 and 1979, nearly a 
quarter of Cambodia’s population at the time.544   
 
In 1977, the Khmer Rouge raided border towns in Vietnam killing large numbers of 
ordinary Vietnamese reigniting the historical territorial conflict between the two countries.  
Eventually, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to remove the Khmer Rouge government from 
power and occupied Phnom Penh.  The Khmer Rouge was supported by China, a fact that led 
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in part to a border war between China and Vietnam later in 1979, which Deng Xiaoping 
famously claimed was to “teach Vietnam a lesson” but likely intended to weaken Vietnam and 
distract it from its invasion and occupation of Cambodia which China believed was against its 
interests.545  Vietnam, however, remained in Cambodia and administered it like a vassal state 
until the late 1980s.546  The civil conflict continued to fester throughout the 1980s with the 
Khmer Rouge continuing to hold some parts of the country.  By the time Vietnam withdrew 
from Cambodia in September 1989, around 30,000 Vietnamese soldiers are thought to have 
died.547  
 
During the 1980s, relations between Cambodia under Vietnamese rule and the United 
States, China and surrounding countries was unsettled and contentious.  Upwards of 300,000 
Cambodian refugees were temporarily housed in UN camps near the border with Thailand.  
International aid flowed primarily to support UNICEF and the International Committee for the 
Red Cross to relieve suffering in the refugee camps.  The Soviet Union and Vietnam supported 
the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government in Phnom Penh with up to $100 
million per year in aid. Meanwhile, the PRK was under economic sanctions by Western 
countries and Japan. China opposed the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia so did not provide 
aid to the government but continued to provide aid to the Khmer Rouge who were holed up 
along the border with Thailand.548 During the rule of the PRK, Chinese schools were closed, 
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and Chinese language publications outlawed.  Hun Sen, the eventual ruler of Cambodia, wrote 
in 1988 that China was the root of all of Cambodia’s problems.549 
 
As shown in Figure 6-12 on page 331, aid flows from DAC donors began in earnest in 
the early 1990s. During the 1980s, the United States had supported non-communist resistance 
groups within Cambodia.  United States aid flowed to these groups rather than the government 
of Cambodia, but this began to change in the 1990s. After Vietnam withdrew its forces from 
Cambodia in late 1989, the UN Security Council took up the issue of stabilizing Cambodia, the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established in March 1990, 
and a peace agreement signed in Paris in October 1991.550  The United States role in the 
mediation process was controversial and as of early 1990, the United States continued to funnel 
aid to non-communist resistance groups who were forming a coalition with the Khmer Rouge.  
United States Representative Chester Atkins and Senator George Mitchell excoriated the Bush 
administration for allowing a coalition that included the Khmer Rouge to participate in the 
national reconciliation efforts.551 The extreme brutality of the Khmer Rouge made any support 
for a coalition that included the Khmer Rouge politically untenable for the United States. By 
July 1990, the United States announced it would change policy to support and provide aid to 
the government, begin negotiating with Hun Sen and Vietnam, and cut support for anti-
government resistance groups. 552  Even though all parties agreed to the peace framework 
supported by UNTAC, a true cease fire did not materialize and China announced in February 
1991 that it would continue to provide military aid to the Khmer Rouge.  In 1992, USAID 
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reopened its office in Phnom Penh and provided about $264 million throughout the 1990s 
primarily for roads and humanitarian assistance.553 
 
The Khmer Rouge refused to give up their weapons as agreed and fought the 
government with declining intensity until the movement completely collapsed in 1999 after the 
death of Pol Pot in 1998.554  Although Vietnam freed Cambodia from the murderous Khmer 
Rouge, their treatment of Cambodia during more than a decade of occupation is still resented 
by Cambodians. The interplay of power and politics between Vietnam, China and Cambodia 
continues to affect international politics in the region with Cambodia generally on the side of 
China against Vietnam. 
 
A new constitution was adopted in September 1993 which restored Sihanouk as king 
and Cambodia became a constitutional monarchy.555 While the country stabilized after the 
elections in 1993, a power struggle continued between the two main political parties (the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen and the royalist FUNCINPEC (Front Uni 
National pour un Cambodge Independant) led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of King 
Sihanouk) and facilitated by the lack of disarmament of the Khmer Rouge.  The conflicts 
between the two main parties eventually came to a head with a coup orchestrated by Hun Sen 
in July 1997 with casualties estimated in the hundreds. As a result, ASEAN postponed 
admitting Cambodia as a member. 556  Most donor countries withheld support for the 
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government of Hun Sen after the coup leading Hun Sen to seek support from China.  The United 
States evacuated its embassy and suspended aid to the country.  China believed Prince 
Ranariddh was not sufficiently against Taiwan independence and generally supported Hun 
Sen’s leadership of the country. China became the first government to officially recognize the 
new government.557 Deterioration in relations between Cambodia and Western countries and 
Japan led to an opening for China to improve its position and exert influence in Cambodia.  In 
April 1998, Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge died and the group disintegrated.  The 
United States and Cambodia restored bilateral relations and economic aid as well as negotiated 
a bilateral trade agreement in late 1999.  United States aid grew to between $50 and $100 
million per year after 2000 but has only exceeded Japanese aid in 2003.  Aside from 2003 and 
2014, Japan has been the largest DAC donor to Cambodia since 1990 though China’s aid now 
exceeds Japan’s by a factor of more than two.558   
 
Since stabilizing after the coup in 1997, Cambodia has, step by step, integrated itself 
into Southeast Asia and the world.  Cambodia joined ASEAN in 1999 followed by WTO 
accession in 2007.559  Cambodia served as the ASEAN Chair in 2002 and 2012. The Cambodian 
economy has grown extremely rapidly since 1994, though it remains the poorest country in 
ASEAN with a GDP per capita of just over $1,000 in 2016.  Even with its rapid economic 
growth for over two decades, the extreme destruction from years of civil war put Cambodia far 
behind the rest of Southeast Asia.  Only Myanmar and Lao Peoples Democratic Republic have 
comparable levels of poverty in the region. 
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6.4.1 The pattern of Japanese ODA to Cambodia 
During the Vietnam war, Japan only provided a small amount of aid to Cambodia with 
the United States providing the largest share by far (see Figure 6-12 on page 331).  Japan 
became the largest aid donor to Cambodia in 1992.  Japan hosted the Tokyo Conference in June 
1990 to try to enable a settlement among the competing parties struggling to control Cambodia.  
The Tokyo Conference succeeded in getting the National Government of Cambodia, controlled 
by Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, the head of the State of Cambodia to agree to hold bilateral 
talks excluding the Khmer Rouge.560) 
 
After the 1991 Paris agreement, Japan actively supported the peace process and 
mediation through the UNTAC through both participation in peacekeeping operations, active 
mediation of the disputes, and with foreign aid.  The UNTAC Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Akashi Yasushi, was a Japanese national and former Japanese 
Ambassador to the UN.561  The Cambodia peacekeeping operation (PKO) was the first time 
that Japanese troops were dispatched to a foreign country since World War II highlighting the 
importance Japan placed on the security situation in Southeast Asia generally and Cambodia in 
particular. Altogether, Japan sent 600 Self Defense Force (SDF) members and 75 police officers 
to Cambodia after a contentious political debate about the role of the SDF. 562  The main tasks 
of the SDF in Cambodia were to assist in reconstructing roads and bridges destroyed during the 
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civil war.563  Japanese law (the International Peace Cooperation Law passed in June 1992) 
forbade the SDF from any use of weapons beyond the minimum needed to protect the SDF 
personnel themselves564 which limited the areas where SDF troops could be sent in Cambodia. 
Japan materially contributed to the peace process by providing personnel including key leaders 
in the negotiations such as Akashi Yasushi at UNTAC and Ogata Sadako as the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the SDF and civilian police as well as financially 
through supporting UNTAC, support for the election process and through economic 
assistance.565  Japan’s aid during the 1990s was wide ranging and not limited to ODA. 
 
Japan again supported dialogue among the contesting parties in Cambodia at a June 
1992 conference in Tokyo, mediated jointly by Japan and Thailand. In 1992, Japan also co-
chaired the Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia where 
Japan indicated its intent to provide $150-$200 million in humanitarian contributions to support 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in Cambodia.566  Afterward, the conferees established the 
International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) to coordinate the aid 
pledges of Cambodia’s development cooperation partners. The ICORC met three times between 
1993 and 1995 with Japan as the chair of the first meeting.567  Japan was one of the driving 
forces bringing combatants together and promoting the eventual reconciliation in Cambodia, 
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reinforced by substantial aid allocations for post-war reconstruction.568  Japan considered ODA 
to be a key part of a strategic approach to peace building in Cambodia.569 The initiation of 
Japan’s aid to Cambodia fits the pattern of humanitarian assistance to support post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 
With regards to Cambodia, Japan’s aid first followed the United States moves to provide 
aid.  In 1990-1991, United States aid to Cambodia exceeded that of Japan. In 1992-1993, 
Japanese aid to Cambodia exceeded United States aid by a small margin.  Japan continued 
expanding its ODA to Cambodia to around $100 million per year, still small by the standards 
of Japanese aid to surrounding countries but positioning Japan as Cambodia’s largest donor 
during the 1990s.  Japan’s initial ODA program in Cambodia was meant to help support the 
peace process and improve the security and economy of the region.570  At the time, Cambodia 
was not a member of ASEAN, was small and impoverished, and could neither threaten Japan 
nor help Japanese national security directly.  But there are two key factors driving Japanese aid 
to Cambodia: 1) supporting the peace process to stabilize all of southeast Asia and recover from 
the major conflicts of the 1970s and 80s which would help improve economic performance and 
commercial opportunities in Southeast Asia (commercial benefit), and 2) promoting Japan’s 
interest in attaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (security benefit). 
 
According to the theory presented in Chapter 2, humanitarian crises result in higher aid 
flows from most donors, but aid commitments may depend on the economic and security 
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importance of the recipient to the donor.  Cambodia’s importance to Japan was a result of 
Cambodia’s importance in stabilizing the rest of Southeast Asia which would support economic 
recovery and commercial opportunities in Southeast Asia.  Cambodia’s instability caused 
refugee crises in Thailand and Vietnam and military tensions along the Cambodia-Vietnam 
border.  Vietnam and Thailand are much larger and vital to Japan’s economic interests which 
led to peace in Cambodia being a key goal for Japanese business interests. 
 
Japan’s ODA commitments, together with the other major OECD DAC donors to 
Cambodia, are shown in Figure 6-12 on page 331.  The pattern of aid commitment to Cambodia 
follows the security situation in Cambodia and the international situation in Southeast Asia.  In 
the early 1970s, only the United States provided a significant amount of aid mainly to prop up 
the regime of Lon Nol struggling to hold off the Khmer Rouge.  When the Khmer Rouge came 
to power, aid from DAC members largely ceased and only resumed at low levels after Vietnam 
invaded the country and removed the Khmer Rouge from power.  During the 1980s, bilateral 
DAC aid was generally below $20 million per year, but jumped to the $200-$300 million level 
after the Paris peace agreement was signed in 1991.  After 2003, DAC aid commitments to 
Cambodia started increasing significantly reaching over $800 million by 2014. 
 
Japan became the largest DAC donor to Cambodia in 1992 and has kept that title every 
year since except for 2003 and 2014.  Overall, Japan’s aid commitment patterns to Cambodia 
change twice. First, the jump after 1991 to support the Cambodian peace process and post 
conflict reconstruction. Second, Japan’s ODA commitments roughly doubled in 2009.  Aid 
commitments from Japan hovered around $100 million from 1993-2008 and between $200 and 
$300 million per year after 2008.  But what explains the pattern of Japan’s commitment of ODA 




by its substantial ODA commitments in the 1990s to help mediate the civil conflict in Cambodia 
during 1997-1998.571  However, Japan could not have known that its aid committed before 1998 
would provide leverage for a mediation it did not know would occur.  So why did Japan increase 
its aid to Cambodia in the 1990s and why did its aid jump in 2009 and continue at elevated 
levels?  The regression analysis in Chapter 5.2 suggests Japan was motivated by a mix of 
commercial and security interests in the low threat period (1992-2001) and primarily security 
interests in the high threat period (2002-2014).  However, there is minimal commercial 
opportunity provided by Cambodia in the low threat period.  The most reasonable explanation 
for Japan’s aid approach to Cambodia is humanitarian assistance for post conflict reconstruction.  
Even though the regression analysis did not find that humanitarian assistance was a significant 
purpose for Japanese aid commitments in any period, Japan’s aid was the largest among DAC 
donors and responded to the needs for post-conflict reconstruction in a country where Japan 
was playing a major role in mediation and through the UN.  
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Figure 6-12: Bi-lateral ODA Commitments to Cambodia from Key DAC Donors, 1966-2015, 
Millions of Current USD 
 
Source: OECD  
 
Japan and other major bi-lateral DAC donors and multilaterals such as the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, UN, EU, IMF…etc., formed the Consultative Group Meeting on 
Cambodia in 1996 to coordinate aid and agree with the government of Cambodia on policy and 
governance reforms and held periodic meetings to review the progress of reform and pledge 
new aid to Cambodia. The government renamed the meeting the Cambodia Development 
Cooperation Forum (CDCF) in 2007 and China joined as a donor member. The Consultative 
Group and Forum meetings were held at about 18-month intervals until the last meeting in early 
2010. Japan has traditionally provided about 25% of the total donor commitments to Cambodia 
at these meetings.572 As noted in the Cambodia Daily, the meetings with traditional donors 
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ended as China became the largest donor to Cambodia. Hun Sen criticized the traditional donors 
for onerous aid conditions noting China provided aid without seeking domestic reform. 573  The 
suspension of the donor meetings and the increase in aid from China did not result in less aid 
from traditional donors.  In fact, aid commitments from the DAC continued increasing (see 
Figure 6-12 on page 331) and comfortably exceeded (cumulatively) aid from China except for 
2003 and 2010.   
 
Japan in particular readily increased aid without much regard for Hun Sen’s behavior. 
In 2017 when Hun Sen forced the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party to dissolve, 
many DAC donors withdrew election aid, but Japan increased grant assistance to support 
elections in the country and Prime Minister Abe met with Hun Sen at the Mekong-Japan 
Summit Meeting in 2018.574  The Nikkei Asian Weekly quotes Japanese government sources 
saying “China acts as an advocate for Myanmar and Cambodia in the UN.”, and “If Japan 
withdrew from the region, Myanmar and Cambodia would only increase their dependence on 
China….Even if the West frowns on us, that’s still better than letting China become the sole 
winner.”575  Japan’s aid to Cambodia was first offered to support Japan’s bid for an expanded 
role in the UN and to balance the influence of China in Southeast Asia. 
 
Cambodia has been able to ramp up aid from all corners, including China and Japan 
simultaneously and cancel its donor meetings which were meant to compel policy reform.  The 
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government of Cambodia under Hun Sen has cleverly played donors against each other to both 
reduce outside pressure for reform and simultaneously increase its overall receipt of ODA 
commitments.  The entry of China into the upper ranks of donors has reduced leverage of donor 
countries over aid recipients and, in the case of Cambodia, forced traditional donors to increase 
aid commitments to maintain ongoing engagement.   
 
6.4.2 The pattern of China’s ODA to Cambodia 
China and Cambodia have a complex relationship with periods of friendly relations 
interspersed with periods of Chinese intervention on different sides in Cambodia’s civil 
conflicts.  The Cambodian government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk recognized the PRC as 
the government of China in 1958 and campaigned for China’s entry into the UN and the 
expulsion of Taiwan.576  Bartke estimates that China was providing aid to Cambodia as early 
as 1956 giving a total equivalent of $39.4 million between 1956 and 1960.  While no aid was 
given to the Cambodian government during the 1960s, official aid resumed in 1973. 577  
However, China did provide ambiguous amounts of aid to various anti-government communist 
factions within Cambodia vying for power.  Relations soured in 1967 when Sihanouk learned 
that China was backing the Khmer Rouge. However, when Sihanouk was overthrown by Lon 
Nol in a coup while traveling, the Prince established a government in exile (the Gouvernement 
Royal d’Union National du Kampuchea or GRUNK) hosted by and based within China to 
oppose Lon Nol’s new government, the United States-supported Khmer Republic.578  However, 
it was not Sihanouk’s faction but the Khmer Rouge which deposed Lon Nol in 1975 also with 
extensive support from China.  Sihanouk’s faction nominally supported the Khmer Rouge 
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against the Khmer Republic in the civil war and returned to Cambodia as a figurehead after the 
Khmer Rouge took power.  
 
Before the Khmer Rouge took power, China’s aid was to support non-government 
factions fighting for power in Cambodia.  When the Khmer Rouge seized power, China was 
quick to establish bi-lateral aid channels to support and influence the new government.  The 
overwhelming brutality of the Khmer Rouge regime led China to be secretive about its support 
so detailed information about the aid provided is not publicly available.  Most of what is known 
about China’s bilateral aid to Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period is provided by Andrew 
Mertha in his 2014 book which is based on Cambodia National Archives information and 
shipping records augmented by interviews with Chinese and Cambodian individuals who 
worked on Chinese funded aid projects during the period.579  China’s aid to the Khmer Rouge 
was vital to keeping it in power as long as it was. Aid from China to Cambodia began almost 
immediately after the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh in April 1975.  China provided shiploads 
of food and other material and dispatched technical advisors to assist the government.  Non-
military aid was agreed to in early 1976 where China provided loans of 140 million CNY (about 
$72 million at the prevailing exchange rate) and $20 million.580 Cambodia could choose what 
to use this money for and it is likely to have financed imports from China. In December 1975, 
Cambodia and China agreed to rehabilitate the Kampong Som petroleum refinery at 
Cambodia’s only deep-water port. The agreement was for China to implement the project and 
provide all equipment and associated facilities. The cost in 1976 was to be 38.8 million CNY 
($20 million at the prevailing exchange rate).581 
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After the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, China’s influence and aid diminished though 
China continued to send money and equipment to Khmer Rouge rebels fighting the Vietnam 
backed government until 1990.582  The excesses of the Khmer Rouge and China’s explicit 
support caused many to blame China for Cambodia’s problems.  Hun Sen, though a former 
member of the Khmer Rouge and current Prime Minister (as of 2019), called China “the root 
of everything that was evil in Cambodia” in a 1988 essay.583 There is little evidence that China 
provided much aid to Cambodia during the Vietnam installed government’s time in power in 
the 80s and Western donors dominated that bilateral aid landscape during and immediately 
following the UN sponsored UNTAC era in 1992-1993. 
 
The UNTAC era was followed by over three years of instability and infighting 
culminating in a 1997 coup orchestrated by Hun Sen.  China quickly gave $6 million in 
assistance one month after the coup and Chinese investment began to flow freely nearly tripling 
between 1997 and 1998.584  After China began supporting Hun Sen’s government, Hun Sen 
announced the closure of the Taiwanese Representatives Office (the de facto Taiwanese 
Embassy) in the country.  The Chinese then increased support for Hun Sen’s government with 
116 military cargo trucks and 70 jeeps worth $2.8 million in December 1997.585 Aid from DAC 
donors, aside from Japan, plummeted in 1998 to protest rampant human rights violations 
surrounding the coup, so Cambodia turned to China for support while also pressing the Japanese 
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to continue providing aid.586 Hun Sen visited China in February 1999 and returned with a 
commitment of $200 million in interest free loans and $18.3 million in grant aid. While it is 
unclear if Hun Sen requested or China offered a large aid package, the likelihood is that Hun 
Sen requested support due to the withdrawal of support from DAC donors (except Japan). 
Jeldres (2003) reports that the Chinese Embassy stated that the $218.3 million provided to 
Cambodia was one of the largest aid commitments ever provided by China to any country at 
the time.  As noted in the previous section, Hun Sen also visited Japan in late 1997 and again 
in 2001 to request continued aid from Japan. Jiang Zemin visited Cambodia in November 2000 
and, while speaking of China’s support for Cambodia’s national sovereignty, promised to 
cancel Cambodia’s older debts to China (about $2 million) and an offered an additional $12.5 
million in no-interest loans. 587  
 
China’s aid commitment pattern to Cambodia is presented in the following chart (see 
Figure 6-13 on page 337).  Pre-2000 aid commitments are not available in the Aiddata dataset. 
The data on aid from 1997-1999 is from Jeldres (2003). China’s aid commitment pattern since 
1997 shows three distinct episodes that need elaboration.  First, the initiation of aid after Hun 
Sen’s coup in 1997.  Second, a large spike in grant aid in 2002, and lastly, elevated levels of 
loan aid from 2009 to 2013.  As shown in Figure 6-12 on page 331, Japan’s aid also increased 
significantly in 2009 though less dramatically than China’s aid.  Another striking fact is that 
China’s aid allocations to Cambodia were much higher than any other donor between 2009 and 
2013 even exceeding all DAC donors combined in 2010. The grant amount in 2002 and the 
ODA loans from 2009-2013 were exceptionally large for a country the size of Cambodia 
(around 15 million people).   
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Figure 6-13: China's ODA to Cambodia, 2000-2014 (Millions of 2014$) 
 
Source: Aiddata.org (2000-2014) and Jeldres, Julio A., “China-Cambodia: More than just friends,” Asia Times 
Online, 16 September 2003 (1997-1999).  
 
6.4.3 Case study hypotheses and predictions 
The case study analysis sought to uncover the motivations behind and impact of the aid 
commitments to Cambodia from Japan and China since the 1990s. Why did Japan increase its 
levels of ODA in the early 1990s? Why did Japan reduce its ODA commitments in 1998? What 
explains the sustained increases in ODA commitments by Japan after 2008?  Why did China 
provide a big commitment in 2002 only to drop to low levels until 2009? What conditions led 
to China’s high levels of aid to Cambodia from 2009-2013?  This case study attempts to explain 
the patterns of Japan and China’s ODA to the Cambodia and link these changes to the 





The case studies in this dissertation are designed to establish the causal relations 
between security, normative, and commercial factors in the ODA allocation decisions of China 
and Japan that were estimated in the panel regressions.  Cambodia offers an intriguing case 
because it reflects several important variables in the regression analysis especially for the China 
case, but also for Japan including: ASEAN chair, variation in its relations with the United States, 
varying relations with Taiwan (before Aiddata.org dataset begins), extreme spikes in Chinese 
aid commitments.  This case study allows us to explore how Japan and China’s ODA 
commitments to Cambodia react to these independent variables over time.   
 
Comparing China and Japan. China and Japan have significant differences when it 
comes to aid behavior towards Cambodia.  Japan is a relatively consistent donor to Cambodia 
with an overall trend of growing aid commitments over time. China is much more erratic with 
big spikes in aid commitments in different years.  Overall, aid to Cambodia is a small 
percentage total aid allocated by Japan and China (see Figure 6-14 on page 339). Until 2000, 
Japan’s aid to Cambodia amounted to less than 1 percent of its total ODA commitments.  Since 
2000, it hovered around 1 percent of the total and has averaged just over 1.5 percent of Japan’s 
total commitments from 2009-2014.  In most years, China’s ODA to Cambodia has also 
hovered around 1 percent of China’s total.  However, China has allocated very large aid 
packages to Cambodia periodically.  In 2002 and 2010, China gave over 15% of its total ODA 
commitments to Cambodia and almost 9 percent in 2013 before dropping back below 1 percent 





Figure 6-14: Japan and China's ODA Commitments to Cambodia as a Percent of Total ODA 
Committed by the Donor, 1990-2014 
 
Sources: OECD DAC and Aiddata.org  
 
The impact of commercial factors.  Cambodia has never been a commercially 
important country by any standard measure. With a population under 15.4 million (2015) and 
a GDP per capital just over $1,100 per person (2015)588, Cambodia is relatively insignificant 
even within ASEAN.  Among the developing countries in ASEAN, only Lao PDR has a smaller 
population (Brunei and Singapore have smaller populations but are larger economies with high 
average incomes and receive no aid).  Cambodia also has the lowest income per capita of any 
country in ASEAN, well below Lao PDR and just lower than Myanmar.589  Economic growth 
and the level of GDP for Cambodia is presented in Figure 6-15 on page 340. 
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Figure 6-15: Cambodia's Economic Performance, 1993-2013 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (no data before 1993)  
 
Due to its overall small population, high poverty and lack of substantial natural 
resources, if aid to Cambodia reflects its economic importance to donor countries, aid levels 
will be small.  This is true for Japan for whom Cambodia has never been a major recipient of 
Japanese ODA with its peak commitment year in 2009 at just under 2% of all Japanese ODA 
for that year and just over 25 billion JPY (in 2013 JPY).590 However, aid from China has been 
low and high; often below 3% of its aid budget but two times exceeding 15% of China’s overall 
foreign aid.  China’s aid levels have been more consistently high after 2009 when Cambodia’s 
economic performance was weakest.  This suggests there were other factors beyond commercial 
benefits driving Chinese aid. 
                                                 





Cambodia is not a large potential market for Japanese or Chinese exports and 
investments by the Japanese private sector is small.  The first year where Japan’s outward 
foreign direct investment is greater than zero is 2006 and only 500 million JPY (less than $5 
million equivalent) and averaging only about 4.5 billion JPY between 2006 and 2013.  The 
corresponding FDI for Thailand was 340 billion JPY and for Vietnam 126 billion JPY, 76 times 
and 28 times Japan’s FDI to Cambodia respectively.  Turning to Japanese exports, the most 
likely impetus for commercially oriented ODA commitments, the difference between 
Cambodia and its neighbors is stark.  Thailand imports from Japan about 123 times that of 
Cambodia in 2014.  Vietnam imports from Japan are over 46 times the level of Cambodia in 
that year.  In the mid-90s, Thailand’s imports from Japan between 200 and 300 times the 
imports of Cambodia while Vietnam’s were around 20 times the level of Cambodia (see Figure 
6-16 on page 342).  From these comparative figures, Cambodia is commercially insignificant 





Figure 6-16: Imports from Japan: Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, 1967-2014 (Millions of 
2013 JPY) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund  
 
The importance of Cambodia to China, like Japan, has little to do with commercial 
opportunities.  As shown in Figure 6-17 on page 343, Chinese exports to Cambodia are growing 
particularly in the last several years for which data is available.  However, Cambodia imports 
far less than Thailand and Vietnam.  From 1997 to 2014, Thailand’s imports from China are 
more than 13 times Cambodia’s and for Vietnam the figure is over 12 times.  Average annual 
aid from China was CNY 1.4 billion while Thailand received just CNY 158 million and 
Vietnam CNY 395 million.  The only year that Thailand received substantial aid from China 





Figure 6-17: Imports from China: Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, 1991-2014 (Millions of 
2013 CNY) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund  
 
Even though Japan was the largest DAC donor to Cambodia since the early 1990s, 
Japanese aid to Cambodia was and remains small compared to other Southeast Asian countries.  
Due to Cambodia’s small market and population, it is useful to compare Japan’s ODA to 
Cambodia to its larger and more economically important neighbors on a per capita basis.  As 
Figure 6-18 on page 346 shows, Japan’s ODA per capita to Cambodia has consistently 
fluctuated between JPY1,000 and JPY1,500 since the early 1990s with two significant drops in 
1998 and 2003.  The drop in 1998 is associated with the 1997 coup when most DAC donors 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) withheld aid from Cambodia.  However, Japan did 
not join other DAC members in suspending aid altogether.  At a meeting between Japan’s 




government decided to recognize Hun Sen as prime minister and stated that it would provide 
aid subject to Cambodia continuing to abide by the Paris Accord, maintain its constitution, 
respect human rights, and hold “free and fair” elections in 1998.591  The Japanese government 
was criticized by other donors for continuing its aid to Cambodia.592 Japan simply continued 
ongoing aid projects and committed a total of only $30 million in 1998, a large drop after 
committing over $130 million in aid in 1997.  By 1999, Japan’s aid commitments rose 
substantially to over $107 million.  
 
Since the government of Cambodia’s budget was heavily reliant on aid in 1997-1998 to 
pay for reconstruction and recovery, Hun Sen was highly motivated to seek a continuation of 
aid from Japan.  Hun Sen visited Japan in November 1997 for medical treatment (officially) 
but met top Japanese officials and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to request a continuation 
of Japanese aid. Japan agreed to continue aid in exchange for Hun Sen agreeing to allow 
Ranariddh to be tried in absentia for plotting a coup, having Sihanouk pardon Ranariddh, and 
allow Ranariddh to return to Cambodia to participate in the planned elections.  Hun Sen agreed 
to the conditions, but failed to implement them and, in fact, drove King Sihanouk into exile in 
Beijing in January 1998.593  Still, Japan did not stop aid, but continued negotiating and put forth 
a new, though similar, proposal.  Ranariddh would cut off his relationship with the Khmer 
Rouge, the CPP and FUNCINPEC would implement a ceasefire, Ranariddh would be pardoned 
and allowed to return for the planned election.  Japan offered to finance the election to be held 
on 26 July 1998 and dispatched a team of 30 election observers to Cambodia led by General 
Nishimoto Tetsuya, former Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground Defense Forces and Chairman 
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of the Joint Staff Office from 1993 to 1996.594  Japan also explicitly threatened to cut aid if 
Ranariddh could not return and participate in the election.  This time, the agreement was 
honored, Ranariddh was pardoned and returned for the elections which took place on 27 July.  
Hun Sen’s party (CPP) won the largest share of the votes and Hun Sen became prime minister.  
FUNCINPEC won the second largest share and Ranariddh became speaker of the national 
assembly – a post he held until 2006. As the situation in Cambodia stabilized, Japan’s aid 
commitments returned to their previous levels and in 2001, Japan hosted a donor conference in 
Tokyo (sponsored by the World Bank) which succeeded in attracting $560 million in aid 
commitments to support development and reform in Cambodia with Japan pledging $118 
million. Hun Sen met Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Yamasaki Taku and 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and requested continuation of Japanese aid to which 
Secretary General Yamasaki agreed.595    
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Figure 6-18: Japanese ODA/population of recipient, 1968-2014 
 
Source: OECD DAC for ODA, World Bank for population  
 
Cambodia is not salient for Japan’s security and the economic importance of Cambodia 
is very small.  For these reasons, Japan’s ODA to Cambodia was and remains relatively small 
and, even on a per capita basis, was far less than Thailand in the 1990s and generally below 
Vietnam’s since the early 1990s.  Table 6-7 on page 347 demonstrates that Japan’s ODA to 
Cambodia was dwarfed by its aid to both Thailand and Vietnam.  Aid to Thailand declined 
significantly in the 2002-2014 period since Thailand had developed to the point of not requiring 
much ODA while annual aid to Cambodia increased a small amount (though large in percentage 





Table 6-7: Average annual ODA commitments from Japan to Cambodia, Thailand and 
Vietnam, Millions of 2013 JPY  
 1991-2001   2002-2014  
 Cambodia  10,876.25  19,222.46  
 Thailand  139,698.56  34,105.88  
 Vietnam  85,715.94  148,342.95  
 
The impact of security factors.  The initiation of substantial aid to Cambodia strongly 
resembles the ramp up of aid in the Philippines case where China took advantage of the 
deteriorating relations between the Philippines and the United States.  In Cambodia, China 
opportunistically filled the void left when Western donors attempted to punish Cambodia for 
violating Western imposed norms like human rights and governance reforms.  China does not 
impose those types of conditions, but does expect states that benefit from China’s largesse to 
support China’s positions in international fora. China’s embrace of Cambodia comes with the 
expectation that Cambodia will break with ASEAN when its position conflicts with Chinese 
interests such as in the South China Sea territorial disputes.  China also wishes to ensure 
Cambodia does not align with Vietnam which China considers a strategic rival.596 
 
From China’s perspective, expanding and improving relations with the more 
authoritarian ASEAN members, Myanmar and Cambodia, provides outsize influence on the 
cohesion of ASEAN.  Due to its consensus-based decision-making, China can influence 
ASEAN to its benefit if it can influence just one member which undermines ASEAN unity. The 
United States has supported other members of ASEAN to counter China’s territorial claims in 
the South China Sea, 597 so China’s ability to secure the support of other ASEAN members 
prevents a united front from forming against its territorial claims. Another issue of extreme 
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importance to China is to counter Taiwanese legitimacy. In the mid-1990s, Ranariddh’s 
FUNCINPEC party started to move to embrace Taiwan due to the pro-Taiwan leanings of many 
Chinese-Cambodians even allowing Taiwan to establish a representative office. A Deputy 
Mayor of Phnom Penh visited Taipei in 1995 infuriating China.598 This issue may explain much 
of China’s subsequent courting of Hun Sen and for looking the other way as Hun Sen overthrew 
Ranariddh in 1997.  After seizing power, Hun Sen almost immediately closed the Taiwan 
Representatives Office and expelled its diplomats establishing a pattern of quid pro quo actions 
by Cambodia for Chinese aid.  China responded as the first country to recognize Hun Sen’s 
government and set the stage for the large packages of aid to come. In addition to the Taiwan 
issue, China has long running disputes with Vietnam including the brief war in 1979 and 
continued territorial conflicts.  A close relationship with Cambodia weakens Vietnam’s 
influence in Cambodia in addition to weakening ASEAN unity after Cambodia joined in 
1999.599 
 
The level of China’s aid allocations to Cambodia and the policies adopted by Cambodia 
that directly benefit China have led to suggestions that China is buying policy concessions with 
its aid to Cambodia.600  Hun Sen’s government became dependent on China’s aid and foreign 
direct investment when Western aid dried up.  United States aid was very low from 1997 until 
2007 giving China the opportunity to establish itself as a needed partner to the Cambodian 
government.  That dependence has led to some clear policy wins for China such as the forced 
deportation of 20 Uighur refugees seeking asylum in Cambodia in 2009.  The deportation was 
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carried out one day before a Chinese delegation arrived providing a $1.2 billion package of 
loans (not necessarily ODA) and grants.601 
 
This pattern of Cambodian actions in support of Chinese interests followed by large 
packages of aid from China began in 1997 with the Taiwan issue and has been repeated over 
and over.  In July 2010, Hun Sen asked the United States to forgive the $400 million that the 
United States claims is owed from the time of the Lon Nol regime in the early 1970s, but the 
United States did not agree.  Though a much smaller debt, China immediately announced it was 
forgiving the $4 million owed by Cambodia under the former Khmer Rouge regime, 
emphasizing its largess compared to the apparently stingy United States.602   
 
In 2012, in the widely reported episode relating the Cambodia hosting of the ASEAN 
foreign ministers meeting in July (Cambodia was ASEAN Chair in 2012), the Chinese 
government preceded that meeting with a flurry of visits and offers of aid.603  China’s maritime 
territorial conflicts with the Philippines and Vietnam as well as Japan were escalating during 
this period.  Chinese Premier Hu Jintao visited Cambodia in March 2012 and offered $70 
million is loans and grants. During that visit, Hun Sen reportedly asked for annual loans from 
China of up to $500 million.  China agreed to support Cambodia’s bid to join the UN Security 
Council while Cambodia promised to ensure the South China Sea issue did not intrude on the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. China signed a commitment for provide $20 million for a 
hospital in Phnom Penh in May 2012 and in June 2012 gave Cambodia a loan worth $430 
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million mostly acquiescing to Hun Sen’s request. 604 Perhaps unsurprisingly, no joint statement 
was issued at the July ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to prevent any mention of the 
disputes between ASEAN members and China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.  
The failure was the first failure to agree on a joint statement in ASEAN’s history.605 The draft 
joint statement reflected the Scarborough Shoal conflict with the Philippines and the EEZ 
conflict with Vietnam. Upon submission, Hor Namhong, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister and 
Chair, rejected those references as bi-lateral issues irrelevant to ASEAN amid suspicions that 
the Cambodians consulted with China during the dispute.606   
 
Despite the growing and mutually beneficial quid pro quo arrangements between 
Cambodian actions in support of China and Chinese aid, Cambodia has been careful not to give 
in completely to China. Even as it complained about the $400 million debt to the United States, 
it still enthusiastically participates in the United States sponsored Lower Mekong Initiative 
(LMI), a framework for organizing United States economic aid and political engagement with 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam established in 2009.607 Cambodia has 
willingly cooperated with the United States on counter terrorism and joint activities under the 
LMI.608  
 
Chinese aid projects have also been controversial in Cambodia with accusations of 
forced resettlement, corruption, and lack of transparency and despite pronouncements that 
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Chinese aid is unconditional, the history of quid pro quo actions by Cambodia in response to 
aid from China indicates otherwise.  China may not be interested in governance, democracy 
and human rights, but it appears to pour aid into Cambodia to counter Vietnam, weaken ASEAN, 
and protect its claims in the South China Sea by enlisting Cambodia as a proxy.  Chinese aid 
projects linked to environmental degradation, human rights abuses and corruption has resulted 
in some resistance and moves to balance the dependence and maintain good relations with 
traditional donors.609 About half of all Cambodia’s foreign debt is owed to China and the 
increasing levels of Chinese lending are putting the country at risk of debt distress.610 Despite 
accepting outsized sums of Chinese aid, Hun Sen has proved adept at playing Japan and other 
major donors and China against each other to reap continued aid allocations from most major 
donor countries.   
 
While Japanese aid to Cambodia is relatively small compared to its neighbors, we can 
see an increase in the share of Japan’s total ODA given to Cambodia. For example, during the 
1992 (when Japan first allocated aid to Cambodia) to 2001 period, Cambodia’s share of total 
Japanese ODA was 0.69%.  For the high threat 2002-2014 period, the share rose to 1.22%.  
Looking at the high threat period, the early 2002-2008 period was 0.98% while the later 2009-
2014 period reached 1.5% of Japan’s overall ODA program.  During the period when Japan 
was most engaged in Cambodia’s peace process was the period when aid from Japan was the 
least significant in terms of Japan’s overall program.  During the higher threat period, the share 
allocated to Cambodia approximately doubled. 
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During the 1990s Japan began aggressively seeking to gain a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council (UNSC).  Japanese government officials made a case that by virtue of Japan’s 
large contribution of ODA, 611  expanding contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 
worldwide including in Cambodia, large contributions to international organizations including 
the UN itself.612  The regression analysis in Chapter 5.2.3 shows that UN sanctions and being 
on the UNSC were significant predictors of Japan ODA commitments in the low threat (1991-
2001) period.  UN sanctions remained significant in the high threat period (2002-2014) and 
UNSC membership was significant in the Asia only regressions.  In the high threat period, 
ASEAN chair became a significant predictor of Japan’s ODA commitments along with United 
States related security variables.  Japan’s role in the UN sponsored peace process in Cambodia 
was intimately tied to its aid policies in Cambodia. 
 
Cambodia even wavered in its support for Japanese permanent membership in the 
UNSC in 2005 after Japan-China relations deteriorated and their territorial disputes flared.  
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong retreated from its usual support of Japan and was 
quoted at a 25 April 2005 new conference saying, “In the past, Cambodia always ex-pressed 
our support for Japan, India and Germany to be admitted into the permanent council of the 
United Nations, but right now, we have to wait and see [if] there is a general tendency [before 
stating] whether or not we support.”613 Following this statement, the Japanese Foreign Minister 
Machimura Nobutaka visited Cambodia on 10 June 2005 during a tour of Southeast Asia to 
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build support for Japan’s position on the UNSC. After meeting Foreign Minister Machimura 
and securing $40 million of development aid from Japan, Foreign Minister Namhong changed 
direction again and reiterated Cambodia’s support for Japan’s UNSC position.614  The speed at 
which Japan shored up support with its ODA shows a dynamic missing from the regression 
analysis based on annual data. In this instance, support for Japan’s UNSC membership helped 
Cambodia secure additional ODA.  The threat of Cambodia withdrawing its support for Japan 
gaining a permanent seat was enough for Japan to provide more aid to Cambodia to bring it 
back into line.  The regression analysis does not measure the diplomatic support for Japan’s 
position, so this factor is not measured directly in the large-N quantitative analysis.  Based on 
the actions of the Japanese government during this episode, gaining a permanent seat on the 
UNSC remains a key goal of Japan’s foreign policy and support for that position is important 
for Japan’s ODA commitment decisions.   
 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
The results of the Cambodia case study are clearer for China than Japan.  Chinese aid 
to Cambodia is predominantly security focused and targeted at undermining ASEAN unity and 
Western influence in Southeast Asia.  Japanese aid to Cambodia has been reasonably consistent 
since the early 1990s and largely reflects the fact that Cambodia is not significant for Japan’s 
security nor its commercial interests but supports Japan’s aspirations for an expanded UN role. 
Cambodia has a very small economy and does not import significant sums from either Japan or 
China and is dwarfed by its immediate neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. During the low threat 
period, Japan’s ODA to Cambodia occurred as part of post-conflict reconstruction efforts and 
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as such, is most consistent with a humanitarian aid purpose as well as to support its security 
interest in gaining a permanent seat on the UN security council.  Overall, the Cambodia case 
study confirms most, but not all, of the core predictions based on the study hypothesis. Each 
prediction is assessed below: 
 
1. Commercial orientation of foreign aid should decline with the degree of threat 
perception. This case study was not able to identify any clear indication that 
commercial factors were salient even during the low threat period.  There is scant 
evidence that Japan’s aid to Cambodia increased or decreased due to changing 
commercial factors in Cambodia.  Japan’s aid to Cambodia did not rise or fall 
significantly over the entire analysis period and when it dropped in 1998, it reflected 
a coup rather than a reduction in the commercial importance of Cambodia.  
Cambodia’s economy grew at its fastest rate in the 1990s, but Japanese ODA only 
increased significantly after 2008 when Chinese aid to Cambodia jumped to higher 
levels than Japan.  The lack of importance of Cambodia overall explains why 
Japanese aid to Cambodia is a small proportion of Japan’s overall aid program, but 
the aid Japan provided to Cambodia was primarily security oriented and reflected 
Japan’s concern with its role in the UN.  
 
2. Security orientation of foreign aid should increase with the degree of threat 
perception.  Japan should increase its aid to Cambodia when it assumes the ASEAN 
chair. China should increase aid when United States-Cambodia relations deteriorate, 
when Cambodia - Taiwan relations deteriorate, and when Cambodia becomes 
ASEAN chair.  For Japan there is no evidence, it considered Cambodia’s assumption 




detectible change in Japan’s aid policy around these events. The one security factor 
that motivated Japan to increase aid to Cambodia happened in 2005 when Japan 
offered $40 million to Cambodia as an incentive to support Japan’s bid for a 
permanent seat on the UN security council.  The other notable increase in Japan’s 
ODA pattern occurs from 2009 to 2015 at the same time Chinese aid was rapidly 
ramping up. The statements of the Japanese government official quoted by the 
Nikkei Asian Review (“China acts as an advocate for Myanmar and Cambodia in 
the UN…If Japan withdrew from the region, Myanmar and Cambodia would only 
increase their dependence on China….Even if the West frowns on us, that’s still 
better than letting China become the sole winner.”)615 suggest that Japanese ODA 
commitments to Cambodia were meant to balance the influence of China in 
Southeast Asia.   
 
In the case study of China’s aid to Cambodia, the pattern of ODA 
commitments closely follows the predictions from the regression analysis.  The 
large increases in China aid are highly correlated with deteriorating relations 
between Cambodia and Western countries after the successful coup by Hun Sen in 
1997.  This event offered China an opportunity to win an ally in Southeast Asia and 
prevent Western countries and Japan from further influence in the region.  
Compounding the attractiveness of supporting Hun Sen was the flirtation of the coup 
target (FUNCINPEC) with improving Cambodia-Taiwan relations.  By supporting 
Hun Sen, China could avoid any drift towards Taiwan and one of Hun Sen’s first 
actions after the coup was to close the Taiwan Representatives office in Phnom Penh. 
                                                 




Like the case of the Philippines, China took advantage of deteriorating relations with 
the United States, which cut off of direct bi-lateral assistance to Cambodia in 
1998,616 by offering several large aid packages.  After Cambodia joined ASEAN, 
China’s support for Cambodia allowed it to undermine ASEAN unity and prevent 
Southeast Asia from uniting against China’s interests in the South China Sea.  The 
years around Cambodia’s assumption of the ASEAN chairmanship closely match 
large spikes in aid to Cambodia.  In the case of 2012, the link between Cambodia 
preventing the release of an ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting joint statement 
mentioning disputes in the South China Sea, and aid commitments from China is 
clear.  As China increasingly asserted its maritime claims in the South China Sea, 
the need to weaken ASEAN and prevent a united front against China became 
increasingly important. This increasing need to undermine ASEAN explains 
China’s large aid commitments to Cambodia after 2008. 
  
3. In the case of Japan, I expect its aid policy to increase support for United States 
security goals as perceived threat increase because of the dependence on the 
United States-Japan alliance for Japan’s security.  This prediction is not relevant 
for this particular case study as United States security interests in Cambodia are 
minimal. Japan has failed to follow the United States lead and cut aid to Cambodia 
after the 1997 coup to maintain leverage as sponsor of the peace process and when 
Hun Sen dissolved the opposition party in 2017 specifically to prevent Cambodia 
from drifting further toward China.   
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4. In the case of China, I expect its aid policy to increasingly counter United States 
security interests as its threat perception of the United States-Japan alliance 
increases.  The United States has limited security interests in Cambodia, but 
Cambodia’s role in ASEAN allows it to balance United States influence on other 
key ASEAN members.  The increasingly testy maritime conflicts in the South China 
Sea increased the salience of Cambodia to China’s security. Deteriorating relations 
with the United States were a clear signal to China to step in to make up for the aid 
lost after the 1997 coup.   
 
Overall, the Cambodia case study partially supports the findings of the regression 
analysis in the case of China and confirms the predictions that security factors dominate the 
China-Cambodia aid relationship.  In the case of Japan, the minimal commercial importance of 
Cambodia is reflected in the small aid allocations to that country from Japan.  The prediction 
that commercial factors should dominate during the low threat period is not confirmed in this 
case.  Japan’s aid to Cambodia was both humanitarian in nature but entwined with its 
aspirations to gain a permanent seat on the UN security council.  While the regression results 
do not find any systematic aid competition between China and Japan, the Cambodia case study 
does illustrate a potential competitive aspect on the part of Japan confirmed by published quotes 
of Japanese government officials.  As Chinese aid to Cambodia rapidly expanded, Japan 
increased its aid commitments to Cambodia both in total amount and in the share of the overall 
aid budget of Japan committed to Cambodia. 
 
6.5 Case study analysis summary 
The results of the two case studies provide mixed evidence for the predictions based on 




foreign aid in particular.  Prediction 1 (aid is commercially oriented during low threat periods) 
is supported for Japan’s aid to the Philippines, but not supported for its aid to Cambodia.  
Japan’s aid to Cambodia in the low threat period was primarily to support its effort to claim a 
place on the UN security council and highlight Japan’s role as the chief mediator of the 
Cambodian civil war.  The lack of a low threat period for China means that I was unable to 
confirm prediction 1 for China in both the quantitative analysis and case studies.  Prediction 2 
(aid is security oriented during high threat periods) was confirmed by the case studies.  Japan’s 
aid to the Philippines and Cambodia during the high threat (2002-2014) period is explained 
primarily by security variables (intensity of territorial dispute with China, relations with the 
United States, United States ally, ODA from the United States, aid from China).  China’s aid 
to the Philippines and Cambodia is explained by security factors with a heavy emphasis on 
countering United States security interests – supporting both predictions 2 and 4 (China’s aid 
policy to counter United States security interests).  When relations with the United States 
deteriorated, China responded with large aid inflows to both countries and allocated particularly 
large aid packages when Cambodia was the ASEAN chair to ensure Cambodia would control 






This dissertation has demonstrated that Japan’s and China’s foreign aid increasingly 
reflects security interests due to increased threat perception precipitated by the rise of China. 
The results for the analysis of Japan’s aid commitments confirms that commercial variables are 
only significant during the low threat period and security variables are dominant during the 
high threat periods.  This confirms the hypothesis for Japan.  Security factors have become the 
most significant variables that explain Japanese foreign aid commitments. I have also 
documented emergence and security implications of China’s burgeoning foreign aid program.  
The increase in the emphasis on security in Japan’s foreign aid program is the result of its 
increasing perception of a threat from the emergence of China and its dependence on the United 
States-Japan alliance for its security.   
 
For China, the analysis cannot fully confirm the hypothesis because there is little 
variation in the CV (threat perception).  The importance of the results for China lie in the 
findings on the factors that drive China’s foreign aid policy. The rapid expansion of China’s 
foreign aid activities since 2000 is best explained as its reaction to the increasing threat it 
perceives from the United States and the United States-Japan alliance as barriers to China 
continued rise and regional ambitions.  China’s aid policy has been predominantly security 
oriented over the entire analysis period and targeted at countering the security interests of the 
United States. 
 
The analysis is bolstered by two case studies of the determinants of Japan and China’s 
aid commitments to Cambodia and the Philippines from the late 1990s to 2014.  The case 




by enabling a more nuanced assessment of the factors that determine overall aid policy.  The 
regression models illustrate that China’s aid is systematically used to counter United States 
interests across the entire analysis period, while Japan’s aid has become more and more aligned 
with United States security interests as its threat perception increases.  The case studies show 
in detail how Chinese aid has been used opportunistically to counter United States interests and 
recruit allies.  
 
In international relations theory, liberals have held that foreign aid enhances national 
security by virtue of its commercial benefits to the donor and promoting interdependence. These 
commercial benefits are derived through expanded trade, liberal economic policies and foreign 
direct investment, and finally promoting economic interdependence and, therefore, peace.617 
Realists claim that anarchy, structure, and the overriding need to ensure state survival constrains 
state behavior to do what society may not want.  For realists, foreign aid primarily focuses on 
balancing external threats, developing and maintaining alliances, and to provide leverage over 
other countries.618  This dissertation sought to explain when countries behave more like liberals 
predict and when they behave more like realists predict in the area of foreign aid. The 
dissertation found that while commercial factors were the largest determinant of Japan’s aid 
commitments in the low threat period, security remained a large and significant determinant. 
Security factors dominated in all high threat periods for both China and Japan. The overall 
findings of the research imply that the realist conception of foreign aid is more likely to be 
correct. 
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7.1 High threat perception leads to security oriented foreign aid 
This dissertation tests whether level of threat perception determines whether 
commercial, security, or normative factors hold sway in the foreign aid commitment decision. 
During the Cold War, the literature on aid policy was heavily influenced by the strategic 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Aid was given to allies and along 
ideological lines in a competition for global influence and to spread and cement particular 
political and economic ideologies.  As the Soviet threat diminished and the Soviet Union 
dissolved, aid policy entered a period of transition and aid allocations overall began to decline 
in the 1990s until the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September. Aid suddenly 
began to jump to levels, adjusting for inflation, exceeding those during the Cold War. At the 
same time, China’s aid program was escalating from the hundreds of millions in the 1990s to 
the billions in the 2000s and tens of billions in the 2010s.  Japan’s aid commitments hit a peak 
in 1991 before entering a slow decline with 2002 the lowest level of aid commitments since 
1986.  In 2003, Japan’s aid jumped to levels similar to the early 1990s and by 2005 
commitments hit the highest level ever in real terms. By 2014-2017, aid commitments jumped 
again to nearly $25 billion, the highest levels ever for Japan. 
 
The rise of China is used to explain many trends in the international relations literature, 
but until recently, there has been no reliable data on its global aid activities to enable a detailed 
understanding of its intentions and motivations of it aid giving.  The literature on Japan’s aid 
program has two main thrusts.  First, that Japan’s aid is increasingly focused on human security 
and reflective of Japan’s role as peacemaker, and second, that Japan’s aid has become 
increasingly tied to its security policy to balance China’s rise.  The findings of this dissertation 
shed light on both of these questions by demonstrating the effect of China’s rise on Japan’s 




rise led it to more skeptically assess the purpose of the United States-Japan alliance and began 
to perceive it as targeting China.  
 
This dissertation performed a careful study of the level of threat perception in China 
and Japan over time.  Using discourse analysis of Chinese and Japanese media, debates in the 
Japanese Diet, defense white papers of Japan and China, and published survey results on 
perceptions in both countries, I demonstrate the Japan’s perception of a China threat emerged 
in the mid to late 1990s and escalated in the early 2000s before becoming an entrenched theme 
in Japanese political discourse. In the case of China, the perception of threat is related primarily 
to the United States and only incidentally to Japan in its role as a partner in the United States-
Japan alliance.  The actions of the United States during the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait and 
the oblique mentioning of the defense of “areas surrounding Japan” in the 1997 revision of the 
defense guidelines that govern the United States-Japan alliance stoked a perception in China 
that the United States-Japan alliance was now targeting it and that both the United States and 
Japan wanted to contain China’s economic growth and limit its power.619  For Japan, the 
analysis period of this dissertation divided the time periods up to reflect high threat and low 
threat environments.  Japan’s threat perception was high during the Cold War (1967-1991), low 
during the immediate post-Cold War period (1992-2001) and high for the remainder of the 
analysis period (2002-2014).  For China, the level of threat perception was elevated throughout 
the period for which data on Chinese foreign aid is available (2000-2014), but China’s threat 
perception has grown over time.  Therefore, I expected that foreign aid policy should have 
changed over the time period to reflect the higher level of threat in the latter part of the analysis 
period (2009-2014).  
                                                 





7.1.1 Commercial factors only important in low threat environment 
After the end of the Cold War, overall threat perception in the West and Japan declined 
as the primary security threat of the past 40 years disintegrated.  It was hailed as the “end of 
history” and the triumph of liberal democracy and free market economics where global security 
threats were thought to be minimal.620 In such a low threat environment, commercial self-
interest was expected to be dominant in the aid commitment decision.   
 
Japan’s aid program has been characterized as an extension of Japanese commercial 
policy and a means to support Japan’s export sector and recycle foreign exchange earnings.  
Having grown out of its post war reparations payments, most observers claimed that Japan’s 
aid program was meant to promote its commercial self-interest.  China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative also seems to point to a commercial motivation for aid to enable more trade and 
investment to flow between China and its immediate neighbors.  Such aid is characterized as 
“win-win” and mutually beneficial between donor and recipient with the subtext of expanding 
the commercial relations between states.  Authors such as Emma Mawdsley621 have said that 
China’s recent aid program is more commercial in nature than DAC aid and points to the 1990s 
as the time when China changed from more ideological and political aid to an aid program 
meant to support Chinese enterprises expanding abroad.  The findings of this dissertation 
contradict this view and find that security factors are the dominant explanatory variables for 
China’s foreign aid commitments. 
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The regression analysis confirms that commercial factors have the highest explanatory 
power in Japan’s ODA commitment decisions only during the low threat period.  Key variables 
that drove foreign aid allocations were FDI and trade with Japan.  However, security factors 
remained more significant than expected and were a close second in determining Japan’s aid 
commitments even in the low threat period.  In the high threat periods, the overall explanatory 
power of commercial variables was extremely low.  In the Cold War period, commercial 
variables explained about 10% of the overall variation in Japan’s aid commitments.  In the low 
threat period, this jumped to nearly 38% of the variation explained by commercial factors while 
security factors were responsible for about 31% of the variation in Japanese aid commitments.  
In the most recent high threat period, commercial factors are nearly irrelevant, only explaining 
2.0% of Japan’s overall aid commitment decisions. 
 
The China regressions find little evidence that commercial variables are significant in 
any period.  Though the evidence indicates that China was at least moderately threatened by 
the United States and the United States-Japan alliance over the entire analysis period, it also 
shows that the level of threat perception increased over that period.  I expected the significance 
of commercial factors to decline over time but did not expect them to be irrelevant.  The 
regression analysis indicates that commercial factors were, in fact, nearly irrelevant in China’s 
aid commitment decisions over the entire analysis period.  In some of the regressions, China 
FDI, and countries with more Chinese firms received more aid, but the effect is small overall 
and much less important than security factors and even normative factors. 
 
The case studies confirm that commercial factors only have salience when states face 
no significant external threats but only for Japan.  China’s foreign aid to the Philippines and 




importance of the Philippines to Japan declined significantly in the low threat period as the 
United States closed its military bases.  At that time, the Philippines was growing rapidly and 
trade with Japan was taking off.  This period represents some of the highest levels of Japanese 
aid to the Philippines reflecting the countries commercial importance to Japan and heavy 
investment flows. As the level of threat perception in Japan escalates, aid commitments to the 
Philippines decline precipitously reaching, by 2005-2006 their lowest levels since reparations 
even as Philippines economic growth was accelerating.  The impetus of Japan to begin 
increasing its aid to the Philippines was the intensifying territorial disputes between the 
Philippines and China starting in late 2007 and moves by China to build military facilities on 
artificial islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea since 2013.622  Commercial factors 
did not explain Japan’s aid policy toward the Philippines in the high threat period. 
 
The Cambodia case study indicates that Japan’s aid to Cambodia in the low threat period 
was small reflecting the very limited importance of the Cambodian economic and market to 
Japan and largely for the purpose of supporting Japan’s UN ambitions, a security factor with 
normative aspects.  Cambodia was recovering from a long period of conflict and needed 
reconstruction. Japan and other donors initiated their aid to Cambodia primarily for 
humanitarian reasons. Japanese aid to Cambodia escalates during the latter part of the high 
threat period as China’s aid to Cambodia jumps to exceptionally high levels.  In the case of 
China, commercial variables were not a factor in its decisions to pump aid into Cambodia. Like 
Japan, China’s trade with Cambodia is very small compared to its neighbors yet, Cambodia 
received huge aid inflows from China related to its role as a proxy to undermine ASEAN unity. 
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7.1.2 Security factors always significant in aid decisions 
A perceived high level of external threat is expected to compel states to allocate foreign 
aid based primarily on security interests. The regression analysis showed that Japanese aid was 
primarily determined by security interests in its high threat periods and security remained 
significant even in the low threat period.  In the Cold War high threat period, Japan rewarded 
countries with good US relations and countries receiving more United States ODA.  In the post-
Cold War low threat period, Japan focused on UN related variables (UNSC, UN Sanctions) but 
less on US related security variables. In the later high threat period, ASEAN chairs, UN security 
council members (Asia only), countries with United States military personnel, and United 
States ODA recipients were rewarded with more Japanese aid. In high threat periods, Japan 
rewarded states with border conflicts with China.  As Japan’s perception of a China threat 
intensified after 2001, Japanese ODA policy became more supportive of United States security 
interests with variables like number of United States military personnel and United States ODA 
becoming significant determinants of Japan’s ODA commitments.   
 
In the case of China, I predicted that security factors would be important overall but 
more significant later in the analysis period than earlier.  The regression results did not bear this 
out.  In the case of China, security factors are the dominant explanatory variables across the 
entire period.  The exceedingly low explanatory power of commercial variables is striking in 
the case of China and are in fact less important than normative factors in explaining China’s 
aid commitments.  The primary change in the China regression results reflect the shift from the 
“charm offensive” strategy where China attempted to ingratiate itself to Southeast Asian 
countries including United States treaty allies early in the decade but switched to a punitive 
policy later in the decade.  This shift is evident by the fact that United States treaty allies 




maritime conflicts with China (Asia regression) and United States treaty allies received less aid 
after 2008.  These effects are strong and statistically significant.   
 
As threat perception escalated in both China and Japan, security factors became the 
dominant explanatory variables in aid commitments.  The case studies confirmed the centrality 
of security factors in the major changes observed in aid policy for both China and Japan.  In the 
early 2000s China and the Philippines were attempting to mend their relations and pursuing 
joint development in the area of their territorial dispute.  China’s charm offensive was in full 
swing and aid commitments from China exploded after the Philippines relations with the United 
States deteriorated.  China displaced Japan as the main bilateral donor to the Philippines during 
the charm offensive.  When the territorial conflict between China and the Philippines flared 
again, Chinese aid quickly went to zero and Japan (along with the United States) stepped in 
with escalating aid packages largely making up for the decline in aid from China.  
 
In the case of Cambodia, Japanese aid has been reasonably consistent over time and 
commitments to that country have been low compared to Japan’s aid to Cambodia’s neighbors.  
The country has limited importance for Japan’s commercial and security interests and 
consequently received limited aid from Japan.  Japan’s aid to Cambodia has increased 
significantly from 2009 onward largely as a response to increasing levels of aid from China as 
a means to ensure Cambodia does not fully align itself with Chinese interests in ASEAN.  
Chinese aid to Cambodia is highly correlated with events related to Chinese security interests.  
After the 1997 coup, DAC donors reduced aid to Cambodia.  China stepped in immediately to 
counter moves by Western powers to punish Hun Sen’s regime.  It saw an opportunity to 
counter moves by Hun Sen’s opposition (FUNCINPEC) to move towards better relations with 




Office in Phnom Penh and seek more aid from China. Other major episodes of large-scale 
Chinese aid commitments surround Cambodia’s assumption of the ASEAN chairmanship.  
Close coordination between aid allocations from China to Cambodia and the 2012 ASEAN 
Defense Ministers Meeting enabled China to undermine ASEAN unity and ensure it did not 
take a position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 
 
7.1.3 Normative factors are generally unimportant in aid decisions 
In the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation, normative factors were not 
expected to be important in the aid commitment decisions of China and Japan.  Since many 
countries do allocate substantial aid when developing countries experience natural and 
anthropogenic disasters, the framework accounts for these events.  Further, a body of literature 
on foreign aid primarily from the constructivist perspective emphasizes the role of values and 
altruism in foreign aid policy. Aid practitioners and agencies use the language of moral values 
to justify their programs and tend to be reticent about explicitly claiming that aid is self-
interested. Within international relations, scholars from the constructivist tradition have argued 
that aid reflects the altruism of donors623 while others emphasize aid as an expression of 
national identity where foreign aid is an established international norm.624  
 
This dissertation includes variables that reflect normative values in the aid commitment 
decision.  Variables indicating the level of poverty, the incidence of humanitarian crises, and 
factors such as liberal voting records in the UN, measures of democracy and human rights 
enable us to assess whether these issues result in more or less aid from donor countries. Despite 
a significant body of literature on Japanese aid that asserts a shift towards international norms 
                                                 
623 David Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics, 30. 




and values in its aid program, there is little evidence from either the regressions or the case 
studies that values have a significant influence on Japan’s foreign aid.  In most instances where 
normative variables are significant for Japanese aid commitments, the sign is opposite from that 
expected.  For example, a liberal democratic voting record in the UN is not rewarded with more 
aid from Japan but less.  In all time periods, normative factors are a minor influence on Japanese 
foreign aid commitments but are approximately equal to commercial influences in the post 2001 
high threat period. 
 
For China, normative factors appear to be more salient than for Japan and the prediction 
that normative factors will be less important than commercial factors does not hold for China.  
Normative factors are more important than commercial factors but less than security factors in 
all periods for China.  In addition, the variables such as the incidence of a humanitarian crisis 
and poverty indicators have the expected sign indicating a preference for providing aid to 
victims of disasters and states with high poverty.  Interestingly, China rewards countries with 
more democratic institutions and respect for human rights with more aid commitments even 
when Japan does not.  Some have criticized Chinese aid as being “rogue aid” that supports 
despotic regimes and undermines the international aid regime.  While Chinese aid serves 
China’s interests, and those interests may conflict with the interests of Western countries and 
Japan; the criticism that China’s aid is inferior to DAC aid from a development or humanitarian 
perspective is not supported. From a normative perspective, there is no evidence that Chinese 
aid is “worse” than aid from Japan. 
 
7.2 Contribution to existing literature 
This dissertation adds to the existing literature in two ways.  First, it explicitly links 




importance of security factors in aid decision-making. In this way, I have shown that the rise 
of China and the accompanying perception of a China threat in Japan has led to more emphasis 
on security factors in Japan’s foreign aid.  Second, through the development of a new dataset 
based on the recently released worldwide China aid database developed by Aiddata.org which 
I modified for this dissertation, I am able to analyze in detail the motivations behind China’s 
aid commitments. Previous studies based on narrow country studies or regional databases 
focused on Africa were too limited to understand the overall scope of China’s aid program and 
its worldwide motivations.  The results of this research help to illuminate China’s motivations 
with its aid and provide a clearer picture of China’s aspirations to challenge the interests and 
influence of the United States.  This dissertation also provides a more comprehensive bespoke 
dataset developed specifically to test China’s intentions with its aid program.  The base 
Aiddata.org worldwide China dataset was recoded to capture all financial flows likely to be 
perceived as aid from the perspective of recipient countries rather than the Aiddata.org 
approach that only categorized financial flows that could be definitively shown to meet the 
DAC definition of ODA as Chinese foreign aid.  This revised dataset is more comprehensive 
and gives a clearer picture of the scope and intent of China’s foreign aid commitments than has 
been possible to date. 
 
7.2.1 Explaining the increasing importance of security in foreign aid 
The results of this research indicate that security is almost always a significant 
determinant of aid commitments to specific countries.  Even though Japan’s aid program had 
been considered an adjunct to its commercial policy nearly since its inception, security factors 




to the recent literature on the “securitization” of Japan’s ODA (Jain 2016625; Yoshimatsu and 
Trinidad 2010626; Carvalho and Potter 2016627) and does not indicate any substantial move 
towards considering normative values in Japan’s aid commitments. Security has become 
increasingly important in Japan’s ODA commitment decisions after 2001. This trend in ODA 
securitization is likely to continue. Japan made major changes to its approach to national 
security in 2013, which was further elaborated and codified in the 2015 Development 
Cooperation Charter.628 The National Security Strategy published in 2013 refers to ODA as a 
“fundamental policy pertaining to national security” and part of the government’s policy of 
“Proactive Contribution to Peace.”629 While explicitly stating that Japan will not provide aid 
for military purposes, the 2015 Charter now allows Japan to provide aid to the armed forces of 
recipient countries for nonmilitary activities such as peacekeeping and disaster response630. 
These policy changes, combined with Japan’s recent practice of providing quasi-military 
equipment in the form of coast guard patrol ships for the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam631, 
imply that security factors will continue to become more important in Japan’s ODA 
commitment decisions. 
 
This dissertation also demonstrates that security variables were the dominant factors 
that influenced Japan’s aid commitment decisions during the Cold War period (1966-1991). 
This finding seems contrary to much of the literature on Japanese ODA, which identifies 
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commercial interests as Japan’s primary motivation, especially early in its aid program. 
However, we must account for the fact that during the Cold War period, Japan’s ODA was 
mostly tied to Japanese contractors and only became predominantly untied during the 1990s. 
Tied aid benefits Japan commercially no matter which country receives its ODA. Paradoxically, 
tied aid frees the government to allocate its ODA to specific countries that serve Japan’s 
security interests, serving commercial and security purposes simultaneously. The results of this 
study demonstrate that Japan only began to align its ODA allocations with commercial factors 
once tied aid was phased out.  
 
This research demonstrates that China’s aid program, since it started increasing aid 
rapidly in 2000, has been predominantly allocated to serve China’s security interests rather than 
commercial interests.  Past studies that suggest that China’s search for securing resources and 
improving trade relations are not confirmed in this research.  While we cannot rule out any 
specific cases of China using its aid for commercial advantage or to secure natural resources, 
there is very little evidence that it systematically uses its aid to support its commercial interests.  
Much of the literature that points to cases where Chinese aid seemingly supports Chinese 
commercial interests appears to be caused by the overall confusion about what financial flows 
from China should be considered aid and which are simply investment or trade finance.  By 
utilizing the modified Aiddata.org dataset, this research is able to distinguish which financial 
flows are perceived to be Chinese foreign aid by the recipient.   
 
This research shows that China’s aid program began scaling up when it announced its 
“Going Out” strategy.  The “Going Out” strategy was announced two years after China’s 
perceived threat from the United States-Japan alliance rose with the 1997 publication of the 




Crisis. During the Cold War, China perceived the United States-Japan alliance as the “cork in 
the bottle” holding back Japan’s military ambitions in Asia.  However, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the dissipation of that threat, China began to perceive that the alliance was 
aimed at containing China. This research suggests that this increase in China’s perceived threat 
was partially responsible for its decision to rapidly escalate its aid activities.  Since the late 
1990s, China’s has used its aid as a tool to counter United States interests and balance against 
the United States-Japan alliance. 
 
7.2.2 Towards understanding China’s aspirations  
One of the motivations for this research was to understand the purpose of China’s aid 
program and to infer from those findings indications of China’s overall intentions with regard 
to the Western dominated international system and the United States alliance network in Asia. 
A large body of scholarly work focuses on China’s intentions; whether it is a status quo or 
revisionist power. 632  The question itself contains debatable assumptions about what the 
international system is and whether there is enough of a consensus about international norms 
to even define such a system.  The United States, which is rarely accused of being a revisionist 
power, has an ambiguous record supporting the international institutions that help define the 
international system.  It has not ratified UNCLOS and explicitly withdrew its signature from 
the International Criminal Court and periodically has withheld its dues to the United Nations.  
It would be illogical to label China a revisionist power just because it pursues its own interest 
which it perceives to be contrary to the interests of the United States or Japan.  All countries 
with the power to influence international institutions and norms constantly try to change them 
to serve their interests. China is no different.   
                                                 






Based on the research in this dissertation, a heightened perception of a threat from the 
United States-Japan alliance immediately preceded the rapid expansion of China’s aid program 
in the late 1990s.  While it is not possible to say that a perceived threat from the United States-
Japan alliance caused China to ramp up its aid activities, I have demonstrated that the primary 
determinants of China’s aid commitment decisions were security factors over the entire analysis 
period. China’s aid program was tailored to counter United States security interests and isolate 
Taiwan. Given the overall security orientation of China’s aid program over the entire period for 
which detailed data is available (2000-2014), the sudden shift from slowly growing aid 
allocations to extremely rapid growth in aid was likely the result of China’s increasing threat 
perception in the mid and late 1990s. 
 
A consistent feature of China’s aid strategy is that of opportunism; China reacts quickly 
to international conditions to offer aid when that aid can counter the United States and Western 
dominated institutions.  China initiated a reform of its aid program in 1995 and first articulated 
its “Going Out” strategy in 1997.  The Asian Financial Crisis provided China an opportunity to 
step in with its aid as Asian countries were reacting strongly against many policy conditions 
imposed by Western multilateral donors and the IMF.  China’s response to the crisis included 
aid and export credits to Thailand, Indonesia and other Asian countries, boosted its domestic 
demand and ensured that its currency was not devalued, which effectively supported the 
economies in the rest of Asia.633 China’s aid began to take off in 1999 after growing slowly 
throughout the 1990s.   
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During the early part of the analysis period (2000-2008), China’s aid program reflects 
the “charm offensive” where China sought to reassure countries of its intentions, particularly 
in Asia.  During the charm offensive, China gave more aid to United States treaty allies and 
those with a US military base.  This policy of reassurance lasted until relations with those 
countries in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines and Vietnam turned testy. As China realized 
that its aid and diplomatic “charm offensive” were not likely to continue suppressing various 
conflicts over territory, around 2008, China’s aid policy became punitive and punished those 
same countries by reducing aid.   
 
In all periods, China increased aid to countries with poor or deteriorating relations with 
the United States. China seeks to undermine United States alliance relationships and interests 
with its aid program. The case studies show that China stepped in with large aid packages when 
states like Cambodia acted in ways that the Western powers condemned.  Western aid to 
Cambodia dropped after Hun Sen’s 1997 coup, but China responded quickly making up for 
most of the drop in total aid.  When the Philippines angered the United States by withdrawing 
its troops from Iraq and United States aid dropped, China responded with large offers of 
economic aid in exchange for cooperation on joint development in contested areas of the South 
China Sea.  In these cases, total aid received by these two countries was not affected much as 
China stepped into compensate for loss of aid from other donors.  In the case of the Philippines, 
when China pulled its aid after territorial disputes escalated, Japan stepped in to compensate 
for the loss of Chinese aid.  The reaction of Japan with its aid to China’s allocations is also 
noteworthy. In the case of Cambodia, Japan only reduced its aid a small amount and quickly 
resumed its ODA to that country at higher levels at the same time China was making large 




displaced it.  This was likely because of the Philippines chose to prefer aid from China rather 
than Japan due to the ease with which corrupt officials could arrange kickbacks under Chinese 
aid practices.  There is no evidence that Japan would have denied the Philippines more aid had 
it been requested. 
 
7.3 Conclusions and policy implications 
This dissertation sought to explain how China and Japan have changed their foreign aid 
programs as a result of China’s rise. Using regression analysis and case studies I have 
demonstrated that security factors explain the rapid growth of China and Japan’s foreign aid 
programs since the beginning of the millennium.  I have modeled how increasing levels of 
threat perception change how much and to whom foreign aid is committed by China and Japan.  
The research has shown that for Japan, commercial factors are only salient during the low threat 
period and that for both Japan and China security factors are the main determinant of how much 
and to whom aid is given when threat perception is high.  I also demonstrate that China’s aid 
program since the late 1990s has been used to counter United States and Japan interests and, 
through the case studies, document how and when China opportunistically uses large aid 
commitments to counter United States security interests and provide an alternative to Western 
donors.  
 
7.3.1 Realism explains foreign aid of China and Japan most of the time 
The theoretical framework proposed for this research hypothesized that during low 
threat periods, states would behave as predicted by commercial liberalism.  During high threat 
periods, states would behave as predicted by realism.  I proposed that the switching of state 
behavior between the predictions of these two international relations paradigms would be 




threat perception is noticeable, but a weaker effect than expected.  The research results indicate 
that security factors are significant predictors of foreign aid commitments even in the low threat 
period.  For Japan, commercial factors only exceeded security factors in their explanatory 
power during the low threat period, but security variables remained surprisingly significant in 
Japan’s aid decision-making.  For China, though there is no detailed foreign aid data during a 
low threat period, the small influence of commercial factors to explain China’s aid commitment 
decisions is remarkable.  Many researchers such as Brautigham have looked at primarily 
African case studies of China’s aid and suggested that business interests and commercial 
benefits are one of the driving forces in China’s aid policy. Contrary to these findings, this 
dissertation shows that China’s aid has been consistently and primarily allocated to promote 
China’s security interests rather than its commercial interests.  The overall picture of foreign 
aid policy, for China and Japan, is that foreign aid is primarily an adjunct to national security 
policy most of the time.  Truly low threat periods are rare and foreign aid is usually allocated 
as realists predict. 
 
7.3.2 Without a security threat, aid declines 
This importance of security factors in foreign aid policy is also evident in the overall 
size of foreign aid budgets.  Without a perceived threat, the overall foreign aid budgets of most 
large powers decline.  As shown in Figure 2-1 on page 19 (DAC Donor ODA), Figure 3-1 on 
page 78 (Japanese ODA), and Figure 3-3 on page 99 (China’s estimated ODA budgets), most 
major donors reduced total foreign aid allocations substantially after the end of the Cold War 
and only began escalating their overall aid allocations in the late 1990s (United States, UK, and 
China) or early 2000s (Japan, Germany, France) as global threats from terrorism and a rapidly 
rising China became apparent.  Foreign aid is a policy choice that requires a degree of domestic 




security, other constituencies supporting commercial interests and those promoting 
humanitarian aid do not appear to have the political power to maintain foreign aid budgets.  It 
takes an external perceived threat to national security to get a majority of decisionmakers to 
support increased levels of foreign aid in major donor countries. 
 
7.3.3 China’s aid is meant to weaken United States influence 
The policy implications of this research revolve primarily around how other donors such 
as Japan and the United States respond to China’s approach to aid and how recipients can 
position themselves to maximize aid flows from multiple donors.  China’s aid policy targets 
weakening the relations between the United States and other countries, particularly in Asia.  
Japan’s aid policy in the high threat periods is aimed at supporting United States security 
interests.  While China’s aid does not appear ideological after the Cold War, some of the 
features of Cold War aid policy is apparent in China’s approach.  The willingness to step in 
when aid recipient countries relations with the United States deteriorate in some ways harkens 
back to the use of aid by the United States and Soviet Union to establish and maintain spheres 
of influence in countries without strong ideological preferences (e.g. Egypt).  China’s approach 
to aid is remarkably similar to that of the United States and other major donors in the past.   
 
7.3.4 Criticisms of Chinese aid are largely (but not entirely) wrong 
There is no evidence that China’s aid is better or worse from a development or 
humanitarian perspective than DAC aid. The criticism that China’s aid is targeted at gaining 
access to resources is also not supported by evidence.  China’s aid engenders such criticism 
because China is perceived as a threat, its aid is an adjunct to its national security policy, and 
the purpose of China’s aid is to undermine recipient countries relations with existing powers.  




“new global battle” for influence around the world.634 She had been warning about aid from 
China since becoming Secretary of State and even encouraged countries to be wary of accepting 
aid from China because she warned it was “more interested in extracting your resources than 
building your capacity.”635  Clinton was reiterating a theme of many critics of Chinese aid; that 
it is not in the best interests of the recipient to accept aid from China.  Moyo Dambisa recounts 
the objections of the European Investment Bank president to China’s aid to Africa which stated 
that the Chinese don’t care about environmental and social safeguards, human rights and labor 
standards and undercut Western donors by ignoring these issues.636  The implication of such 
criticism is that only the Western donors know what is good for the aid recipients and that 
developing countries are incapable of ensuring projects meet basic standards.  This paternalistic 
view is one reason China’s aid is appreciated in much of the developing world and the criticisms 
that imply China’s aid is not beneficial are dubious.637  Some developing countries do not 
enforce project environmental and social safeguards, but it is the responsibility of the recipient 
country to ensure standards appropriate to the recipient’s level of development and needs are 
met, not China’s.  Others criticize China’s aid for trapping developing countries in debt.  Again, 
this argument is paternalistic implying the aid recipient does not know what is good for them.  
Further, ODA lending to developing countries by DAC donors has led many recipients into 
debt distress.  The same may happen again with Chinese lending but it is up to the recipient 
country to decide what level of borrowing from international donors is appropriate.   
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Most developing countries receiving aid from China perceive that aid to be in their own 
national interest.  As I have argued, aid is mainly given to promote the interests of the donor 
and, in the cases of China and Japan, I have shown that it is primarily security interests that 
drive aid commitments.  As the analysis in this dissertation makes clear, China’s aid is aimed 
at undermining United States interests and pulling countries away from United States and 
Western influence, which is the likely source of most criticism of Chinese aid.   
 
7.3.5 Aid recipients can increase their aid and minimize aid conditions 
China’s use of aid to balance against the United States may be a challenge to the United 
States and its allies like Japan but offers developing countries a prime opportunity to extract 
more total aid than could be gleaned from China or DAC donors alone. The willingness of 
China to move in when other donors threaten to leave, offers the opportunity to avoid the 
conditions that may have come attached to past DAC donor aid packages.  The fact that China 
will often step in to make up for losses in aid from other donors also makes other donors less 
likely to reduce aid even when countries act in ways that Western donors and Japan do not like.  
Cambodia is a good example of a nation that maximizes its aid receipts while avoiding 
significant domestic policy conditions even though China’s aid appears conditional on 
Cambodia taking China friendly positions in ASEAN and other international organizations.  
Other DAC donors, especially Japan, have been reluctant to reduce aid to Cambodia and overall 
aid to Cambodia has trended upward for well over a decade even without much progress 
towards democracy and human rights in Cambodia which DAC donors have been promoting 
since the early 1990s.   
 
The Philippines also seems to have figured out how to leverage large aid packages from 




no aid to the Philippines, President Duterte has made a habit of insulting the United States and 
deemphasizing the United States-Philippines alliance.  Predictably, China has stepped up with 
massive promises of new lending to the Philippines. While the China financed projects have 
not yet materialized as of early 2019, the pipeline of new projects proposed for Chinese 
financing ($13.5 billion) exceed the pipeline of proposed Japanese aid financed projects ($7.6 
billion).638  Both of these numbers are much higher than during the 2008-2017 period when 
new aid commitments averaged about $1.46 billion per year.639 While United States economic 
aid commitments to the Philippines dropped from around $172 million in 2015 to $113 million 
in 2017 (OECD), aid continues to flow.  Even with President Duterte’s deteriorating relations 
with the United States, military aid from the United States to the Philippines between 2016-
2018 reached about $375 million640 and included many systems meant to help the Philippines 
assert its claims in the South China Sea.  The Philippines has now figured out how to sustain 
aid from DAC donors while also inducing large aid packages from China.   
 
Developing countries now have an opportunity to receive more aid than ever before due 
to China’s rapidly growing aid program and the unwillingness to other donors to cut aid even 
when relations falter.  The strategy that appears most effective is to follow these steps: 
1) declare the country’s policy independence from the United States, but do not 
fully break relations 
2) approach China with requests for aid and investment 
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3) participate in United States or Western/Japan led initiatives (e.g. military to 
military exchanges, weapons purchases from the United States, Lower Mekong 
Initiative, Tokyo International Conference of Africa’s Development (TICAD), 
etc.) 
4) participate in China led initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), BRI and 
AIIB 
 
By appealing to all sides, developing countries can extract maximum aid from donors 
while minimizing the conditions attached to that aid.  Countries that have fully rejected relations 
with the United States, resulting in the cutoff of United States (and other Western) aid, and 
dependence on China have not fared well.  Venezuela is an example of a state that fully rejected 
relations with the United States under Hugo Chavez (President, 1999-2013) and Nicolas 
Maduro (President, 2013-present). Venezuela has received $62 billion in Chinese investment641  
while the United States has provided less than $20 million per year in aid to Venezuela which 
is almost entirely given to governance and civil society NGOs, not the government.642  China, 
by being the primary backer of the Chavez and Maduro regimes, has succeeded in buying an 
ally in South America but Venezuela has become a near pariah state with no alternative but to 
depend on China for external financing.  Countries that wish to maximize inflows of foreign 
aid and investment should avoid overly antagonistic relations with Western donors and Japan 
to ensure aid and investment flows continue from all parties.   
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7.3.6 Ability to impose aid conditions is declining 
The willingness of China to step in with aid when others threaten to leave has 
significantly reduced the ability of donors to extract policy concessions from aid recipients.  
The United States, Japan and other DAC countries have increasingly found that China is willing 
to make up for reduced aid commitments from other donors and reward countries that 
antagonize the United States.  The logical result of this along with the large size of China’s aid 
program which now rivals Japan’s in total concessional lending, means that traditional donors 
cannot extract much in the way of domestic policy concessions to become more democratic, 
respect human rights and the rule of law, and/or economic liberalization because China is not 
as interested in the aid recipient’s policy actions in these areas.  In fact, there is no substantial 
evidence that China specifically offers aid to more despotic regimes vs. more democratic ones.  
China’s aid is primarily conditioned on support for China in international institutions like 
ASEAN, support for Chinese territorial aspirations, and isolating Taiwan.  DAC donors will 
likely enjoy more limited leverage over countries that are receiving aid from China.  It is an 
open question whether this will lead to declining aid commitments from DAC donors in the 
future due to the declining utility of aid to buy policy concessions from developing countries.  
Data from the OECD shows that DAC aid has been on a nearly continual trend upward (see 
Figure 2-1 on page 19) since 1997 through 2016.  As of this writing there is no evidence that 
Chinese aid is displacing DAC aid.  Thus far, Chinese aid is adding to the total available aid. 
 
7.3.7 How should donors respond? 
The landscape of aid has changed.  New and emerging donors are expanding the amount 
of aid available, reducing the leverage of donors to extract policy concessions, and challenging 




aid motivation.  The policy recommendations here are not focused on improving aid 
effectiveness but how to better respond to the challenge from new and emerging donors.  I have 
shown that donors which perceive significant security threats allocate their aid to enhance their 
security.  They do this by supporting their own alliance partners, weakening the alliances of 
their adversaries, and buying votes and influence in international institutions.  With the 
expanding number of donors with disparate interests, how should donors promote their interests 
using aid? 
 
First, donors should avoid imposing negative aid sanctions unless absolutely necessary.  
In some cases, particularly odious regimes will act with such brutality or corruption that aid to 
such governments must be severed for moral and political necessity.  But other cases, such as 
the Philippines pulling its support for the Iraq war in 2004 or the military takeover in Thailand 
in 2014, were not such cases and the reduced aid (from the United States) to these countries in 
response only served to enable China to increase its influence at the expense of the United 
States.  In the current environment, negative aid sanctions are unlikely to be effective and may 
be counter-productive if such sanctions result in a closer relationship between an adversary and 
the recipient.   
 
Second, existing donors should expand concessional lending rather than grant aid.  
Recipient countries have massive infrastructure deficits that are appropriate for concessional 
lending.  One reason that China’s aid program has been so well received by many recipients is 
that it addresses these needs.  While Japan has a high share of ODA loans compared to grants, 
most other DAC donors heavily favor grants and some, like the United States have very limited 
ability to provide concessional ODA lending and many DAC donors provide relatively little 




lending in infrastructure sectors to be more competitive with Chinese aid.  ODA lending is 
much lower cost to donors since much of it is repaid by the recipient and offers similar 
reputational benefits to grant aid.   
 
Third, other donors should understand China’s aid program and respond to ensure 
recipients do not fall into dependence on China.  This dissertation has demonstrated that China 
seeks to undermine Western interests, and the security interests of the United States in particular, 
with its aid program and moves quickly and opportunistically to pull strategic countries away 
from Western powers.  Other donors should anticipate China’s actions and respond with their 
own aid programs.  Donors should understand that leverage over recipients has declined so aid 
sanctions are not nearly as useful as in the past.  To some extent, Western donors and Japan 
have done this in the case of Myanmar which had long been isolated by Western sanctions and 
supported by China.  When the country transitioned from military rule in 2012, Japan quickly 
ramped up its aid to over 470 billion JPY in 2013 (over $4 billion) with over half provided as 
grants.  Such a quick response helps countries reduce dependency on China and will, 
consequently, be less likely to act contrary to the security interests of its other donors.  Donors 
also can proactively provide alternatives to Chinese aid.  As shown in the Philippines case study, 
China’s aid is prone to corruption and usually of higher cost than DAC donor financing.  
Chinese aid is tied to Chinese contractors who have been willing to pay kickbacks to politicians 
and has led to corruption scandals that damage the reputation of both China as a donor and the 
recipient government.643  False arguments that Chinese aid is only to get access to resources or 
is not beneficial will not be effective, but other donors can emphasize their generosity, 
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transparency, and lack of corruption risk in comparison to Chinese aid.  Other donors should 
be prepared to quickly step in and offer better terms than Chinese concessional lending – 
essentially meeting the challenge of Chinese aid with better aid offers for the recipient.   
 
Lastly, China should continue professionalizing its aid program by expanding the 
project preparation, implementation, and monitoring responsibilities of CIDCA, investing in 
staff resources to manage its aid program, and improving the transparency of its decision-
making.  One of the biggest threats to China’s ability to pursue its goals through foreign aid is 
the susceptibility of its aid to corruption due to the lack of oversight and monitoring, limited 
staffing, and lack of transparency.  China’s international reputation and the good will 
engendered by is aid can be tarnished by corruption scandals and unflattering publicity around 
Chinese financed projects.  China should address these risks with more active participation in 
project selection and preparation, ensure actual competition in the selection of contractors for 
Chinese financed projects, and provide more transparency in aid commitment decisions 







APPENDIX 1: Data and notes 
 
All of the data used in this dissertation is available from the author upon request.  Data 
on Japan’s ODA program is based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee data set. 
The OECD data set is used in order to maintain maximum comparability with the available data 
on Chinese foreign assistance provided by AidData.  AidData provides estimates of Chinese 
financial flows that are intended to be consistent with OECD definitions of ODA and OOF. For 
this reason, OECD data is preferred over that available directly from JICA for the purpose of 
international comparability.   
 
This dissertation primarily uses ODA estimates expressed in national currencies at 
constant prices. OECD data is typically presented in USD so that aid levels from one country 
can be compared to aid provided by others from the perspective of recipients.  However, 
exchange rate swings can significantly affect our interpretation of the intent of aid policy 
decisions.  Therefore, OECD data is converted back to constant Japanese Yen while AidData’s 
China ODA is expressed in constant Chinese Yuan for most of the analysis.  Only when 
discussing the overall size of aid programs in order to make international comparisons of impact 
do we revert to constant USD.  For Japan, I use the current USD estimate of ODA levels 
converted to JPY using period average exchange rates and then expressed in constant JPY using 
the GDP deflator for Japan.644  For China, ODA is converted to constant 2013 CNY using 
exchange rates published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank and the GDP deflator for China 
published by the World Bank.   
                                                 








APPENDIX 2: ODA RECIPIENT COUNTRIES IN THE ANALYSIS 
Some countries excluded from the OECD data set.  Excluded countries are those that 
have no country data in the World Bank and IMF datasets or that do not qualify as ODA 
recipients.  Note that some countries that have had regions split and become new states (e.g. 
Indonesia/Timor-Leste, Sudan/South Sudan, Serbia/Montenegro) are treated as a single state 
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APPENDIX 3: JAPAN DEFENSE WHITE PAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Year Situation around Japan  Security concerns with respect to China  Overall Threat Rating 
1991 As we have seen above, the situation of Japan's surrounding areas, is more 
complicated than in Europe. In the future, through the movement toward easing 
tensions in the region, such as described above, fostering of political trust is 
achieved, and therefore, it is expected that the range is preferred also affect the 
military situation in the region, in the region situation is not change the fact that 
there is still uncertain. 
 http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1991/w1991_01.html 
China, which has a vast territory and a huge population, has a large-scale ground 
forces, is an excellent country in the defense force, succeeded in the mid-1960s, 
the atomic bomb experiment, one after another to the nuclear missiles test 
launch, This has led to the even nuclear weapons capability. In this way, China 
has become a presence that may have a significant impact on the security of the 
region independent from the United States and the Soviet Union. 
2 
1992 Reflecting the above security characteristics, the diagram of conflict in this region is 
also complex and diverse, and a framework for regional security, like the CSCE seen 
in Europe, has been created There is no situation. Furthermore, there are political 
problems that cannot be caught in the composition of the East-West conflict like the 
Cambodian problem or the territorial issue of the Spratly Islands. 
 
As has been seen above, the situation in the surrounding areas of Japan is 
complicated, and there have been no major changes yet occurred in Europe. Under 
these circumstances, each country in the region such as China, South Korea, ASEAN 
countries, etc. has been trying to enrich defense power.  (Sections 3.1 3.2)  
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1992/w1992_01.html 
In this way, China is independent from the United States and the former Soviet 
Union, which can have a significant influence on the security of this region. 
Section 3.1 
2 
1993 Thus, in today's international military affairs, while various efforts are continuing 
towards stabilization, there are many fluid elements, and there are uncertainty and 
uncertainty about the future. However, as a result of the fact that the Cold War has 
come to an end indeed due to the dismantlement of the Soviet Union in general, in 
general, it can be recognized that the flow to the preferred direction is progressing. 
Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1993/w1993_01.html 
China seeks a stable foreign relationship to advance reform and open-mind 
policy, while for military, it is trying to shift from a guerilla war-oriented 
popular warfare setting to a regular warfare-oriented position, especially high 
performance in the Gulf Crisis We emphasize the effectiveness of weapons, and 
in recent years we are trying to modernize equipment.  Section 1 
1 
1994 In this way, the change accompanying the end of the Cold War is not uniform 
throughout the region, and each country is seeking a more stable order under the 
security environment in which they are located, It cannot be said that the direction 
was clarified. For this reason, the military situation around the world is still having a 
fluid element in the midst of continuing uncertainty about the future.  Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1994/w1994_01.html 
China is trying to change its defense capability from quantity to quality, and in 
recent years it has drastically increased the defense budget and is trying to 
gradually modernize equipment mainly in the sea and air force. In addition, 
there are movements to strengthen the base of activities in the ocean centering 





1995  In the Asia-Pacific region, various problems remain unsolved even after the end of 
the Cold War, and there is no situation where big changes like those occurred in 
Europe accompanying the end of the Cold War are seen. Also, with the expansion of 
the economy, many Asian countries are striving to enhance and modernize defense 
power. Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1995/ara11.htm 
China is trying to change its defense capability from quantity to quality, and in 
recent years it has significantly increased its defense budget. China has been 
modernizing nuclear forces, and last year we conducted a nuclear test twice and 
this year in May. In addition, we are advancing the progressive modernization 
of equipment centering on the sea and air force. In February this year concerns 
of related countries are rising as a result of relocating buildings to the "mischief 
reef" (commonly known) in the Nansha archipelago. It is necessary to keep a 
close eye on the movement of such activities in China's oceans in the future.  
Section 1 
2 
1996 In the Asia-Pacific region, although there are changes such as the quantitative 
reduction of Russian forces in the Far East, while there still exists large-scale 
military power including nuclear forces, many countries are facing increasing 
economic power, etc. We are striving to expand and modernize military power, and 
various problems such as our northern territories, the Korean Peninsula, and the 
Nansha archipelago remain unresolved, and still uncertain elements remain. 
Furthermore, there is no situation where a multilateral security framework like that 
in Europe is being built, but the bilateral alliance / friendship relations centering on 
the United States and the existence of the US military based on this exist in this 
region It plays an important role in peace and stability, but in recent years, 
multilateral security dialogue efforts such as the establishment of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) have started and future progress is expected. Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1996/index.html 
The modernization of the military power of China seems to progress gradually 
from the fact that the country regards economic construction as the most 
important task at hand for the time being, but promoting modernization of 
nuclear forces and maritime and air forces, It is necessary to pay close attention 
to such trends as the expansion of the scope of activities in Taiwan and the 
growing tension in the Taiwan Strait due to military exercises around Taiwan. 
Section 3 2 
1997 In the Asia-Pacific region, although there are changes such as the quantitative 
reduction of the Far East Russian army, while there still exist large-scale military 
power including nuclear forces, many countries expand economic power, etc. As we 
are striving to expand and modernize military, various problems such as the 
Northern Territories of Japan, Takeshima, Korea Peninsula, and the Nansha 
Archipelago remain unresolved, and uncertain elements remain unknown. 
Furthermore, there is no situation where a multilateral security framework like that 
in Europe is being built, but the bilateral alliance / friendship relations centering on 
the United States and the existence of the US military based on this exist in this 
region It plays an important role in peace and stability. Also, in recent years, 
opportunities for bilateral military exchanges have increased, and efforts of 
multilateral dialogue on regional security such as ARF are getting established. 
Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1997/def11.htm 
The modernization of the military power of China seems to progress gradually 
from the fact that the country regards economic construction as the most 
important issue at the moment, but promoting modernization of nuclear forces 
and maritime / air forces, It is necessary to keep an eye on the situation of the 
Taiwan Strait which expanded the scope of activities, the rise of temporary 
tension last year. Section 4 
2 
1998 After the end of the Cold War, the possibility of worldwide armed conflict occurred 
declined, but complicated and diverse regional conflicts occurred Moreover, there is 
a strong concern that an increase in relocation / diffusion of weapons of mass 
destruction etc. is strong. In this way, the international situation, We still have 
uncertain and uncertain elements. Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1998/wp1998_11.pdf 
For military power, we are planning to switch from quantity to quality. The 
modernization of military capability, China is making the economic 
construction the immediate It seems that it progresses progressively because it is 
regarded as an important issue, but it is expected to modernize nuclear forces 
and maritime and air forces It is necessary to keep a close eye on future 





1999 In the Asia-Pacific region, there was no clear East-West conflict like in Europe, such 
as China's third pole existed even during the Cold War. Therefore, in this region, 
even after the end of the Cold War, quantitative reductions of the Russian Army in 
the Far East and changes in the military situation are seen, but while large-scale 
military forces including nuclear forces still exist, many countries have been trying 
to expand and modernize military power with the expansion of economic power, etc. 
Also, various problems such as the Korean Peninsula remain unresolved, and 
uncertain elements remain unclear.  
 
Furthermore, there is no situation where a multilateral security framework like that 
in Europe is being built, but the bilateral alliance / friendship relations centered on 
the United States and the existence of the US military based on this as a result of 
peace in this area and plays an important role for stability. In recent years, there has 
been an increase in opportunities for military exchanges between bilateral countries 
in this region, and the efforts of multilateral dialogue on regional security such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are also becoming established However, how to 
utilize such efforts against concrete security problems will be a future task.  Section 
1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1999/honmon/index.htm 
China has promoted reform and open-door routes with the aim of constructing 
socialist countries with "wealthy", "democratic", and "civilized" with economic 
construction as the most important task, and the stable In order to maintain an 
environment, on the diplomatic front, we are making efforts to modernize and 
strengthen national defense capabilities while defending relations with 
neighboring countries and promoting exchange expansion. Section 4.1 
1 
2000 On the other hand, there is no dramatic change in the security structure of this region 
compared with Europe, and there is still a large military power including nuclear 
forces, respectively. In addition, although it is necessary to consider the impact of 
the currency and financial crisis since 97 (the same year 9) in many countries in this 
region, due to remarkable economic growth so far, increase in defense expenses 
Expansion and modernization of military capabilities such as introduction of new 
equipment have been carried out. Furthermore, the continuation of tension in the 
Korean peninsula, various problems such as the Northern Territories of Japan and 
Takeshima and the Nansha archipelago remain unresolved, and North Korea's 
missile launches and North and South warships' shooting cases are seen, There are 
uncertain and uncertain elements left in this area. Chapter 1 Section 3.1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2000/w2000_00.html  
China has promoted reform and open-door routes with the aim of constructing 
socialist countries with "wealthy", "democratic", and "civilized" with economic 
construction as the most important task, and the stable In order to maintain the 
environment, it is important to emphasize the stability and unity of domestic 
affairs, especially social stability, while at the same time to improve relations 
with neighboring countries and promote exchange expansion… China is trying 
to modernize and strengthen its power. It has repeatedly emphasized that there is 
no change in the policy even after the death of President Deng Xiaoping, the 
former Communist Party Central Military Commission who created such basic 





2001 With the conclusion of the Cold War, the structure of military confrontation between 
the East and the West (Note 1-1) with the overwhelming military force disappeared, 
and the normal strength of Russia has drastically decreased after the Cold War, No 
country that can militarily counter the United States has appeared, and the possibility 
of armed conflict of the world scale like the Cold War period is far away. 
  
On the other hand, the territorial problem still survives, and conflicts based on 
religious conflict and ethnic issues are rather manifest, complicated and diverse 
regional conflicts are occurring. In addition, the risks of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) (Note 1-2) and 
missile spreading are increasing. Thus, even after the end of the Cold War, the 
international situation remains uncertain and uncertain. 
  
On the other hand, while aspects such as deterrence by force and stabilization by the 
balance of force continue to exist, there is a growing need for international relations 
with the background of the disappearance of ideological conflict between the US and 
Soviet Union and the expansion and deepening of interdependence among countries 
Various efforts are being made to promote international cooperation for stabilization.  
Chapter 1 Section 1 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2001/w2001_00.html  
China acknowledges that the multilateralization of the world and the 
globalization of the economy are progressing more and more towards easing in 
the international situation, and the situation in the Asia-Pacific region is also 
generally stable. Meanwhile, nepotism and powerful politics still exist in the 
world, and negative factors that affect safety are increasing newly in the Asia-
Pacific region, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security system and strengthening 
the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) It shows a sense of caution against Japan-
US joint technical research, especially in relation to the Taiwan issue.  
Under such circumstances recognition, China says it must strengthen its ability 
to protect sovereignty and safety through military means, and defines "active 
defense" as a military strategy policy. This is a strategic way of thinking that if 
you do not attack from your opponent you will never attack yourself, but if you 
take an attack should actively fight back.  Chapter 1 Section 3.4 
1 
2002 Globalization of security issues is progressing against the backdrop of the expansion 
and deepening of interdependence among countries accompanying the progress of 
globalization. A number of cases are recognized that a variety of situations such as 
massive human rights violations caused by regional conflicts and ethnic conflicts, 
the occurrence of a large number of refugees, terrorism, etc. are recognized not only 
as one domestic problem but as a problem of the international community There. In 
such cases, examples of cases where related countries cooperate to exercise their 
military capabilities to try to solve problems has come to be seen. Meanwhile, in 
solving the security problem, the necessity to use not only military ability but also 
means such as diplomacy, information gathering, police, justice, economy and the 
like is increasing. One of them is the fight against terrorism by the international 
community centered on the United States against this terrorist attack. 
 
 
In this way, while the international situation still has uncertain and uncertain 
elements while adding a new aspect, while aspects such as deterrence by force and 
stability by equilibrium of power continue to exist, international relations Various 
efforts are being made to promote international cooperation to further stabilize 
Japan's economy. Chapter 1 Section 1.1 
 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2002/w2002_00.html  
Based on the recognition of the situation that there is a possibility of world 
warfare occurrence in the past, China emphasized coping with large-scale full-
scale warfare, using the vast country land and enormous population, to fight 
guerilla warfare We have adopted the "People's War" strategy that emphasized 
(1-248) . However, in addition to the occurrence of harmful effects such as 
bloating and inefficiency of the military, in recognition of the new situation that 
global warfare will not take place over the long term, from the early 1980s the 
territory · It began to focus on dealing with local wars such as conflict over the 
territorial waters. For this reason, since the mid-1980s, we have promoted the 
formation and operation efficiency by simplifying the organization and 
organization, the modernization of equipment, strengthening R & D, etc. from 
the "amount" to "quality" of military power and is shifting to the position of a 
regular warfare subject that can respond to modern warfare. In accordance with 
this basic policy, the reduction of military personnel, mainly the Army (1-249), 
and the modernization of the entire army centering on nuclear and missile forces 
and the marine and air forces are carried out. In addition, after the Gulf War of 
91 (the same year 3), a policy is being taken to improve the military operation 






2003 The conclusion of the Cold War 1 was thought to save humanity from the ruin of 
death and resolve the conflict factors on the earth. Certainly the possibility of 
worldwide armed conflict arising is far away. However, various conflicts caused by 
religious and ethnic problems in various parts of the world, which have been 
suppressed under the East-West confrontation, have surfaced or sharpened, resulting 
in complicated and diverse regional conflicts. In addition, the danger of relocation 
and diffusion of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical 
weapons) and ballistic missiles, which had been strictly managed during the Cold 
War period, has become strongly concerned internationally.  
 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2003/2003/index.html 
In general China has been promoting reform and open-door routes with the aim 
of constructing a socialist country of "wealthy," "democracy," and "civilization" 
with economic construction as the most important task and its premise In order 
to maintain stable domestic and overseas environments, we emphasize the 
stability and unity of domestic affairs, in particular social stability, and at the 
outward, we are working to improve relations with developed countries, good 
cooperative relationships with neighboring countries In terms of defense, we are 
striving to modernize and strengthen national defense capabilities while 
basically maintaining and promoting. 
 
Last November, the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
(the party convention) and the 1st General Meeting of the 16th Central 
Committee (Alliance Alliance) 1 held the 10th National People's Congress of 
the 10th National People's Congress ( NPC) The first meeting was held, the 
leadership of the party, the nation, and the military switched, and the basic 
policy of the party and the nation was indicated. Chapter 1 Section 3.3 
2 
2004 As a subject of threats, not only conventional nations but also non-state actors are 
gaining attention, and in recent years, various illegal behaviors including terrorism 
have become important to the security impact, etc. In recent years, Changes are 
emerging. Under these circumstances, military forces are also required to change and 
diversify their roles, and international relations are becoming new, especially in the 
United States which became the sole superpower. 
  
Also in the Asia-Pacific region, territorial issues and unification issues continue to 
exist, as well as active activities of international terrorist organizations and problems 
of weapons of mass destruction, etc. are also occurring. Chapter 1 Intro 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2004/w2004_00.html  
No section specifically on China 
3 
2005 As evident in the activities of international terrorists, it is difficult to forecast when 
and where new threats will emerge. Questions have arisen as to what measures are 
effective against entities like terrorist organizations which do not necessarily act on 
rational judgment. 
 
In order to properly address such threats, not only military capabilities but also 
comprehensive approaches including diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, 
intelligence, and economic measures are needed. On the other hand, the very nature 
of new threats makes it difficult for a country to deal with them by itself. 
International cooperation, therefore, has been promoted to nip threats in the bud, 
establishing international frameworks and conducting measures based on such 
initiatives. In such cases as authoritarian regimes threatening regional order or states 
eroded away by terrorism collapsed, international efforts have been made so as to 
restore them to responsible nation to prevent them from becoming hotbeds for 
terrorism. Under the circumstances, the reform of the United Nations (U.N.) has 
been brought up for agenda so that the U.N. can strengthen its function and more 
effectively address new threats. Chapter 1 Overview 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2005/1.pdf 
In recent years, China has been continuously achieving dramatic economic 
growth. The country has also improved its diplomatic image and achieved many 
results. On the military front, China has been making efforts to modernize its 
military power supported by the continuing expansion of its military 
expenditure. China has thus been steadily growing as a political and economic 
power in the Asia-Pacific region and the trend of its military development draws 





2006 The most striking characteristic of the international security environment at present 
is the diversity and complexity of threats and the increasing difficulty of predicting 
when and where these threats will emerge. Activities of international terrorist 
organizations and other non-state actors in particular pose a serious threat to 
countries.   Ch 1 Section 1 
 
 
The possibility of a large-scale armed conflict between states that existed during the 
Cold War era has been eliminated in Europe, and terrorism and conflicts in 
neighboring regions are now being regarded by each country as common security 
threats. In the Asia-Pacific region, on the other hand, the pattern of disputes among 
countries and areas remain intact even in the post-Cold War era, and views on 
security and threat perceptions vary greatly by country. Ch1 Section 2 
 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2006/1-1-1.pdf 
China has been mounting its position in the world economy and now many 
countries welcome deeper economic relation and mutual benefit with China. At 
the same time, it is pointed out that China is seeking diplomacy focusing much 
on resources acquisition. On the military front, China has thus been steadily 
growing as an outstanding political and economic power in the Asia-pacific 
region. And the trend of its military development draws attention from countries 
in the region. Ch 1 Section 2 
3 
2007 The most characteristic features of today’s security environment are increasing 
diversity and complexity of threats and difficulty of accurately estimating emergence 
of such threats. This requires each country to develop new approaches to them. Part. 
1 Section 1 
  
On the other hand, this region boasts considerable political, economic, ethnic, and 
religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain despite the end of 
the Cold War. Since views on security and threats differ by country, major changes 
in the security environment, which are seen in Europe following the end of the Cold 
War, have yet to be found. In addition, long-standing issues of territorial rights and 
reunification still plague the region.  Part 1 Section 2 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/06Part1_overview.pdf 
Moreover, many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic 
growth to expand and upgrade their military forces by increasing their defense 
budgets and introducing new weapon systems. In particular, China, a regional 
power with tremendous political and economic influence, has been continuously 
boosting its defense spending and has been modernizing its military forces. 
Consequently, China has drawn international attention. There are also concerns 
about the lack of transparency regarding China’s military capabilities. When 
China destroyed one of its own satellites in a test in January this year, the 
absence of a sufficient explanation by the Chinese government has aroused the 
concern of other countries, including Japan with regard to the peaceful use of 
space and their own security. Part 1 Section 2 
3 
2008 In the international community today, with relations of mutual dependence between 
sovereign states growing ever stronger, matters of security or the potential for 
instability emanating in one country have increasing potential to transcend national 
borders and spread globally, impacting on other countries. As such, it is to the 
common bene t of each country to secure global and regional peace, stability and 
prosperity through the promotion of a more stable international security 
environment. Therefore it becomes more important for multinational cooperation in 
the resolution of issues to the bene t of the international community as a whole. Part 
1 Sec 1 
 
On the other hand, this region is considerably rich in political, economic, ethnic, and 
religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain even after the end 
of the Cold War, unlike Europe. Because of these reasons major changes in the 
security environment have yet to emerge and long-standing issues of territorial rights 
and reunification continue to plague the region. part 1 sec 2 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2008/04Part1_Overview.pdf 
Moreover, many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic 
growth to expand and upgrade their military forces by increasing their defense 
budgets and introducing new weapons systems. 
In particular, China, a regional power with tremendous political and economic 
clout, is increasingly drawing the close attention of many countries. China has 
been continuously boosting its defense spending and has been modernizing its 
military forces, with this significant increase in total defense spending. 
However, with clarity on neither the present condition nor the future image, 
Japan is apprehensive about how the military power of China will influence the 
regional state of affairs and the security of Japan. Moreover, due to the 
insufficient transparency, it is noted that other nations might have distrust and 
misunderstandings about the process of decision-making concerning the security 
and the military of China. In this fashion, improvement on the transparency 
relating to China’s national defense policies is demanded, and it has become an 
important task to pursue dialogues and exchanges, and strengthen the mutual 





2009 As seen above, today’s international community confronts a range of issues from 
traditional inter-state relations to the new threats and diverse contingencies. These 
issues could arise independently or in combination. In order to respond to such 
issues, the roles of military forces are diversifying beyond deterrence and armed 
conflicts to include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to 
reconstruction assistance. Moreover, unified responses that incorporate military as 
well as diplomatic, police, judicial, information and economic measures are 
becoming necessary. Accordingly, each state continues to enhance its military 
capabilities in line with its resources and circumstances, and pursue international 
cooperation and partnership in security areas. Part 1 Sec 1 
 
The Asia-Pacific region has been getting more global attention, due to the rapid 
development of economies such as China and India resulting in enhanced 
coordination and cooperation among countries, mainly in economic affairs. On the 
other hand, this region is considerably rich in political, economic, ethnic, and 
religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain even after the end 
of the Cold War, unlike Europe. Because of these reasons major changes in the 
security environment have yet to emerge and long-standing issues of territorial rights 
and reunification continue to plague the region. Par 1 Sec 2 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/04Part1_Overview.pdf 
Many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic growth to 
expand and modernize their military forces by increasing their defense budgets 
and introducing new weapons systems. In particular, China, a major political 
and economic power in the region with important clout, is drawing the close 
attention of many countries. China has been modernizing its military forces, 
with the rapid and continuous increase in its total defense spending. However, 
with clarity on neither the present condition nor the future of its military power, 
there is concern how the military power of China will influence the regional 
state of affairs and the security of Japan. Moreover, due to the insufficient 
transparency, it is noted that other nations might have distrust and 
misunderstandings about China’s decision-making processes concerning the 
security and the military. For these reasons, improved in the transparency 
relating to China’s national defense policies are needed, and it has become an 
important task to promote dialogues and exchanges, and further strengthen the 
mutual understanding and trust relationship with China. Furthermore, several 
senior military officials recently made positive remarks on the possession of an 
aircraft carrier, and maritime activities in the sea surrounding Japan have been 
intensifying. Such events happened that Japan should keep a careful watch over. 
Part 1 Sec 2 
4 
2010 In the international community today, the international security environment has 
become complicated and uncertain due to factors such as the rise of nations against 
the backdrop of economic growth in recent years, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so forth, activities by international 
terrorist organizations and other non-state actors, and the danger of fragile nations 
becoming hotbeds for international terrorism 
 
The relationships of mutual dependence among nations that have brought stability 
and prosperity to countries at the same time have negative aspects. These include 
economic problems and security problems that have arisen in certain countries and 
regional instability factors spreading across borders throughout the world and 
affecting other countries. In such relationships of mutual dependence, countries have 
the common interest of ensuring global and regional peace, stability, and prosperity 
by building a more stable international security environment. Therefore, it is 
increasingly important for nations that have a common interest in resolving these 
problems to cooperate in tackling such problems. Part 1 Section 1 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html 
In particular, China, a major political and economic power with important clout, 
is gaining confidence in the international community and demonstrating a more 
proactive stance. It also continues to promote the 
further modernization of its military capabilities against the backdrop of the 
continuing rapid growth of its defense budget. China has not clarified the 
current status of or future vision for the modernization of its military 
capabilities, and since transparency is not sufficiently ensured regarding its 
decision-making processes for security and military matters, it has been pointed 
out that there is a possibility that this could lead to a sense 
of distrust and misunderstandings in other countries. Furthermore, China is 
increasing its activities in waters close to Japan. The lack of transparency of its 
national defense policies, and the military activities are a matter of concern for 
the region and the international community, including Japan, and need to be 
carefully analyzed. 
Based on this situation, there is a need for further improvements to transparency 
regarding China’s military, and promoting dialogues and exchanges with China 
and further strengthening mutual understanding and relations of trust are 
important issues. Recently, noteworthy events have occurred such as the 
announcement of the testing of 





2011 With regard to Japan’s security environment, in the past one year, continued 
provocation by North Korea such as the disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility 
and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island, as well as various notable military 
movements by China and the continued growing military activities in Russia, have 
been observed. 
 
On the other hand, notable phenomenon have also continuously been observed with 
regard to global security issues including cyber-attacks, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and their delivery means, as well as international terrorism and 
the weakening of governing systems. Furthermore, as a result of the mutual 
interdependence among countries that has contributed to the stability and prosperity 
of each country, it is also possible for security issues and instability arising in one 
country to go beyond national borders and affect other countries. As such, the 
international security environment remains complex and uncertain. 
 
Under such a security environment, it has become extremely difficult for one 
country to deal with issues confronting the international community. It is also 
increasingly important for countries with common interests in the 
resolution of issues to work together, as countries gain shared benefits by ensuring 
regional and global peace, stability and prosperity through the establishment of a 
more stable international security environment. Part 1 Section 1 
 
As seen above, today’s international community confronts diverse, complex, and 
multi-layered security issues and unstable elements. These issues could arise 
independently or in combination. In order to respond to such issues, the roles of 
military forces are also diversifying beyond deterrence and handling of armed 
conflicts to include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to 
reconstruction assistance. Moreover, while there are increasing opportunities for the 
military to take on important roles, unified responses that incorporate military as 
well as diplomatic, police, judicial, information, and economic measures become 
more necessary. Part 1 Section 2 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/05Part1_Overview.pdf  
In particular, China, a major political and economic power with important clout, 
has taken active part in international initiatives in non-traditional security fields, 
and is playing an increasingly important role in the region and the world. 
Although it is welcome by the international community, it is also promoting the 
extensive and rapid modernization of its 
military capabilities against the backdrop of the continuing rapid growth of its 
defense budget. China has not clarified the current status of or future vision for 
the modernization of its military capabilities, and since transparency is not 
sufficiently ensured regarding its decision-making processes for security and 
military matters, it has been pointed out that there is a possibility that this could 
lead to a sense of distrust and misunderstandings in other countries. 
Furthermore, China is expanding and increasing its activities in waters close to 
Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defense poli- 
cies, and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the 
international community, including Japan, and need to be carefully analyzed. 
Based on this situation, there is a need for further improvements to transparency 
regarding China’s military, and promoting dialogues and exchanges with China 
and further strengthening mutual understanding and relations of trust are 





2012 With regard to Japan’s security environment over the past year, various movements 
have been observed including the transition of power to Kim Jong-un as the new 
leader of North Korea, and act of provocation such as launching a missile, which 
North Korea calls “Satellite”, various notable military movements by China and 
continued growing military activities by Russia. In the meantime, against the 
background of progress in the U.S. force’s drawing down from Afghanistan and Iraq 
and the serious scale circumstances of the U.S. Government, the U.S. released a new 
defense strategic guidance, showing policies to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific 
region in its security strategy, and to emphasize its existing alliances in the region 
and to expand its networks of cooperation with emerging partners. Part 1 Section 1 
 
As seen above, the international community today faces diverse, complex and 
multilayered security issues and unstable factors. Such challenges could even occur 
simultaneously or compound each other. In addition to deterrence and handling of 
armed conflicts, the roles of military forces in responding to these are becoming 
more diverse to include a broad spectrum of activities from the conflict prevention to 
reconstruction assistance. Moreover, as the opportunities for military forces to play 
such an important role are increasing, comprehensive responses are required that 
seek to combine military capacity with methods focused on diplomacy, law 
enforcement and justice, intelligence and the economy. Part 1 Section 3 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html  
In particular, as China became an influential country both politically and 
economically, its military trends draw attention from other countries. On the one 
hand, the international community welcomes the fact that China has started 
playing a major role in the region and the world as illustrated by its active 
participation in international activities in non-traditional security areas. On the 
other hand, China has been broadly and rapidly modernizing its military forces, 
backed by the high and constant increase in its defense budget. China has not 
clarified the current status and future vision of its military modernization, and 
the transparency of its decision-making process in military and security affairs is 
not enough. These are why it has been pointed out that there is a possibility that 
this could lead to a sense of distrust and misunderstandings by other countries. 
Furthermore, China has been expanding and intensifying its activities in waters 
close to Japan. These moves, together with the lack of transparency in its 
military and security affairs, are a matter of concern for the region and the 
international community, 
including Japan, which should require prudent analysis. These are why China is 
asked to further improve transparency regarding its military, and further 
strengthening mutual understanding and trust by promoting dialogues and 
exchanges with China is an important issue. While a substantial reshuffle in the 
Chinese Communist Party leadership is expected after the autumn of 2012, the 
environment surrounding the next administration would not be rosy due to its 
various domestic problems. How the next administration would deal with 





2013 Japan’s security environment is encompassed by various issues and destabilizing 
factors, some of which are becoming increasingly tangible, acute, and serious. 
Above all, as conflicts between countries etc. remain, major changes in the security 
environment in the vicinity of Japan have yet to emerge even after the end of the 
Cold War, unlike Europe. Factors in opacity and uncertainty such as issues of 
territorial rights and the reunification remain, and neighboring states are continuing 
to modernize their military capacity. Furthermore, over the past year, North Korea 
has taken such provocative actions as its launch of the missile, which it called 
“Satellite” and its nuclear test, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its 
activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan as exemplified by its 
intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, and Russia continues to 
intensify its military activities. Thus, security environment in the vicinity of Japan 
has increasingly grown severe. Part 1 Section 1 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/06_Part1_Chapter0_Sec1.pdf 
In particular, China has now become an influential country both politically and 
economically, and its military developments also draw attention from other 
countries. Accordingly, China is strongly expected to recognize its 
responsibility as a major power, accept and stick to the international norms, and 
play a more active and cooperative role in regional and global issues. On the 
other hand, China has been engaging in extensive, rapid modernization of its 
military forces, backed by continual substantial increases in its defense budget. 
China has not clarified the current status and future vision of its military 
modernization initiatives, while its decision-making process in military and 
security affairs is not sufficiently transparent: Hence it has been pointed out that 
this could potentially lead to a sense of distrust and misunderstanding by other 
countries. Further- more, China has been rapidly expanding and intensifying its 
maritime activities. In particular, in the waters and airspace around Japan, it has 
engaged in dangerous acts that could give rise to a contingency situation, such 
as Chinese naval vessel’s direction of its fire-control radar at a JMSDF 
destroyer in January this year. In addition, Chinese aircraft and surveillance 
ships affiliated to China’s maritime law enforcement agencies have intruded 
into Japanese territorial waters and airspace. Coupled with the lack of 
transparency in its military and security affairs, these moves by China are a 
matter of concern for Japan and other countries in the region and the 
international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to 
China’s movements. This is why China is asked to further improve transparency 
regarding its military and why further strengthening of mutual understanding 
and trust by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China is an important 
issue. At the same time, while a substantial reshuffle in the Chinese Communist 
Party leadership has taken place, resulting in the establishment of the Xi Jinping 
regime, the environment sur- rounding the next administration is certainly not 
rosy, due to its various domestic problems. Thus, the question of how it will 





2014 The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, being 
encompassed by various challenges and destabilizing factors, which are becoming 
more tangible and acute. Above all, as conflicts between countries, etc., remain, 
major changes in the security environment in the vicinity of Japan have yet to 
emerge even after the end of the Cold War, unlike in Europe. Opaque and uncertain 
factors such as issues of territorial claims and reunification remain. There is also an 
increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations that is neither purely 
peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic 
interests, etc.1 In addition, there are clearer trends for neighboring states to 
modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military 
activities. As such, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific 
region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious. Part 1 
Section 1 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_1-1-0_web_1031.pdf 
China has now become influential both politically and economically, and its 
military developments also draw attention from other countries. Accordingly, 
China is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility in the international 
community, accept and stick to international norms, and play a more active and 
cooperative role in regional and global issues. In the meantime, China has been 
continuously increasing its defense budget at a high level, reinforcing its 
military forces broadly and rapidly. As a part of such efforts, China is believed 
to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to 
prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and 
deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas (so-called “Anti-
Access /Area-Denial” [“A2/ AD”] capabilities4). China has not clearly stated 
the purposes and goals of the military buildup, and transparency concerning its 
decision making process on military and security matters is not also fully 
achieved. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities 
in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea 
and South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with 
regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified 
by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace 
around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and 
violated Japan’s airspace by its government ships and aircraft belonging to 
maritime law-enforcement agencies, and has engaged in dangerous activities 
that could cause unexpected situations, such as its vessel’s direction of  control 
radar at a JMSDF destroyer, the  flight of  fighters abnormally close to JSDF 
aircraft, and its announcement of establishing the “East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ)” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the 
freedom of over flight over the high seas. As Japan has great concern about 
these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these 
activities also raise concerns over regional and global security. This is why 
China is asked to further improve transparency regarding its military and why 
further strengthening of mutual understanding and trust by promoting dialogue 





2015 The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with 
various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. 
Even after the end of the Cold War, interstate conflicts remain in the periphery of 
Japan, and as such, this region has not witnessed major changes in the security 
environment as were observed in Europe. Opaque and uncertain factors such as 
territorial disputes and reunification issues remain. There has been also a 
tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” 
situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, 
sovereignty, and maritime economic interests1. In addition, there has been a 
noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their 
military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, security 
challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region including the area 




In the meantime, China has been continuously increasing its defense budget 
at a high level and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of 
areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to 
strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by 
other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign 
militaries to its surrounding areas (so-called “Anti- Access/Area-Denial” 
[“A2/AD”] capabilities5, as well as to build its structure for joint operations 
and enhance combat-oriented military trainings. China has not clearly stated 
the purposes and goals of the military buildup, and transparency concerning 
its decision making process on military and security matters is not fully 
achieved. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities 
in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China 
Sea and South China Sea. In particular, China has continued to take assertive 
actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, 
as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and has 
signaled its position to realize its unilateral assertions without making any 
compromises. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded 
into Japanese territorial waters frequently by its government ships, and has 
engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unforeseen consequences, 
such as its vessel’s direction of  re control radar at a JMSDF destroyer, 
the  flight of fighters abnormally close to JSDF aircraft, and its announcement 
of establishing the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” 
based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of over flight over 
the high seas. In the South China Sea, China has also intensified friction with 
countries in the surrounding area by proceeding rapidly with land reclamation 
projects in multiple reefs, among other activities, based on China’s unilateral 
assertion of sovereignty. In addition, a Chinese fighter is alleged to have flown 
abnormally close to and conducted an intercept of a U.S. Forces aircraft. As 
Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay 
utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional 
and global security. This is why China is asked to further increase 
transparency regarding its military and why further strengthening of mutual 
understanding and trust by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China is 
an important issue. Against this backdrop, recently, China has begun to 
actively respond to the calls to take measures to avoid and prevent 
unforeseen consequences in the maritime domain. It is strongly hoped that 
progress on these efforts supplements the existing order based on 
international law and leads to enhancing China’s compliance with 








APPENDIX 4: CHINA DEFENSE WHITE PAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS 




1998 international security situation has continued to tend toward relaxation….influence of armed conflicts 
and local wars on the overall international situation has been remarkably weakened...security situation in 
the Asia-Pacific region is relatively stable. http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm  
Relaxed, Stable. "Hegomonism", India Pakistan 
nuclear tests, military alliances, 
Taiwan independence 
Low 1 
2000 international security situation, in general, continues to tend toward relaxation…security situation in the 
Asia-Pacific region has been on the whole stable…factors that may cause instability and uncertainty 
have markedly increased…United States is further strengthening its military presence and bilateral 
military alliances in this region, advocating the development of the TMD system and planning to deploy 
it in East Asia. Japan has passed a bill relating to measures in the event of a situation in the areas 





missile defense, US alliance 
network, Japan law on territorial 
seas, Taiwan 
Low-moderate 2 
2002 international situation is undergoing profound changes...Competition in the overall national strength has 
become increasingly fierce...Peace and development remain the themes of the present era...Asia-Pacific 
region has, on the whole, continued to enjoy its peace and stability...uncertainties impeding peace and 
development are also on the increase...serious disequilibrium has occurred in the balance of military 
power...developing countries are facing a serious challenge in their effort to safeguard sovereignty and 





ethnic and religious conflicts, 
hegemonism, military technology 
gap,  terrorism and separatism, 
Taiwan separatism 
Moderate 3 
2004 Although the international situation as a whole tends to be stable, factors of uncertainty, instability and 
insecurity are on the increase...military factor plays a greater role in international configuration and 
national security...struggles for strategic points, strategic resources and strategic dominance crop up 
from time to time...military imbalance worldwide has further increased...The Asia-Pacific region enjoys 
basic stability in its security situation...complicated security factors in the Asia-Pacific region are on the 
increase...China's national security environment in this pluralistic, diversified and interdependent world 





hegemonism and unilateralism, 
RMA and military imbalance, 
non-traditional security, US 
military alliance strengthening, 
Japan missile defense and 
constitutional reform 
Low-moderate 2 
2006 overall international security environment remains stable. But, uncertainties and destabilizing factors are 
on the increase, and new challenges and threats are continuously emerging….World peace and security 
face more opportunities than challenges...Hegemonism and power politics remain key factors 
undermining international security. Non-traditional security threats present greater danger...The overall 
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region remains stable...China's overall security environment 




hegemonism, US alliances and 
realignment, Japan collective self 
defense 
Low-moderate 2 
2008 Peace and development remain the principal themes of the times...a profound readjustment is brewing in 
the international system. In addition, factors conducive to maintaining peace and containing war are on 
the rise, and the common interests of countries in the security field have increased, and their willingness 
to cooperate is enhanced, thereby keeping low the risk of worldwide, all-out and large-scale wars for a 
relatively long period of time...World peace and development are faced with multiple difficulties and 
challenges. Struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance have 
intensified....The Asia-Pacific security situation is stable on the whole....terrorist, separatist and 
extremist forces are running rampant...China's security situation has improved steadily....China is still 






RMA, US realignment to Asia 






2010 international strategic competition and contradictions are intensifying, global challenges are becoming 
more prominent, and security threats are becoming increasingly integrated, complex and volatile...the 
world remains peaceful and stable...international security situation has become more complex. 
International strategic competition centering on international order, comprehensive national strength and 
geopolitics has intensified...International military competition remains fierce...Asia-Pacific security 
situation is generally stable...Asia-Pacific security is becoming more intricate and volatile....Profound 
changes are taking shape in the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. Relevant major powers are increasing 
their strategic investment. The United States is reinforcing its regional military alliances, and increasing 
its involvement in regional security affairs....the overall security environment for it remains 
favorable...China is meanwhile confronted by more diverse and complex security challenges. China has 
vast territories and territorial seas. It is in a critical phase of the building of a moderately prosperous 







traditional security, military 
technology gap, ethnic and 
religious discord, independence 
movements, US arms sales to 
Taiwan 
Moderate 3 
2012 White Paper (new format) - peace and development remain the underlying trends of our times...China's 
overall national strength has grown dramatically...On the issues concerning China's territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that 
complicate or exacerbate the situation, and Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. 
The threats posed by "three forces," namely, terrorism, separatism and extremism, are on the 
rise....China's armed forces broaden their visions of national security strategy and military strategy, aim 
at winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, make active planning for the use of 
armed forces in peacetime, deal effectively with various security threats and accomplish diversified 
military tasks...Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity... 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2012.htm  
Peace, China strength, 
territorial sovereignty 
Strengthened military alliances, 
Japan making trouble re Senkaku, 
military technology gap, Taiwan 
independence 
Moderate 3 
2014 Peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide...a world war is 
unlikely, and the international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful. There are, however, 
new threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism...the world still faces both 
immediate and potential threats of local wars...China still faces multiple and complex security threats, as 
well as increasing external impediments and challenges...China has an arduous task to safeguard its 
national unification, territorial integrity and development interests...Some external countries are also 
busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance 
and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime 
rights and interests...revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have not only 
had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes, but also posed new and 






Non-traditional security, US 
rebalancing,  Japan military and 
security policy, territorial 
sovereignty, Taiwan 
independence, separatist 








APPENDIX 5: China Regression Results – Heckman  
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Heckman Selection Model, Robust Standard Errors, Lagged 
Dependent Variable  
 
Full Time Period 2000-2014 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est 
L.CN_FDIout_2013Y L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Life_exp L.GDP_cap_2013 
L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr 
BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase 
L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success 
L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y L.Share_AllChnODA_max, select(L.GDP_2013 L.Pop 
L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est L.CN_FDIout_2013Y L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y 
L.Inf_Mort_rate L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS 
L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict L.ChinaBorderConflict 
L.Taiwan_Recog USTreatyAlly USMilBase L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions 
L.UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 
L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y, noconstant) vce(robust) first 
 
 
Heckman selection model                         Number of obs     =      2,270 
(regression model with sample selection)              Selected    =      1,307 
                                                      Nonselected =        963 
 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =         . 
Log pseudolikelihood =  1966.922                Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |               Robust 
  Share_AllChnODA_max |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share_AllChnODA_max   | 
             GDP_2013 | 
                  L1. |   3.67e-16   6.23e-15     0.06   0.953    -1.18e-14    1.26e-14 
                      | 
                  Pop | 
                  L1. |  -2.06e-14   1.16e-11    -0.00   0.999    -2.28e-11    2.28e-11 
                      | 
         Oil_rent_gdp | 
                  L1. |  -.0000326     .00007    -0.47   0.641    -.0001698    .0001046 
                      | 
          CN_Firm_Est | 
                  L1. |     .00018   .0000989     1.82   0.069    -.0000138    .0003739 
                      | 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -3.85e-07   4.26e-07    -0.90   0.366    -1.22e-06    4.50e-07 
                      | 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -6.82e-08   5.42e-08    -1.26   0.208    -1.74e-07    3.79e-08 
                      | 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -3.85e-08   3.42e-08    -1.13   0.259    -1.05e-07    2.84e-08 
                      | 
             Life_exp | 
                  L1. |  -.0003448   .0001201    -2.87   0.004    -.0005801   -.0001095 
                      | 
         GDP_cap_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -2.73e-07   2.42e-07    -1.13   0.259    -7.47e-07    2.01e-07 
                      | 
       UN_IdealPoints | 
                  L1. |  -.0002686   .0031922    -0.08   0.933    -.0065251     .005988 
                      | 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0000151   .0000111     1.36   0.175    -6.68e-06    .0000368 
                      | 




                  L1. |  -.0002586   .0002118    -1.22   0.222    -.0006737    .0001564 
                      | 
            UN_pctwUS | 
                  L1. |   .0211746   .0135016     1.57   0.117     -.005288    .0476372 
                      | 
         UN_pctwChina | 
                  L1. |   .0071528   .0154896     0.46   0.644    -.0232062    .0375118 
                      | 
                 UNSC |   .0002089    .003476     0.06   0.952     -.006604    .0070218 
             ASEANChr |   .0245782   .0154015     1.60   0.111    -.0056082    .0547647 
          BorderChina |   .0065726   .0057705     1.14   0.255    -.0047374    .0178827 
                      | 
ChinaMaritimeConflict | 
                  L1. |   .0111668   .0107726     1.04   0.300     -.009947    .0322807 
                      | 
  ChinaBorderConflict | 
                  L1. |   -.017506   .0083135    -2.11   0.035       -.0338   -.0012119 
                      | 
         USTreatyAlly |   .0096247   .0093991     1.02   0.306    -.0087971    .0280465 
            USMilBase |   .0040055   .0060977     0.66   0.511    -.0079457    .0159568 
                      | 
       Total_viol_war | 
                  L1. |   .0020359   .0010182     2.00   0.046     .0000402    .0040316 
                      | 
           USMil_Pers | 
                  L1. |  -1.36e-07   6.79e-08    -2.01   0.045    -2.69e-07   -3.19e-09 
                      | 
         US_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |   .0045384    .005129     0.88   0.376    -.0055143     .014591 
                      | 
         UN_Sanctions |  -.0065187   .0044592    -1.46   0.144    -.0152586    .0022213 
                      | 
     US_Relations_ind | 
                  L1. |  -.0024635   .0017632    -1.40   0.162    -.0059193    .0009924 
                      | 
         Coup_Success | 
                  L1. |  -.0030551   .0053182    -0.57   0.566    -.0134786    .0073685 
                      | 
            Coup_Fail | 
                  L1. |  -.0111098   .0037574    -2.96   0.003    -.0184742   -.0037454 
                      | 
         USAODA_M2013 | 
                  L1. |  -2.07e-06   2.49e-06    -0.83   0.405    -6.95e-06    2.81e-06 
                      | 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y | 
                  L1. |   1.14e-08   3.49e-08     0.33   0.744    -5.70e-08    7.98e-08 
                      | 
  Share_AllChnODA_max | 
                  L1. |   .0553357   .0497181     1.11   0.266    -.0421099    .1527814 
                      | 
                _cons |   .0262098     .01254     2.09   0.037      .001632    .0507877 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
select                | 
             GDP_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -3.96e-12   1.05e-12    -3.77   0.000    -6.02e-12   -1.90e-12 
                      | 
                  Pop | 
                  L1. |   6.55e-10   6.33e-10     1.04   0.301    -5.85e-10    1.90e-09 
                      | 
         Oil_rent_gdp | 
                  L1. |   .0156625   .0031883     4.91   0.000     .0094136    .0219115 
                      | 
          CN_Firm_Est | 
                  L1. |   1.353554   .1531694     8.84   0.000     1.053348    1.653761 
                      | 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y | 
                  L1. |    .008023   .0010377     7.73   0.000     .0059892    .0100567 
                      | 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |   .0002111   .0000423     4.99   0.000     .0001282    .0002939 
                      | 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -5.18e-06   .0000131    -0.40   0.692    -.0000308    .0000204 
                      | 




                  L1. |  -.0086576   .0015153    -5.71   0.000    -.0116275   -.0056877 
                      | 
         GDP_cap_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -.0000521   .0000212    -2.46   0.014    -.0000937   -.0000105 
                      | 
       UN_IdealPoints | 
                  L1. |   .6278956   .1139483     5.51   0.000     .4045611    .8512302 
                      | 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0057675   .0011648     4.95   0.000     .0034846    .0080505 
                      | 
          Polity2_use | 
                  L1. |   .0420282   .0072017     5.84   0.000     .0279132    .0561432 
                      | 
            UN_pctwUS | 
                  L1. |  -6.230846   .5975634   -10.43   0.000    -7.402048   -5.059643 
                      | 
         UN_pctwChina | 
                  L1. |   .9859111   .2590038     3.81   0.000      .478273    1.493549 
                      | 
                 UNSC |   -.340448   .1672968    -2.03   0.042    -.6683437   -.0125522 
             ASEANChr |   .0594488    .834144     0.07   0.943    -1.575443    1.694341 
          BorderChina |   .0085061   .1970148     0.04   0.966    -.3776357     .394648 
                      | 
ChinaMaritimeConflict | 
                  L1. |  -2.087299   .6663752    -3.13   0.002     -3.39337   -.7812274 
                      | 
  ChinaBorderConflict | 
                  L1. |  -.1580309   .3270695    -0.48   0.629    -.7990754    .4830137 
                      | 
         Taiwan_Recog | 
                  L1. |   .1649673   .1055627     1.56   0.118    -.0419318    .3718664 
                      | 
         USTreatyAlly |  -1.490729   .4526186    -3.29   0.001    -2.377846   -.6036132 
            USMilBase |  -.1647015    .198312    -0.83   0.406    -.5533858    .2239828 
                      | 
       Total_viol_war | 
                  L1. |  -.1513869   .0326493    -4.64   0.000    -.2153784   -.0873955 
                      | 
           USMil_Pers | 
                  L1. |  -.0000141   5.01e-06    -2.80   0.005    -.0000239   -4.23e-06 
                      | 
         US_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |  -.1208707   .1382024    -0.87   0.382    -.3917423     .150001 
                      | 
         UN_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |   .4485954   .2392757     1.87   0.061    -.0203763    .9175672 
                      | 
     US_Relations_ind | 
                  L1. |   .2849596   .0790525     3.60   0.000     .1300196    .4398995 
                      | 
         Coup_Success | 
                  L1. |  -.0951643   .3472857    -0.27   0.784    -.7758317    .5855031 
                      | 
            Coup_Fail | 
                  L1. |    .151363   .2478219     0.61   0.541    -.3343589    .6370849 
                      | 
         USAODA_M2013 | 
                  L1. |   .0001174   .0001636     0.72   0.473    -.0002033     .000438 
                      | 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -2.77e-06   1.51e-06    -1.84   0.066    -5.72e-06    1.85e-07 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /athrho |  -.0957393   .0977672    -0.98   0.327    -.2873594    .0958808 
             /lnsigma |  -3.523315    .136613   -25.79   0.000    -3.791071   -3.255558 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  rho |  -.0954478   .0968765                     -.2797026    .0955881 
                sigma |   .0295015   .0040303                      .0225714    .0385593 
               lambda |  -.0028159   .0028988                     -.0084974    .0028657 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.96   Prob > chi2 = 0.3275 
 
Time Period 2000-2008 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est 




L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr 
BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase 
L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success 
L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y L.Share_AllChnODA_max if Year <= 2008, 
select(L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est L.CN_FDIout_2013Y L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y 
L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Inf_Mort_rate L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use 
L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict 
L.ChinaBorderConflict L.Taiwan_Recog USTreatyAlly USMilBase L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers 
L.US_Sanctions L.UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 
L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y, noconstant) vce(robust) first 
 
 
Heckman selection model                         Number of obs     =      1,765 
(regression model with sample selection)              Selected    =        802 
                                                      Nonselected =        963 
 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =         . 
Log pseudolikelihood =  944.7682                Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |               Robust 
  Share_AllChnODA_max |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share_AllChnODA_max   | 
             GDP_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -3.11e-15   1.08e-14    -0.29   0.774    -2.43e-14    1.81e-14 
                      | 
                  Pop | 
                  L1. |   1.95e-12   1.30e-11     0.15   0.881    -2.36e-11    2.75e-11 
                      | 
         Oil_rent_gdp | 
                  L1. |   -.000012   .0000925    -0.13   0.896    -.0001934    .0001693 
                      | 
          CN_Firm_Est | 
                  L1. |  -.0000125   .0003367    -0.04   0.970    -.0006725    .0006475 
                      | 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y | 
                  L1. |   8.71e-06   5.05e-06     1.72   0.085    -1.19e-06    .0000186 
                      | 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -1.61e-07   1.57e-07    -1.02   0.307    -4.69e-07    1.47e-07 
                      | 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -2.77e-08   1.52e-07    -0.18   0.856    -3.26e-07    2.71e-07 
                      | 
             Life_exp | 
                  L1. |  -.0003682   .0001779    -2.07   0.038    -.0007169   -.0000196 
                      | 
         GDP_cap_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -4.52e-07   4.25e-07    -1.06   0.288    -1.29e-06    3.81e-07 
                      | 
       UN_IdealPoints | 
                  L1. |   .0046985   .0039058     1.20   0.229    -.0029566    .0123537 
                      | 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0000138   .0000121     1.14   0.256      -.00001    .0000376 
                      | 
          Polity2_use | 
                  L1. |  -.0003473   .0002864    -1.21   0.225    -.0009086    .0002141 
                      | 
            UN_pctwUS | 
                  L1. |   .0380327   .0228772     1.66   0.096    -.0068058    .0828711 
                      | 
         UN_pctwChina | 
                  L1. |   .0425366   .0230343     1.85   0.065    -.0026098    .0876831 
                      | 
                 UNSC |   .0040449    .005695     0.71   0.478    -.0071171     .015207 
             ASEANChr |   .0302498   .0218252     1.39   0.166    -.0125269    .0730265 
          BorderChina |   .0125729   .0093869     1.34   0.180    -.0058251    .0309708 
                      | 
ChinaMaritimeConflict | 
                  L1. |   .0188692   .0199564     0.95   0.344    -.0202445     .057983 
                      | 
  ChinaBorderConflict | 
                  L1. |  -.0216373   .0117691    -1.84   0.066    -.0447043    .0014296 




         USTreatyAlly |   .0206111   .0155474     1.33   0.185    -.0098612    .0510834 
            USMilBase |   .0020331   .0088799     0.23   0.819    -.0153712    .0194373 
                      | 
       Total_viol_war | 
                  L1. |   .0021703    .001155     1.88   0.060    -.0000935    .0044341 
                      | 
           USMil_Pers | 
                  L1. |  -1.02e-07   7.89e-08    -1.29   0.197    -2.57e-07    5.28e-08 
                      | 
         US_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |   .0052097   .0083355     0.63   0.532    -.0111276     .021547 
                      | 
         UN_Sanctions |  -.0037925   .0057649    -0.66   0.511    -.0150915    .0075065 
                      | 
     US_Relations_ind | 
                  L1. |  -.0016512   .0020707    -0.80   0.425    -.0057096    .0024072 
                      | 
         Coup_Success | 
                  L1. |   -.002971   .0066417    -0.45   0.655    -.0159885    .0100465 
                      | 
            Coup_Fail | 
                  L1. |  -.0095392   .0049889    -1.91   0.056    -.0193173    .0002389 
                      | 
         USAODA_M2013 | 
                  L1. |  -1.86e-06   3.56e-06    -0.52   0.602    -8.85e-06    5.13e-06 
                      | 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y | 
                  L1. |   9.43e-09   4.65e-08     0.20   0.839    -8.17e-08    1.01e-07 
                      | 
  Share_AllChnODA_max | 
                  L1. |   .0245275   .0682294     0.36   0.719    -.1091997    .1582547 
                      | 
                _cons |   -.004701   .0130416    -0.36   0.719    -.0302621    .0208601 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
select                | 
             GDP_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -3.05e-12   1.00e-12    -3.04   0.002    -5.01e-12   -1.08e-12 
                      | 
                  Pop | 
                  L1. |   3.92e-10   6.30e-10     0.62   0.534    -8.42e-10    1.63e-09 
                      | 
         Oil_rent_gdp | 
                  L1. |   .0185636    .003298     5.63   0.000     .0120996    .0250276 
                      | 
          CN_Firm_Est | 
                  L1. |   1.173437   .1609294     7.29   0.000     .8580212    1.488853 
                      | 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y | 
                  L1. |   .0446566   .0048195     9.27   0.000     .0352106    .0541026 
                      | 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |    .000214   .0000442     4.84   0.000     .0001273    .0003007 
                      | 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -.0000156   .0000175    -0.89   0.373    -.0000499    .0000187 
                      | 
        Inf_Mort_rate | 
                  L1. |   -.008769   .0015887    -5.52   0.000    -.0118827   -.0056553 
                      | 
         GDP_cap_2013 | 
                  L1. |   -.000085   .0000246    -3.46   0.001    -.0001332   -.0000368 
                      | 
       UN_IdealPoints | 
                  L1. |    .557701   .1203324     4.63   0.000     .3218538    .7935483 
                      | 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0058795   .0011769     5.00   0.000     .0035727    .0081862 
                      | 
          Polity2_use | 
                  L1. |   .0390434   .0076579     5.10   0.000     .0240343    .0540526 
                      | 
            UN_pctwUS | 
                  L1. |  -6.334521   .6609371    -9.58   0.000    -7.629934   -5.039108 
                      | 
         UN_pctwChina | 




                      | 
                 UNSC |  -.4084291   .1834278    -2.23   0.026     -.767941   -.0489171 
             ASEANChr |   .1501578   .7607905     0.20   0.844    -1.340964     1.64128 
          BorderChina |   .0715375   .1970807     0.36   0.717    -.3147335    .4578086 
                      | 
ChinaMaritimeConflict | 
                  L1. |  -1.733065   .6081325    -2.85   0.004    -2.924983   -.5411475 
                      | 
  ChinaBorderConflict | 
                  L1. |  -.1454144   .3243614    -0.45   0.654     -.781151    .4903222 
                      | 
         Taiwan_Recog | 
                  L1. |   .1497158   .1139049     1.31   0.189    -.0735337    .3729653 
                      | 
         USTreatyAlly |  -1.388848   .4393982    -3.16   0.002    -2.250052   -.5276429 
            USMilBase |  -.0239351   .2009714    -0.12   0.905    -.4178318    .3699616 
                      | 
       Total_viol_war | 
                  L1. |  -.1434971   .0323396    -4.44   0.000    -.2068815   -.0801128 
                      | 
           USMil_Pers | 
                  L1. |  -.0000186   6.12e-06    -3.04   0.002    -.0000306   -6.59e-06 
                      | 
         US_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |  -.1302155   .1437276    -0.91   0.365    -.4119164    .1514855 
                      | 
         UN_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |    .471757   .2590944     1.82   0.069    -.0360587    .9795728 
                      | 
     US_Relations_ind | 
                  L1. |   .3070559   .0859818     3.57   0.000     .1385348    .4755771 
                      | 
         Coup_Success | 
                  L1. |  -.1723301   .3908754    -0.44   0.659    -.9384318    .5937715 
                      | 
            Coup_Fail | 
                  L1. |   .1941777   .2474435     0.78   0.433    -.2908026     .679158 
                      | 
         USAODA_M2013 | 
                  L1. |   .0001289   .0001759     0.73   0.464    -.0002158    .0004735 
                      | 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -3.34e-06   1.93e-06    -1.73   0.084    -7.13e-06    4.48e-07 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /athrho |  -.0553375    .099208    -0.56   0.577    -.2497816    .1391065 
             /lnsigma |  -3.488247   .1719141   -20.29   0.000    -3.825193   -3.151302 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  rho |  -.0552811   .0989048                     -.2447133    .1382161 
                sigma |   .0305544   .0052527                      .0218142    .0427964 
               lambda |  -.0016891   .0030912                     -.0077478    .0043697 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.31   Prob > chi2 = 0.5770 
 
Time Period 2009-2014 FAIL 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est 
L.CN_FDIout_2013Y L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Life_exp L.GDP_cap_2013 
L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr 
BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase 
L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success 
L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y L.Share_AllChnODA_max if Year >= 2009, 
select(L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est L.CN_FDIout_2013Y L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y 
L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Inf_Mort_rate L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use 
L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict 
L.ChinaBorderConflict L.Taiwan_Recog USTreatyAlly USMilBase L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers 
L.US_Sanctions L.UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 
L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y, noconstant) vce(robust) first 
Dependent variable never censored because of selection:  
model would simplify to OLS regression 
r(498); 
 
Time Period 2007-2008 FAIL 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est 




L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr 
BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase 
L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success 
L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y L.Share_AllChnODA_max if Year == 2007 |  Year 
== 2008, select(L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_Firm_Est L.CN_FDIout_2013Y 
L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Inf_Mort_rate L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints 
Humanitarian_M L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina 
L.ChinaMaritimeConflict L.ChinaBorderConflict L.Taiwan_Recog USTreatyAlly USMilBase 
L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions L.UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success 
L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y, noconstant) twostep first 
Dependent variable never censored because of selection:  
model would simplify to OLS regression 
r(498); 
 
Rerun Heckman without CN_Firm_Est 2000-2014 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_FDIout_2013Y 
L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Life_exp L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M 
L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict 
L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions 
UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y 
L.Share_AllChnODA_max, select(GDP_2013 Pop Oil_rent_gdp CN_FDIout_2013Y CN_exp_Mill2013Y 
CN_imp_Mill2013Y Inf_Mort_rate GDP_cap_2013 UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M Polity2_use UN_pctwUS 
UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina ChinaMaritimeConflict ChinaBorderConflict Taiwan_Recog 
USTreatyAlly USMilBase Total_viol_war USMil_Pers US_Sanctions UN_Sanctions US_Relations_ind 
Coup_Success Coup_Fail USAODA_M2013 ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y, noconstant) first 
 
 
Heckman selection model                         Number of obs     =      2,464 
(regression model with sample selection)              Selected    =      1,408 
                                                      Nonselected =      1,056 
 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =         . 
Log likelihood =   2113.38                      Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Share_AllChnODA_max |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share_AllChnODA_max   | 
             GDP_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -1.90e-15   7.60e-15    -0.25   0.803    -1.68e-14    1.30e-14 
                      | 
                  Pop | 
                  L1. |   2.04e-12   1.29e-11     0.16   0.874    -2.32e-11    2.72e-11 
                      | 
         Oil_rent_gdp | 
                  L1. |   .0000151   .0000642     0.24   0.814    -.0001108     .000141 
                      | 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y | 
                  L1. |   1.01e-08   7.46e-07     0.01   0.989    -1.45e-06    1.47e-06 
                      | 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -4.58e-09   6.70e-08    -0.07   0.945    -1.36e-07    1.27e-07 
                      | 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -3.93e-08   4.07e-08    -0.97   0.334    -1.19e-07    4.05e-08 
                      | 
             Life_exp | 
                  L1. |  -.0002519   .0001011    -2.49   0.013    -.0004501   -.0000537 
                      | 
         GDP_cap_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -2.77e-07   3.53e-07    -0.78   0.433    -9.68e-07    4.15e-07 
                      | 
       UN_IdealPoints | 
                  L1. |  -.0014349   .0031719    -0.45   0.651    -.0076517     .004782 
                      | 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0000115   5.15e-06     2.23   0.025     1.41e-06    .0000216 
                      | 
          Polity2_use | 
                  L1. |  -.0001215   .0001742    -0.70   0.486     -.000463      .00022 
                      | 
            UN_pctwUS | 
                  L1. |   .0100355   .0150657     0.67   0.505    -.0194928    .0395637 
                      | 




                  L1. |   .0030968   .0166247     0.19   0.852     -.029487    .0356806 
                      | 
                 UNSC |    .000259   .0033198     0.08   0.938    -.0062477    .0067657 
             ASEANChr |   .0257872   .0098996     2.60   0.009     .0063844      .04519 
          BorderChina |   .0094035   .0035035     2.68   0.007     .0025368    .0162702 
                      | 
ChinaMaritimeConflict | 
                  L1. |   .0099882   .0060916     1.64   0.101    -.0019511    .0219275 
                      | 
  ChinaBorderConflict | 
                  L1. |  -.0186606   .0070701    -2.64   0.008    -.0325179   -.0048034 
                      | 
         USTreatyAlly |   .0106623   .0058288     1.83   0.067    -.0007619    .0220866 
            USMilBase |   .0033062   .0043795     0.75   0.450    -.0052774    .0118899 
                      | 
       Total_viol_war | 
                  L1. |   .0016445   .0007438     2.21   0.027     .0001867    .0031022 
                      | 
           USMil_Pers | 
                  L1. |  -1.77e-07   1.10e-07    -1.61   0.108    -3.93e-07    3.89e-08 
                      | 
         US_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |   .0047075   .0032128     1.47   0.143    -.0015895    .0110045 
                      | 
         UN_Sanctions |   -.004296   .0041221    -1.04   0.297    -.0123751    .0037832 
                      | 
     US_Relations_ind | 
                  L1. |  -.0021273    .001565    -1.36   0.174    -.0051946      .00094 
                      | 
         Coup_Success | 
                  L1. |  -.0058611   .0075566    -0.78   0.438    -.0206717    .0089495 
                      | 
            Coup_Fail | 
                  L1. |  -.0102257    .006925    -1.48   0.140    -.0237985     .003347 
                      | 
         USAODA_M2013 | 
                  L1. |   1.13e-07   3.42e-06     0.03   0.974    -6.59e-06    6.82e-06 
                      | 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y | 
                  L1. |   5.17e-09   2.91e-08     0.18   0.859    -5.19e-08    6.22e-08 
                      | 
  Share_AllChnODA_max | 
                  L1. |   .0834217   .0287338     2.90   0.004     .0271044    .1397389 
                      | 
                _cons |   .0214816   .0158876     1.35   0.176    -.0096575    .0526206 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
select                | 
             GDP_2013 |  -8.66e-12   1.10e-12    -7.85   0.000    -1.08e-11   -6.50e-12 
                  Pop |   1.22e-09   8.08e-10     1.51   0.131    -3.64e-10    2.80e-09 
         Oil_rent_gdp |   .0067057   .0030559     2.19   0.028     .0007162    .0126951 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y |   .0026163   .0004899     5.34   0.000     .0016561    .0035765 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y |   .0003042   .0000268    11.36   0.000     .0002517    .0003567 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y |   9.43e-06   8.50e-06     1.11   0.267    -7.23e-06    .0000261 
        Inf_Mort_rate |  -.0079161   .0013602    -5.82   0.000     -.010582   -.0052502 
         GDP_cap_2013 |   .0000141   .0000176     0.80   0.423    -.0000203    .0000485 
       UN_IdealPoints |   1.064149   .1083843     9.82   0.000     .8517197    1.276578 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0051881   .0006637     7.82   0.000     .0038872     .006489 
          Polity2_use |   .0320617   .0067796     4.73   0.000      .018774    .0453494 
            UN_pctwUS |  -8.188034   .4295453   -19.06   0.000    -9.029927   -7.346141 
         UN_pctwChina |   2.131822   .2361753     9.03   0.000     1.668927    2.594717 
                 UNSC |  -.3478508   .1588382    -2.19   0.029     -.659168   -.0365335 
             ASEANChr |  -.1408224   .6098498    -0.23   0.817    -1.336106    1.054461 
          BorderChina |  -.1657045    .187332    -0.88   0.376    -.5328684    .2014594 
ChinaMaritimeConflict |  -4.235803   .5503598    -7.70   0.000    -5.314489   -3.157118 
  ChinaBorderConflict |   .0938393   .2855888     0.33   0.742    -.4659044     .653583 
         Taiwan_Recog |  -.0403352   .0933705    -0.43   0.666     -.223338    .1426676 
         USTreatyAlly |  -1.631591   .3777192    -4.32   0.000    -2.371908   -.8912754 
            USMilBase |  -.5417848   .1939328    -2.79   0.005    -.9218862   -.1616834 
       Total_viol_war |  -.1605804   .0300238    -5.35   0.000     -.219426   -.1017348 
           USMil_Pers |  -.0000164   4.92e-06    -3.34   0.001     -.000026   -6.77e-06 
         US_Sanctions |  -.1023275    .127518    -0.80   0.422    -.3522581    .1476031 
         UN_Sanctions |   .7615507   .2192738     3.47   0.001     .3317819    1.191319 
     US_Relations_ind |    .146784   .0693727     2.12   0.034      .010816     .282752 
         Coup_Success |   .0823787   .3175871     0.26   0.795    -.5400806     .704838 




         USAODA_M2013 |    .000186   .0001221     1.52   0.127    -.0000532    .0004253 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y |  -1.69e-06   1.50e-06    -1.13   0.258    -4.63e-06    1.24e-06 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /athrho |   .0311443   .0585634     0.53   0.595    -.0836379    .1459265 
             /lnsigma |  -3.551356   .0188494  -188.41   0.000      -3.5883   -3.514412 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  rho |   .0311342   .0585066                     -.0834434    .1448994 
                sigma |   .0286857   .0005407                      .0276453    .0297653 
               lambda |   .0008931   .0016788                     -.0023973    .0041835 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =   -29.07   Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
 
Rerun Heckman without CN_Firm_Est, 2000-2008 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_FDIout_2013Y 
L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Life_exp L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M 
L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict 
L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions 
UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y 
L.Share_AllChnODA_max if Year <= 2008, select(GDP_2013 Pop Oil_rent_gdp CN_FDIout_2013Y 
CN_exp_Mill2013Y CN_imp_Mill2013Y Inf_Mort_rate GDP_cap_2013 UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M 
Polity2_use UN_pctwUS UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina ChinaMaritimeConflict 
ChinaBorderConflict Taiwan_Recog USTreatyAlly USMilBase Total_viol_war USMil_Pers US_Sanctions 




Heckman selection model                         Number of obs     =      1,917 
(regression model with sample selection)              Selected    =        861 
                                                      Nonselected =      1,056 
 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =         . 
Log likelihood =  1234.767                      Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Share_AllChnODA_max |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share_AllChnODA_max   | 
             GDP_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -2.84e-15   1.47e-14    -0.19   0.847    -3.17e-14    2.60e-14 
                      | 
                  Pop | 
                  L1. |   2.52e-12   1.68e-11     0.15   0.881    -3.04e-11    3.54e-11 
                      | 
         Oil_rent_gdp | 
                  L1. |   .0000488   .0000841     0.58   0.561     -.000116    .0002136 
                      | 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y | 
                  L1. |   8.72e-06   4.42e-06     1.97   0.048     6.01e-08    .0000174 
                      | 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -1.24e-07   1.98e-07    -0.62   0.532    -5.11e-07    2.64e-07 
                      | 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y | 
                  L1. |  -4.08e-08   1.18e-07    -0.35   0.729    -2.72e-07    1.90e-07 
                      | 
             Life_exp | 
                  L1. |  -.0002687   .0001357    -1.98   0.048    -.0005346   -2.67e-06 
                      | 
         GDP_cap_2013 | 
                  L1. |  -6.00e-07   6.45e-07    -0.93   0.353    -1.86e-06    6.65e-07 
                      | 
       UN_IdealPoints | 
                  L1. |   .0042133   .0048968     0.86   0.390    -.0053841    .0138108 
                      | 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0000172   8.66e-06     1.99   0.047     2.47e-07    .0000342 
                      | 
          Polity2_use | 
                  L1. |  -.0001716   .0002424    -0.71   0.479    -.0006467    .0003035 
                      | 
            UN_pctwUS | 
                  L1. |   .0177399   .0272365     0.65   0.515    -.0356426    .0711225 
                      | 
         UN_pctwChina | 




                      | 
                 UNSC |   .0035995   .0045257     0.80   0.426    -.0052707    .0124698 
             ASEANChr |    .030875   .0129227     2.39   0.017     .0055469     .056203 
          BorderChina |   .0138431   .0048298     2.87   0.004      .004377    .0233093 
                      | 
ChinaMaritimeConflict | 
                  L1. |   .0183883   .0087108     2.11   0.035     .0013153    .0354612 
                      | 
  ChinaBorderConflict | 
                  L1. |  -.0210235   .0088343    -2.38   0.017    -.0383383   -.0037086 
                      | 
         USTreatyAlly |   .0208619   .0080054     2.61   0.009     .0051716    .0365522 
            USMilBase |   .0022634   .0058228     0.39   0.697    -.0091491    .0136758 
                      | 
       Total_viol_war | 
                  L1. |   .0017768   .0009659     1.84   0.066    -.0001163    .0036699 
                      | 
           USMil_Pers | 
                  L1. |  -1.31e-07   1.80e-07    -0.73   0.467    -4.83e-07    2.21e-07 
                      | 
         US_Sanctions | 
                  L1. |   .0033314   .0045051     0.74   0.460    -.0054985    .0121612 
                      | 
         UN_Sanctions |   -.001487   .0062863    -0.24   0.813    -.0138079    .0108339 
                      | 
     US_Relations_ind | 
                  L1. |  -.0015753   .0021667    -0.73   0.467    -.0058219    .0026713 
                      | 
         Coup_Success | 
                  L1. |  -.0045638   .0115654    -0.39   0.693    -.0272316    .0181039 
                      | 
            Coup_Fail | 
                  L1. |  -.0084281    .008883    -0.95   0.343    -.0258385    .0089822 
                      | 
         USAODA_M2013 | 
                  L1. |  -1.57e-06   5.07e-06    -0.31   0.757    -.0000115    8.37e-06 
                      | 
  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y | 
                  L1. |   9.01e-09   3.63e-08     0.25   0.804    -6.22e-08    8.02e-08 
                      | 
  Share_AllChnODA_max | 
                  L1. |   .0313004     .03454     0.91   0.365    -.0363969    .0989976 
                      | 
                _cons |  -.0072125   .0230811    -0.31   0.755    -.0524506    .0380257 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
select                | 
             GDP_2013 |  -5.13e-12   1.23e-12    -4.18   0.000    -7.54e-12   -2.73e-12 
                  Pop |   1.24e-09   8.90e-10     1.40   0.163    -5.02e-10    2.99e-09 
         Oil_rent_gdp |   .0146748   .0037584     3.90   0.000     .0073085    .0220411 
      CN_FDIout_2013Y |   .0183129   .0033831     5.41   0.000     .0116821    .0249437 
     CN_exp_Mill2013Y |   .0002266   .0000298     7.61   0.000     .0001682     .000285 
     CN_imp_Mill2013Y |   2.01e-06   .0000126     0.16   0.873    -.0000227    .0000267 
        Inf_Mort_rate |  -.0098362   .0016723    -5.88   0.000    -.0131138   -.0065586 
         GDP_cap_2013 |  -.0000338   .0000235    -1.44   0.151      -.00008    .0000123 
       UN_IdealPoints |   2.028073   .1559156    13.01   0.000     1.722484    2.333662 
       Humanitarian_M |   .0059773   .0008161     7.32   0.000     .0043778    .0075767 
          Polity2_use |   .0273346   .0085942     3.18   0.001     .0104903    .0441789 
            UN_pctwUS |  -16.77149     .79694   -21.04   0.000    -18.33347   -15.20952 
         UN_pctwChina |   3.435462   .3185358    10.79   0.000     2.811143    4.059781 
                 UNSC |  -.3701094    .201553    -1.84   0.066     -.765146    .0249271 
             ASEANChr |   .0728482   .7336062     0.10   0.921    -1.364994     1.51069 
          BorderChina |   .1073295   .2322846     0.46   0.644      -.34794    .5625989 
ChinaMaritimeConflict |   -2.80692   .6503708    -4.32   0.000    -4.081624   -1.532217 
  ChinaBorderConflict |  -.2767034   .3818162    -0.72   0.469    -1.025049    .4716426 
         Taiwan_Recog |   .0018767   .1179168     0.02   0.987     -.229236    .2329894 
         USTreatyAlly |  -1.537915   .4148004    -3.71   0.000    -2.350909    -.724921 
            USMilBase |  -.1738715   .2312924    -0.75   0.452    -.6271962    .2794533 
       Total_viol_war |   -.151701   .0354088    -4.28   0.000     -.221101    -.082301 
           USMil_Pers |  -.0000145   5.73e-06    -2.52   0.012    -.0000257   -3.23e-06 
         US_Sanctions |   .0844881   .1576898     0.54   0.592    -.2245782    .3935544 
         UN_Sanctions |   .6076434   .3193054     1.90   0.057    -.0181836     1.23347 
     US_Relations_ind |    .435103   .0912305     4.77   0.000     .2562945    .6139115 
         Coup_Success |  -.0115199   .3992646    -0.03   0.977    -.7940641    .7710242 
            Coup_Fail |  -.2080776   .3119825    -0.67   0.505    -.8195521    .4033968 




  ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y |  -1.41e-06   1.89e-06    -0.75   0.455    -5.10e-06    2.29e-06 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /athrho |   .0728996   .1217905     0.60   0.549    -.1658054    .3116046 
             /lnsigma |  -3.514431   .0241849  -145.31   0.000    -3.561833   -3.467029 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  rho |   .0727707   .1211455                     -.1643025    .3018961 
                sigma |   .0297647   .0007199                      .0283868    .0312096 
               lambda |    .002166   .0036107                     -.0049109    .0092429 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     0.54   Prob > chi2 = 0.4606 
 
Rerun Heckman without CN_Firm_Est 2009-2014 FAIL 
 
. heckman Share_AllChnODA_max L.GDP_2013 L.Pop L.Oil_rent_gdp L.CN_FDIout_2013Y 
L.CN_exp_Mill2013Y L.CN_imp_Mill2013Y L.Life_exp L.GDP_cap_2013 L.UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M 
L.Polity2_use L.UN_pctwUS L.UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina L.ChinaMaritimeConflict 
L.ChinaBorderConflict USTreatyAlly USMilBase L.Total_viol_war L.USMil_Pers L.US_Sanctions 
UN_Sanctions L.US_Relations_ind L.Coup_Success L.Coup_Fail L.USAODA_M2013 L.ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y 
L.Share_AllChnODA_max if Year > 2008, select(GDP_2013 Pop Oil_rent_gdp CN_FDIout_2013Y 
CN_exp_Mill2013Y CN_imp_Mill2013Y Inf_Mort_rate GDP_cap_2013 UN_IdealPoints Humanitarian_M 
Polity2_use UN_pctwUS UN_pctwChina UNSC ASEANChr BorderChina ChinaMaritimeConflict 
ChinaBorderConflict Taiwan_Recog USTreatyAlly USMilBase Total_viol_war USMil_Pers US_Sanctions 
UN_Sanctions US_Relations_ind Coup_Success Coup_Fail USAODA_M2013 ODACom_JPTot_M2013Y, 
noconstant) first 
Dependent variable never censored because of selection:  
model would simplify to OLS regression 
r(498); 
 













APPENDIX 6: Supplemental case study -  Japan’s aid to China 
 
The evolution of Japan’s aid policy and the move towards more explicitly strategic 
foreign aid can be seen in the changes in Japan’s approach to aid for China.  Japan was the first 
country to provide ODA to China in 1979. During much of the 1980s and 90s, Japan was the 
largest provider of foreign aid to China.645 Figure 7-1 on page 420 shows Japan's ODA to China 
including ODA project loans, ODA project grants, and technical cooperation grants. Project 
loans and ODA grants pay for specific projects agreed to between the two governments. ODA 
loans tend to be used for economic infrastructure while ODA grants tend to be used for 
peacebuilding, human security, and grants to Japanese NGO projects. Technical cooperation 
grants pay for capacity building, conferences and working groups, dispatch of experts, training, 
and Japanese Oversees Cooperation Volunteers. 
 
There have been three major disruptions since the beginning of Japan's ODA program 
to China: 1) the suspension of ODA in 1989 in response to the Tiananmen incident, 2) the 
suspension of ODA grants in 1995 in response to China's nuclear testing, and 3) the 2005 
decision to phase out ODA loans to China altogether. The blue vertical lines in the following 
charts indicate these points.  
 
                                                 




Figure 7-1: Japan's ODA Commitments to China, 1979-2013 (Millions of JPY) 
Notes: Data are commitments rather than disbursements because commitments are more representative of policy 
choices. Horizontal blue lines represent Japan's key ODA policy events regarding China. Figures not adjusted for 
inflation. 
Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency 
 
Many scholars view Japan's ODA program as commercially oriented to benefit Japanese 
business and, in the case of China, to ensure China is integrated into regional and international 
institutions. A substantial amount of quantitative research on Japan's ODA has confirmed that 
it is commercially oriented. 646 Commercial orientation helps Japan justify its ODA to the 
public and ensure benefits accrue to Japanese taxpayers. As Japan’s Official Development 
Assistance White Paper 2012 states that ODA “will contribute to both assisting developing 
countries and stimulating the Japanese economy.” 647 
Contrary to the commercial view, Takamine Tsukasa648 makes the case that Japan’s aid 
to China was primarily to institutionally bind China to the global economic system. He argues 
                                                 
646 Peter J. Schraeder, Stephen W. Hook and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A comparison of 
American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics, No. 50 (January 1998), 294-323.  
647 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s International Cooperation: Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
White Paper 2012,” Tokyo: Government of Japan (2013), 24. 
648 Tsukasa Takamine, “The Political Economy of Japanese Foreign Aid: The Role of Yen Loan in China’s 




that this policy was meant to constrain China’s unilateral behavior and encourage more 
cooperative international relations. If these explanations (commercial orientation and 
institutional binding) explain Japan's ODA policy, the cutoff of yen loans is puzzling. Stopping 
ODA loans would seem to be at cross-purposes to both goals.  Key question: Why did Japan 
decide (2005) to eliminate ODA loans to China? 
 
Explanation 1: Japan reduced and eliminated ODA loans to China in order to pursue a 
policy of balancing against China’s rise. Many realist international relations scholars interpret 
the decision as the point where Japan finally started acting like a realist power. Realists expect 
Japan (and other regional powers) to balance against China's rise and to pursue policies that 
provide relative gains for Japan vis-à-vis China.649 Richard Samuels notes the tone of discourse 
in Japan during 2001 to 2003 regarded China as an economic threat, regionally uncooperative, 
and militarily dangerous.650 Some scholars (e.g. Michael Green) have called Japan’s overall 
policy “soft containment" or "reluctant realism".651 Japan may have phased out ODA lending 
to China because ODA was perceived to be harmful to Japan's security. 
 
Explanation 2: Japan eliminated ODA loans to China because they no longer served 
Japan's economic interests and/or to sanction behavior contrary to Japan's interests and provide 
incentives for China to be more cooperative in the future. This explanation is more consistent 
with commercial and institutional liberalism. 
 
                                                 
649 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Kindle 
Edition, 2013), loc. 5922 of 10916. 
650 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, Kindle Edition, 2011), loc. 3336 of 8578. 




Explanation 3: Japan eliminated ODA loans to China because of domestic politics. 
This is consistent with either explanation and could be interpreted as a condition variable that 
facilitated the cutoff of ODA loans. 
 
The evolution of Japan’s foreign aid policy can be discerned from its ODA policy 
responses and conditions during the China ODA controversies in 1989, 1995, and the 2000s. 
The different responses represent the evolution in Japanese leaders perceptions regarding China 
and the changing purpose of ODA. The competing hypotheses will be evaluated to determine 
if one can be supported over the others based on these three historical events. 
 
Subcase 1: Response to Tiananmen Incident (1989) 
On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government forcefully cracked down on democracy 
protesters in Tiananmen Square, killing a large number while arresting and imprisoning 
thousands of others. The Japanese people's reaction was severe (see Figure 7-2 on page 423). 
Japanese affinity for China dropped by nearly 20 percentage points and has been on a downward 
trajectory ever since. However, while a major drop, over 50% of Japanese still felt affinity for 
China immediately after the Tiananmen incident so it is unlikely that public pressure or 





Figure 7-2: Japanese Citizen's Reported Affinity for China, 1978-2013 
 
Source: Cabinet Office - 内閣府、外交に関する世論調査 - 2013 (see http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html 
Accessed 1/30/2017). 
 
Japan together with its G-7 partners at the economic summit in Paris on July 15, 1989 
announced a suspension in ODA and imposed other economic sanctions on China. Some 
scholars point to foreign pressure from the United States in particular as a key reason Japan was 
the only Asian country to sanction China after the incident.652 However, Japan was the most 
reluctant member of the G-7 to take punitive action against China. Japanese leaders felt that if 
China's integration into the global economy were derailed, it would be contrary to Japan's 
economic and political interests. 653  Japan announced that it would resume existing ODA 
projects on a selective basis on August 17, 1989 and resumed regular ODA to China on July 
                                                 
652 Akitoshi Miyashita, “Consensus or compliance: Gaiatsu, interests, and Japan’s foreign aid,” 40. 
653 Koji Murata, "Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China", in ed. Peng Er Lam, Japan's Relations 




11, 1990.654 Watanabe Shino argues that Japanese leaders believed it was more important to 
support continued economic reforms and China's opening to the world than to punish it.655 
Katada Saori notes that Japan resumed ODA to China unilaterally and China "appreciated" the 
move.656  
 
Katada also claims that business support for resumption of ODA was important for the 
Japanese government's decision-making (p. 46). While there was business support for 
continued ODA to China, Figure 7-3 on page 425 shows that in 1989 China's economy was a 
small fraction of Japan's. Figure 7-4 on page 425 also shows that foreign direct investment from 
Japan to China was very limited in 1989. The commercial potential for China may have been 
large, but the actual economic activity between China and Japan was small in 1989. In fact, 
Watanabe references Ishiwara Takashi (Chairman of the Keizai Douyuukai 経済同友会, a 
prominent pro-business lobbying group) as demanding that "the Japanese government take 
stronger measures against the Chinese authorities."657 It is doubtful that commercial pressure 
was dominant in Japan's reluctance to impose sanctions. 
 
                                                 
654 G. Hufbauer, J. Schott, K.A. Elliott, and B. Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (Washington 
DC: Petersen Institute for International Economics, 2008). See Chronology of Events at 
http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/china.cfm#chronology. 
655 Shino Watanabe, "Foreign Aid and Influence: Paradoxical Power Dynamics in Japan's Official Development 
Assistance to China," Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, January 2007. 
656 Saori Katada, "Why did Japan Suspend Foreign Aid to China? Japan's Foreign Aid Decision-making and 
Sources of Aid Sanction," Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2001), 45-46. 
657 “Head of Japan Economic Association promotes critical view of China,” (Japanese: 経済同友会の石原代表、中
国への日本政府の批判的見解を求める, Asahi Shimbun, 7 June 1989, referenced in Shino Watanabe, "Foreign 




Figure 7-3: Japan and China GDP, Trillions of USD 
 
Note: Blue lines represent key ODA events of 1989, 1995, and 2005. 
Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 7-4: Japan's Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1987-2013 (USD Millions) 
 
Note: Blue lines represent key ODA events of 1989, 1995, and 2005. 
Source: JETRO based on Ministry of Finance Balance of Payments Statistics and Bank of Japan foreign 
exchange rates. 
 
Further, there is little evidence that Japan was militarily concerned about China. The 
Cold War had just ended and there is no evidence that Japan was actively pursuing 
strengthening the United States Japan Security Alliance at the time. It was not until the Gulf 




Government did not revise its National Defense Program Outline until 1995.658 Japan was not 
acting like a "realist" power in 1989. 
 
In the Tiananmen case, Japan quickly resumed ODA because of concern that China's 
reform and opening up policy might be reversed if it were isolated from the international 
community. As Zhao Quansheng argues, Japanese leaders thought sanctions would strengthen 
hard-liners in China and heighten anti-Japanese nationalism. Japanese leaders believed that an 
isolated China would behave in ways contrary to its interests and be destabilizing for the 
region.659 Kesavan summarizes Japanese thinking towards China in 1989 as follows: "Japan 
attaches great importance to China's role…and believes that China, if diplomatically isolated, 
could become disruptive and combative."660Japan's policy in 1989 adhered most closely to the 
institutional binding hypothesis. Japan was acting consistent with institutional liberal 
predictions. 
 
Subcase 2: Response to nuclear tests 
On May 15, 1995, China conducted a nuclear weapons test. After the first test, Japan 
announced a reduction in grant aid to China. A second test was conducted in August 
1995. Japan quickly froze all grant aid to China ($75 million) aside from humanitarian 
assistance. China then conducted missile tests in Taiwan Straights in 1995 and 1996. These 
events mark a beginning of Japanese concern regarding China's military behavior and its 
potential to threaten Japan. 
 
                                                 
658 Michael J. Green, "Managing Chinese Power,”154-5. 
659 Quansheng Zhao, "Japan's Aid Diplomacy with China," 163-187. 
660 K.V. Kesavan, "Japan and the Tiananmen Square Incident: Aspects of the Bi-Lateral Relationship," Asian 




Unlike the 1989 case, no other state imposed meaningful sanctions on China for these 
tests. Masuda Masayuki argues that after the Cold War, Japan began to see ODA as a tool for 
imposing sanctions on undesirable behavior.661 In the nuclear test case, Japan intended to signal 
its displeasure with Chinese behavior and combined ODA sanctions with official protests to the 
Chinese government.662 Since Japan had protested the first nuclear test and warned China about 
further damage to the bilateral relationship, Japan needed to impose a consequence on further 
tests. Also, the policy of aid sanctioning was consistent with the 1992 ODA Charter663, which 
identifies development of weapons of mass destruction as a factor in aid decisions. China's 
ambassador to Japan Xu Dunxin reacted angrily to the move:  
…Japan's nuclear policy is "not persuasive," since Japan is under the nuclear 
umbrella while taking an antinuclear stance….Japan's decision to link political 
factors to its economic cooperation will hurt the Chinese people's feelings, and 
will "pour cold water" on Chinese-Japanese relations…664 
 
But why did Japan choose only to freeze grants and not the larger loan program? 
Compared to 1989, the commercial importance of ODA to China had increased. FDI was 
substantially higher as was the level of lending with China becoming (again) the largest single 
recipient of Japanese ODA and had become the 2nd largest trading partner after the United 
States.665 As shown in Figure 7-5 on page 428, China was considered the most promising 
destination for foreign investment according to a survey of Japanese companies.  
                                                 
661 Masayuki Masada, "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China", China Perspectives, Vol. 47 (May-June 
2003), 2. 
662 "Japan Announces Freeze on Grant Aid to China," Jiji Press English News Service, 30 August 1995. 
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Figure 7-5: Promising Countries for overseas Business in the Medium Term (3-years) 
 
Source: JBIC, Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies: Outlook 
for Foreign Direct Investment (25th Annual Survey), November 2013. 
 
Watanabe Shino documents that several business leaders supported the grant aid freeze 
but argued against freezing yen loans.666 It is impossible to say if business pressure was decisive, 
but suspending grant aid rather than yen loans served Japan's commercial interests. Japan's aid 
to China was substantial in 1995, but amounted to only about 0.2% of China's GDP. China's 
economy was large enough by 1995 that ODA from Japan was not economically significant 
and held largely symbolic and political meaning. For this reason, Japan could signal its 
displeasure with the Chinese nuclear tests without harming its business interests by freezing 
yen loans. Japanese leaders were also aware that China was set to join the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and was likely testing its nuclear weapons a last time before signing. 
Therefore, Japan could claim success for its policy when China signed the CTBT in September 
1996. There is no evidence that domestic politics was a significant factor in 1995 given the 
insignificant change in Japanese affinity for China. Overall, this case supports the view that 
                                                 




Japan acted in a manner consistent with institutional binding but more commercial orientation. 
Japan ODA policy towards China was still consistent with liberalism. 
 
Subcase 3: ODA loan phase-out 
Following several controversial incidents (e.g. Yasukuni Shrine visits, repeated Chinese 
encroachments into Japan's territorial waters) and deteriorating relations between Japan and 
China, Japan announced on April 17, 2005 that it would stop providing ODA yen loans to China 
by 2008. This event coincided with a sharp deterioration in Japanese people's feelings of affinity 
towards China and increasingly contentious rhetoric between governments. Zhang Qiyue, 
spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, reacted angrily stating that "irresponsible 
remarks" about ending ODA "would damage Sino-Japanese relations."667 
 
Economic difficulties in Japan have been reported as a domestic factor in the decision 
to end yen loans to China.668 However, ending of yen loans to China would be an ineffective 
means of helping Japan's budgetary predicament. From a budget perspective, ODA loans are 
reported net of repayments. Further, the issuance of a yen loan is also a government receivable 
so while it is a budgetary expenditure, it does not harm the government's balance sheet and 
China has never failed to repay on time. If Japan was trying to improve its improve its fiscal 
condition, cutting ODA grants would have been much more effective. That Japan continues to 
provide ODA technical cooperation grants to China indicates that financial difficulties most 
likely had little to do with the decision to cut ODA loan aid in 2005. 
 
                                                 
667 "China Official Raps ODA Remarks by Japanese Leaders," Jiji Press English News Service, 3 December 
2004. 




Does the conventional wisdom that Japan's ODA program serves primarily commercial 
interests explain the 2005 case? As seen in Figure 7-5 on page 428, China was considered by 
far the most promising country for Japanese business investment and was reaching a peak in 
the early 2000s. It did not lose its top ranking until 2013. FDI from Japan to China was also 
rising strongly throughout this period (Figure 7-4 on page 425). Given the increasing level of 
dependence of Japan on the Chinese economy, even if ODA was only modestly beneficial to 
Japanese companies, phasing out ODA loans antagonized the Chinese side. The Chinese 
government tends to penalize firms from countries with which it has disputes and the yen loan 
phase-out would have predictably had negative consequences for Japan's commercial interests. 
Japanese FDI in China declined in 2006 and 2007 before recovering later in the decade. The 
Japanese government appeared to ignore its commercial interests in the 2005 decision. 
 
Another argument is that yen loans were stopped to signal displeasure with China's 
behavior in the same manner as the 1995 grant freeze. However, when using a sanction to signal 
displeasure with a state’s behavior, there must be the possibility of resumption of the original 
policy. Otherwise the target state will have no incentive to change their behavior. Further, aid 
sanctions are generally imposed immediately rather than phased in over a period of years. The 
1989 and 1995 cases fit the aid sanctions model well, but the 2005 decision does not. Therefore, 
Japanese leaders most likely did not consider the phase-out of yen loans as an aid sanction or 
as an incentive for China to change its international behavior. Japan did not appear to be acting 
in a manner consistent with commercial or institutional liberalism in 2005. 
 
Sino-Japanese relations were on a downward trajectory from around 2003 so many 




Japanese leaders had been arguing for ending ODA loans to China as early as 1995.669 The 
reason commonly cited was to stop promoting China's prosperity at Japan's expense, a relative 
gains argument consistent with realism.670 Newspaper editorials frequently called for Japan to 
stop helping China who was claimed to be building up its military contrary to Japan's 1992 
ODA charter and providing aid to third countries.671 By 2003, editorials opposed ODA to China 
because it was becoming a military and economic "threat" to Japan.672 These debates preceded 
the sharp deterioration in relations in 2004 and 2005.  
 
Xu Xianfen argues673 that Japanese disillusionment with the effect of ODA on anti-
Japanese sentiment in China is to blame for the political pressure to end yen loans. He argues 
that Japan expected that the historical problems between Japan and China could be lessened if 
the Chinese people understood and felt gratitude for Japanese ODA and the failure of this to 
happen explains the 2005 decision. Xu's argument is not persuasive because the discourse on 
ending yen loans to China began years earlier. Most likely, domestic political factors 
contributed to the momentum behind the 2005 decision, but the perception of China as a rising 
military and economic threat to Japan was behind the Japanese leaders reticence about 
continued ODA to China. Japanese leaders674 had already decided that Japan's ODA to China 
was against its interests, driven by concerns about Japan's relative power vis-à-vis China.  
 
                                                 
669 Japan Forum on International Relations, The Future of China in the Context of Asian Security, (Tokyo,  
January 1995), 9, referenced in Reinhardt Drifte, "The ending of Japan's ODA loan programme to China,” 109. 
670 "Japan will not slash aid budget for East Asia; Ignoring calls at home to stop financing China's prosperity, 
Tokyo says it still regards the region as a 'priority area'," The Straights Times (Singapore), August 13, 2002.  
671 "ODA Getting the Review it Needs," Japan Economic Newswire (Translated from Daily Yomiuri), December 
12, 2000. 
672 "Should Japan Curtail ODA Spending?", The Daily Yomiuri, August 11, 2003. 
673 Xu Xianfen, The Diplomacy of Japan’s ODA to China: Profit, Power, and Values Dynamics (Tokyo: Regional 
Studies Series on Modern China, 2011), 236-9. 




If Japan were using ODA as part of a balancing strategy, we would expect a shift of 
ODA from China to states likely to balance against China. India and Vietnam, each with active 
border disputes and a history of military conflict with China, are the most likely candidates. 
Since 2006, Japan's ODA to India and Vietnam together has grown 15% annually while Japan's 
ODA to the rest of Asia combined (excluding China, Myanmar675 and Afghanistan676) grew 
only 5 percent. Figure 7-6 on page 433 shows the rapid rise of ODA to India and Vietnam 
beginning around 2002 and continuing to the present and coinciding with the slide in ODO to 
China.  
 
                                                 
675 Myanmar excluded due to confounding factor of 2012 opening resulting in massive increase in Japan's ODA in 
2013.  
676 Afghanistan excluded due to confounding factor of 2001-2014 US led war and recovery effort, which brought 




Figure 7-6: Trends in Japan's ODA to Asia, 1990-2013 (Millions of USD) 
 
Note: Other Asia excludes China (end of ODA loans), Myanmar (lifting sanctions) and Afghanistan (war) due to 
external cofounding factors. The spike in ODA seen in 2003 reflects large onetime increases to Indonesia and 
Pakistan. Arrows are trend lines for China (blue), India (red), Vietnam (turquoise), and Rest of Asia (green). 
Source: OECD DAC Database. 
 
 
Aside from 2003 where one-time spikes in ODA occurred for Indonesia and Pakistan, 
ODA to the rest of Asia has held relatively steady since the early 2000s. Overall, the picture is 
consistent with realist balancing behavior. 
 
Why did Japan decide to end yen loans to China? 
The most reasonable explanation for the 2005 ODA loan phase-out is to contain China's 
rise. Japanese leaders understood that ending yen loans to China would antagonize the Chinese 
government, hurt bilateral relations, reduce China's incentives to cooperate with Japan, and 





Through these three cases, the evolution of Japan's foreign policy approach to China 
becomes clearer. Business support for ODA has been consistently strong, but commercial 
considerations in ODA decline even as the commercial importance of China to Japan increases. 
Institutional binding is the most compelling rationale for Japan's behavior in 1989. The 1995 
case shows the beginning of Japan identifying China as a threat and using ODA as a means of 
signaling its displeasure but trying not to harm business ties, a blend of institutional and 
commercial liberalism. By the early 2000s, Japanese leaders became convinced that China's 
rising economic and military power was a threat to its interests. Ending ODA loans became the 
most obvious policy tool to begin implementing a containment and balancing strategy.  
 
The impact of the ODA phase-out in 2005 was probably counterproductive. Thomas 
Christensen argues that preventing a security dilemma from emerging with China is critical for 
continued peace in East Asia. 677  He proposes a reassurance and multilateral engagement 
strategy toward China. If Chinese leaders believe that Japan is working to prevent its rise while 
also taking a larger role in an expanding military alliance with the US, the likelihood of a 
security dilemma increases. Murata Koji argues "Japan-China cooperation is essential for 
regional stability…". 678  Cutting off yen loans removes whatever leverage Japan`s ODA 
provided and removes one incentive for China to participate in multilateral institutions where 
Japan is a key actor. Most of the impacts of the policy were negative. 
 
The 2005 decision is also unlikely to have much effect on China's rise due to the small 
scale of the assistance and large size of China's economy. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign 
                                                 
677 Thomas Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 49-80.  




Affairs (MOFA) had already begun responding to concerns that ODA was fueling China's rise 
at Japan's expense and began reorienting Japan's ODA to environmental, institutional capacity 
building, and projects in China's underdeveloped Western Provinces. This would have oriented 
ODA toward projects that more clearly benefit Japan, explicitly promote institutional binding, 
and promote development in areas of China far from the industrial centers in China's East that 
directly compete with Japan. 679  MOFA bureaucrats probably understood the negative 
consequences of stopping ODA loans altogether and sought to reorient loans to more clearly 
target areas that did not threaten Japan. In the end, political leaders overruled them. The result 
has been the continued slide in Sino-Japanese relations, reduced bi-lateral and multilateral 
cooperation, and less security in Asia. 
  
                                                 
679 David Arase, "Japanese ODA policy toward China: The new agenda," in ed. Peng Er Lam, Japan's Relations 








APPENDIX 7: AIDDATA.ORG METHODOLOGY FOR 
TRACKING CHINESE FINANCIAL FLOWS 
China’s ODA-like flows are identified using Aiddata.org’s methodology called 
Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF).680 The process begins with a media-based 
data collection (MDBC) effort through structured searches using Factiva to identify the broad 
universe of potential Chinese financed projects.  This first versions of Aiddata’s methodology 
explicitly labeled the methodology as MDBC approach.  Since those early efforts, the 
methodology has been extended from the media-based approach to augment and fact-check the 
data in ways that extend well beyond MBDC.   
 
The media-based data collection phase uses Factiva is the starting point.  The Factiva 
search is extended by searches of Chinese Embassy websites operated by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Economic and Commercial Counselor websites operated by the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce, and aid recipient government websites that often publish data on 
foreign aid projects.  The data set is also extended using case studies by affiliated scholars.  
During the research phase of this dissertation, I provided data collected from the Philippines 
case study to AidData.org, which have been incorporated into the final data set.  In addition, 
the Development Cooperation chapters of the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) project 
approval documents contain a listing of aid projects financed by other donors and often include 
Chinese aid financed projects among them.  I  mined ADBs approval documents for explicit 
references to Chinese financed aid projects and provided this information to AidData.org to 
                                                 




include in the Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 2000-2014, Version 1.0.681  ADB’s 
project documents were particularly useful for identifying Chinese financed projects in Central 
and South Asia where news reports may be sparse but where local ADB country offices keep 
track of Chinese financed aid projects in the sectors where the ADB also provides concessional 
financing.   
 
Aiddata uses a prescribed step-by-step methodology that is published in detail in the its 
report on tracking unreported financing flows.682 The data collection process contains three 
steps: project identification, source triangulation, and quality control.  The project identification 
step mines aid project reports from aid systems in recipient countries, Chinese embassy and 
economic and commercial counselor websites, IMF staff country reports, and targeted Factiva 
searches. Data triangulation is intended to bolster the level of detail and information regarding 
the projects identified during identification.  This is done though Google and Baidu searches 
and the new sources used to confirm the project and add details on the project.  During quality 
control, each record is reviewed individually by Aiddata senior project managers to ensure 
projects are not double counted, are logically consistent, and remove or correct any suspicious 
records.  Aiddata converts all project costs into constant 2014 USD to ensure local currency 
changes and revaluations are accounted for.683  During data set development, several advance 
draft datasets were circulated to scholars, including this author, for quality control about one 
year prior to the official public release of the China dataset. Researchers analyzed descriptive 
and summary statistics on the data to identify anomalies and questionable values, compared the 
                                                 
681 Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney, "Aid, China, and 
Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset," AidData Working Paper #46, Williamsburg, 
VA: AidData, 2017. 
682 Strange, et. al, (2017). 




results to official Chinese Government publications and other third-party estimates to identify 
significant differences to investigate further. Individual project records were carefully reviewed 
by Aiddata.org project team members to identify missing or anomalous entries.  The public 
release of the dataset was on 11 October 2017.684 
  
                                                 













The models are estimated using random effects generalized least squares (GLS) with 
robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. A lagged dependent variable is included 
as an explanatory variable for two reasons. First and most important is that there are good 
reasons to expect that ODA allocations have some degree of path dependency.  ODA 
commitments must be agreed by both the donor and the recipient and successful ODA projects 
in particular countries tend to make aid bureaucrats more comfortable preparing new projects.  
It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that past ODA commitments would have positive effect on 
commitments in the current period, all else being equal. The second benefit of a lagged 
dependent variable model is to correct for serial correlation. The models were estimated with 
and without the lagged dependent variable which confirmed that the signs and overall 
magnitude of the coefficients are consistent between both specifications.  Therefore, the 




While basically the same models and methods as used for Japan were used in the China 
aid commitment regressions, there are a number of differences and limitations do to 
idiosyncrasies in the China data set and overall aid program that required some adjustments.  




Dealing with data limitations. The approach with respect to China is necessarily 
somewhat different than the approach with the models of Japanese aid flows.  First, Japanese 
aid data is publicly available at the project level for over 50 years allowing the analysis of broad 
policy changes over long periods. Chinese project level data is only available for 2000-2014, a 
time when there does not appear to be major variations in China’s security situation and the 
level of China’s threat perception may not change much.  However, the analysis on threat 
perception indicates that China’s threat perception may have been lower around the worldwide 
financial crisis in 2008-2009. Therefore, I test whether China’s aid policy was driven by 
different explanatory variables during this time of lower perceived threat than before or after.  
It may also be the case that the nature of China’s threat perception changed from earlier in the 
2000s to more recent years after 2009 when China’s territorial disputes with Japan and various 
Southeast Asian countries became more intense.   
 
The models also need to account for the massive growth in China’s aid commitments 
over the analysis period.  In the case of Japan, there is also growth over time, but the magnitude 
of the increase is much less and therefore, less prone to distorting the results. The rapid growth 
of total foreign aid committed could explain year to year increases in aid allocations to specific 
countries and not the independent variables included in the model.  The most attractive way to 
deal with this problem is to use the percent of total aid committed in year i to country j.  This 
removes the effect of a growing program on the annual allocations to specific countries leaving 
only the effects of the independent variables on the propensity of the China to allocate its aid 
budget to a specific recipient.685   
                                                 
685 The analysis for the Japanese data presents both regressions on total aid commitments in JPY and on the 
share of all Japanese aid commitments to a country in a given year.  The results of these regressions are only 





Dealing with program idiosyncrasies.  China’s aid program is less established, less 
professionalized686 and varies much more year-to-year than the aid programs of DAC donors 
such as Japan – an issue particularly acute when using aid commitments as the DV.  Large 
commitments may be offered in one year and then implemented over a period of years and new 
commitments may not be offered until later years.  This pattern presents difficulties because 
the aid commitment data contains many zeros.  One approach to accounting for processes with 
multiple zeros is to use two-step models the best known of which is the Heckman Selection 
Model687 to correct for sample selection bias. These models are meant to estimate processes 
that have a two-step decision structure where an initial decision is made which defines the 
sample for a subsequent regression.  Heckman was considering a labor force model of wages 
and noted that the wage equation ignored everyone not in the labor force. To correct for this 
sample selection bias, he developed a two-step process where a binary choice is made to 
participate in the labor force resulting in the probability that each individual is employed.  Then 
the self-selection is corrected by incorporating these individual employment probabilities as an 
explanatory variable.  Such models have been used to analyze foreign aid allocations in Meernik 
et. al (1998)688 and Berthelemy (2006)689.  The problem when applying these types of models 
to foreign aid allocations is that the decision to give or withhold aid in a given year should be 
based on the variables included in the binary decision model.  However, in the case of China’s 
aid program, year to year volatility is primarily the result of China’s decision-making process 
                                                 
686 China established its first aid agency, the China International Development Cooperation Agency, or CIDCA, in 
April 2018. The agency is still in a formative stage as of this writing and aid implementation remains with 
MOFCOM. See Cornish, Lisa, “China's new aid agency: What we know,” Devex: Inside Development, The Rise of 
Chinese Aid, 20 April 2018 (accessed at https://www.devex.com/news/china-s-new-aid-agency-what-we-know-
92553 on 10 November 2018). 
687 James Heckman, “Sample selection bias as a specification error,” Econometrica, Vol. 47 (1979), 153-61. 
688 James Meernik, Erik L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe, “Testing Models of US Foreign Policy,” 63-85. 





for aid where there are no annual programs agreed with recipient governments and periodic 
blanket agreements that cover multiple years are common and may depend on state visits by 
Chinese leaders and the overall status of past aid projects. Therefore, the zeros in the data set 
are not likely to be caused by conditions that we can model.  Rather, the zero values just reflect 
the fact that China is not making ODA loans that often even in its most important aid recipient 
countries.  For example, note the aid pattern to Angola in Table 7-1 on page 444 below.  Over 
a period of 15 years, China provided grants in 11 of those years and loans in only 6 of those 
years.  In three of those years, Angola received neither grants nor loans from China.  It does not 
follow, however, that in for example 2004, Angola suddenly became less important to China 
commercially or strategically.  Quite the contrary, high levels of aid resumed a few years later 
suggesting Angola’s continued importance to China.  The periodic zero values are simply the 
result of an aid program that less systematic than most DAC donor programs, at least in the 
case of Angola.  This is not to say that two-step models are necessarily useless for modeling 
the aid decision-making process since certain variables, such as recognition of Taiwan, may 
influence China’s initial decision to offer aid in the first place. For this reason, I test the 
Heckman selection model approach as a supplementary exercise to determine if any useful 
results can be derived.  The results are reported in APPENDIX 5. 
 
Table 7-1: China ODA-like flows to Angola (2014 USD), Aiddata.org definition 
Year ODA-Like Grant ODA-Like Loan 
2000 $0 $0 
2001 $74,486,700.21 $0 
2002 $4,077,553.88 $327,725,552.35 
2003 $660,988.13 $24,236,231.27 
2004 $0 $0 
2005 $2,204,410.25 $11,984,691.71 
2006 $367,882.20 $0 
2007 $11,124,718.61 $379,214,930.88 




2009 $0 $0 
2010 $11,146,068.93 $0 
2011 $343,571.61 $0 
2012 $16,777,243.28 $0 
2013 $32,820,949.66 $0 
2014 $29,356,545.09 $54,900,000.00  
Source: Aiddata.org Global Official Finance Dataset, 2000-2014, Ver. 1.0. 
 
In addition to the Heckman approach, there are other approaches that may be used to 
deal with multiple zero values in the China dataset in this dissertation. The first is to define 
multiple cross-sections using averages over the years in the cross-section. This approach 
removes most zero observations unless China provided no aid during the entire time period.  
The problem with using the cross-section approach is that it cannot capture the information 
available in the year to year variations and China’s aid commitment responses to those serial 
changes.     
 
Lastly, the models can be estimated using statistical approaches developed to handle 
data sets with many zero observations. These models have been developed for use in applied 
econometrics of demand when purchases are infrequent.  Examples include long distance air 
travel, food purchases when consumption is from stored foodstuffs, and other large purchases 
made infrequently.  The choice of model to handle these zeros depends on the reason for the 
zeros.  In the case of foreign aid commitments, the problem is truncated data at zero. Truncated 
data is when the value of the variable of interest has a boundary value and the observations at 
the boundary are not missing data, but the true value. The selection of the appropriate estimation 




model690, double hurdle models such as Cragg’s691, and the aforementioned Heckman Selection 
Model.692  Recently, the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML)693 has gained favor for 
cases with heteroskedasticity (variance of a variable is not constant over time) which is the case 
in the aid commitment panel data.694  PPML was designed for the case of trade data where many 
bi-lateral trade observations happen to be zero especially in the case of small and/or distant 
countries.695 The aid relationship is not precisely analogous to the case of trade since it is quite 
likely that zero trade will be more consistent by country than the periodic zeros in aid 
commitment data. There have some studies that have shown that PPML estimators with large 
numbers of zero observations are less biased than other alternatives, at least in the case of trade 
data with heteroskedasticity.696 Some critics of the PPML approach have use simulation models 
to demonstrate that the Heckman Selection Model is preferred when the initial sample selection 
equation differs from the subsequent model.697 However, the assumptions of the Heckman 
Selection Model; namely, that the choice whether to give aid or to give no aid (the selection 
equation) is a function of the explanatory variables in a particular year, do not reflect the actual 
decisionmaking process resulting in zero aid.  In fact, the “lumpy” nature of China’s aid 
program is likely to result in confusing results since countries that receive zero aid in one year 
may have received a large package in a previous year and simply do not have the capacity to 
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receive more aid from China until the projects are complete.  Other zero observations may be 
the result of security or commercial factors that are a result of the explanatory variables.   
 
The Tobit model, developed to handle limited dependent variables where a selection by 
an agent reverts to zero, is not an appropriate approach because it assumes the reason for the 
zero is a corner solution.  A corner solution occurs when an agent maximizes their utility by 
choosing zero such as the case where a consumer decides to purchase nothing because the price 
is too high.698  This assumes that the main reason for not providing aid to a given country in a 
given year is due to budget constraints which is not likely the case for China or the aid giving 
of any country for that matter.  This restrictive assumption is the reason that two-step models 
like Craggs and the Heckman Selection Model were developed. 
 
The case of zeros in aid commitments from China most closely resemble infrequent 
purchase models (IPM) which attempt to model demand for goods that are not purchased 
annually.  The main problem with China’s aid commitment data is that their aid program is not 
based on an annual allocation but provided at different periods depending on a variety of factors 
which might include the importance of the country politically or economically, the performance 
of past projects, the relations between China and the recipient, or the ability of the recipient to 
take on more foreign debt. Further, prior aid projects may still be under implementation and the 
recipient country may simply be unable to absorb any more until the existing projects are 
complete.  Infrequent purchase models (IPM) have been developed but have not proven to be 
effective and generally result in systematic under prediction of the number of zeros and hence, 
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overprediction of the dependent variable.699 Recent work on IPM which compares results of the 
models to actual consumption of infrequently purchased foodstuffs shows that IPM results are 
highly biased.700  
 
There is no perfect solution for a situation like the China aid commitment data. The 
approach chosen for this dissertation is to follow a sequence of methods to derive results 
comparable to the analysis of the more consistent, extensive and high-quality data on Japan’s 
ODA program. By analyzing China’s aid program using the best available tools for the data 
that exists, the overall pattern of China’s aid behavior will become clearer even if each 
individual quantitative approach has drawbacks. First, I mirror the approach to the Japan 
analysis using standard panel regression techniques estimated by generalized least squares 
controlling for heteroskedasticity in different periods that can reasonably be expected to 
represent different levels of threat perception (2000-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010-2014).  Next, 
I construct cross sections for those periods and estimate the regression equations on the period 
averages to reduce the impact of multiple zeros in many years, but with a loss of the ability to 
capture information from year-to-year variations. The cross-section regressions are estimated 
using fractional probit is provided which is specifically tailored to variables that are limited to 
values between 0 and 1.  The models are then estimated using PPML.  The Heckman Selection 
Model approach is then tested because the selection equation could reasonably be constructed 
using different variables than the subsequent model; for example, using recognition of Taiwan 
as an explanatory variable in the selection equation but not the aid commitment equation.  For 
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all methods, the independent variables are lagged one year if the information from the previous 
year is the only information available to decisionmakers. At the outset, it is clear that the 
statistical results of the China models are unlikely to perform as well as the Japan models and 
it should be expected that goodness-of-fit measures such as R2 will be lower for the China 
models in the cases where such measures are produced.  All models are estimated in Stata 15.  
The PPML execution routines are Stata add-ons developed by Silva and Tenreyro (2015).701 
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